Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A California-based company that produces lab-grown chicken sought to distribute and sell its product in Florida. After the company received federal approval from the USDA and FDA to market its lab-grown chicken, Florida enacted SB 1084, a law banning the manufacture, sale, and distribution of all lab-grown meat within the state. The company had previously held tasting events and developed business relationships in Florida but had no plans to manufacture its product there.Following the enactment of SB 1084, the company filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida against state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The company argued that the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) preempted Florida’s ban, claiming the state’s law imposed “additional or different” ingredient or facilities requirements in violation of the PPIA. The district court denied the company’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the company unlikely to succeed on its preemption claims because SB 1084 did not regulate the company’s ingredients, premises, facilities, or operations. The court also addressed standing and procedural questions, ultimately dismissing the preemption claims after the company amended its complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the filing of an amended complaint or the district court’s dismissal order rendered the appeal moot and whether the company could challenge the Florida law as preempted. The Eleventh Circuit held the appeal was not moot and that the company could bring a preemption action in equity. However, the court concluded the company was unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court held that Florida’s ban did not impose ingredient or facilities requirements preempted by the PPIA, as it simply banned the product’s sale and manufacture. Therefore, the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Upside Foods Inc v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Michael Nance, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state prison officials. He alleged that execution by lethal injection posed a substantial likelihood of severe pain due to his compromised veins, which he claimed would make it difficult or impossible for the execution team to establish intravenous access. Nance argued that extravasation of pentobarbital could cause intense, prolonged pain and asserted that execution by firing squad was a feasible, less painful alternative.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held a bench trial. Prior to trial, the court permitted the prison officials’ medical expert to examine Nance’s veins and allowed members of the execution team to testify anonymously and remotely, consistent with Georgia’s Secrecy Act. The parties submitted medical records and declarations, which showed that Nance had successfully undergone several recent medical procedures requiring intravenous access without noted complications. After trial, the district court found that Nance failed to prove a substantial likelihood of severe pain from lethal injection, based largely on his medical records, and entered judgment for the defendants. Nance later moved to alter or amend the judgment, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in its factual findings or evidentiary rulings, and concluded that Nance failed to prove the planned execution method posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the prison officials. View "Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dr. Lana Foster, a lifelong resident of Echols County, Georgia, was among the first Black students and later one of the first Black educators in the county’s school district. Over the years, she experienced various forms of racial discrimination, including being reassigned to a less desirable teaching position and being stripped of leadership duties, which led her to sue the school district. That lawsuit was settled in 2011, with the district agreeing to reinstate her role and pay damages. However, Foster alleged continued racial hostility, culminating in her termination in 2018. Subsequent investigations found no probable cause for her firing based on the cited ethical violations. Foster then filed complaints with state and federal agencies, resulting in another settlement in 2020 that required the district to revise its hiring practices and take additional steps to remedy discrimination.Foster later discovered, through an open records request, that the school district had not complied with the settlement's terms. She filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the district, the school board, and several school officials, alleging violations of her rights under federal and state law, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 for denial of her right to make and enforce contracts based on her race. The district court dismissed some claims but allowed others to proceed, including her § 1981 claim against the individual officials, and denied their motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. It held that the law was clearly established that government officials may not interfere with contractual rights because of race. The court concluded that uncertainty about possible personal liability under § 1981 does not entitle officials to qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision denying qualified immunity. View "Foster v. King" on Justia Law

