Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

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The case involves Jose Rosado, a Hispanic male of Colombian origin, who worked as an Information Technology (IT) Specialist for the United States Navy. Rosado alleged that he was denied promotions on five occasions between 2014 and 2018 due to race, national origin, and age discrimination, as well as retaliation for his prior Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) activity. The promotions in question were for various IT Specialist positions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast (NAVFAC SE).In the lower court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy. The court concluded that Rosado failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation for any of the promotion decisions. Specifically, the court found that Rosado did not provide sufficient evidence to show that he was equally or more qualified than the individuals who were selected for the positions or that the Navy's decisions were influenced by discriminatory or retaliatory motives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Rosado did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he failed to show that the selected candidates were similarly situated in all material respects or that unlawful discrimination played any part in the Navy's decision-making process. Additionally, the court found that Rosado did not present sufficient evidence to support his retaliation claims, as there was no indication that retaliatory animus influenced the Navy's actions.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Navy, concluding that Rosado did not provide enough evidence to support his claims of discrimination and retaliation. View "Rosado v. Secretary, U.S. Department of the Navy" on Justia Law

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Sheryl Glover and Cathy Booze, plaintiffs, argued that Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by charging optional fees for expedited mortgage payments online or by phone. Ocwen offered borrowers the option to make expedited payments for an additional fee, while mailed payments incurred no fee. Glover and Booze paid these fees multiple times, but their mortgage agreements did not mention such fees.The Southern District of Florida held that Ocwen was acting as a debt collector when it charged the fees, that the fees were incidental to the principal obligation, and that they were not permitted by law nor authorized by the debt agreements. The district court awarded actual damages to Glover and Booze. Ocwen appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Ocwen, as a debt collector, violated the FDCPA by charging an amount not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. The court emphasized that the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from collecting any amount unless it is expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by law. The court found that the convenience fees were not permitted by law, as neither the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) nor the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) substantively authorized such fees. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Glover and Booze. View "Glover v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Consumer Law
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Rhonda Fleming, an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee (FCIT), filed a pro se lawsuit against Warden Erica Strong and the United States, alleging Eighth Amendment violations due to her exposure to mold, asbestos, and COVID-19, which she claimed caused severe health issues. Fleming sought injunctive relief and damages under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). She alleged that despite her complaints, the prison officials, including Warden Strong, failed to address the hazardous conditions, leading to her contracting COVID-19 twice and requiring hospitalization.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The magistrate judge recommended dismissing most of Fleming's claims, including all claims against Strong, citing that Bivens did not provide a remedy for her Eighth Amendment claim. However, the district court disagreed, finding that Fleming's Eighth Amendment claim was similar to a previously recognized Bivens claim and allowed it to proceed. The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the district court's order recognizing a Bivens cause of action. The Eleventh Circuit joined four other circuits in holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to Bivens-extension orders that do not address qualified immunity. The court emphasized that qualified immunity adequately protects government officials from the burdens of litigation and that separation-of-powers concerns with Bivens extensions do not justify immediate appeal. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fleming v. FCI Tallahassee Warden" on Justia Law

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Kristie Williams, a former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham, requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to care for her daughter, who was allegedly sexually assaulted while serving in the Marine Corps. The University approved her leave, but Williams claimed she continued to receive work-related communications and criticism from her supervisors during her leave. This led to her resignation, and she subsequently sued the University, alleging interference with her FMLA rights and retaliation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama denied the University’s motion to dismiss, which argued that the suit was barred by state sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that Williams might have been seeking family-care leave under the FMLA, for which the Supreme Court had previously held that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Williams’s suit could proceed regardless of whether she sought family-care leave, active-duty leave, or servicemember-family leave. For family-care leave, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hibbs confirmed that Congress had abrogated state sovereign immunity. For active-duty and servicemember-family leave, the court concluded that Alabama waived its sovereign immunity under the plan-of-the-Convention doctrine when it joined the Union, as these provisions were enacted pursuant to Congress’s constitutional authority to raise and support the military. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the University’s motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama" on Justia Law

