Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Athos Overseas Limited owns copyrights to numerous classic Mexican and Latin American films. The company discovered that its copyrighted films were posted on YouTube without authorization. Athos sent multiple takedown notices to YouTube, which removed the specific videos identified in those notices. However, Athos argued that YouTube’s technology—particularly its video-hashing and content management tools—gave it actual or “red flag” knowledge of additional infringing material beyond what was specifically identified, and thus YouTube should have removed all such matches automatically.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied Athos’s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of YouTube. The court found that YouTube qualified for safe-harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as it expeditiously removed infringing material identified by valid takedown notices and did not have actual or red flag knowledge of other specific infringements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Eleventh Circuit held that YouTube’s copyright management technologies do not, in themselves, give YouTube actual or red flag knowledge of specific infringing material unless a valid DMCA notice is received. The court also found that YouTube’s moderation and curation features did not constitute the right and ability to control infringing activity for purposes of the DMCA safe harbor. Therefore, YouTube was entitled to safe-harbor protection under § 512(c), and summary judgment in its favor was proper. View "Athos Overseas Limited Corp. v. YouTube, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of individuals, including the appellant, participated in a scheme involving the use of stolen credit cards and fraudulent memberships at a warehouse store to purchase large quantities of cigarettes. The appellant served as the primary account holder for two business membership accounts and was a secondary member on two others. The scheme resulted in over $2 million in cigarette purchases. Following an 85-count indictment, the appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, several counts of credit card fraud, and aggravated identity theft. After his codefendants pleaded guilty, the appellant proceeded to trial. During the trial, the government presented testimony from victims whose credit cards were used without authorization. The district court granted the appellant’s motion for acquittal on certain counts due to insufficient evidence, and the jury acquitted him on others, but found him guilty of the remaining charges.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia sentenced the appellant, holding him accountable for the total loss amount charged by all members of the conspiracy using the shared credit cards. This figure was calculated in the presentence report and included losses attributable to the codefendants, except for those counts where the appellant was acquitted. The appellant objected, arguing that he should only be held responsible for transactions he personally conducted, but the district court overruled his objection and imposed restitution matching the total loss amount.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court committed legal error by failing to make individualized findings regarding the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the appellant, as required under the Sentencing Guidelines. The appellate court vacated the appellant’s sentence and restitution order, remanding for resentencing with instructions to determine the loss amount based on the appellant’s own conduct and correct a clerical error in the judgment. View "USA v. Barry" on Justia Law

A.B., a minor, was sexually exploited by her mother and David Barrow when she was ten years old. In February 2018, A.B. filed a lawsuit against Barrow in Alabama state court for invasion of privacy. After a bench trial in April 2022, the court found in favor of A.B., awarding her $4 million in compensatory damages and $6 million in punitive damages. During related litigation, A.B.’s attorney learned that Barrow was likely insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, and in November 2018, served a subpoena on Nationwide, which produced Barrow’s umbrella liability insurance policy covering invasion of privacy claims.Nationwide removed the subsequent coverage action filed by A.B. under Alabama’s Direct Action Statute to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The district court granted summary judgment for Nationwide, holding that neither Barrow nor A.B. notified Nationwide of the potential duty to indemnify “as soon as reasonably possible,” as required by the policy. The district court emphasized the 58-month delay between Barrow’s conduct and Nationwide receiving notice, and found that no reasonable excuse for the delay was offered by Barrow.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, under Alabama law and the terms of the policy, notice may be provided by the insured or someone on the insured’s behalf, including the injured party. However, the timeliness of notice is judged from the insured’s perspective. Because Barrow did not give notice to Nationwide within a reasonable time and offered no excuse for the delay, coverage was barred. The court rejected arguments that notice by A.B. could reset the timing requirement and concluded that summary judgment for Nationwide was proper. View "A. B. v. Barrow" on Justia Law

