Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Troy Olhausen, a former Senior Vice President of Business Development and Marketing at Arriva Medical, LLC, filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against his former employers, Arriva, Alere, Inc., and Abbott Laboratories, Inc. He alleged that the defendants submitted fraudulent claims to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for reimbursement. Specifically, Olhausen claimed that Arriva submitted claims without obtaining required assignment-of-benefits signatures and failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations that processed claims.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Olhausen’s third amended complaint, holding that he failed to plead with the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) that any fraudulent claims were actually submitted to the government. The district court found that Olhausen did not provide sufficient details to establish that false claims had been submitted, as he did not work in the billing department and lacked firsthand knowledge of the claim submissions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Olhausen adequately pled with particularity that allegedly false claims were submitted under Count II, which involved claims for heating pads that lacked assignment-of-benefits signatures. The court found that the internal audit allegations provided sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy Rule 9(b). However, the court upheld the dismissal of Count IV, which alleged that Arriva failed to disclose or accredit certain call-center locations, as Olhausen did not adequately allege that any claims involving these locations were actually submitted. Consequently, the court vacated the dismissal of Counts II and VI (conspiracy) and remanded them for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of Count IV. View "Olhausen v. Arriva Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

ArrMaz Products, Inc. (ArrMaz), a specialty chemical manufacturer, and the International Chemical Workers Union Council of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (the Union) entered into a stipulated election agreement to determine if the Union would represent ArrMaz’s employees. During the election, the Union challenged two ballots from employees of AMP Trucking, Inc. (AMP), a wholly owned subsidiary of ArrMaz. The challenged ballots were not counted, and the Union won the election by a 20 to 18 vote. The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) sustained the Union’s challenge, certifying the Union as the bargaining representative of ArrMaz’s employees, finding that only ArrMaz’s employees were eligible to vote under the agreement.ArrMaz refused to bargain with the Union, leading to a second Board order mandating that ArrMaz engage in bargaining. The Board severed the issue of whether to require ArrMaz to compensate employees for the lost opportunity to bargain during the post-election proceedings for further consideration. The Board then applied for enforcement of its orders, and ArrMaz cross-petitioned for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the Board’s orders, as the Board had completed its decision-making process regarding the Union’s certification and ArrMaz’s duty to bargain. On the merits, the court agreed with the Board that the stipulated election agreement unambiguously provided that only ArrMaz employees were eligible to vote, thus excluding AMP employees. Consequently, the Board properly sustained the Union’s challenge. The court granted the Board’s application for enforcement and denied ArrMaz’s petition for review. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Arrmaz Products Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Elvis Eghosa Ogiekpolor, who was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering and 15 counts of money laundering. The charges stemmed from business email compromise schemes and online romance scams, where victims were defrauded into sending money. Ogiekpolor and his co-conspirators registered sham corporations, opened bank accounts in their names, and deposited the fraudulently obtained money into these accounts. They then laundered approximately six million dollars through these accounts.In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia handled the case. Ogiekpolor was initially charged via a criminal complaint in August 2020 and was detained pending trial. The government filed an information in November 2020, and Ogiekpolor waived indictment. However, after he denied committing the fraud at a change of plea hearing, the court did not proceed with the plea. A grand jury returned an indictment in January 2021, and a superseding indictment in February 2022 added more charges. Ogiekpolor filed multiple motions to dismiss based on Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment violations, which the district court denied. The trial began in May 2022, and the jury convicted him on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Ogiekpolor appealed his convictions, arguing violations of the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the delays in the case did not violate the Sixth Amendment or the Speedy Trial Act. The court found that the delays were justified due to the complexity of the case, the need for adequate preparation, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also concluded that Ogiekpolor did not suffer actual prejudice from the delays. View "USA v. Ogiekpolor" on Justia Law

Ariel Torres, a former Starbucks employee, and Raphyr Lubin, the husband of another former Starbucks employee, filed a putative class action against Starbucks. They alleged that Starbucks sent them deficient health-insurance notices under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Starbucks moved to compel arbitration based on employment agreements signed by Torres and Lubin’s wife. Torres agreed to arbitration, but Lubin opposed it, arguing he was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration for Lubin. The court found that Lubin was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement and was not suing to enforce it. Instead, Lubin sought to enforce his own statutory right to an adequate COBRA notice. The court held that no equitable doctrine of Florida contract law required Lubin to arbitrate and that Starbucks waived its argument that Lubin’s rights were derivative of his wife’s rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Lubin, not being a party to the arbitration agreement, could not be compelled to arbitrate. The court also found that the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause did not apply to Lubin, as he was not a party to the agreement. Additionally, the court rejected Starbucks’s arguments based on equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary doctrine, and the derivative claim theory, concluding that none of these principles required Lubin to arbitrate his claim. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Lubin v. Starbucks Corporation" on Justia Law

John Armstrong, Jr. was indicted on multiple charges, including Hobbs Act robbery, bank robbery, attempted bank robbery, aiding and abetting bank robbery, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during these crimes. He pled guilty to several counts, and the government dismissed others. Armstrong was sentenced to 420 months in prison, including mandatory consecutive sentences for the firearm charges.Armstrong appealed, arguing that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were invalid because the predicate offenses (bank robbery) could be committed without violence, making the "crime of violence" definition unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected this argument, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent that bank robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed Armstrong's convictions. However, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), prompted the Supreme Court to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remand the case for reconsideration.Upon reconsideration, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Armstrong's convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a divisible statute, criminalizing both bank robbery and bank extortion as separate offenses. Armstrong's convictions for bank robbery by intimidation were upheld as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also affirmed that aiding and abetting bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. Additionally, the court concluded that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence because it requires an element of force, violence, or intimidation.The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed Armstrong's convictions for Counts 4, 10, and 12. View "United States v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