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Alexander Olson was involved in a conspiracy with seven others to set fires in four Walmart stores in Alabama and Mississippi during business hours. The fires caused chaos, fear, and significant property damage. Olson was indicted on two counts of maliciously setting fires and one count of conspiracy to do so. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges and a recommended sentence of 60 months imprisonment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama accepted Olson's guilty plea but did not follow the government's sentencing recommendation. Instead, the court sentenced Olson to 180 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay over $7 million in restitution. The court justified the higher sentence by citing the extensive property damage, the risk to human life, and the political motivation behind the fires.Olson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by not clearly specifying whether the sentence was a result of a departure or a variance and that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court's statement that it would have imposed the same sentence "whether an upward departure or a variance" rendered the distinction irrelevant. The appellate court also held that the sentence was substantively reasonable given the severity of the offenses and the factors considered by the district court.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in the sentencing. View "USA v. Alexander Olson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Armando Guevara worked as a domestic service employee for Robert and Maria Zamora for over a decade, performing various tasks such as cleaning, car maintenance, and grocery shopping. Occasionally, he also provided services for the Zamoras' businesses, Lafise Corporation and Latin American Financial Services, Inc. (LAFS). Guevara was paid $1,365.88 biweekly, but there was no written employment agreement, and the parties disagreed on whether this amount represented a salary or an hourly wage. The Zamoras claimed they paid him an hourly rate with overtime, while Guevara asserted he was paid a salary without proper overtime compensation.Guevara filed a putative class action against the Zamoras, Lafise, and LAFS for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Guevara was not covered by the FLSA through either "enterprise coverage" or "individual coverage." The court also found that Guevara was fully compensated for all his overtime work hours based on the Zamoras' testimony and calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The appellate court determined that there was a genuine dispute regarding Guevara's regular hourly rate and, therefore, his overtime rate. The court noted that the Zamoras did not maintain accurate records, and the evidence presented created a genuine issue of fact that should be determined by a jury. The appellate court also vacated the district court's ruling on whether Lafise was a joint employer, as the lower court failed to provide sufficient reasoning and did not address the relevant factors. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Guevara v. Lafise Corp." on Justia Law

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Sheldon Turner, born in Jamaica to Jamaican parents Desmond and Roslyn Turner, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1990. His parents divorced in 1987, and his mother remarried twice, including a remarriage to Desmond in 1994. Roslyn naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1999 while still married to Desmond. Turner was convicted of a felony in 2016, leading to removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Turner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that Turner did not derive U.S. citizenship from his mother’s naturalization because his parents were married at the time of her naturalization, thus not meeting the legal separation requirement under former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3). The IJ’s decision was based on the statute’s plain language and the rationale explained in Levy v. U.S. Attorney General. Turner’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was dismissed, with the BIA agreeing that the statute requires a continuing legal separation at the time of naturalization.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the BIA’s interpretation. The court held that former 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) imposes a continuing requirement of legal separation that must exist at the time all other conditions of derivative citizenship are satisfied. Since Turner’s mother was married to his father at the time of her naturalization, Turner did not derive automatic citizenship. The court denied Turner’s petition for review. View "Turner v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Clevon Webster and his brother used stolen social security numbers to apply for government benefits from September 2014 until June 2015. The government had until June 3, 2020, to bring charges against Webster due to the five-year statute of limitations. However, the Southern District of Florida suspended grand jury sessions from March 2020 until November 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic. Unable to obtain an indictment, the government filed an information against Webster on May 26, 2020, but did not obtain a waiver of indictment from him. After grand juries resumed, a grand jury indicted Webster on January 21, 2021, for the same offenses.Webster moved to dismiss the indictment as untimely, arguing that filing an information without a waiver of indictment did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court denied his motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report that concluded filing an information was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations and that the later indictment related back to the date of the timely filed information. Webster then pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to commit access device fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that filing an information without a waiver of indictment tolls the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The court reasoned that the statute's text, structure, and history support this interpretation and that the statute does not require a waiver of indictment to toll the limitations period. The court also held that the January 2021 indictment related back to the timely filed May 2020 information, making the indictment timely. View "USA v. Webster" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves the Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited (IMC) challenging a decision by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the interpretation of "prior express consent" under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA requires that robocalls must have the called party's "prior express consent." The FCC's 2012 regulation defined this as "prior express written consent" for telemarketing or advertising calls. In 2023, the FCC issued a new rule further interpreting "prior express consent" to include two additional restrictions: (1) consent must be given to only one entity at a time, and (2) the subject matter of the calls must be logically and topically associated with the interaction that prompted the consent.The FCC's 2023 Order was challenged by IMC, which argued that the FCC exceeded its statutory authority under the TCPA. IMC contended that the new restrictions conflicted with the ordinary statutory meaning of "prior express consent." The FCC defended its rule, claiming it was consistent with the common understanding of the phrase and within its authority to implement the TCPA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FCC's additional restrictions on "prior express consent" were inconsistent with the ordinary statutory meaning of the phrase. The court held that under common law principles, "prior express consent" means a willingness for certain conduct to occur, clearly and unmistakably stated before the conduct. The court concluded that the FCC's one-to-one-consent and logically-and-topically-related restrictions impermissibly altered this meaning.The Eleventh Circuit granted IMC's petition for review, vacated Part III.D of the FCC's 2023 Order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court determined that the FCC had exceeded its statutory authority by imposing additional restrictions that were not supported by the TCPA's text. View "Insurance Marketing Coalition Limited v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law