Corpay, Inc., a publicly traded company based in Atlanta, Georgia, markets fuel credit cards to businesses, primarily small and medium-sized enterprises. The cards were advertised to offer per-gallon fuel savings, “fuel only” purchase restrictions, and no transaction fees. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought suit alleging that Corpay’s advertisements were misleading and its billing practices unfair. The FTC presented evidence that customers received significantly lower discounts than advertised, that “fuel only” cards were frequently used for non-fuel purchases, and that transaction fees were charged despite claims to the contrary. Additionally, Corpay was found to have automatically enrolled customers in various add-on programs and fees, often without clear disclosure or express consent, and assessed late fees even when customers paid on time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed these claims. It granted summary judgment for the FTC on all five counts, holding that Corpay’s advertisements and fee practices were deceptive and unfair under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The court also found Corpay’s CEO, Ronald Clarke, personally liable due to his authority and knowledge of the company’s practices. To address ongoing and potential future violations, the district court issued a permanent injunction, requiring clear and unavoidable fee disclosures and separate customer assent for each fee charged.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment and permanent injunction against Corpay on all counts. It also affirmed summary judgment against Clarke on four counts but vacated the judgment on the “fuel only” advertising count, remanding for further proceedings on that issue. The appellate court held that the injunction’s requirements for express informed consent and prominent disclosure were within the district court’s equitable authority. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Federal Trade Commission v. FleetCor Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Three men, including the defendant, agreed to steal marijuana from a known individual at his apartment. On the day of the incident, the defendant and one accomplice entered the apartment, while the third remained in the car. The accomplice took the marijuana and left the apartment without the defendant’s knowledge. When the apartment’s occupants realized the theft, they told the defendant he could not leave until the accomplice returned. The defendant, feeling threatened, subsequently used deadly force against two men several minutes after the marijuana had already been taken. The three men later regrouped, and the defendant admitted to the shootings.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida indicted the defendant for conspiracy to commit robbery under the Hobbs Act (Count 1), substantive Hobbs Act robbery (Count 2), and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence resulting in murder (Count 3). At trial, the defendant argued that force was not used to effectuate the taking, asserting that the theft was complete when the marijuana was taken, and that the subsequent use of force did not constitute robbery under the Hobbs Act. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal and the jury convicted him on all counts. The court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms, including life for Count 3.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under the Hobbs Act, robbery requires that force or threatened force be used before or during the taking of property—not solely after the property has been surreptitiously taken and carried away. Because the defendant used force only after the marijuana was stolen, the convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and for using a firearm in relation to that robbery (Counts 2 and 3) were reversed for insufficient evidence, and the sentences for those counts were vacated. The conviction and sentence for conspiracy (Count 1) were affirmed. The case was remanded for correction of the judgment. View "United States v. Grable" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers arrested the defendant after receiving a tip that a fugitive was staying at a local RV park. Upon stopping the defendant’s car for a traffic violation, deputies observed crystal methamphetamine in the front seat and, during a search, found that the defendant was carrying a handgun. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant on two counts: possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, which carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence, and use of a firearm in relation to a drug crime, which also carries a consecutive five-year mandatory minimum sentence.The defendant entered a plea agreement, wherein the government promised to move for a downward departure from the statutory minimum sentence if the defendant provided substantial assistance, reserving discretion over whether and to what extent to make such a motion. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama accepted the plea. The government eventually moved for a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, but only with respect to the drug possession count. At sentencing, the district court granted the motion and sentenced the defendant below the statutory minimum for both counts, issuing a time-served sentence on the first count and one day on the second count, served consecutively. The government objected, arguing that its motion pertained only to the first count.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes a departure below a statutory minimum sentence only when the government specifically moves for such a departure as to that particular count. Because the government did not move for a departure on the firearm count, the district court lacked authority to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum for that count. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence as to the firearm count and remanded for resentencing in accordance with its opinion. View "USA v. Day" on Justia Law

Elena Mukhina, a Russian national who practices Russian Folk Christianity and has limited English proficiency, worked at Walmart in the apparel department where she interacted with customers. During her employment, she reported experiencing daily mockery and rude behavior from both customers and coworkers due to her inability to speak English fluently. She requested a transfer to the night shift, which was granted several weeks later, and her working conditions improved, though some negative treatment persisted. Mukhina also requested time off for New Year’s Eve, which she described as an important holiday for Russians. Her supervisor denied the request based on a first-come, first-served policy. Mukhina took the day off anyway and received attendance points per Walmart policy. After filing an ethics complaint, she experienced mixed changes in coworker behavior and eventually quit; Walmart then formally terminated her employment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama reviewed Mukhina’s claims of hostile work environment based on national origin, religious discrimination for denial of holiday leave, and retaliatory discharge. The court granted summary judgment for Walmart, finding that Mukhina did not present sufficient evidence that the alleged harassment was based on her national origin, that any harassment was severe or pervasive, or that Walmart was liable for coworker or customer conduct. The court also held that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies for religious discrimination and did not inform Walmart of the religious nature of her holiday request. On retaliation, the court found no causal connection between her complaints and any adverse employment action.