Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Walmart, Inc. faced allegations from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for 11,103 violations of immigration-related recordkeeping requirements at 20 locations. These cases were assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Department of Justice’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). Before the ALJ could rule on the merits, Walmart filed a lawsuit in federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the "good cause" removal procedure for ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Walmart argued that this removal procedure infringed upon the President’s executive power under Article II of the Constitution.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia ruled in favor of Walmart, declaring § 7521(a) unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the Department and its Chief ALJ from adjudicating ICE’s complaints against Walmart. The district court refused to sever § 7521(a) from the rest of the statute.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The Eleventh Circuit held that the APA’s § 7521(a) is constitutional as applied to the Department’s ALJs in OCAHO. The court reasoned that the ALJs perform purely adjudicative functions, have limited duties, and lack policymaking or administrative authority. Additionally, the decisions of the ALJs are subject to plenary review by the Attorney General, who is removable at will by the President, ensuring sufficient executive control.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s permanent injunction and reversed its entry of summary judgment for Walmart. The court also noted that even if § 7521(a) were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to sever the "good cause" removal restriction, leaving the rest of the APA intact. View "Walmart, Inc. v. King" on Justia Law

In 2014, Mikel Mims pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and was sentenced to three years of probation and ordered to pay $255,620 in restitution. After completing her probation in 2017, Mims stopped making restitution payments. In 2022, the district court ordered Mims to resume her restitution payments, prompting Mims to appeal, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and violated her due process rights.The district court for the Southern District of Florida initially expressed doubts about its jurisdiction after Mims's probation ended. However, after the government filed a motion and Mims responded, the court concluded it had jurisdiction under various statutory provisions and ordered Mims to comply with the original restitution order, including making up for missed payments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its restitution order, as it was part of Mims's original criminal sentence. The court also found that Mims had been given adequate notice and opportunities to be heard, satisfying due process requirements. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in ordering Mims to resume her restitution payments and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States v. Mims" on Justia Law

Ka’Toria Gray filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC (Ala-Koch), its parent company Koch Foods, Inc., and former Ala-Koch employees Melissa McDickinson and David Birchfield, alleging harassment. The jury found in favor of Koch Foods and Ala-Koch on all claims, in favor of Birchfield and McDickinson on Gray’s claims of invasion of privacy and outrage, and in favor of Gray on her claims for assault and battery, awarding her $50,000 in total damages.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied all parties' motions for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) and entered a final judgment consistent with the jury verdict. The court also awarded costs to Gray against Birchfield and McDickinson and to Koch Foods and Ala-Koch against Gray.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Birchfield and McDickinson’s renewed motion for JMOL on the assault and battery claims, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The court also upheld the punitive damages awarded to Gray, concluding that the evidence met the clear and convincing standard required under Alabama law.The court rejected Gray’s argument for a new trial on her Title VII sexual harassment claim, noting that she waived her right to contest the verdicts as inconsistent by not objecting before the jury was discharged. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Gray’s constructive discharge claim, as the jury’s verdict on the hostile work environment claim precluded her constructive discharge claim.Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s prevailing party determinations, awarding costs to Gray against Birchfield and McDickinson and to Koch Foods and Ala-Koch against Gray. The court found no abuse of discretion in these awards. View "Gray v. Birchfield" on Justia Law

Charles Rowe pleaded guilty to three federal crimes and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. He had a prior conviction for cocaine trafficking under Florida law. The district court determined that this prior conviction was a controlled substance offense, triggering a sentencing enhancement under the career offender guidelines. Rowe appealed, challenging the legitimacy of his guilty plea and the enhanced sentence.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida accepted Rowe's guilty plea after a thorough plea colloquy conducted by a magistrate judge. The probation office recommended an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act and the career offender guidelines due to Rowe's prior convictions. Rowe objected, arguing that his prior conviction for cocaine trafficking did not qualify as a controlled substance offense. The district court held the sentencing in abeyance pending a decision from the Florida Supreme Court on a related issue. After the Florida Supreme Court's decision, the district court applied the enhanced sentence and sentenced Rowe to 360 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Conage II clarified that a conviction for cocaine trafficking under Florida law requires proof of possession with intent to distribute, aligning it with the federal definition of a controlled substance offense under the career offender guidelines. The court concluded that Rowe's prior conviction was a controlled substance offense and upheld the enhanced sentence. The court also found that the district court properly substantiated and accepted Rowe's guilty plea. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Rowe's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Rowe" on Justia Law

