Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two commercial fishermen and their family business challenged federal regulations that reduced catch limits for gag grouper in the Gulf of Mexico, a fish central to their livelihood. The fishermen argued that the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, which played a key role in proposing the catch limits and regulatory framework, was unconstitutionally composed and shielded from removal, violating the Appointments Clause and other constitutional provisions. Their complaint alleged significant financial harm resulting from the reduced catch limits.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama found that certain powers granted to the Council—specifically, three statutory “veto” provisions that allow the Council to block actions by the Secretary of Commerce—rendered Councilmembers “officers” wielding significant federal authority. It determined their appointments violated the Appointments Clause because they were not properly appointed as principal officers. However, instead of vacating the catch limit rule, the district court severed the unconstitutional veto provisions from the governing statute and entered judgment for the plaintiffs.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit largely agreed that the Council’s veto powers confer significant authority, so Councilmembers’ appointments as currently structured are constitutionally deficient. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that the remedy should be limited to invalidating actions taken with those veto powers. Because the gag grouper rule was not promulgated using the Council’s unconstitutional veto authority but rather through an advisory process ratified by the Secretary, the rule itself was not tainted. The court vacated the district court’s judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the government, concluding that vacatur of the challenged rule was unwarranted. View "Russo v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce" on Justia Law

Andrew Filipowski, a software entrepreneur, accumulated significant tax liability after selling his company for $3.5 billion in 1999 and claiming $110 million in losses through a partnership later deemed a sham by the U.S. Tax Court. The IRS assessed Filipowski’s individual tax liability, including taxes, penalties, and interest totaling approximately $140 million. Filipowski did not challenge the notice of deficiency or the amount owed, nor did he make substantive payments toward the liability, aside from applying a minor tax credit. When the IRS initiated collection proceedings, Filipowski sought a Collection Due Process hearing, indicating his inability to pay and offering an installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise (OIC).After receiving Filipowski’s OIC proposing to settle his tax debt for $1.5 million, the IRS’s collections department investigated his finances. The investigation raised concerns about Filipowski’s connections to the DePasquale Trust, delayed tax filings, and alleged undisclosed assets. The IRS calculated his reasonable collection potential as $5.9 million, which was less than the owed amount but still higher than the OIC. The IRS ultimately rejected the OIC on public policy grounds, reasoning that acceptance would undermine voluntary compliance. Filipowski challenged this decision in the U.S. Tax Court, arguing that disputed facts remained and that summary judgment was inappropriate. The Tax Court granted summary judgment in favor of the IRS, concluding that the rejection was supported by Filipowski’s tax history and the magnitude of his liability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Tax Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Filipowski’s OIC on public policy grounds and affirmed the Tax Court’s decision, finding no genuine disputes of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. View "Filipowski v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A physician brought a lawsuit on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that her employer and associated healthcare entities knowingly submitted false diagnosis codes to Medicare in order to obtain inflated payments. The case proceeded for several years. In February 2024, the defendants sought judgment on the pleadings or dismissal, arguing that the FCA’s qui tam provisions—which allow private individuals (relators) to sue on behalf of the government—violated the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, Take Care Clause, and Vesting Clause.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the defendants’ motion, concluding that the qui tam provisions violated the Appointments Clause. The district court reasoned that relators are “officers of the United States” because they exercise significant federal authority and occupy a continuing position established by law, but are not appointed by the President as required by Article II. The court dismissed the case, finding the relator lacked authority to proceed on behalf of the United States, and did not address the other constitutional arguments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s constitutional analysis de novo. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion, holding that relators under the FCA are not officers of the United States because they do not occupy a continuing position established by law. The court explained that relators’ roles are temporary, personal, and lack a continuing emolument or transferable duties. Therefore, the FCA’s qui tam provisions do not violate the Appointments Clause. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of the remaining constitutional arguments. View "Zafirov v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC" on Justia Law

