Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sonny Ramdeo, while working as a payroll director for Promise Healthcare, recommended the company hire PayServ Tax, which he falsely claimed was a subsidiary of Ceridian Corporation. In reality, PayServ was Ramdeo’s own company, and he diverted over $20 million from Promise to fund a charter airline service. After Promise’s auditors discovered discrepancies, Ramdeo was arrested and pled guilty to wire fraud and money laundering. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $21,442,173 in restitution.Ramdeo challenged his conviction and restitution amount on direct appeal, which was unsuccessful. He then sought a writ of audita querela to contest the restitution amount, which the district court recharacterized as a petition for coram nobis and subsequently denied. The Eleventh Circuit declined to address the merits of his claim. Ramdeo also filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, which the district court denied as frivolous and meritless. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this decision. Ramdeo later filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and new financial evidence. The district court denied the petition, stating that prisoners in federal custody are ineligible for coram nobis relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that being in custody does not categorically bar a petitioner from seeking coram nobis relief for non-custodial aspects of their sentence, such as restitution. The court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available when no other remedy is available, and the petitioner presents sound reasons for not seeking relief earlier. View "Ramdeo v. United States" on Justia Law

Eric Brenes-Colon was arrested following an investigation into his co-conspirator's trafficking of firearms and large quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and MDMA. Brenes-Colon obtained cocaine from Puerto Rico and provided it to his co-conspirator for distribution. During a search of the co-conspirator's apartment, where Brenes-Colon was living, agents found drugs, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, cash, and evidence linking Brenes-Colon to the apartment. He was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute MDMA. Brenes-Colon pleaded guilty to all charges.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida sentenced Brenes-Colon to 108 months’ imprisonment. The court emphasized the seriousness of his criminal activities due to the large volume of drugs trafficked, stating that illegal drugs are the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 35. Brenes-Colon appealed, arguing that the court's statement was a clearly erroneous fact and that it constituted procedural error in determining his sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as Brenes-Colon did not object to his sentence in the lower court. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit plain error. It held that the district court was entitled to rely on its experience and common sense in sentencing, and that the statement about the deadliness of illegal drugs was not required to be supported by empirical studies in the record. The appellate court affirmed the district court's sentence, concluding that Brenes-Colon did not demonstrate that the alleged error affected his substantial rights or the fairness of the judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Brenes-Colon" on Justia Law

Richard Spizzirri and his fourth wife, Holly Lueders, entered into a prenuptial agreement requiring Spizzirri’s estate to transfer $6 million to Lueders and $3 million to her children upon his death. After Spizzirri’s death, the estate paid the stepchildren and deducted the payments as “claims against the estate” for tax purposes. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, denying these deductions, leading the estate to petition the tax court for review.The U.S. Tax Court ruled that the transfers to the stepchildren were not deductible as “claims against the estate” because they were neither “contracted bona fide” nor “for an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth.” The estate failed to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, as it did not provide credible evidence to support the deductions. The court found that the payments were essentially donative in character, as they were made to keep Lueders happy and maintain the marriage, rather than as part of an arm’s length transaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the tax court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the payments to the stepchildren were not contracted bona fide, as they were related to Lueders’s expectation of inheritance and lacked the characteristics of a bona fide transaction. The court emphasized that the payments were made with donative intent and were not part of an ordinary business transaction. Therefore, the estate was not entitled to deduct the $3 million transfer to the stepchildren as “claims against the estate.” View "Estate of Spizzirri v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

A couple, the Marons, alleged that Florida's Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They claimed that the Act allowed the state to take their unclaimed property without compensating them for the earnings accrued while the property was in the state's custody. The Act requires holders of unclaimed property to deliver it to the state's Department of Financial Services, which then uses the property for public purposes, including investing it. The Marons argued that they were entitled to these earnings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida dismissed the Marons' suit. The court reasoned that the state could constitutionally escheat the property altogether, so it could also keep the property in its custody without compensating for the earnings. The court also addressed jurisdictional issues, concluding that the Marons had standing and that their claim was not fully barred by sovereign immunity, but ultimately found that the Marons failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over the Marons' takings claim, as the Marons had standing, the claim was ripe, and it was not barred by sovereign immunity. However, the appellate court disagreed with the district court's analysis on the merits. The appellate court held that the Act did not transfer title of the unclaimed property to the state, but merely placed it in the state's custody. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the Marons' property was directly appropriated by the state and whether the Act provided just compensation. View "Maron v. Chief Financial Officer of Florida" on Justia Law

Curtis Solomon, Devin Chance, and Jamaur Lewis were convicted of multiple counts, including Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery, and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. Their convictions for conspiracy to carry a firearm during a crime of violence were vacated following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States. The district court amended their judgments by removing the vacated counts but reimposed the same sentences on the remaining counts without providing an explanation for denying their requests for de novo resentencing.The appellants appealed the amended judgments, arguing that the district court erred by not explaining its decision to deny de novo resentencing and contending that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case.The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellants' challenge to the district court's refusal to conduct a de novo resentencing because no certificate of appealability (COA) had been issued on that question. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to consider the appellants' challenge to their § 924(c) convictions based on Hobbs Act robbery.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its precedent that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, did not disturb its prior holdings that completed Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. Therefore, the appellants' § 924(c) convictions based on Hobbs Act robbery were affirmed.The court affirmed the appellants' § 924(c) convictions and dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction regarding the challenge to the district court's denial of de novo resentencing. View "USA v. Solomon" on Justia Law

