Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

Sheldon Turner, born in Jamaica to Jamaican parents Desmond and Roslyn Turner, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. His parents divorced in 1987, and his mother remarried twice, including a remarriage to Desmond in 1994. Roslyn naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1999 while still married to Desmond. Turner was convicted of a felony in 2016, leading to removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Turner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that Turner did not derive U.S. citizenship from his mother’s naturalization because his parents were married at the time of her naturalization, thus not meeting the legal separation requirement under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). The IJ’s decision was based on the statute’s plain language and the rationale explained in Levy v. U.S. Attorney General. Turner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed, with the BIA agreeing that the statute requires a continuing legal separation at the time of naturalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the BIA’s interpretation. The court held that former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) imposes a continuing requirement of legal separation that must exist at the time all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. Since Turner’s mother was married to his father at the time of her naturalization, Turner did not derive automatic citizenship. The court denied Turner’s petition for review. View "Turner v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Clevon Webster and his brother used stolen social security numbers to apply for government benefits from September 2014 until June 2015. The government had until June 3, 2020, to bring charges against Webster due to the five-year statute of limitations. However, the Southern District of Florida suspended grand jury sessions from March 2020 until November 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic. Unable to obtain an indictment, the government filed an information against Webster on May 26, 2020, but did not obtain a waiver of indictment from him. After grand juries resumed, a grand jury indicted Webster on January 21, 2021, for the same offenses.Webster moved to dismiss the indictment as untimely, arguing that filing an information without a waiver of indictment did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court denied his motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report that concluded filing an information was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and that the later indictment related back to the date of the timely filed information. Webster then pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit access device fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that filing an information without a waiver of indictment tolls the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The court reasoned that the statute's text, structure, and history support this interpretation and that the statute does not require a waiver of indictment to toll the limitations period. The court also held that the January 2021 indictment related back to the timely filed May 2020 information, making the indictment timely. View "USA v. Webster" on Justia Law

The case involves the Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited (IMC) challenging a decision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the interpretation of "prior express consent" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA requires that robocalls must have the called party's "prior express consent." The FCC's 2012 regulation defined this as "prior express written consent" for telemarketing or advertising calls. In 2023, the FCC issued a new rule further interpreting "prior express consent" to include two additional restrictions: (1) consent must be given to only one entity at a time, and (2) the subject matter of the calls must be logically and topically associated with the interaction that prompted the consent.The FCC's 2023 Order was challenged by IMC, which argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA. IMC contended that the new restrictions conflicted with the ordinary statutory meaning of "prior express consent." The FCC defended its rule, claiming it was consistent with the common understanding of the phrase and within its authority to implement the TCPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC's additional restrictions on "prior express consent" were inconsistent with the ordinary statutory meaning of the phrase. The court held that under common law principles, "prior express consent" means a willingness for certain conduct to occur, clearly and unmistakably stated before the conduct. The court concluded that the FCC's one-to-one-consent and logically-and-topically-related restrictions impermissibly altered this meaning.The Eleventh Circuit granted IMC's petition for review, vacated Part III.D of the FCC's 2023 Order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court determined that the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority by imposing additional restrictions that were not supported by the TCPA's text. View "Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

Isaac Industries, a Florida corporation, contracted with Bariven, a Venezuelan oil company, for the sale of chemicals. After Isaac shipped the products, Bariven failed to pay. Later, Petroquímica de Venezuela (Pequiven) assumed Bariven’s debt and negotiated an extended payment period but only made the first payment. Isaac sued both companies for breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially dealt with objections about service of process and sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge concluded that effective service occurred but recommended denying Isaac’s motion for default and ordering it to amend its complaint. The oil companies did not object and answered the amended complaint. When Isaac moved for summary judgment, the oil companies argued that no valid contracts existed and that sovereign immunity shielded Pequiven. The district court granted summary judgment for Isaac, ruling that Pequiven waived sovereign immunity by not raising it in its answer and that the commercial-activity exception applied. The court also found that the undisputed facts established that Pequiven and Bariven breached their contracts with Isaac.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the oil companies waived their challenge to personal jurisdiction by not objecting to the magistrate judge’s report and by omitting any reference to service of process in their answers. The court also held that Pequiven waived sovereign immunity by failing to raise it in its answer or motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of fact that Pequiven and Bariven breached their contracts. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the oil companies’ Rule 56(d) motion to defer ruling on the summary judgment. The judgments in favor of Isaac were affirmed. View "Isaac Industries, Inc. v. Bariven S.A." on Justia Law

