Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bidi Vapor LLC filed a premarket tobacco product application (PMTA) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2020 for its tobacco-flavored electronic nicotine delivery system (ENDS) product, the Bidi Stick – Classic. The FDA identified several deficiencies in the application, and despite Bidi Vapor submitting supplemental information, the FDA found the evidence insufficient. On January 22, 2024, the FDA issued a Marketing Denial Order (MDO) based on three independent grounds: high abuse liability of the product, incomplete study on leachable compounds, and lack of adequate comparison data on harmful constituents. This order prevented Bidi Vapor from marketing the Bidi Classic.Bidi Vapor appealed the FDA’s decision, arguing that the FDA violated the Tobacco Control Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The company contended that the FDA failed to conduct a balanced analysis of the product’s benefits and deficiencies, imposed product standards without proper rulemaking, and did not conduct a second cycle of toxicological review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FDA’s decision was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The court found that the FDA had appropriately considered the relevant data and provided a satisfactory explanation for its actions, particularly regarding the high abuse liability of the Bidi Classic. The court noted that this deficiency alone was sufficient to support the MDO, and therefore did not address the other two grounds. The court denied Bidi Vapor’s petition for review, upholding the FDA’s Marketing Denial Order. View "Bidi Vapor LLC v. Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Bruce Henry, who pled guilty to possessing child pornography in 2013, challenged Alabama Code § 15-20A-11(d)(4), which prohibits adult sex offenders convicted of a sex offense involving a child from residing or conducting overnight visits with a minor, including their own child. Henry, who has completed his prison term, married, and fathered a son, argued that the statute violated his First Amendment right of intimate association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Henry’s motion for a preliminary injunction but later partially granted his motion for summary judgment, finding the statute facially unconstitutional. The district court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to further Alabama’s compelling interest in protecting children and issued an injunction against its enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the statute violated Henry’s fundamental right to live with his child. The court held that the statute was overinclusive, underinclusive, and not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal. However, the court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in facially enjoining the statute, as Henry had not shown that it was unconstitutional in all its applications. The court vacated the district court’s injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Henry v. Sheriff of Tuscaloosa County" on Justia Law

Several adult-entertainment establishments and individual dancers in Jacksonville, Florida, challenged a city ordinance that effectively prohibits erotic dancers under the age of 21 from performing in adult-entertainment venues. The ordinance also requires dancers aged 21 and older to obtain a Work Identification Card through a licensing process. The plaintiffs argued that the age restriction and the licensing scheme violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida upheld both the age restriction and the licensing scheme. The court concluded that the age restriction is a content-neutral regulation aimed at reducing human trafficking and other criminal activities associated with adult-entertainment establishments. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found that the restriction furthered a substantial government interest and was appropriately tailored. The court also held that the licensing scheme did not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint, as it provided sufficient procedural protections, including a 14-day period for the sheriff to approve or deny applications and the ability for applicants to continue dancing while their applications were pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ordinance's age restriction must be treated as a content-neutral regulation of expressive activity and is thus subject to intermediate scrutiny, which it survives. The court found that the restriction furthers the city's substantial interest in combatting human trafficking and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Additionally, the court concluded that the licensing scheme includes sufficient procedural safeguards to avoid being an unconstitutional prior restraint, as it requires the sheriff to make licensing decisions within a reasonable time and allows dancers to continue performing while their applications are under review. View "Wacko's Too, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville" on Justia Law

The case involves a shooting incident at the Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc. (the "Lodge") on March 2, 2015, where Tanya Oliver was shot in the forehead and later died from her injuries. The Lodge was insured by Kinsale Insurance Company ("Kinsale"), which had a $50,000 policy sublimit for claims arising out of assault and battery. The Estate of Tanya Oliver sued the Lodge for negligent security, and a jury awarded damages exceeding $3.348 million.The Lodge and the Estate then sued Kinsale for common law bad faith under Florida law, claiming Kinsale breached its duty of good faith by failing to make a settlement offer within the policy limits before the Estate’s claim was filed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to Kinsale, concluding that Kinsale had no duty to initiate settlement negotiations because no reasonable jury could find that this was a case of "clear liability."The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Lodge and the Estate, a jury could reasonably find that Kinsale knew or should have known that liability was clear. The court noted that the Lodge's security guards had failed to prevent a second fight in the parking lot, which led to the shooting, and that Kinsale was aware of the severity of Oliver's injuries and the potential for damages far exceeding the policy limit.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial by jury, holding that a jury could reasonably find that Kinsale acted in bad faith by failing to tender its policy limit before the Estate filed suit. View "Kinsale Insurance Company v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc." on Justia Law

On Thanksgiving night in 2018, Officer David Alexander, a policeman with the City of Hoover, was on foot patrol at the Galleria Mall in Birmingham, Alabama. During a suspected active shooting situation, Officer Alexander saw Emantic "E.J." Fitzgerald Bradford moving towards two men with a gun in his hand. Without issuing a verbal warning, Officer Alexander shot and killed Mr. Bradford, who was legally authorized to carry his gun and was attempting to provide assistance.April Pipkins, Mr. Bradford's mother and representative of his estate, filed a lawsuit against Officer Alexander, the City of Hoover, and other defendants, asserting Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for negligence and wantonness. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the state law claims and granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, ruling that Officer Alexander's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that a verbal warning was not feasible under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Officer Alexander acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances, which included a crowded mall, the sound of gunshots, and Mr. Bradford running with a gun towards two men. The court also found that a verbal warning was not feasible due to the immediate threat perceived by Officer Alexander. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the state law claims, concluding that the Mall defendants did not owe a duty to protect Mr. Bradford from the criminal acts of a third party and that the complaint did not plausibly allege foreseeability or incompetency in hiring, training, and supervising Officer Alexander. View "Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama" on Justia Law

