Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Maria Acosta, who sued six Miami-Dade officers involved in the arrest of her son, Maykel Barrera, who died after the encounter. Acosta alleged federal excessive-force claims and state wrongful-death claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, and Acosta appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to five of the six officers on Acosta’s excessive-force claims and to all of the officers on Acosta’s wrongful-death claims.The Court of Appeals found that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Acosta, the officers used excessive force when they tased and kicked Barrera while he was subdued, on the ground, and no longer resisting arrest, violating clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.Furthermore, the court vacated the summary judgment on Acosta’s wrongful-death claim, concluding that there was enough evidence for the case to go to trial. The court ruled that the district court erred in emphasizing Acosta’s lack of expert evidence directed to the cause of Barrera’s death since she did not have to present expert testimony to show causation. View "Acosta v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tyler Copeland, a transgender male, sued his employer, the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC), for workplace harassment. Copeland was a sergeant at a prison in Georgia and alleged that, after coming out as transgender at work, he endured constant and demeaning harassment from colleagues at various levels, despite repeated complaints to supervisors and HR personnel.He brought three claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The first was that his employer had created a hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GDOC, concluding that the harassment Copeland experienced was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. However, the appellate court disagreed and vacated the summary judgment on this claim.The second claim was that Copeland had been denied promotion due to his transgender status. The district court also granted summary judgment on this count, as Copeland failed to provide evidence that those who decided not to promote him were aware of his protected conduct. The appellate court affirmed this decision.The third claim was that GDOC had retaliated against Copeland for engaging in a protected practice, namely opposing sex discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment on this count as well, and the appellate court affirmed the decision, citing lack of evidence of causation.In summary, the appellate court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim but affirmed the summary judgments on the failure to promote and retaliation claims. The case was remanded for the district court to consider the fifth element of Copeland’s hostile work environment claim. View "Copeland v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) denial of a whistleblower award. The petitioner, John Meisel, reported his suspicions about his former tenant's involvement in a Ponzi scheme, which he read about in a newspaper, to the SEC. After the SEC's successful enforcement action against the scheme's perpetrators, Meisel applied for a whistleblower award. The SEC denied his application, reasoning that Meisel's information did not contribute to the enforcement action. Furthermore, his assistance to a court-appointed receiver, who was tasked with recovering funds related to the scheme, did not qualify him for an award as the receiver was not a representative of the Commission. Meisel appealed the denial, claiming it was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Meisel’s petition for review. The court held that the SEC's denial of the whistleblower award was neither arbitrary nor capricious, nor was it unsupported by substantial evidence. The court found that the SEC had not used Meisel’s information in its enforcement action, and therefore, his information did not lead to its success. The court also held that Meisel's assistance to the receiver did not qualify him for an award because the receiver was an independent court officer, not a representative of the SEC. Lastly, the court determined that Meisel could not qualify for an award in any related actions because he did not qualify for an award in the covered action. View "Meisel v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of sisters Tierzah, Charis, and Elisa Mapson in connection with a shooting incident. The victims were Joshua Thornton, the father of Tierzah's daughter, and his wife. The government charged the sisters with interstate domestic violence, interstate stalking, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. The jury found that the shooting was part of a scheme by the sisters to kill Mr. Thornton over a child custody dispute.In their appeal, the sisters argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Charis also challenged the admission of testimony that she once owned a firearm, claiming it was prejudicial hearsay. Elisa and Charis contested the admissibility of data obtained from automated license plate readers (ALPRs), arguing that its acquisition constituted a warrantless search in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeals found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. The court also rejected Charis's challenge to the hearsay evidence, ruling it was admissible as an admission by a party opponent. The court further concluded that the ALPR data was admissible because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, and its introduction did not require expert testimony. View "United States v. Mapson" on Justia Law

In a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant, Adam Joseph Owens, was arrested as part of a federal-state task force's investigation into a large drug ring. Owens was initially charged with multiple crimes but pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court imposed a 120-month prison sentence, double the 60-month recommendation by the Sentencing Guidelines. The court argued this upward variance was due to Owens planning to sell drugs while in jail awaiting sentencing and his involvement in the overdose death of one of his customers.Owens appealed against these findings. The appellate court, however, affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that the findings were not clearly erroneous. The court relied on the testimony of the warden of the detention center where Owens was held and a police sergeant who testified about the victim's death. It was found that Owens was involved in drug dealing in jail and was responsible for selling drugs that led to the victim's death. The court noted that the district court's factual findings at sentencing were not clearly erroneous and thus upheld Owens's sentence. View "United States v. Owens" on Justia Law