Two Black employees, Hall and Hughes, worked as laborer-operators for Coal Bed Services, Inc., a subsidiary of Pate Holdings, Inc. They complained to their supervisor about alleged racially discriminatory conduct by another supervisor. About a month later, Hall and Hughes were fired after refusing a drug test on a jobsite. A White coworker, Ramsey, also refused the same test and was initially terminated, but was later allowed to return to work under conditions not imposed on Hall and Hughes. The company paid Ramsey for a full shift but only paid Hall and Hughes for the hours worked. Subsequent hires for their positions were White employees, including one previously fired for failing a drug test. Hall and Hughes alleged these events were motivated by racial discrimination and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Coal Bed Services and Pate Holdings, on all claims. Hall and Hughes had brought four claims: two under Title VII (race discrimination and retaliation) against Coal Bed Services, and two under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (race discrimination and retaliation) against both companies. The district court found, among other things, that the White coworker was not a valid comparator under the McDonnell Douglas framework and concluded that Hall and Hughes could not establish causation for their retaliation claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the companies discriminated and retaliated against Hall and Hughes. The court held that circumstantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination and retaliation under both Title VII and § 1981. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guthrie v. Coal Bed Services Inc." on Justia Law

Reginald Smith, previously convicted of multiple cocaine-related felonies in Florida state court, was arrested in December 2019 after officers investigating illegal hunting found him holding a loaded shotgun. During a search, officers discovered additional ammunition, a hunting knife, and MDMA pills. An agent determined that Smith’s shotgun had traveled in interstate commerce, having been manufactured outside Florida. Smith, as a result, was indicted for possession of a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of MDMA under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He pleaded guilty to both counts.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed Smith’s prior convictions to determine whether they triggered the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The court considered evolving precedent—including United States v. Conage and United States v. Jackson—regarding whether certain Florida drug crimes qualified as “serious drug offenses” under ACCA. After law developments clarified that Smith’s two 1993 convictions for selling cocaine and his 2001 conviction for trafficking cocaine were ACCA predicates under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court applied the ACCA enhancement. Smith was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for the firearm count and 12 months for MDMA possession, to run concurrently. Smith objected to the ACCA enhancement but acknowledged its applicability under current circuit law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence. The court held that § 922(g)(1) did not violate the Second Amendment or Commerce Clause, Smith invited any error regarding ACCA classification of his convictions, the district court’s error under Erlinger v. United States did not affect Smith’s substantial rights, and any error in calculating his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines was harmless. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law

A city’s Chief of Police was recruited for his reformist reputation and soon after his arrival, he observed and reported that several City Commissioners were improperly interfering in police investigations and using police resources to pursue personal vendettas. The Chief communicated his concerns to the Mayor and City Manager, and, believing himself unable to investigate the Commissioners due to a prior City resolution, he sent a whistleblowing memorandum detailing abuses of power to the Mayor, City Manager, the State Attorney’s Office, and the FBI. The memo was subsequently leaked to the media. Following this, the Chief faced public criticism from the Commissioners, had his job responsibilities undermined, was suspended with pay by the City Manager pending a termination hearing, and was ultimately terminated by the City Commission.The Chief filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against three Commissioners and the City Manager, alleging retaliation for protected First Amendment activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual defendants moved to dismiss, asserting legislative and qualified immunity. The district court denied their motions, finding that neither defense shielded the Commissioners or the City Manager at that stage.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of immunity de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity because terminating an employee is administrative, not legislative, action. The court further held that the Commissioners were not entitled to qualified immunity at the pleading stage because, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the Chief’s whistleblower memo was constitutionally protected speech, and binding precedent clearly established that retaliating against such speech is unlawful. However, the court held that the City Manager was entitled to qualified immunity, as it was not clearly established that suspending the Chief with pay, pending further proceedings, constituted an adverse employment action. The panel affirmed the denial of immunity for the Commissioners, reversed as to the City Manager, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Acevedo v. de la Portilla" on Justia Law

