Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Selina Anderson, a federal employee with a history of severe lung disease, broke her leg in a parking lot accident and subsequently died less than a week later following complications from surgery. Her official cause of death was a pulmonary embolism, but her autopsy noted that her longstanding interstitial lung disease contributed to her death. Anderson’s daughter, Brittany Finney, was the beneficiary of Anderson’s life insurance policy under the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLI), which included both standard and accidental death benefits.After Anderson’s death, Finney submitted claims for both types of benefits to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), the insurer. MetLife paid the standard life insurance benefit but denied the additional accidental death benefit. The denial was based on two grounds: that Anderson’s death was not “accidental” within the policy’s meaning, and that her death was “contributed to by” her pre-existing physical illness, thus falling under an exclusion in the policy. Finney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, arguing that the denial breached the insurance contract. Both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court ruled in favor of MetLife, finding that the denial was reasonable under the policy’s physical illness exclusion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eleventh Circuit held that MetLife’s decision to deny accidental death benefits was not arbitrary or capricious, as the policy clearly excluded coverage when a physical illness contributed to the insured’s death. The court concluded that Anderson’s pre-existing lung disease contributed to her death and that MetLife’s denial was reasonable under the terms of the insurance contract. View "Finney v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A former elementary school teacher employed by the U.S. Department of Defense at an American school in Germany was charged with multiple counts of aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact with children under twelve. The allegations concerned incidents occurring between 2006 and 2010, when the teacher allegedly molested four students during class and private reading sessions. The accusations surfaced years later, as the now-adult women recalled the abuse after encountering triggers such as documentaries or educational programs about sexual abuse. Several witnesses, including additional former students, teachers, and a dental assistant, testified to observations of the teacher’s inappropriate physical interactions with students.A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia indicted the defendant on several counts. Before trial, prosecutors sought to limit the scope of expert testimony proposed by the defense regarding the reliability of childhood memories. The district court allowed the defense expert to testify on general issues about memory and child abuse but excluded or limited testimony specifically addressing the credibility of the victims or the reliability of their memories in this case. A second defense expert’s testimony was excluded entirely as cumulative. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in restricting and excluding defense expert testimony. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court ruled that expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitnesses is generally inadmissible if it invades the jury’s role in assessing credibility, and that the excluded testimony was either cumulative or not helpful to the jury. The court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Zappey" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over discovery between two companies engaged in mining operations in Peru and a group of law firms representing Peruvian plaintiffs who allege injuries from toxic exposure. The companies, seeking to defend themselves against these claims and pursuing a related criminal complaint in Peru alleging document falsification and other misconduct by a former attorney, Victor Careaga, filed an ex parte application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the Southern District of Florida. They sought discovery from Careaga, who had worked for the law firms and played a key role in recruiting plaintiffs. The law firms intervened, seeking protective orders to prevent disclosure of certain documents, asserting attorney-client privilege and work product protection.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, where the underlying personal injury cases (Reid and Collins) were pending, had denied the companies' discovery requests as to the active plaintiffs. When the companies sought discovery in Florida, the Southern District of Florida granted the application, which led to the disputed subpoena. The law firms then moved for protective orders, but the magistrate judge and the district judge found that the privilege claims were insufficiently supported—citing vague, bundled privilege logs, lack of individualized document identification, and inadequate supporting affidavits. The district court denied the motions for protective orders.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Halpern law firm's appeal after the other intervenors voluntarily dismissed their appeals. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the protective order because Halpern failed to substantiate its privilege and work product claims with adequate evidence and document-specific explanations. The court also found that Halpern was not entitled to further process, such as in camera review or amendment of the privilege log, given these deficiencies. View "The Renco Group Inc. v. Napoli Shkolnik PLLC" on Justia Law

Several individuals orchestrated microcap securities fraud schemes by creating nineteen shell companies with no genuine business operations or assets, selling their securities at inflated prices once publicly tradable. Two firms, operated by Carl Dilley and Micah Eldred—Spartan Securities Group, Ltd. (a broker-dealer) and Island Capital Management (a transfer agent)—facilitated this process. Spartan submitted Form 211 applications to FINRA for each shell company, enabling public trading, while Island managed applications for Depository Trust Company (DTC) eligibility. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Dilley, Eldred, Spartan, and Island, alleging, among other claims, that they made false statements to obtain FINRA clearance and DTC eligibility, violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5(b).The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the defendants’ pretrial motions to exclude the SEC’s expert witness and for special jury interrogatories, and allowed the case to proceed to trial. The jury found all defendants liable on the count concerning false statements or omissions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b. The district court subsequently denied the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, and imposed remedies including injunctions against future violations, penny stock bars, civil penalties, and ordered Island to disgorge profits to the U.S. Treasury.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants challenged the admission of expert testimony, denial of judgment as a matter of law, and the remedies imposed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of material misrepresentations made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The court further held that the SEC was authorized to seek disgorgement to the Treasury and that the remedies, including civil penalties, were timely and equitable. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spartan Securities Group, LTD" on Justia Law

