Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Arturs Spila, a Latvian national, entered the United States in May 2018 and deposited over $284,000 in cash into three bank accounts over three months. The cash originated from a fraudulent scheme where victims were hired for fake work-from-home jobs, instructed to cash checks, and mail the cash to Spila. The checks bounced, and the victims were not reimbursed. Spila then wired over $200,000 from these accounts, mostly to international recipients, in small transactions to avoid mandatory reporting.A federal grand jury indicted Spila for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The Northern District of Georgia district court admitted emails between Spila and his co-conspirators as evidence and allowed a forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The jury convicted Spila, and he was sentenced to 32 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Spila appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge that the money came from a felony, prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, improper authentication of emails, and improper lay witness testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove Spila knew the money came from unlawful activity, even if he did not know it was a felony. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor's comments were fair responses to defense arguments. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the emails as self-authenticating documents and allowing the forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Spila's conviction. View "United States v. Spila" on Justia Law

A Florida restaurant, Hamburger Mary’s, regularly hosted drag performances, including family-friendly shows that invited children. Following the enactment of Florida’s Senate Bill 1438, which prohibits children from attending "adult live performances" deemed obscene for minors, Hamburger Mary’s canceled its family-friendly shows and barred children from all performances, fearing penalties under the new law.Hamburger Mary’s filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the Governor of Florida and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation (FDBPR), alleging that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a content-based speech regulation that failed strict scrutiny. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act was likely unconstitutional on its face due to its vague and overbroad nature. The Act’s prohibition on "lewd conduct" was found to be insufficiently specific under the Miller test for obscenity, which requires clear definitions to avoid arbitrary enforcement and to protect free speech. Additionally, the Act’s age-variable obscenity standard, which adjusts the criteria for what is considered obscene based on the age of the child present, was deemed unconstitutionally vague and likely to chill a substantial amount of protected speech.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against Hamburger Mary’s and others, citing the need for clarity in speech regulations to avoid arbitrary enforcement and protect First Amendment rights. View "HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

In 2008, Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera began working with co-conspirators in Latin America to obtain and transport cocaine for importation into the United States. Rafael Segundo Castro Diaz joined the conspiracy later, helping transport 1,200 kilos of cocaine in April 2013. The United States Coast Guard intercepted the boat carrying the cocaine, and the men aboard were arrested. Years later, a federal grand jury returned three indictments against Gomez Rivera and Castro Diaz, with the second superseding indictment expanding the conspiracy period from January 2008 to September 2013.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the second superseding indictment, which they argued was untimely and broadened the original charges. The defendants then negotiated a stipulated bench trial, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their motions to dismiss. The district court adjudicated them guilty, but there were clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment documentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a superseding indictment can satisfy the statute of limitations if it is independently timely or relates back to a timely prior indictment. The second superseding indictment was independently timely, as it was returned within five years of the alleged conspiracy period. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as both defendants stipulated to facts indicating their involvement in the conspiracy until September 2013. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences but remanded for the correction of clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment. View "USA v. Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera" on Justia Law

Jeremy Jones was stopped by Officer David Ceinski for a traffic infraction. Jones complied with Ceinski’s instructions to exit his car and provide his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Jones also informed Ceinski that he had a firearm in the car. After seeing the firearm under the driver’s seat, Ceinski grabbed Jones’s wrist, twisted his arm, and pushed him against the car. While Jones was subdued, Ceinski choked him until he could not breathe and punched him on the top of his head. Jones filed a complaint against Ceinski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.The magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Ceinski’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, ruling that Ceinski’s conduct did not violate any clearly established federal right.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Ceinski used excessive force when he choked and punched Jones after he was subdued and could not access his firearm. The court noted that Jones’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly established, since controlling case law placed the illegality of Ceinski’s actions beyond debate. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Ceinski and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Ceinski" on Justia Law