A former employee brought a Title VII action against his previous employer, alleging that he suffered race-based harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination. After being fired in May 2022, he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on June 2, 2023, which required him to file a lawsuit within ninety days, by August 31, 2023. The plaintiff attempted to retain an attorney, paying consultation fees twice, but the attorney was unresponsive for several weeks. Only a few days before the filing deadline, the attorney declined representation and advised the plaintiff to file pro se. The plaintiff quickly prepared his complaint and, with two days remaining, paid for guaranteed overnight delivery via the U.S. Postal Service. Due to delays caused in part by Hurricane Idalia, the complaint arrived at the district court after the ninety-day deadline.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia dismissed the lawsuit as untimely, finding that the plaintiff had not met his burden to show timely filing within the statutory period. The court considered, but rejected, the plaintiff’s explanation for the late filing.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling because he pursued his rights diligently and extraordinary circumstances—specifically, the attorney’s delay and the effects of Hurricane Idalia—prevented timely filing. The court found no prejudice to the defendant from the brief delay. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the complaint should be deemed timely under the doctrine of equitable tolling. View "Beazer v. Richmond County Constructors, LLC" on Justia Law

Two men wearing masks and armed with guns entered a Miami convenience store and exchanged gunfire with the store clerk during a failed robbery attempt. The suspects fled the scene, and shortly afterwards, a Ford Explorer registered to Rodrick Maurice Hamilton crashed nearby. Blood and a cellphone belonging to Hamilton were found in the vehicle. Hamilton’s girlfriend testified that he directed her to falsely report the vehicle stolen, and he later told her he was leaving for Georgia. Investigators also discovered evidence linking Hamilton and co-conspirator Untarius Alexander to the robbery, including phone records, location data, and clothing matches from surveillance footage. Both men were indicted and prosecuted in federal court.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida conducted a jury trial, resulting in Hamilton’s conviction for conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery. The district court sentenced Hamilton to 170 months in prison, which included a twenty-month upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range. The government’s motion to dismiss a firearm charge was granted in light of United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022). Hamilton appealed his convictions and sentence, raising several challenges, including the propriety of a jury flight instruction, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the handling of a juror’s post-verdict statement, and the sentencing process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the flight instruction was proper, the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments did not violate Hamilton’s Fifth Amendment rights, and the district court acted within its discretion by denying a new trial and declining to investigate the juror’s post-verdict remarks under Rule 606(b). In addition, the appellate court found no procedural or substantive error in the upward departure at sentencing, as proper notice was given and the sentence was justified by Hamilton’s criminal history and the need for deterrence. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Between December 2007 and February 2008, the defendant and accomplices robbed seven Florida convenience stores and attempted to rob two others, occasionally stealing cash and cigarettes. In April 2009, a federal grand jury indicted him on twenty-two counts related to conspiracy, robbery, attempted robbery, and using or brandishing a firearm during crimes of violence. A jury convicted him on eighteen counts, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida sentenced him to 196 years in prison, primarily due to consecutive mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, United States v. Davis, and United States v. Taylor clarified the definition of “crime of violence” under § 924(c), the defendant filed petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Eleventh Circuit permitted a limited successive motion challenging only his § 924(c) conviction predicated on attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count Sixteen). The district court vacated that count and held a de novo resentencing, ultimately imposing a new 173-year sentence. The defendant argued for application of the more lenient sentencing provisions of the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) and sought to challenge his other § 924(c) convictions, but the district court declined both requests. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit originally affirmed.After the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v. United States, which held that defendants resentenced after the FSA’s enactment are eligible for its revised penalties, the Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the FSA applies retroactively to the defendant’s resentencing and vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing under the FSA. The court affirmed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider new challenges to other counts not authorized by the appellate court. View "United States v. Ragland" on Justia Law

Three individuals were involved in a conspiracy to rob a marijuana dealer at his home on the Big Cypress Seminole Indian Reservation. During the attempted robbery, a bystander was shot and killed, and the perpetrators fled without obtaining money or drugs. One of the defendants later discussed the crime with a third party, who reported the information to law enforcement and recorded a conversation, further implicating the participants. Additional evidence, including surveillance footage, cell site records, and ballistics, corroborated the involvement of the defendants.