Arturs Spila, a Latvian national, entered the United States in May 2018 and deposited over $284,000 in cash into three bank accounts over three months. The cash originated from a fraudulent scheme where victims were hired for fake work-from-home jobs, instructed to cash checks, and mail the cash to Spila. The checks bounced, and the victims were not reimbursed. Spila then wired over $200,000 from these accounts, mostly to international recipients, in small transactions to avoid mandatory reporting.A federal grand jury indicted Spila for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The Northern District of Georgia district court admitted emails between Spila and his co-conspirators as evidence and allowed a forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The jury convicted Spila, and he was sentenced to 32 months in prison and one year of supervised release. Spila appealed, arguing insufficient evidence of his knowledge that the money came from a felony, prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, improper authentication of emails, and improper lay witness testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government presented sufficient evidence to prove Spila knew the money came from unlawful activity, even if he did not know it was a felony. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct, as the prosecutor's comments were fair responses to defense arguments. The court also ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the emails as self-authenticating documents and allowing the forensic accountant to testify as a lay witness. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Spila's conviction. View "United States v. Spila" on Justia Law

A Florida restaurant, Hamburger Mary’s, regularly hosted drag performances, including family-friendly shows that invited children. Following the enactment of Florida’s Senate Bill 1438, which prohibits children from attending "adult live performances" deemed obscene for minors, Hamburger Mary’s canceled its family-friendly shows and barred children from all performances, fearing penalties under the new law.Hamburger Mary’s filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the Governor of Florida and the Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation (FDBPR), alleging that the Act was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a content-based speech regulation that failed strict scrutiny. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Act and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Act was likely unconstitutional on its face due to its vague and overbroad nature. The Act’s prohibition on "lewd conduct" was found to be insufficiently specific under the Miller test for obscenity, which requires clear definitions to avoid arbitrary enforcement and to protect free speech. Additionally, the Act’s age-variable obscenity standard, which adjusts the criteria for what is considered obscene based on the age of the child present, was deemed unconstitutionally vague and likely to chill a substantial amount of protected speech.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against Hamburger Mary’s and others, citing the need for clarity in speech regulations to avoid arbitrary enforcement and protect First Amendment rights. View "HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

In 2008, Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera began working with co-conspirators in Latin America to obtain and transport cocaine for importation into the United States. Rafael Segundo Castro Diaz joined the conspiracy later, helping transport 1,200 kilos of cocaine in April 2013. The United States Coast Guard intercepted the boat carrying the cocaine, and the men aboard were arrested. Years later, a federal grand jury returned three indictments against Gomez Rivera and Castro Diaz, with the second superseding indictment expanding the conspiracy period from January 2008 to September 2013.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the second superseding indictment, which they argued was untimely and broadened the original charges. The defendants then negotiated a stipulated bench trial, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their motions to dismiss. The district court adjudicated them guilty, but there were clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment documentation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a superseding indictment can satisfy the statute of limitations if it is independently timely or relates back to a timely prior indictment. The second superseding indictment was independently timely, as it was returned within five years of the alleged conspiracy period. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, as both defendants stipulated to facts indicating their involvement in the conspiracy until September 2013. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences but remanded for the correction of clerical errors in Castro Diaz's judgment. View "USA v. Santiago Alirio Gomez Rivera" on Justia Law

Jeremy Jones was stopped by Officer David Ceinski for a traffic infraction. Jones complied with Ceinski’s instructions to exit his car and provide his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Jones also informed Ceinski that he had a firearm in the car. After seeing the firearm under the driver’s seat, Ceinski grabbed Jones’s wrist, twisted his arm, and pushed him against the car. While Jones was subdued, Ceinski choked him until he could not breathe and punched him on the top of his head. Jones filed a complaint against Ceinski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.The magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted Ceinski’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, ruling that Ceinski’s conduct did not violate any clearly established federal right.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Ceinski used excessive force when he choked and punched Jones after he was subdued and could not access his firearm. The court noted that Jones’s right to be free from excessive force was clearly established, since controlling case law placed the illegality of Ceinski’s actions beyond debate. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Ceinski and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Ceinski" on Justia Law

A former president of Panama, while residing in the United States, was extradited to Panama under a bilateral treaty. Panama initially charged him with specific crimes, but after his extradition, he was prosecuted for additional money laundering crimes not included in the original extradition request. He claimed these prosecutions violated the treaty's rule of specialty, which restricts prosecution to the crimes listed in the extradition request unless the extradited individual has had the opportunity to return to the extraditing country.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed his lawsuit for lack of standing. The court concluded that he failed to show that his injury was traceable to the defendants' actions or that a favorable ruling would redress his injuries. The court also determined that he lacked standing under the treaty's rule of specialty provision because the United States had waived its right to object to the additional prosecutions, and his rights under the treaty were derivative of the United States' rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish Article III standing because his injury was not fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, as the decision to prosecute him was made independently by Panamanian officials. Additionally, the court found that a favorable declaratory judgment would not redress his injury, as it would not bind the Panamanian officials to drop the prosecutions. The court also concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing under the rule of specialty because the United States had consented to the prosecutions, extinguishing his derivative rights under the treaty. View "Berrocal v. Attorney General of the United States" on Justia Law