Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession. During Defenant's direct examination, he testified that he did not conspire with a co-defendant. In response, the district court held a sidebar conference, at which the prosecution requested the court instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy. The court provided the instruction to the jury, and the jury convicted Defendant.On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's clarifying instruction to the jury regarding conspiratorial liability as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it intervened to prevent a misunderstanding of the law of conspiracy that Defendant's counsel invited. Further the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the necessary men's rea to commit the offense. View "USA v. Francisco Morel" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for a 2004 conviction for possessing cocaine base. At the time, Defendant's sentence was the statutory maximum for his crime because he had a prior conviction for a drug felony. Since then, Congress passed the First Step Act, which raised the threshold quantity required to authorize a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, under the Fair Sentencing Act, Defendant's current maximum sentence would be 30 years. However, Defendant did not appeal his sentence on that ground because it complied with the statutory maximum at the time.In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Dorsey v. United States that defendants who had been convicted but not sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act should be sentenced in accordance with the Act. Defendant filed a motion to vacate but failed to cite the Dorsey opinion.In 2018, Defendant filed a motion for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court denied relief. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the First Step Act never requires that a Defendant receive a reduced sentence. The court also held that the district court gave an adequate “brief statement of reasons” for the exercise of its discretion. View "USA v. Patrick Frederick Williams" on Justia Law

S.D. lost control of his van while driving on a divided highway in Pasco County, Florida. The van jumped the center median and landed directly on top of an oncoming car driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff was seriously injured in the resulting wreck. S.D.’s insurer, USAA General Indemnity Company, immediately began investigating. But despite learning that Plaintiff had suffered grievous injuries so that his damages would almost surely exceed S.D.’s $10,000 policy limit, and despite determining that S.D. was solely at fault for the accident, USAA delayed initiating settlement negotiations for over a month. Then, USAA failed to confirm for Plaintiff’s attorney that S.D. lacked additional insurance coverage with which to satisfy a judgment. Plaintiff then commenced this action to hold USAA responsible for the judgment, bringing a single claim for bad faith under Florida common law. USAA moved for summary judgment, arguing that no reasonable jury could find that its conduct amounted to bad faith.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court improvidently granted summary judgment to USAA. Material issues of fact as to bad faith and causation remain in dispute, and Plaintiff is entitled to have a jury resolve them. The court explained had USAA complied with its “duty to initiate settlement negotiations” sooner or provided Plaintiff’s attorney with a coverage affidavit before Plaintiff filed suit, the case may have settled before rising costs changed the calculus. View "Daniel Ilias v. USAA General Indemnity Company" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his First Step Act motion to reduce his sentence. The district court considering Defendant’s motion concluded that it was bound by the sentencing court’s drug-quantity finding when determining what his statutory penalties would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because that drug quantity would still trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court also concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly used the 15-kilogram finding to determine what the statutory penalty would have been for Defendant under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because this finding would have compelled the sentencing court to impose the same mandatory life sentence even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time, the district court correctly concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The court explained Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce disparities between prison sentences for future offenses involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine. And in the First Step Act, Congress decided to extend the same reduction in sentencing disparities to past offenses. The language of that statute is straightforward—eligible crack offenders can now be resentenced “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had already been in place during their original sentencing. What Congress did not do is offer a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum under the Fair Sentencing Act, or vacate drug-quantity findings that would have triggered that minimum at the time of the movant’s offense. View "USA v. Pinkney Clowers, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on three grounds. First, he argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 2251(a)’s interstate commerce element. Second, he contended that the district court reversibly erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet-sworn jury in his absence. Third, he asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish production under Section 2251(a) because of what he calls a “factual impossibility.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The court held that from the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant had the requisite intent to “produce” child pornography when he originally captured the photos of the victim. Further, here, Defendant’s initial jury was impaneled, but not sworn. In fact, the record shows that both parties agreed not to swear the jury given the impending storm—and, further, that once the storm had made landfall, Defendant’s lawyer admitted that he was “glad the jury wasn’t sworn” because it gave the court the necessary flexibility to make new trial arrangements. Because the jury wasn’t sworn, jeopardy never attached. And absent jeopardy, Defendant had no right to have his case decided by the particular jury that the judge had initially impaneled. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it discharged the entire panel. Moreover, the court found that Defendant’s s constitutional arguments are unavailing because he has failed to show any error—plain or otherwise—under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

Acting as the decedent’s estate’s administrator and on behalf of his two sons, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant-Officer. Plaintiff principally sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant had used constitutionally excessive force—and had thereby “unreasonably . . . seized” Plaintiff’s son in violation of the Fourth Amendment—when she fired the 58th and fatal bullet. She also appended two Georgia law claims: one for assault and battery and another for wrongful death. Defendant moved for summary judgment. She argued that qualified immunity shielded her from suit on the Section 1983 claim and that official immunity protected her from the state-law claims. The district court granted Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that in firing the shot that tragically killed Plaintiff’s son, Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The court reasoned that Defendant was facing down a man who had been threatening to kill her for several minutes straight. He had held a gun to her head, separately pointed his gun at her and her partners, spurned repeated orders to drop his weapons and surrender, barricaded himself in his car, and, finally, opened fire. This man knew how to conceal guns; he was suicidal, dogged, and erratic, and he had shown no signs of backing down. The court wrote it has little trouble concluding that, in those circumstances, Defendant could reasonably have believed that he posed a lethal threat. Her decision to neutralize that threat was “reasonable” and therefore constitutional. View "Iwoinakee Gebray Harris-Billups v. Milele Anderson" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a nonjusticiable political question: who has the authority to litigate in the name of the Venezuelan state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. The underlying action, brought by a litigation trust on behalf of Petróleos de Venezuela, alleged conspiracy, antitrust, cybercrime, and fraud claims against various individuals and entities. After the district court dismissed the action for lack of standing and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, an entity purporting to speak for Petróleos de Venezuela sought to substitute itself as the real party in interest. The entity’s board was appointed by Nicolás Maduro, who claims to be the president of Venezuela. But the United States Department of State has concluded that Maduro is not Venezuela’s legitimate political leader.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed because the district court could not grant the motion without addressing a nonjusticiable political question. The district court cannot question the validity of then-President Guaidó’s appointment of an alternative board of directors. So, under the political-question doctrine, it was powerless to grant the Maduro entity’s motion to substitute the entity as the real party in interest in contravention of the position taken by the United States Department of State.   Further, the court wrote that the district court would not have jurisdiction to conduct the requested inquiry on remand. And even if the Department of State declared today that the Maduro entity is authorized to bring suit in Petróleos de Venezuela’s name, the court would still affirm because, under Article III, a justiciable case or controversy must exist “through all stages of the litigation,” including “at the time the complaint is filed.” View "PDVSA US Litigation Trust v. Lukoil Pan Americas LLC, et al." on Justia Law