Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Georgia inmate was sentenced to death after being convicted by a jury of two counts of malice murder, along with other crimes, based on evidence that he and an accomplice burglarized a residence, set fire to another nearby home, and killed two victims. The inmate confessed to the crimes and was linked by physical evidence. After exhausting his appeals in the Georgia Supreme Court and being denied certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, he filed a state habeas petition, which was denied, and the Georgia Supreme Court denied his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal.Following these state proceedings, the inmate filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, raising nine claims with approximately sixty subclaims. The Warden argued that most claims were procedurally defaulted, unexhausted, or insufficiently pleaded under Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The district court dismissed six subclaims as insufficiently pleaded, some on its own motion (sua sponte), and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and for leave to amend the petition, reasoning that the petitioner had long been aware of the pleading requirements and had delayed seeking leave to amend.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the narrow question of whether the Constitution required the district court to give the petitioner notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissing subclaims sua sponte for insufficient pleading. The Eleventh Circuit held that the petitioner had adequate notice of the pleading requirements and the possibility of dismissal under the applicable rules and case law, and that he had sufficient opportunity to be heard, including through his original petition and motion for reconsideration. The court therefore affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. View "O'Kelley v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 1997 of participating in a conspiracy to rob drug dealers at gunpoint, resulting in the theft of large amounts of money and drugs. He received a total sentence of 468 months, which included consecutive sentences for two convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) related to firearm use during crimes of violence and drug trafficking. At the time, sentencing law required a 20-year consecutive sentence for a “second or subsequent” § 924(c) conviction, even if both convictions arose from the same prosecution.Following a 2018 amendment to § 924(c), which eliminated the “stacking” requirement for first-time offenders with multiple convictions in a single prosecution, the defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. He argued that the change in law, though not retroactive, constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a reduction under a 2023 Sentencing Commission policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)). The district court granted the motion, reduced the defendant’s second § 924(c) sentence from 20 to 5 years, and ordered his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held it had jurisdiction over the government’s appeal. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred because, under Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. 454 (2026), the 2018 non-retroactive amendment to § 924(c) cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order and directed reinstatement of the original sentence. View "USA v. Rizo" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in Florida state court in 2013 of two counts of first-degree grand theft and one count of second-degree grand theft for taking investments from three individuals and using the funds for personal expenses. He was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and ordered to pay $835,000 in restitution. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal, and his motion for rehearing was denied in January 2016, making his conviction final ninety days later. Shortly before his conviction became final, he filed a motion to reduce his imprisonment, which was denied in April 2016. He later mailed a separate motion, challenging only the restitution part of his sentence, but this motion was never docketed by the state court. In December 2017, he filed a state post-conviction motion, which was eventually denied and became final in December 2022.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his federal habeas petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), holding that the one-year limitations period was not tolled by his undocketed motion challenging restitution, because it did not challenge the custody-imposing portion of his sentence. The district court also found no basis for equitable tolling and held, in the alternative, that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel and due process claims were not colorable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that a motion challenging only restitution does not toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations, because restitution does not relate to the custody underlying habeas relief. Therefore, his federal habeas petition was untimely, and the court did not reach the merits of his constitutional claims. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Cormier v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Several individuals sought the Republican nomination for Governor in Georgia’s 2026 primary election. Under state law, only certain officials—including the Lieutenant Governor—could create a special “leadership committee” that was permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds in direct coordination with their campaigns. Burt Jones, the Lieutenant Governor, formed such a committee to support his own campaign. Brad Raffensperger, Georgia’s Secretary of State, also ran in the primary, but his supporters—including Safe Affordable Georgia, a hybrid political action committee (PAC) chaired by Raffensperger—were subject to contribution and coordination restrictions and could not operate a leadership committee.Safe Affordable Georgia filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging these campaign finance restrictions as violating the First Amendment. The group sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contribution and coordination limits against it, specifically so it could support Raffensperger’s campaign during the ongoing primary. The district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. Safe Affordable Georgia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, seeking expedited review.By the time the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal, the 2026 primary election was over and Raffensperger’s campaign had ended. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the case was moot because the court could no longer provide meaningful relief relating to the completed election. The court also found that the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that the same dispute would recur involving the same parties. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "Safe Affordable Georgia, Inc. v. Chairman of the State Ethics Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. The defendant was part of a group engaged in distributing these drugs from multiple residences. Law enforcement conducted several search warrants at locations linked to the group, recovering significant quantities of the controlled substances and other evidence. The defendant admitted to being involved in the conspiracy, selling drugs at one of the residences, and participating in music videos promoting the drug operation.After the indictment, the defendant entered a guilty plea to both conspiracy and substantive drug charges without a plea agreement. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted the plea. At sentencing, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, which attributed to the defendant all drugs seized in connection with the group’s activities at various residences. The court also applied a two-level enhancement for maintaining premises for drug distribution, based on co-conspirator conduct. The defendant objected, arguing he should be accountable only for drugs at the location where he sold, and that the enhancement should not apply based on co-conspirator actions.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant contested the drug quantity attributed to him and the application of the sentencing enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in attributing the full drug quantity to the defendant because the relevant conduct included reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators within the scope of the conspiracy. The court also held that the premises-maintaining enhancement could be based on co-conspirator conduct if it was reasonably foreseeable. The court affirmed the sentence. View "USA v. McLaurin" on Justia Law