A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law

Kepali Group procured insurance for its fleet of vehicles through an agent at Brown & Brown of Florida, with Prime Property & Casualty Insurance Company issuing a commercial automobile policy for the period from January 23, 2019, to January 23, 2020. The policy included a provision for after-acquired vehicles, requiring notification within 30 days of acquisition for coverage. On December 6, 2019, a 2009 Toyota Sienna owned by Kepali was involved in an accident. Kepali had acquired the vehicle on September 30, 2019, and notified Brown to add it to the Prime policy. Prime issued a quote for the additional premium, but Kepali did not pay it, and Prime did not issue an endorsement for the vehicle.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that Brown was acting as Kepali’s agent, not Prime’s, when attempting to procure insurance for the 3985 Toyota. However, the court concluded that the vehicle was covered under the policy’s after-acquired auto provision because Kepali met the two conditions: Prime covered all of Kepali’s vehicles, and Kepali notified Prime within 30 days of acquiring the vehicle. The court ruled that Prime had a duty to defend Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez but deferred ruling on the duty to indemnify until the underlying suit was resolved. The court granted summary judgment against Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez on their reformation and promissory estoppel claims and dismissed the remaining claims as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court held that the after-acquired auto provision did not require payment of an additional premium within 30 days for coverage to continue. The court also found that the premium audit provision allowed Prime to compute the final premium and bill Kepali, and that Prime failed to perform this audit or send a bill. Therefore, Prime could not terminate coverage for non-payment without following the policy’s cancellation procedures. The court concluded that Prime had a duty to defend Kepali and Mr. Rodriguez in the underlying state court action. View "Prime Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Kepali Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Booker was convicted of four drug-distribution offenses and two firearm offenses, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The case arose from a traffic stop where officers found drugs and a firearm in a truck where Booker was a passenger. Booker admitted ownership of the drugs and the firearm was found in the glove box. A drug ledger was also found, indicating drug transactions.In the district court, Booker filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior state drug convictions, which were based on guilty pleas entered under North Carolina v. Alford. The district court denied the motion, allowing the evidence to be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake. Booker was convicted on all counts by a jury and sentenced to 185 months in prison.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Booker argued that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the prior convictions and by not giving his requested jury instruction. He also raised new arguments, including that the district court failed to question a juror about potential bias, the government improperly vouched for a witness, and the government introduced improper testimony about the drug ledger.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that the prior convictions were properly admitted under Rule 404(b) as they were relevant to Booker’s intent to distribute drugs. The court also found no plain error in the district court’s handling of the juror issue, the prosecutor’s comments, or the admission of the drug ledger testimony. The court concluded that any potential errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Booker’s guilt. View "USA v. Booker" on Justia Law

Top Tobacco, L.P., Republic Technologies (NA), LLC, and Republic Tobacco, L.P. sued Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc., and its president, Amin Hudda, for selling counterfeit TOP® and JOB® cigarette rolling papers. Republic conducted test buys and laboratory testing, which confirmed the products were counterfeit. The police seized 704 jars of allegedly counterfeit rolling papers from Star’s warehouse. Republic alleged trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment against Star on liability for trademark infringement and counterfeiting but not against Hudda. The remaining issues for trial were Hudda’s personal liability, whether Star’s actions were willful, and the amount of statutory damages. The jury found Star did not act willfully and awarded Republic $123,000 in damages per mark, totaling $1,107,000 for nine marks. The district court denied Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law challenging the verdict size.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to reduce the jury verdict, as it fell within the statutory damages range permitted by the Lanham Act. The court affirmed that statutory damages need not be related to actual damages and that the jury could consider factors such as the value of the trademark, deterrence, and public safety risks. The court also found that the verdict did not violate due process, as it was not so disproportionate as to be unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Star’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. View "Top Tobacco, L.P. v. Star Importers & Wholesalers, Inc." on Justia Law

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and others filed a lawsuit against Michael LaRocca and his associated chiropractic clinics, alleging that the clinics submitted fraudulent insurance claims for services that were not medically necessary. The clinics, owned by LaRocca, were operating under an exemption from Florida's Health Care Clinic Act, which requires clinics to be licensed unless they are wholly owned by licensed health care practitioners who are legally responsible for compliance with all federal and state laws.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied State Farm's motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that LaRocca's failure to ensure compliance with all laws invalidated the clinics' exemption and rendered their charges noncompensable. The court found that the term "legally responsible" did not impose an affirmative duty on LaRocca to ensure compliance with all laws but rather indicated accountability for violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the interpretation of "legally responsible" within the context of Florida's Health Care Clinic Act was a matter best decided by the Florida Supreme Court. The Eleventh Circuit certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court, seeking clarification on whether the term imposes an affirmative duty on clinic owners to ensure compliance with all federal and state laws to maintain their exemption status. The Eleventh Circuit deferred its decision pending the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. LaRocca" on Justia Law

Detectives with the Fort Myers Police Department observed Alphonso Lataurean James engaging in suspected drug transactions at a gas station. James was seen wearing a cross-body bag, which he later took into a vehicle. After stopping the vehicle, detectives found the bag containing a handgun and ammunition. They also discovered drugs in the car, including fentanyl and cocaine. James admitted to possessing the bag but denied knowledge of the firearm. DNA testing linked James and others to the gun. James, a convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced James to ninety-two months in prison, applying a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. James objected, arguing that the enhancement was improperly applied based on the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary. The district court overruled his objections, finding that the firearm was in close proximity to the drugs, thus meeting the "in connection with" requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the phrase "in connection with" in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is unambiguous and does not require deference to the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary. Despite the district court's error in relying on the commentary, the appellate court found that the district court's factual findings were sufficient to support the enhancement. The court affirmed James's sentence, concluding that he possessed the firearm in connection with drug trafficking. View "USA v. James" on Justia Law