C.H., an eleven-year-old, was sexually exploited by a stranger on Omegle.com, an online platform that connects users in video chatrooms. The stranger, referred to as John Doe, threatened C.H. into creating child pornography. C.H.'s parents sued Omegle.com LLC, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Masha’s Law) for knowingly possessing child pornography and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act for knowingly benefiting from a sex trafficking venture.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the claims, citing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects providers of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher or speaker of user-provided information. The court also found that the sex trafficking claim did not meet the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) exception to section 230 because C.H.'s parents did not allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of benefiting from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that C.H.'s parents did not state a claim under Masha’s Law because they failed to allege that Omegle.com knowingly possessed or accessed child pornography. The court also held that the FOSTA exception to section 230 requires actual knowledge of sex trafficking, not just constructive knowledge. Since C.H.'s parents did not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking incident involving C.H., the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims. View "M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC" on Justia Law

One night, Officer Devosie Jones of the City of Remerton Police Department attempted to stop a black Cadillac with one headlight. The car did not stop, leading to a high-speed chase that ended when the Cadillac crashed into a tree. Quinton Simmons was found trying to exit the car and was arrested. Officers found narcotics and a firearm in the vehicle. Simmons was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pleaded not guilty, claiming he was kidnapped and framed by a gang member who fled the scene.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied Simmons's Batson challenge, accepting the government's race-neutral reasons for striking three black jurors. During the trial, the court allowed the government to play a brief segment of a body camera video but denied Simmons's request to play additional clips during closing arguments, as they had not been shown during the evidence phase. The jury found Simmons guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of closing arguments, as Simmons had the opportunity to present the video clips during the trial but chose not to. The court also found no error in the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, as Simmons failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and the government's race-neutral explanations were credible. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

The case involves Reginald Graham, Antonio Glass, Jerimaine Bryant, Mario Rodriguez, Torivis Reginald Ingram, Michael Walker, Levi Bryant, Curtis Bryant, Daniel Jones, and Samuel Hayes, who were convicted of various crimes related to their involvement in the Dub Street Blood Family (DSBF), a Miami-based gang. The gang engaged in drug trafficking, armed robberies, and murders over nearly two decades. The FBI, ATF, and local police departments conducted extensive investigations, leading to a broad indictment and subsequent trial.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the defendants were charged with multiple offenses, including racketeering conspiracy and narcotics conspiracy. After a 38-day trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on several counts, resulting in sentences ranging from 168 months to life imprisonment. The defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, raising numerous issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court vacated the Count 1 RICO conspiracy convictions due to the district court's erroneous exclusion of the defendants' gang expert and the government's failure to address harmless error. The court also vacated Daniel Jones' sentence due to the improper application of a use-of-violence enhancement. In all other respects, the court affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court addressed various challenges, including the sufficiency of the indictment, the denial of motions to suppress, the denial of a motion to sever, Batson challenges, and several evidentiary rulings. The court found no reversible error in the district court's handling of these issues, except for the exclusion of the defense expert and the sentencing error for Daniel Jones. View "United States v. Graham" on Justia Law

A medical student at Florida International University (FIU) failed nine courses, including six while on academic probation, and was required to repeat a year. He was also reported for unprofessional behavior by three professors. Despite receiving accommodations for his diagnosed ADHD and anxiety disorder, he continued to perform poorly, failing multiple exams and receiving low scores on others.The student was placed on academic probation and later took a voluntary medical leave. Upon returning, he failed additional courses and was given another chance to repeat the second year. In his third year, he failed five final exams and scored poorly on others, leading to a third hearing by the promotion committee, which recommended his dismissal. The student appealed, citing various personal issues but did not initially claim inadequate disability accommodations.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FIU, concluding that the student was not a "qualified individual" under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he could not meet the university's academic standards even with reasonable accommodations. The student appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the student was not a qualified individual under the ADA, as he failed to meet the essential eligibility requirements of the medical program despite receiving accommodations. The court emphasized the deference given to academic institutions in making judgments about students' academic performance and found that FIU had provided ample opportunities for the student to improve, which he failed to do. View "Nehme v. Florida International University Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

Carey Dale Grayson, an Alabama prisoner, sought a preliminary injunction to halt his scheduled execution by nitrogen hypoxia, arguing that the method violated the Eighth Amendment due to the risk of conscious suffocation and other potential harms. Grayson proposed alternative methods of execution, including nitrogen gas with sedation and a sequential injection of ketamine followed by fentanyl.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied Grayson's motion, finding that he did not demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. The court held an evidentiary hearing where expert testimonies were presented. The court found that Grayson's evidence was speculative and did not show that the nitrogen hypoxia protocol created an unacceptable risk of pain. The court also found that the proposed alternatives were not feasible or readily implemented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction, agreeing that Grayson failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The court noted that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that the nitrogen hypoxia protocol had been successfully used in previous executions without evidence of conscious suffocation or other significant issues. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. View "Grayson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law