First Solar Electric LLC was constructing a solar power plant in Georgia when five heavy rain events damaged the project. First Solar held a builders risk insurance policy with Zurich American Insurance Company, which covered both water and flood damage but applied different deductibles: $100,000 for water damage and $2.5 million for flood damage. Zurich initially determined the damage was water-related and issued three advance payments to First Solar, applying the lower deductible and not reserving rights to later change its determination. Subsequently, Zurich reversed its coverage decision, classified the events as floods, and asserted that the higher deductible applied, concluding First Solar’s losses did not exceed the deductible and closing the claim.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia reviewed the dispute. It granted partial summary judgment to both parties, finding that, absent waiver, the flood deductible applied, but Zurich had waived its right to enforce the flood deductible for all events by its conduct. The court also ruled that the policy’s suit-against-the-company provision did not bar First Solar’s suit as untimely. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on damages, after which the court denied Zurich’s motion to strike a damages witness and entered final judgment in favor of First Solar.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) Georgia law permits an insurer to waive a deductible provision that limits payment, but not coverage; (2) Zurich waived the flood deductible for the first three rain events by its unconditional payments and conduct, but a genuine factual dispute remains as to waiver for the last two events; (3) the suit-against-the-company provision is not a suit-limitation bar; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions; and (5) absent waiver, the flood deductible applies. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zurich American Insurance Co. v. First Solar Electric LLC" on Justia Law

A group of parents, authors, a free speech organization, and a book publisher brought a lawsuit against a county school board, challenging the removal of certain library books from public school libraries. The school board had adopted policies, as required by Florida law, mandating the removal of materials deemed pornographic or describing sexual conduct, and established procedures for reviewing objections to specific books. After objections were raised to various titles, review committees and the superintendent made recommendations, and the school board ultimately voted to remove several groups of books based on its existing policies and a directive aligned with state guidelines.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida considered whether members of the school board could claim legislative privilege to avoid being deposed about their reasons for voting to remove the books. The district court ruled that legislative privilege did not apply in this context, finding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books constituted administrative acts—applying established policy to particular facts—rather than legislative acts involving the creation or amendment of policy. The district court denied the board members’ motion for a protective order and subsequent motions to quash deposition subpoenas.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether legislative privilege shielded the school board members from testifying about their decisions to remove the books. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the board members’ votes to remove specific books, as applications of existing policy to individual cases, were administrative rather than legislative acts. Therefore, legislative privilege did not bar their depositions regarding those specific removal decisions. The court emphasized its holding was limited to the particular facts of this case and did not address whether other privileges or rules might limit such discovery. View "Pen American Center, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

A recently enacted Georgia law restricts minors’ ability to create accounts on social media platforms. The statute requires covered platforms to verify users’ ages, prohibits minors under sixteen from creating accounts without parental consent, and limits how personal data may be used for advertising to minors. The law defines “social media platform” broadly, but includes numerous exceptions for platforms with different primary functions. An internet trade association, representing major social media companies, challenged the law before its effective date, arguing that it violates the First Amendment, is unconstitutionally vague, and is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the law. The court found that the association had associational and third-party standing, that the law was likely a content-based speech restriction failing strict scrutiny, was unconstitutionally vague, and was preempted by federal law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the association had standing and whether it demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The circuit court held that the association had associational standing to challenge the law on behalf of its members. However, the court concluded that the association failed to meet the burden required for a facial First Amendment challenge under the standard set forth in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, because it did not adequately address the full range of the law’s applications and did not demonstrate that unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed constitutional ones. The court also found that the vagueness and Section 230 preemption claims were unlikely to succeed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the standing determination, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "NetChoice v. Attorney General, State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Florida enacted a statute (HB3) restricting minors’ access to social media platforms that employ certain “addictive features,” such as infinite scrolling, push notifications, and auto-play. Platforms meeting defined criteria—including algorithmic content selection and significant minor usage—must prohibit account creation by those under 14 and require parental consent for those aged 14–15. The Computer & Communications Industry Association and NetChoice, representing affected platforms, challenged the law on First Amendment grounds, asserting both facial and as-applied claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida initially denied a preliminary injunction for lack of associational standing, but after the plaintiffs amended their complaint and renewed their motion, the court granted a preliminary injunction. The district court found that the trade groups had standing, abstention under Younger v. Harris was unwarranted, and that although HB3 was a content-neutral regulation, it was insufficiently tailored to survive intermediate scrutiny, thus likely unconstitutional.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first held that the plaintiffs had associational standing to challenge HB3 on behalf of their members. The court also determined that the district court properly declined to abstain under Younger because substantial proceedings had already occurred in federal court before the state enforcement action was initiated. Addressing the merits, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that HB3 is a content-neutral regulation implicating the First Amendment, but it likely survives intermediate scrutiny due to its age-based tailoring and focus on addictive features. The court rejected the facial challenge, holding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated, as required by Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, that HB3’s unconstitutional applications substantially outweighed its constitutional ones. The disposition affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Computer & Communications Industry Association v. Attorney General, State of Florida" on Justia Law

A defendant was indicted in federal court for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty to the charge. At sentencing, his presentence investigation report calculated a higher base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines because of a prior Florida conviction for attempted manslaughter, which was treated as a “crime of violence.” The defendant also received enhancements for involvement with a stolen firearm and drugs, and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The recommended Guidelines range was 84 to 105 months. The defendant objected, arguing that his prior conviction was not a “crime of violence” and requested his federal sentence run concurrently with an expected state court sentence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida overruled his objections, found that attempted manslaughter was a crime of violence, and imposed an 84-month sentence, to run consecutively to any state sentence. The court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence even if it had ruled differently on the Guidelines issue. The defendant appealed, challenging the crime of violence finding, the consecutive sentence, and raising a new constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in finding Florida attempted manslaughter to be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines, and that its statement about imposing the same sentence did not render the error harmless due to procedural timing. The court affirmed that it was not an abuse of discretion to impose a consecutive sentence and rejected the constitutional challenge, finding it foreclosed by precedent. The sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law