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit held that Mukhina failed to present substantial evidence of a hostile work environment or retaliation, and failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her religious discrimination claim. View "Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Police arrested the defendant after stopping a car in which he was a passenger and finding a loaded handgun, drugs, and cash. Subsequent searches yielded further incriminating evidence, including text messages, videos, and images related to drug trafficking on his cellphone, as well as additional firearms, ammunition, and drugs at his apartment. Officers also discovered a large quantity of marijuana in his girlfriend’s car. The government charged him with five counts: two related to drug distribution, two for illegal firearm possession, and one for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama conducted a jury trial. The government introduced all seized evidence, including digital content and rap music videos. The prosecutor, during closing argument, referred jurors to an exhibit containing Instagram messages that had not been admitted into evidence. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, with a 45-year sentence imposed, including a 30-year mandatory minimum for the firearm-in-furtherance count. The defendant appealed, raising issues of insufficient evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, the improper admission of rap videos, improper comment on his invocation of Miranda rights, and cumulative error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the prosecutor’s reference to the unadmitted exhibit during closing argument constituted plain error that affected the defendant’s substantial rights. The court vacated the conviction and sentence on the count for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 3) and remanded for a new trial on that count. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment on all other counts, finding no reversible error regarding sufficiency of the evidence, admission of the rap videos, the Miranda issue, or cumulative error. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Jefferson County Jail, who was on suicide watch and housed on the bottom floor of a two-story cell block, suffered a head injury and requested medical attention. A deputy, who was not previously familiar with the inmate, observed her distress and the visible injury. After consulting with a nurse, the deputy prepared to transport the inmate to the medical clinic and remotely unlocked her cell door from the control room. Upon release, the inmate ran upstairs and jumped from the second-story landing, sustaining additional injuries.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama considered the inmate’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the deputy was deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood of self-harm. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. It found that a reasonable juror could conclude the deputy violated the inmate's constitutional rights by disregarding the risk of harm in releasing her unsupervised and that the law regarding deliberate indifference to detainee safety was clearly established.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity de novo. The appellate court determined that, although the inmate suffered a serious deprivation, there was insufficient evidence that the deputy was subjectively aware that unlocking the cell presented a substantial suicide risk specific to this inmate. The court found the deputy acted to aid the inmate and did not knowingly disregard a substantial risk of harm. The Eleventh Circuit held the deputy did not violate the inmate’s constitutional rights and was entitled to qualified immunity. It vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for the deputy. View "Gantt v. Everett" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was charged with multiple crimes related to the production, possession, and distribution of child pornography involving her fourteen-year-old sister. Law enforcement initially investigated the defendant’s husband, but their attention turned to the defendant after she admitted to possibly sending inappropriate photos of her sister to her husband. Subsequent forensic analysis uncovered additional incriminating evidence. Both the sister and husband testified regarding the abuse. The defendant’s primary defense was that she acted under duress due to severe abuse by her husband.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, the defendant sought to introduce statements she made to a psychologist, Dr. Reynolds, as part of her duress defense. Dr. Reynolds, who had not practiced clinical work in a decade and was retained specifically to evaluate the defendant in anticipation of litigation, diagnosed her with a dissociative disorder. The government moved to exclude as hearsay those statements made by the defendant to Dr. Reynolds concerning her husband's alleged abuse, arguing that they did not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4). The district court agreed, finding the statements were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, but rather to prepare for trial. The court alternatively excluded the statements under Rule 403 due to prejudicial effect. After this ruling, the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving her right to appeal the evidentiary ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear error. The Eleventh Circuit held that statements made to a medical expert retained for litigation, not for genuine medical diagnosis or treatment, do not qualify for the hearsay exception under Rule 803(4). The court found no error in the district court’s exclusion of the statements and affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "USA v. Keegan" on Justia Law