Jaime Vargas and Francis R. Alvarez, former employees of medical supplier Lincare, Inc., and its subsidiary Optigen, Inc., filed a qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act (FCA). They alleged that Optigen engaged in fraudulent practices, including systematic upcoding of durable medical equipment, improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and shipment of unordered supplies. The relators claimed that Optigen billed CPAP batteries and accessories under codes designated for ventilator accessories, waived patient co-pays without assessing financial hardship, shipped CPAP supplies automatically without patient requests, and paid kickbacks to healthcare providers for referrals.The case was initially filed in the Eastern District of Virginia and later transferred to the Middle District of Florida. The United States declined to intervene, and the District Court unsealed the complaint. The relators filed multiple amended complaints, each of which was dismissed by the District Court for failing to meet the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The District Court dismissed the fourth amended complaint, holding that it still failed to plead sufficient facts with the requisite specificity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the relators' claims regarding improper kickback arrangements, waiver of co-pays, and automatic shipment of supplies, finding that these allegations lacked the necessary specificity and failed to identify any actual false claims submitted to the government. However, the court reversed the dismissal of the upcoding claim, holding that the relators had pleaded sufficient facts with particularity to withstand a motion to dismiss. The court remanded the case for further proceedings limited to the upcoding issue. View "Vargas v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

A class of incarcerated juvenile offenders in Florida, all sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole under a now-defunct sentencing scheme, sued the Commissioners of the Florida Commission on Offender Review. They claimed that the parole system violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights. The plaintiffs argued that the parole system did not provide a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment to the Commissioners, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that Florida's parole system did not violate the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Florida's parole system does not violate the Eighth Amendment for either homicide or non-homicide juvenile offenders. For homicide offenders, the system is not a sham and provides a genuine possibility of parole, satisfying the requirements set forth in Miller v. Alabama. For non-homicide offenders, the system offers a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, as required by Graham v. Florida.Regarding the due process claim, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole under either state law or the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, their procedural due process claim failed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Commissioners. View "Howard v. Coonrod" on Justia Law

In 1996, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act to allow U.S. nationals to seek compensation for property confiscated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Odette Blanco de Fernandez and her siblings' heirs and estates alleged that Seaboard Marine trafficked in property confiscated from their family’s companies, Azucarera Mariel, S.A. and Maritima Mariel, S.A., by shipping goods to a container terminal on the west side of Mariel Bay. The district court granted summary judgment for Seaboard, concluding that Fernandez failed to present evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated land.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims of Fernandez’s siblings' heirs and estates, ruling they could not bring a claim under the Act because the siblings died after the statutory bar date of March 12, 1996. However, the court allowed Fernandez’s claims to proceed. The district court later granted summary judgment for Seaboard, holding that Fernandez did not provide sufficient evidence that Seaboard trafficked in confiscated property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the siblings' heirs and estates' claims, citing the statutory bar date. The court also affirmed the summary judgment regarding Maritima’s 1955 concession, agreeing that it did not grant exclusive rights to exploit the entirety of Mariel Bay. However, the court reversed the summary judgment concerning Azucarera’s confiscated land, finding that Fernandez presented sufficient evidence that Seaboard’s commercial activities benefited from the confiscated property. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Seaboard benefited from the confiscated land by using the terminal built on it. The case was affirmed in part and reversed in part, allowing Fernandez’s claim regarding Azucarera’s land to proceed. View "De Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd." on Justia Law

Christin Bilotti was convicted of second-degree murder in Florida state court. After exhausting her appeals, she sought postconviction relief in Florida, which was denied. Bilotti then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court also rejected. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on two claims from Bilotti’s federal habeas petition: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to preserve a religion-based challenge to a juror strike and for failing to object to jury instructions.The Florida intermediate appellate court initially reversed Bilotti’s conviction, citing a similar case involving her co-defendant, John Pacchiana, where the court found the state’s peremptory strike of a juror pretextual and improper. However, the Florida Supreme Court quashed this decision, ruling that the religion-based objection was not properly preserved at trial. On remand, the intermediate appellate court affirmed Bilotti’s conviction.In state postconviction proceedings, Bilotti argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for not preserving the religion-based Batson challenge and for not objecting to the jury instructions. The state postconviction court denied her claims, adopting the state’s arguments, and the appellate court affirmed without explanation.The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that even if Bilotti could show prejudice from her counsel’s failure to preserve the religion-based objection, she could not establish deficient performance. At the time of her trial, the law was unsettled on whether Batson extended to religion-based exclusions. The court also found that the jury instructions were substantively identical to Florida’s standard instructions, which had not been invalidated by the Florida Supreme Court. Therefore, counsel’s failure to object to these instructions was not deficient performance, nor was it prejudicial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, denying Bilotti’s habeas petition. View "Bilotti v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Several college volleyball players accused their coach of physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse. The players alleged that the coach engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and abuse, including inappropriate touching and forcing players to engage in uncomfortable physical interactions. They also claimed that the coach's misconduct was reported to various university administrators and assistant coaches, who either witnessed or were informed of the abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that the players had abandoned their breach-of-contract claims and dismissed those with prejudice. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the players failed to state a Title IX claim because only certain university administrators were "appropriate persons" to receive notice of the misconduct, and the players did not provide sufficient actual notice of sexual harassment to those individuals. The court also found that the university did not act with deliberate indifference upon receiving the notice.Regarding the § 1983 claims, the court held that the players did not show that the university employees' conduct violated clearly established substantive-due-process principles. The court concluded that the employees were entitled to qualified immunity because the players did not provide case law with indistinguishable facts, a broad statement of principle, or conduct so egregious that it clearly violated constitutional rights.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims. View "DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law