Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Tammie Terrell, an African-American nurse, applied for a Chief Nurse position at the James A. Haley Veterans’ Hospital but was not selected. She sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under Title VII, alleging race and national-origin discrimination, retaliation, and a discriminatory and retaliatory hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Terrell failed to provide evidence that her race or national origin was a but-for cause of her non-selection or that it tainted the hiring process. The court also found that Terrell did not engage in any protected Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity that could form the basis for a retaliation claim. Furthermore, the court found that Terrell did not provide evidence that she experienced a hostile work environment due to her race, national origin, or EEO activity.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Terrell's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, finding that Terrell was attempting to relitigate her case and present evidence that she could have raised at the summary-judgment stage. View "Terrell v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the death of Susan Teel, who was shot by Deputy Jonathan Lozada during a suicide attempt at her home. Dr. Dudley Teel, Susan's husband and the personal representative of her estate, sued Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff of Indian River County, alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but the decision was partially reversed and vacated in an earlier appeal. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment on the Monell claim, and the excessive force claim proceeded to trial. The jury found that Deputy Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Estate appealed the grant of summary judgment on the Monell claim, two of the district court’s jury instructions, and one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decisions on all issues. The Court held that the district court had wide discretion to modify the jury instructions to make them understandable for the jury. The Court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Deputy Lozada's prior misconduct. Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff on the Monell claim, as there was no underlying constitutional violation. View "Teel v. Lozada" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jeffrey Boone, was charged with using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing child pornography, distributing child pornography, and possessing child pornography. The minor in question was Boone's four-year-old daughter. Boone pleaded guilty to all three counts. The evidence against Boone included images and videos of his sexual abuse of his daughter, which he had shared via Kik Messenger. The FBI was alerted to Boone's activities by an online covert employee who had received the explicit images from Boone.Boone's case was heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The Presentence Investigation Report grouped Boone's three counts together and assigned a total offense level of 43, factoring in enhancements based on the victim's age and other offense characteristics. The report recommended a five-level increase due to Boone's pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct. Boone did not object to the report. The district court imposed an 840-month sentence, comprised of consecutive terms of 360 months on Count 1 and 240 months each on Counts 2 and 3, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.Boone appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that the district court erred at sentencing by applying a pattern-of-activity enhancement and considering his military service as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed Boone's sentence, finding no procedural or substantive error in the district court's decision. The court noted that Boone had invited the error he was alleging by expressly agreeing to the application of the pattern-of-activity enhancement. The court also found that the district court had acted within its discretion in considering Boone's military service as an aggravating factor. View "United States v. Boone" on Justia Law

The case involves Nihad Al Jaberi, who was convicted and sentenced for attempted smuggling, failure to notify a common carrier, and submitting false or misleading export information. Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing that there was insufficient evidence of his guilt, his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated due to the Government's failure to correct false witness testimony and prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.In February 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Al Jaberi for smuggling firearms from the United States, delivering firearms to a common carrier without giving written notice, and submitting false and misleading export information. The Government presented evidence that Al Jaberi admitted to shipping the firearms to Iraq without informing the common carrier of the firearms. The jury found Al Jaberi guilty on all counts.Al Jaberi appealed his convictions and sentences to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, his convictions and sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were violated because the Government failed to correct false witness testimony and made prejudicial statements, and his sentences were unreasonable.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Al Jaberi’s convictions and sentences. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Al Jaberi on all three charges. The court also found that Al Jaberi’s convictions did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, his due process rights were not violated, and his sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Al Jaberi" on Justia Law

In this case, Amber Jackson filed a lawsuit against Atlanta police officers Cody Swanger and Jeremiah Brandt, alleging that they violated her constitutional rights by unlawfully seizing her without reasonable suspicion or probable cause and using excessive force. She also claimed that Brandt failed to intervene in Swanger's use of excessive force. The officers moved to dismiss the case, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The officers then appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the officers' motion to dismiss Jackson's unlawful seizure claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Jackson had plausibly alleged that the officers violated her clearly established right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.However, the court found that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court's decision not to incorporate certain video footage into the pleadings. The court also declined to assert pendant appellate jurisdiction over that issue.As for Jackson's claim that Brandt failed to intervene in Swanger's use of excessive force, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of Brandt's motion to dismiss this claim. However, the court vacated and remanded this part of the case, instructing the district court to dismiss the claim. The court reasoned that Brandt did not have a reasonable opportunity to intervene physically or verbally and stop Swanger's use of alleged excessive force against Jackson. Therefore, Brandt did not violate Jackson's Fourth Amendment rights. View "Jackson v. Swanger" on Justia Law