Several individuals who reside in DeKalb County, Georgia, outside the city limits of Atlanta, opposed the construction of a new public safety training facility on city-owned land and wished to collect signatures for a referendum petition to repeal the city ordinance authorizing the lease for the facility. Atlanta’s municipal code required that signature gatherers for such petitions be residents of the City of Atlanta. Because they did not meet this residency requirement, the plaintiffs filed suit against the City, arguing that the restriction violated their First Amendment rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the residency requirement, as well as other relief connected to the signature collection process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Atlanta from enforcing the residency requirement for signature gatherers. The court also ordered the City to issue new petitions without the residency restriction and restarted the 60-day signature collection period, while counting previously collected signatures. The City appealed the injunction and obtained a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm sufficient for injunctive relief. The court specified that, under Kemp v. City of Claxton, 496 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 1998), Georgia law does not allow the use of a referendum petition to challenge or repeal a city ordinance unless it amends the city charter. Because the plaintiffs could not lawfully utilize the referendum process for their intended purpose, they lacked a right to the process and consequently could not show irreparable injury. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Baker v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper. View "Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of individuals, including the appellant, participated in a scheme involving the use of stolen credit cards and fraudulent memberships at a warehouse store to purchase large quantities of cigarettes. The appellant served as the primary account holder for two business membership accounts and was a secondary member on two others. The scheme resulted in over $2 million in cigarette purchases. Following an 85-count indictment, the appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, several counts of credit card fraud, and aggravated identity theft. After his codefendants pleaded guilty, the appellant proceeded to trial. During the trial, the government presented testimony from victims whose credit cards were used without authorization. The district court granted the appellant’s motion for acquittal on certain counts due to insufficient evidence, and the jury acquitted him on others, but found him guilty of the remaining charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia sentenced the appellant, holding him accountable for the total loss amount charged by all members of the conspiracy using the shared credit cards. This figure was calculated in the presentence report and included losses attributable to the codefendants, except for those counts where the appellant was acquitted. The appellant objected, arguing that he should only be held responsible for transactions he personally conducted, but the district court overruled his objection and imposed restitution matching the total loss amount.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court committed legal error by failing to make individualized findings regarding the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the appellant, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court vacated the appellant’s sentence and restitution order, remanding for resentencing with instructions to determine the loss amount based on the appellant’s own conduct and correct a clerical error in the judgment. View "USA v. Barry" on Justia Law

A.B., a minor, was sexually exploited by her mother and David Barrow when she was ten years old. In February 2018, A.B. filed a lawsuit against Barrow in Alabama state court for invasion of privacy. After a bench trial in April 2022, the court found in favor of A.B., awarding her $4 million in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. During related litigation, A.B.’s attorney learned that Barrow was likely insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, and in November 2018, served a subpoena on Nationwide, which produced Barrow’s umbrella liability insurance policy covering invasion of privacy claims.Nationwide removed the subsequent coverage action filed by A.B. under Alabama’s Direct Action Statute to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The district court granted summary judgment for Nationwide, holding that neither Barrow nor A.B. notified Nationwide of the potential duty to indemnify “as soon as reasonably possible,” as required by the policy. The district court emphasized the 58-month delay between Barrow’s conduct and Nationwide receiving notice, and found that no reasonable excuse for the delay was offered by Barrow.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, under Alabama law and the terms of the policy, notice may be provided by the insured or someone on the insured’s behalf, including the injured party. However, the timeliness of notice is judged from the insured’s perspective. Because Barrow did not give notice to Nationwide within a reasonable time and offered no excuse for the delay, coverage was barred. The court rejected arguments that notice by A.B. could reset the timing requirement and concluded that summary judgment for Nationwide was proper. View "A. B. v. Barrow" on Justia Law

Corpay, Inc., a publicly traded company based in Atlanta, Georgia, markets fuel credit cards to businesses, primarily small and medium-sized enterprises. The cards were advertised to offer per-gallon fuel savings, “fuel only” purchase restrictions, and no transaction fees. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought suit alleging that Corpay’s advertisements were misleading and its billing practices unfair. The FTC presented evidence that customers received significantly lower discounts than advertised, that “fuel only” cards were frequently used for non-fuel purchases, and that transaction fees were charged despite claims to the contrary. Additionally, Corpay was found to have automatically enrolled customers in various add-on programs and fees, often without clear disclosure or express consent, and assessed late fees even when customers paid on time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed these claims. It granted summary judgment for the FTC on all five counts, holding that Corpay’s advertisements and fee practices were deceptive and unfair under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The court also found Corpay’s CEO, Ronald Clarke, personally liable due to his authority and knowledge of the company’s practices. To address ongoing and potential future violations, the district court issued a permanent injunction, requiring clear and unavoidable fee disclosures and separate customer assent for each fee charged.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment and permanent injunction against Corpay on all counts. It also affirmed summary judgment against Clarke on four counts but vacated the judgment on the “fuel only” advertising count, remanding for further proceedings on that issue. The appellate court held that the injunction’s requirements for express informed consent and prominent disclosure were within the district court’s equitable authority. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Federal Trade Commission v. FleetCor Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Three men, including the defendant, agreed to steal marijuana from a known individual at his apartment. On the day of the incident, the defendant and one accomplice entered the apartment, while the third remained in the car. The accomplice took the marijuana and left the apartment without the defendant’s knowledge. When the apartment’s occupants realized the theft, they told the defendant he could not leave until the accomplice returned. The defendant, feeling threatened, subsequently used deadly force against two men several minutes after the marijuana had already been taken. The three men later regrouped, and the defendant admitted to the shootings.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida indicted the defendant for conspiracy to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act (Count 1), substantive Hobbs Act robbery (Count 2), and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence resulting in murder (Count 3). At trial, the defendant argued that force was not used to effectuate the taking, asserting that the theft was complete when the marijuana was taken, and that the subsequent use of force did not constitute robbery under the Hobbs Act. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and the jury convicted him on all counts. The court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms, including life for Count 3.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under the Hobbs Act, robbery requires that force or threatened force be used before or during the taking of property—not solely after the property has been surreptitiously taken and carried away. Because the defendant used force only after the marijuana was stolen, the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and for using a firearm in relation to that robbery (Counts 2 and 3) were reversed for insufficient evidence, and the sentences for those counts were vacated. The conviction and sentence for conspiracy (Count 1) were affirmed. The case was remanded for correction of the judgment. View "United States v. Grable" on Justia Law