Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with possessing two firearms as a convicted felon and with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, following a shooting and possible abduction at a motel in Hialeah, Florida. Surveillance footage and subsequent police investigation linked the defendant to the incident via a work van registered to his business, J&M Electric, and to a residential property where evidence was found. The defendant, his girlfriend, and his stepfather Soriano were associated with the property. After a violent altercation, Soriano temporarily relocated but retained access and possessions at the residence. Police obtained Soriano’s consent to search the property, and later, a search warrant; they found firearms, ammunition, and a large quantity of methamphetamine, along with items indicating drug trafficking.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida conducted a jury trial, during which the government presented evidence, including surveillance videos, forensic analyses, and a YouTube video filmed at the defendant’s residence. The jury convicted the defendant on two counts: felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, but acquitted him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court dismissed one firearm count to avoid double jeopardy and sentenced the defendant to concurrent 96-month terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, finding Soriano had actual authority to consent to the search. The appellate court also upheld evidentiary rulings, denial of the Rule 29 motion for acquittal, rejection of the prosecutorial misconduct claim, and the application of the sentencing guidelines. The court held there was no cumulative error and affirmed both convictions and the sentence. View "United States v. Estadella" on Justia Law

A student with Down syndrome, C.B., attends school in the Henry County School District in Georgia. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the school district was required to develop an individualized education program (IEP) for C.B. After reviewing C.B.’s progress in fourth grade, the school district’s IEP team decided to move C.B. from an interrelated resource (IRR) class to a mild intellectual disability (MID) class for language arts and math. C.B.’s parents disagreed with this new placement, believing the IRR class was less restrictive and more appropriate. They also objected to the school district’s decision to place C.B. on an alternative assessment track, rather than the regular statewide assessment.Following the school district’s decision, C.B.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the Georgia Office of State Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge conducted a five-day hearing and found that the school district had complied with IDEA in making the placement decision and that the Georgia Alternate Assessment was appropriate for C.B. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia affirmed the administrative law judge’s findings regarding the placement, concluding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA did not apply to the choice between different types of special education classes. The district court also found C.B.’s claim regarding the alternative assessment moot, since C.B. was no longer required to take the alternative assessment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision regarding the placement in the MID class, holding that the least restrictive environment requirement under IDEA does not apply to placement decisions among special education classes. However, the court reversed the district court’s mootness determination on the assessment claim and remanded the case for further proceedings on that issue. View "C.B. v. Henry County School District" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a citizen of Sierra Leone and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in the District of Columbia in 2014 of attempted first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping. The factual basis for his conviction included both forceful digital penetration and forceful penile penetration. After serving his prison sentence, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically as “rape” or “an attempt to commit an aggravated felony,” and also as a crime of violence.In removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the petitioner admitted the factual allegations but disputed that his conviction was an aggravated felony, arguing that the D.C. statute criminalized digital penetration, which he claimed was not covered by the generic federal definition of rape. The Immigration Judge ordered removal, finding the conviction constituted attempted rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on its precedent that the generic definition of rape included digital penetration, and dismissed other removability grounds as unnecessary. The Board also denied the petitioner’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility, but remanded for further consideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture, directing the Immigration Judge to consider aggregate risks of torture. After additional hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the Board affirmed, declining to revisit removability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Board’s removability determination. It held that the generic federal definition of “rape” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) does not include digital penetration, joining other circuits. Consequently, the Board erred in concluding the petitioner’s conviction categorically matched the federal definition of rape. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on other removability grounds. View "Barrie v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Javier Hernandez was a participant in a transnational criminal operation that smuggled Cuban migrants into Mexico for eventual entry into the United States. His primary role involved stealing boats from Southwest Florida, which he delivered to co-conspirators in Mexico. These vessels were used to transport migrants from Cuba or were sold to support the smuggling enterprise, including bribing law enforcement. Hernandez also transported stolen vehicles to Mexico for similar purposes. He was compensated for each delivery and admitted to earning substantial profits from these activities.Federal authorities identified Hernandez through investigative techniques including cell-site location tracking and the recovery of his cell phone, which had been seized by Mexican authorities. The government obtained and executed a warrant to search his phone, extracting relevant data. After initial technical difficulties, a second extraction was performed after the warrant’s nominal expiration date but while the phone was still in government custody. Hernandez was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on five counts, including conspiracy to encourage unlawful entry, transportation of stolen vessels, trafficking in vehicles with altered VINs, and money laundering. He moved to suppress the evidence from the second extraction, but the district court denied the motion, applied several sentencing enhancements, and imposed a sentence of ninety-five months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the second extraction did not violate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 or the Fourth Amendment, as Rule 41(e)(2)(B) allows for off-site copying and review of electronic information after the warrant period. The court also found that even if there were a procedural violation, suppression would not be warranted due to the agents’ good faith and lack of prejudice. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to sustain all convictions and found no reversible error in the sentencing calculations or guideline enhancements. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner serving a sentence for drug-related offenses sought compassionate release, arguing that he was the only available caregiver for his incapacitated father living in Honduras. The prisoner’s father had become bedridden and previously relied on the care of the prisoner’s former partner, who could no longer provide assistance due to her own health problems. The prisoner asserted that none of his five children could serve as caregivers: one was deceased, one’s whereabouts were unknown, two resided in the United States and could not relocate, and the remaining son, Elmer, lived four hours away in Honduras but faced logistical and economic barriers to providing care.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially denied the compassionate release motion, finding that the prisoner had not demonstrated the unavailability of other family members as caregivers. After the prisoner renewed his motion with more details, the district court again denied relief, concluding that Elmer, despite living several hours away and having work and family obligations, was nonetheless an available caregiver. The court reasoned that the practical burdens cited were not sufficient to show unavailability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the meaning of “only available caregiver” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C). The court held that an inmate must show that no other person is both qualified and free to provide the needed care, and outlined relevant factors for district courts to consider in making this determination. Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s determination that Elmer was available to provide care, and affirmed the denial of compassionate release. View "United States v. Robelo-Galo" on Justia Law