The case involves a claimant, Isaac Flowers, who applied for Social Security Disability benefits due to various health issues including back, neck, shoulder, and joint problems, obesity, vision loss in one eye, and depression and opioid dependence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially denied his claim, deeming that he could perform "sedentary work". Later, Flowers applied for benefits again, and the ALJ denied his claim again, this time finding that he could perform "light work", a classification slightly more intensive than "sedentary work".Flowers appealed this decision, arguing that the ALJ's finding that he could perform "light work" wasn't supported by substantial evidence as there was no proof of his condition improving. He also suggested that the ALJ should have considered the previous finding of him only being able to perform "sedentary work".The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Flowers' argument. Firstly, the court found that Flowers hadn't raised this legal issue in the lower courts and they declined to consider it for the first time on appeal. Secondly, the court concluded that even if Flowers had raised the issue in the lower courts, any error would have been harmless because Flowers hadn't shown that he would be entitled to disability benefits even if he was limited to "sedentary work". Lastly, the court found that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the court affirmed the ALJ's decision. View "Flowers v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Victor Vargas, was convicted for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the 35-month delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the delay did not weigh heavily against the government.The court noted that the delay was broken down into three parts. The first ten months involved diligent efforts by the case agent to arrest Vargas. The second part was an eight-month period of inactivity due to the case agent being transferred to another position. The final period was a 16-month delay due to the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.The court found that none of these delays were intentional or in bad faith. It further pointed out that throughout this period, Vargas was living freely and was not restricted in any way. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the delay did not uniformly weigh heavily against the government. Consequently, the court held that Vargas must demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay, which he admitted he could not do. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision that Vargas's right to a speedy trial was not violated. View "USA v. Vargas" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida by Talal Qais Abdulmunem Al Zawawi, a citizen of Oman. Al Zawawi was seeking to overturn the bankruptcy court's decision that recognized foreign proceedings in a Chapter 15 bankruptcy case. The main question was whether 11 U.S.C. § 109(a), which limits the class of persons and entities that could constitute a “debtor,” applied to cases brought under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing the case, found that a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code indicated that § 109(a) did apply to Chapter 15 cases. However, the Court was bound by prior precedent that stated that Chapter 1’s debtor eligibility language did not apply to cases ancillary to a foreign proceeding.The Court found that the former § 304 and Chapter 15 had sufficiently similar purposes such that their decision in a previous case, In re Goerg, controlled their analysis in this case. Based on this reasoning, the Court held that debtor eligibility under Chapter 1 was not a prerequisite for the recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15. The Court therefore affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to recognize the foreign proceeding. View "Al Zawawi v. Diss" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by Quinton Handlon, a prisoner convicted of producing, coercing, and possessing child pornography. Handlon had requested compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because his elderly father needed a caregiver. The district court denied the request as Handlon failed to provide substantial evidence about his father's condition or proving that he was the only available caretaker. Handlon appealed this decision.The Appeals Court upheld the district court's decision, affirming that Handlon's case did not meet the extraordinary and compelling reasons necessary for compassionate release under the policy statement of the U.S. Sentencing Commission. At the time of Handlon's motion, the policy statement recognized four categories for compassionate release, none of which included the incapacitation of a parent when the defendant could serve as a caregiver.The court noted that a recent amendment to the policy statement now includes such a scenario, but clarified that it could not be applied retroactively in this appeal because it was a substantive amendment, not a clarifying one. The court affirmed the denial of Handlon's motion for compassionate release, but hinted that Handlon might be able to file a new motion for compassionate release under the updated policy. View "USA v. Handlon" on Justia Law

The case involves Haitham Yousef Alhindi, the defendant-appellant, who was charged with five counts of cyberstalking. Alhindi's counsel requested a competency evaluation, which was conducted by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau), albeit late. Based on limited information and caution, the Bureau's report deemed Alhindi incompetent. The court ordered Alhindi to be hospitalized for treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). However, before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bureau reported that he was not exhibiting any signs of mental illness and recommended a second competency evaluation, which the court ordered over Alhindi's objection. The second evaluation also concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. Alhindi appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to order a second competency evaluation and commitment for hospitalization.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 authorizes district courts to order multiple competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization when appropriate under the statute's terms. The court also found that the four-month limit in § 4241(d)(1) applies to the period of hospitalization, not the entire commitment period. The court emphasized the importance of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's entry of the commitment order. View "USA v. Haitham Alhindi" on Justia Law