The case is about an appeal by Jayson Wright against his conviction for producing child pornography. Wright had pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography by a parent or legal guardian and one count of producing child pornography, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) and (e), and 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) respectively, and was sentenced to a total of 720-months’ imprisonment. Wright appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in taking his guilty plea on the § 2251(a) charge. He argued that there was not an adequate factual basis supporting his guilty plea and that the district court did not adequately explain the nature of his charge.Wright argued that the minor needed to have volitionally participated in the sexual act to sustain his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e). He contended that he was prejudiced and his conviction should be reversed because the district court did not mention a volitional requirement during the plea colloquy, and he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about what he contends is the volitional requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. The appellate court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) does not require the minor to volitionally participate in the sexual act. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error in taking Wright’s guilty plea without finding that the minor volitionally participated in the sexual act. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

The case in question involves a receiver, Burton Wiand, appointed after the collapse of a $78 million Ponzi scheme operated by Oasis, who sued ATC Brokers Ltd. (where Oasis held accounts), David Manoukian (owner of ATC Brokers), and Spotex LLC (which provided software to Oasis). Wiand alleged common-law tort claims against the defendants and fraudulent-transfer claims against ATC Brokers only. The district court dismissed Wiand’s complaint with prejudice, ruling that Wiand lacked standing to sue ATC Brokers and Manoukian and that Spotex was immune under the Communications Decency Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing the fraudulent-transfer claims for lack of standing. The court explained that a receiver for a Ponzi estate has standing to maintain fraudulent-transfer claims on behalf of the estate. However, the court agreed with the district court that Wiand lacked standing to maintain the tort claims, as the Oasis corporate entities were not separate and distinct from the Ponzi scheme, and Wiand couldn't allege an injury to sustain his tort claims.As a result, the court reversed the dismissal of the fraudulent-transfer claims and remanded for further proceedings, and vacated the dismissal with prejudice of the tort claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Wiand v. ATC Brokers Ltd." on Justia Law

Jesus Gabriel Navarro Guadarrama, a Mexican citizen, pursued a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision dismissing his appeal for adjustment of status and the subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider. Navarro Guadarrama contended that the Board used an incorrect legal standard in considering his application.Navarro Guadarrama entered the U.S. in 1995 and was later convicted of several crimes. His criminal record led to the initiation of removal proceedings against him. Navarro Guadarrama applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), which enables an alien illegally in the U.S. to seek relief from removal if they meet certain requirements. His application was denied by an Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board due to his criminal record and evidence of bad character.Navarro Guadarrama petitioned the court to review the Board's decision. He argued that the Board used the legal standard from a previous case, Matter of Mendez-Moralez, which applies to aliens requiring waivers, instead of Matter of Arai, which applies to those who don't require waivers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider Navarro Guadarrama’s petitions for review and that the Board did not apply the wrong legal standard. The court found that even if the Board cited the "wrong" case, there was no indication that, in substance, it applied the wrong standard. Therefore, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Guadarrama v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "United States v. Markovich" on Justia Law

Creditors obtained a $1.6 million default judgment against Rodney Dorand and sought to satisfy the judgment with funds from Dorand's individual retirement account, held by Morgan Stanley. An Alabama court approved the transfer of funds, but before the transfer occurred, Dorand filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, asserting that the retirement account was exempt property of his bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court agreed with Dorand. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision, stating that the Alabama judgment did not extinguish Dorand’s interest in his account before he filed his bankruptcy petition.Rodney Dorand had been sued by creditors for damages arising from a failed condominium development. After the state court issued a writ of garnishment to Morgan Stanley, Dorand argued that the retirement account was exempt from garnishment, but the state court rejected this argument. However, before the funds were transferred, Dorand filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court determined that the retirement account was Dorand’s exempt property and that the Alabama judgment against garnishee Morgan Stanley “does not affect the [retirement account’s] exempt status.”The Alabama judgment did not terminate all of Dorand's interests in his property. While the judgment had given Morgan Stanley a limited right to transfer Dorand’s funds, it had not exercised that right before Dorand filed for bankruptcy. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the retirement account was part of Dorand’s bankruptcy estate, as Dorand had an interest in the retirement account when he filed for bankruptcy. View "The Alabama Creditors v. Dorand" on Justia Law