Summit Carbon Solutions, LLC plans to build an interstate pipeline through Iowa, passing through Shelby and Story Counties. Both counties enacted ordinances regulating pipelines, including setback, emergency response plan, and local permit requirements. Summit challenged these ordinances, claiming they were preempted by the federal Pipeline Safety Act (PSA) and Iowa law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Summit, permanently enjoining the ordinances.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa reviewed the case and ruled in favor of Summit, finding that the PSA preempted the counties' ordinances. The court held that the ordinances imposed safety standards, which are under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also found that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, which grants the Iowa Utilities Commission (IUC) the authority to regulate pipeline routes and safety standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the PSA preempts the Shelby and Story ordinances' setback, emergency response, and abandonment provisions. The court found that the ordinances' primary motivation was safety, which falls under the exclusive regulatory authority of the federal government. The court also held that the ordinances were inconsistent with Iowa state law, as they imposed additional requirements that could prohibit pipeline construction even if the IUC had granted a permit.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in both cases, but vacated and remanded the judgment in the Story County case to the extent it addressed a repealed ordinance. View "McNair v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Rachael Gorecki applied for disability benefits and received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) whose appointment was ratified by Nancy Berryhill during her second tenure as Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. The ALJ denied Gorecki's benefits application, and the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council denied review, making the decision final. Gorecki then sued, arguing that the ALJ had no constitutional authority to issue a decision because Berryhill's second stint as Acting Commissioner violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama rejected Gorecki's argument, aligning with other appellate courts that had ruled on similar issues. The district court found that Berryhill's second tenure as Acting Commissioner was lawful under the FVRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and joined five other circuits in holding that the FVRA authorized Berryhill's second stint as Acting Commissioner. The court found that the plain text of the FVRA allowed Berryhill to serve again as Acting Commissioner once a nomination for the office was submitted to the Senate, regardless of whether the nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Berryhill's ratification of the ALJ's appointment was valid and that the ALJ had the authority to deny Gorecki's benefits application. The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Gorecki v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Steven Morgan was convicted by a jury of three drug-trafficking crimes for smuggling cocaine from the Caribbean into South Florida. The scheme involved shipping jars of shaving gel with false bottoms containing cocaine. The operation was discovered when law enforcement dogs in Puerto Rico alerted on packages containing cocaine. A controlled delivery led to Morgan's arrest, during which two cellphones were found near him. Morgan initially claimed ownership of both phones but later stated only the iPhone was his.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida suppressed Morgan's statement in the patrol car and his statements made 18 months later but admitted the LG phone's contents, finding Morgan had abandoned it. The court also allowed the government to introduce Morgan's initial statement claiming ownership of both phones but later reversed this decision during the trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in finding Morgan had abandoned the LG phone, thus allowing its contents to be admitted. The court also found that the Fifth Amendment did not require suppression of the phone's contents, as Morgan's statement was voluntary despite being obtained in violation of Miranda. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a mistrial after an agent referred to Morgan's suppressed statement, finding no substantial prejudice. The court also upheld the admission of testimony from Agent Gaviria and expert testimony from Agent Suarez, finding no plain error in the government's expert disclosures. Finally, the court found no cumulative error warranting reversal and affirmed Morgan's conviction. View "United States v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Joseph Heid filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Orange County Sheriff's Deputies Mark Rutkoski and Forrest Best, alleging they used unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The incident occurred after Heid had a domestic dispute, left his house, and later returned armed with a rifle. He engaged in a gunfight with deputies in his backyard and then re-entered his house. When he exited the house again, Deputies Rutkoski and Best, believing he was still armed, shot him multiple times.In the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Heid was found guilty of several charges, including Attempted Second Degree Murder of a Law Enforcement Officer and Resisting an Officer with Violence. Heid then filed a civil lawsuit, and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment, which asserted qualified immunity. The District Court found there was a genuine factual dispute regarding whether the deputies used excessive force and whether Heid posed a threat when he exited the house.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Deputies Rutkoski and Best did not violate Heid's Fourth Amendment rights. The court reasoned that the deputies reasonably believed Heid was armed and dangerous based on the information they had, including Heid's recent gunfight with other deputies and his rapid exit from the house. The court held that the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances and that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity. The judgment of the District Court was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "Heid v. Rutkoski" on Justia Law

Laurence Bonday, a former employee of Nalco Company LLC, filed an arbitration demand against Nalco, alleging that the company violated its severance plan by demoting him without offering severance pay. Nalco argued that a court needed to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement before proceeding. However, the arbitrator concluded that Bonday’s severance claim fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarded him nothing on that claim. Instead, the arbitrator awarded Bonday $129,465.50 on an ERISA discrimination claim that he never raised.Nalco moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by deciding the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on a claim Bonday never made. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Nalco's motion, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by interpreting the scope of the arbitration agreement and awarding relief on an unraised ERISA discrimination claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by granting relief on an ERISA discrimination claim that Bonday did not submit for arbitration. The court emphasized that an arbitrator can only bind the parties on issues they have agreed to submit and that the arbitrator's decision to award relief on an unsubmitted claim was beyond her authority. The court did not address the district court's first reason for vacating the award, as the second reason was sufficient to affirm the decision. View "Nalco Company LLC v. Bonday" on Justia Law

Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. (Sunshine State) is an EB-5 regional center that was designated in 2014. The EB-5 program allows immigrants to obtain visas by investing in job-creating enterprises in the U.S. The EB-5 Reform and Integrity Act of 2022 (the Act) introduced an annual fee for regional centers to fund the EB-5 Integrity Fund, aimed at preventing fraud. Sunshine State, which is not currently sponsoring new investment projects, argued that it should not be subject to this fee because it was designated before the Act was passed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Sunshine State’s motion for summary judgment and granted, in part, the motion to dismiss filed by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The district court found that the Act’s text did not exempt pre-Act regional centers from the Integrity Fund Fee and that the structure of the Act suggested the opposite.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act’s language and structure indicate that all regional centers, regardless of when they were designated, are subject to the Integrity Fund Fee. The court reasoned that the term “designated under subparagraph (E)” includes both pre- and post-Act regional centers because the Act governs the entire EB-5 program, and any designation for that program must now operate under subparagraph (E). The court also rejected Sunshine State’s argument that imposing the fee would be retroactive, stating that the fee is prospective and applies to the ongoing status of being a designated regional center.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the imposition of the Integrity Fund Fee on Sunshine State. View "Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, US Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law