Alice Guan and her homeowners association (HOA), Ellingsworth Residential Community Association, Inc., were involved in a dispute after Guan failed to conform her yard to the HOA’s covenants. Ellingsworth sued Guan in state court, and Guan countersued for various state-law claims. The state court awarded Guan costs and fees, but before she could collect, Ellingsworth filed for subchapter V bankruptcy.In the Bankruptcy Court, Guan filed several motions, including objections to Ellingsworth’s subchapter V eligibility and reorganization plan, and a motion for relief from the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Court overruled Guan’s objections, confirming Ellingsworth’s subchapter V status and reorganization plan, and denied her motion for relief from the stay. Guan appealed these decisions to the District Court.The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s orders, finding that Ellingsworth was eligible for subchapter V as it was engaged in business activities, and that the reorganization plan was fair and equitable. The court also upheld the denial of Guan’s motion for relief from the stay, concluding that the Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its discretion and had jurisdiction over Guan’s claims.Guan also appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of her motion to abstain from ruling on state law issues. The District Court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the abstention order was not a final appealable order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decisions on subchapter V eligibility, the reorganization plan, and the denial of stay relief. However, it vacated the dismissal of Guan’s abstention appeal, remanding it to the District Court for further consideration, as the denial of mandatory abstention is immediately appealable. View "Guan v. Ellingsworth Residential Community Association, Inc." on Justia Law

Kerby Brown Jr. was charged with conspiracy to commit child sex trafficking and attempted child sex trafficking. In 2018, Brown was involved in recruiting minors for prostitution, including a 14-year-old girl (Minor Victim 1) and a 15-year-old girl (Minor Victim 2). Brown and his accomplice, Heidy Archer, took explicit photos of the minors and posted them online to solicit clients. Brown managed the logistics, including pricing and client screening. The minors were coerced into participating due to their vulnerable situations.The case was initially delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and multiple continuances requested by Brown's defense counsel. Brown filed several pro se motions to dismiss the indictment based on the Speedy Trial Act, which were denied by the district court. The court cited local rules prohibiting pro se filings when represented by counsel and found that the delays were justified and excluded under the Act. The trial eventually commenced in August 2022, where Brown was convicted on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found sufficient evidence to support Brown's convictions, including testimonies from the victims and corroborating evidence. The court also upheld the district court's admission of phone records and communications from Archer's phone, finding no abuse of discretion or violation of the Confrontation Clause. The court ruled that the district court did not err in denying Brown's Speedy Trial Act claims, as the continuances were properly excluded. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to strike the jury venire after an initial error in reading the indictment, as curative instructions were provided.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Brown's convictions and the district court's rulings on all contested issues. View "U.S. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Payroll Management, Inc. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and received $1,070,330.23 from British Petroleum, Inc. for economic losses due to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. Sunz Insurance Company claimed a first-priority security interest in these funds, asserting that its security interest attached and perfected before any other creditor. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) contended that its federal tax lien had first priority as it attached and perfected first. Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS, determining that Payroll’s BP claim was a commercial tort claim when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The court found that the IRS’s tax lien attached and perfected first, while Sunz’s security interest did not attach to commercial tort claims. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Payroll’s BP claim remained a commercial tort claim in March 2017 when the IRS filed its tax lien notice. The settlement agreement did not automatically convert the tort claim into a contract, as it did not create an automatic obligation for BP to pay Payroll a certain amount. Therefore, the IRS’s tax lien, which attached and perfected first, took priority over Sunz’s security interest. The court concluded that the IRS was entitled to the $1,070,330.23 payment. View "Sunz Insurance Company v. Treasury Department" on Justia Law

North American Sugar Industries, Inc. ("North American Sugar") filed a lawsuit against five defendants under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, alleging that the defendants unlawfully trafficked its property, which was confiscated by the Cuban government. The defendants include three East Asian corporations (Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd., Goldwind International Holdings (HK) Ltd., and BBC Chartering Singapore Pte Ltd.), and two U.S. corporations (DSV Air & Sea, Inc. and BBC Chartering USA, LLC). North American Sugar claimed that the defendants participated in a conspiracy involving trafficking from China, through Miami, Florida, and then to Puerto Carupano, Cuba.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation. The magistrate judge found that the alleged trafficking occurred in Cuba, not Florida, and that none of the defendants engaged in any activity in Florida related to the shipments. North American Sugar objected, but the district court upheld the recommendation, concluding that the Helms-Burton Act violations occurred only in Cuba.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its narrow interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. The Act broadly defines "traffics" to include various activities, and the court noted that trafficking can occur outside of Cuba. The appellate court also found that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence without holding an evidentiary hearing, as required under the prima facie standard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider personal jurisdiction in light of the correct interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act and to address whether any defendants committed trafficking activities in Florida. The court also directed the district court to consider the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction if it finds jurisdiction over any defendant. View "North American Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Jose Villegas, a 39-year-old inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) in Florida, died following a physical confrontation with correctional officers. The incident began when officers found Villegas unconscious in his cell. Upon regaining consciousness, Villegas resisted the officers' attempts to restrain him. The officers eventually subdued Villegas and transported him to a medical unit, but he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The autopsy reported that Villegas died from restraint asphyxia, with excited delirium as a contributing factor, and noted the presence of synthetic cannabinoids in his system.Douglas B. Stalley, representing Villegas's estate and his minor children, filed a lawsuit against the officers, their supervisors, and the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) for negligence, wrongful death, excessive force, deliberate indifference, and supervisory liability. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the constitutional claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law wrongful death claim, remanding it to state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. Stalley appealed the district court's decision regarding the deliberate indifference and supervisory liability claims. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' decision to transport Villegas to a medical unit rather than provide on-scene care did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim also failed, as it was contingent on the underlying constitutional violation. View "Stalley v. Lake Correctional Institution Warden" on Justia Law