The case involves a man who was convicted of first-degree murder in Broward County, Florida, after a fatal shooting during a domestic dispute with his girlfriend. The key evidence during trial was a confession obtained by police after the man initially invoked his right to counsel but later agreed to speak with detectives. This confession was not admitted as direct evidence at his second trial but was used extensively to impeach his testimony when he took the stand in his own defense. The prosecution also presented substantial physical and eyewitness evidence, including the testimony of two individuals present at the scene and expert forensic analysis.After his conviction, the defendant challenged the use of his statement in postconviction proceedings. The Florida trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The defendant later argued in a state postconviction proceeding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the statement on the grounds that it was coerced, in violation of the Due Process Clause. The state postconviction court, adopting the State’s response, found that the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error of his counsel, as the other evidence against him was overwhelming. The Fourth DCA affirmed without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief. The court held that the state court had adjudicated the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance claim on the merits, entitling its decision to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Eleventh Circuit found that the state court’s determination—that the outcome would not have been different even if the statement had been excluded—was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "Calder v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

A franchisee brought several claims against a franchisor and related parties, including allegations of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, violations of Florida law, and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) violations. The parties settled, with the franchisee receiving $50,000 and both sides signing a mutual release that broadly barred any future claims. The agreement was not approved by a court or the Department of Labor and contained a confidentiality provision. Subsequently, the franchisee initiated a separate action for fraudulent transfer and other non-FLSA claims, arguing these were not barred by the settlement’s release.After the settlement, the franchisee filed a supplemental complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging fraudulent transfer and related non-FLSA claims. The franchisor responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, citing the settlement’s release. The franchisor also filed counterclaims, including breach of contract based on the franchisee’s new filings. The franchisee attempted to amend his complaint to add a claim for rescission, arguing fraudulent inducement, but the magistrate judge denied this motion, finding it was inadequately pleaded and untimely. The franchisee did not properly object to this denial before the district judge.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the unapproved settlement agreement barred the non-FLSA claims. The court held that, while FLSA claims cannot be waived or settled without court or Department of Labor approval, non-FLSA claims may be released according to state contract law. The court found the release enforceable under Florida law as to non-FLSA claims and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the fraudulent transfer claims and grant of summary judgment to the franchisor on its counterclaims. The court also ruled the franchisee had waived his right to appeal the denial of his motion to amend. View "O'Neal v. American Shaman Franchise Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