A group of Colombian plaintiffs retained two attorneys under a contingency fee agreement to sue a multinational corporation for allegedly funding a paramilitary group that murdered their relatives. The agreement specified that the attorneys would receive one-third of any monetary award obtained before trial. A conflict soon arose between the attorneys after one joined a law firm, leading to disputes over representation and eventual court intervention. The case was consolidated into multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and over time, one attorney was discharged, with the court instructing the discharged attorney’s firm to file a charging lien to preserve its claim for fees and costs.After a settlement was reached that allocated $12.8 million to the plaintiffs and their counsel, the discharged firm moved to enforce its charging lien against the attorney’s share of the recovery. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended nearly full payment to the firm. The district court adopted this recommendation, ordered the disputed funds to be held in the court registry pending appeal, and required that the funds not be disbursed until appellate review was exhausted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order enforcing the charging lien. The Eleventh Circuit held that such orders do not fall within the collateral-order doctrine because they do not resolve important issues separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The court explained that attorneys’ contractual or equitable rights to payment do not implicate substantial public interests or values of a high order and can be adequately reviewed after final judgment. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "All Does v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP" on Justia Law

A passenger aboard a cruise ship alleged that, after becoming inebriated, she was separated from her friends and ended up in a maintenance closet with a crewmember. She stated that she was held against her will and sexually assaulted. Both she and the crewmember gave differing accounts of the incident to FBI agents: she could not recall if she consented to sexual conduct, while the crewmember claimed it was consensual and that he did not know she was intoxicated. The FBI investigator ultimately concluded the encounter was consensual, and prosecutors declined to bring criminal charges.The passenger brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida asserting claims including false imprisonment and sexual assault. In pretrial proceedings, the district court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment liability, finding that the cruise line had not produced admissible evidence to create a dispute of material fact. The district court excluded the FBI reports as hearsay. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the cruise line was already liable for false imprisonment and limited the ability of the defendant to challenge the factual basis for that claim. The jury found the cruise line liable for sexual assault but rejected the negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, awarding over $10 million in damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on false imprisonment and in excluding the FBI investigator’s conclusions, which were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court reversed the partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacated the judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remanded for a new trial on those claims. The negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims remain resolved in favor of the cruise line. View "Doe v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

After his termination from the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, Jeremy Ellis, who had worked there since 2007 and as a detention deputy since 2010, filed suit against the Sheriff in his official capacity. Ellis claimed he was fired in retaliation for filing charges of discrimination with both the EEOC and the Florida Commission on Human Relations, which alleged disability and religious discrimination. The Sheriff's Office conducted an internal investigation after Ellis's EEOC filing, focusing on alleged falsehoods and disparagement found in his charge, and asserted his termination was based on these false statements, along with a procedural infraction regarding address notification. Evidence at trial showed that Ellis’s drinking and his statements during the investigation were also considered, but the termination notice expressly cited the EEOC charge as the basis for dismissal.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida heard the case. At trial, both sides presented evidence regarding the motivations for Ellis's termination. The jury found in Ellis’s favor on both his retaliation claims under Title VII and Florida law, awarding him significant damages. After the verdict, the Sheriff moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing insufficient evidence of causation, and separately for a new trial, contending the jury was improperly instructed that an employer cannot fire an employee for statements in an EEOC charge, even if false. The district court denied both motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s jury instruction and its denial of judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court held that, under binding precedent, an employer may not terminate an employee for statements made in an EEOC charge, even if believed false, and found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of retaliatory motive. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. View "Ellis v. Sheriff, Hillsborough County Florida" on Justia Law

A Florida state inmate alleged that he was severely beaten by prison guards on two occasions and subsequently experienced seizures and ongoing pain in his head, hand, and ribs. After the assaults, he sought medical care and was treated for his head wound by staff, but further injuries were not assessed. When he was later evaluated by a prison doctor, he claimed the doctor refused to provide meaningful treatment for his injuries and dismissed his complaints, allegedly in retaliation for grievances the inmate had filed against him. Over the following months, the inmate’s hand injury worsened, and a later orthopedic evaluation confirmed a deformity that required physical therapy. Despite this recommendation, the doctor again refused treatment, allegedly referencing the inmate’s previous grievances as the reason.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the doctor, finding that he was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s medical needs and had not retaliated against him for filing grievances. The district court concluded that the doctor neither acted with subjective recklessness nor denied medical care for retaliatory reasons.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. The appellate court found that, crediting the inmate’s verified complaint, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the doctor was deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs regarding both the head and hand injuries, and that he acted with retaliatory motive in denying care after grievances were filed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the inmate’s claims should proceed to a jury. View "Burton v. Espino" on Justia Law