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida heard the case. One defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that because both he and the victim were enrolled members of Indian tribes and the offense occurred in Indian country, and since the charged crimes were not listed in the Major Crimes Act, the court lacked jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and denied the motion, allowing the prosecution to proceed. During trial, another defendant objected to the admission of prior convictions without an explicit balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect. The court admitted the evidence without making such a finding. The jury ultimately found the defendants guilty on various counts, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that federal courts possess jurisdiction over generally applicable federal crimes, such as Hobbs Act robbery, even when committed by an Indian against another Indian in Indian country. The court also found that the district court erred by not conducting an on-the-record balancing before admitting evidence of prior convictions, but deemed this error harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions of all three defendants were affirmed. View "USA v. Brice" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with possessing two firearms as a convicted felon and with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, following a shooting and possible abduction at a motel in Hialeah, Florida. Surveillance footage and subsequent police investigation linked the defendant to the incident via a work van registered to his business, J&M Electric, and to a residential property where evidence was found. The defendant, his girlfriend, and his stepfather Soriano were associated with the property. After a violent altercation, Soriano temporarily relocated but retained access and possessions at the residence. Police obtained Soriano’s consent to search the property, and later, a search warrant; they found firearms, ammunition, and a large quantity of methamphetamine, along with items indicating drug trafficking.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida conducted a jury trial, during which the government presented evidence, including surveillance videos, forensic analyses, and a YouTube video filmed at the defendant’s residence. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, but acquitted him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court dismissed one firearm count to avoid double jeopardy and sentenced the defendant to concurrent 96-month terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding Soriano had actual authority to consent to the search. The appellate court also upheld evidentiary rulings, denial of the Rule 29 motion for acquittal, rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim, and the application of the sentencing guidelines. The court held there was no cumulative error and affirmed both convictions and the sentence. View "United States v. Estadella" on Justia Law

A student with Down syndrome, C.B., attends school in the Henry County School District in Georgia. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the school district was required to develop an individualized education program (IEP) for C.B. After reviewing C.B.’s progress in fourth grade, the school district’s IEP team decided to move C.B. from an interrelated resource (IRR) class to a mild intellectual disability (MID) class for language arts and math. C.B.’s parents disagreed with this new placement, believing the IRR class was less restrictive and more appropriate. They also objected to the school district’s decision to place C.B. on an alternative assessment track, rather than the regular statewide assessment.Following the school district’s decision, C.B.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge conducted a five-day hearing and found that the school district had complied with IDEA in making the placement decision and that the Georgia Alternate Assessment was appropriate for C.B. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the administrative law judge’s findings regarding the placement, concluding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA did not apply to the choice between different types of special education classes. The district court also found C.B.’s claim regarding the alternative assessment moot, since C.B. was no longer required to take the alternative assessment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the placement in the MID class, holding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA does not apply to placement decisions among special education classes. However, the court reversed the district court’s mootness determination on the assessment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "C.B. v. Henry County School District" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a citizen of Sierra Leone and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in the District of Columbia in 2014 of attempted first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping. The factual basis for his conviction included both forceful digital penetration and forceful penile penetration. After serving his prison sentence, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically as “rape” or “an attempt to commit an aggravated felony,” and also as a crime of violence.In removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the petitioner admitted the factual allegations but disputed that his conviction was an aggravated felony, arguing that the D.C. statute criminalized digital penetration, which he claimed was not covered by the generic federal definition of rape. The Immigration Judge ordered removal, finding the conviction constituted attempted rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on its precedent that the generic definition of rape included digital penetration, and dismissed other removability grounds as unnecessary. The Board also denied the petitioner’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility, but remanded for further consideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture, directing the Immigration Judge to consider aggregate risks of torture. After additional hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the Board affirmed, declining to revisit removability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Board’s removability determination. It held that the generic federal definition of “rape” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) does not include digital penetration, joining other circuits. Consequently, the Board erred in concluding the petitioner’s conviction categorically matched the federal definition of rape. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on other removability grounds. View "Barrie v. Attorney General" on Justia Law