A man was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and seven counts of money laundering after opening numerous bank accounts and using them to launder millions of dollars in fraud proceeds for a group operating romance and business email scams. He also recruited and supervised a co-conspirator, helping that person set up a similar laundering operation. The laundered funds were ultimately sent to Africa. Following his arrest, the defendant attempted to cooperate with the government but did not enter into a plea agreement. At his first change-of-plea hearing, he hesitated and the hearing was postponed. At the second hearing, with two lawyers present, he pleaded guilty to all charges, affirming he did so knowingly and voluntarily.Before sentencing, the defendant’s bond was revoked after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. While in custody, he moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging one of his lawyers coerced him into pleading guilty and that he was not aware of a co-conspirator’s cooperation with the government. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held an evidentiary hearing, found the attorneys credible and the defendant not credible, and denied the motion to withdraw the plea.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the calculation of the loss amount, several sentencing enhancements, the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the substantive reasonableness of the 120-month sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea, did not err in its application of sentencing enhancements and guidelines, and that the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable. The court affirmed the judgment. View "USA v. Mullings" on Justia Law

In 2008, a federal grand jury indicted Michael Bowe on charges including conspiracy and attempt to commit Hobbs Act robbery, and for using, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, with the firearm offense predicated on the Hobbs Act offenses. Bowe pleaded guilty and admitted in court to shooting a security guard during the attempted robbery. He was sentenced in 2009 to 288 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory 120-month consecutive sentence for the firearm offense. He did not file a direct appeal.Over the years, Bowe challenged his conviction and sentence through several motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, citing Supreme Court decisions such as Johnson v. United States, United States v. Davis, and United States v. Taylor, which altered the understanding of what qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). His initial and successive motions were denied by the United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, largely because, at the time, circuit precedent held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery remained a crime of violence. The Eleventh Circuit repeatedly denied his applications, relying on its decision in In re Baptiste, which interpreted statutory bars to successive claims as applicable to federal prisoners.Subsequently, the Supreme Court abrogated Baptiste, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)’s bar on “old claims” does not apply to federal prisoners seeking successive § 2255 motions. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Bowe made a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) that his conviction for discharging a firearm during a crime of violence may no longer be valid in light of Davis and Taylor. The court granted his application for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. View "In re: Bowe" on Justia Law

A young man, after displaying erratic behavior in his Florida apartment, was tied up by his family who feared for his safety. Family members called 911, expressing concern but clarifying he was not violent. When police officers arrived, they found the man tied up, wet, and partially undressed. The officers attempted to detain him under Florida’s Baker Act, which allows for involuntary mental health evaluations under specific criteria. A struggle ensued, during which officers used force, including repeated taser deployments, physical strikes, and dragging the man outside, resulting in injuries. The man was taken to the hospital but not criminally charged.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the man sued the responding officers and the city under federal and state law, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and assault and battery, among other claims. The officers moved for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity and state agent immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for some claims but allowed others—including false arrest and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law claims of assault and battery—to proceed to trial against certain officers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to two officers on the false arrest claim, finding they had arguable probable cause to detain the man under the Baker Act. However, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to two other officers on excessive force claims, concluding that a reasonable jury could find their use of force grossly disproportionate and in violation of clearly established law. The court also affirmed denial of state agent immunity on the assault and battery claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Castro-Reyes v. Bosque" on Justia Law