Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two defendants, Antonio Lemus and Carlos Daniel Canario-Vilomar, were convicted of cocaine-related charges under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). Lemus was apprehended on December 30, 2021, when U.S. Coast Guard officers intercepted a vessel north of Panama, found cocaine, and determined the vessel was without nationality after Colombia could not confirm its registration. Canario-Vilomar was arrested on December 6, 2021, when a similar vessel was intercepted north of Colombia, and the Dominican Republic could not confirm its registration. Both defendants were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction.In the Southern District of Florida, Lemus pled guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 87 months in prison. In the Middle District of Florida, Canario-Vilomar pled guilty to conspiracy, and his motion to dismiss the indictment was denied. He was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the MDLEA exceeded Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause of the Constitution and that their vessels were not stateless under international law. Canario-Vilomar also argued that his offense occurred in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which he claimed was beyond Congress's regulatory authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause is not limited by international law, affirming that the MDLEA's definition of a "vessel without nationality" and the inclusion of the EEZ within the "high seas" were constitutional. The court also rejected Canario-Vilomar's due process argument, citing precedent that the MDLEA does not require a nexus to the United States for jurisdiction. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of both defendants. View "USA v. Canario-Vilomar" on Justia Law

Tim Daniels, a commercial fisherman in Florida, challenged the constitutionality of regulations by Florida’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC) that restrict where and how Florida-registered vessels can harvest Florida pompano in federal waters. Daniels argued that federal law preempts state regulations affecting fishing in federal waters and that Florida’s regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause by only restricting Florida-registered vessels.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for the FWC, concluding that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court also determined that Daniels lacked standing to sue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Daniels has standing to sue because he faces a credible threat of prosecution under Florida’s regulations, which affects his commercial fishing activities. The court found that Daniels’s injury is directly traceable to Florida’s regulations and can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act does not preempt Florida’s regulations. The court reasoned that the Act allows states to regulate fishing vessels registered under their laws in federal waters when there is no federal fishery management plan or regulations in place. The court also held that Florida’s regulations do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving and managing pompano stock, and the regulations only apply to Florida-registered vessels, which are within the state’s jurisdiction.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, upholding Florida’s pompano regulations. View "Daniels v. Executive Director of the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Havana Docks Corporation, which held a 99-year usufructuary concession at the Port of Havana, Cuba. This concession, granted in 1905, allowed Havana Docks to build and operate piers at the port. The Cuban Government expropriated this concession in 1960, and Havana Docks has not received compensation for this expropriation. The concession was set to expire in 2004. Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified its loss at $9.179 million.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of Havana Docks, awarding over $100 million in judgments against four cruise lines—Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises—for trafficking in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court found that the cruise lines had engaged in trafficking by docking their ships at the terminal, using the property to embark and disembark passengers, and using it as a starting and ending point for shore excursions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Havana Docks' limited property interest had expired in 2004, and therefore, the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property from 2016 to 2019. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reversed the judgments against the cruise lines for the 2016-2019 period. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Havana Docks' claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking from 1996 to 2001. View "Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

John Moore, Jr., and Tanner Mansell, who worked as boat crew for a shark encounter company in Jupiter, Florida, were involved in an incident on August 10, 2020. During a trip with the Kuehl family, they found a long fishing line attached to a buoy, which they believed was illegal. They hauled the line into the boat, cut sharks free from the hooks, and reported the incident to a Florida Fish and Wildlife Officer. However, the line was legally placed by Scott Taylor, who had the proper permits for shark research. Moore and Mansell were later indicted for theft of property within special maritime jurisdiction, as the line and gear belonged to Taylor.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida handled the initial trial. Moore and Mansell requested a jury instruction that required the jury to find they stole the property for their own use or benefit to convict them under 18 U.S.C. § 661. The district court rejected this request, instead instructing the jury that to steal means to wrongfully take property with the intent to deprive the owner of its use. The jury found both defendants guilty, and they were sentenced to one year of probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the proposed jury instruction. The appellate court found that the term "steal" in 18 U.S.C. § 661 does not require the intent to convert the property for personal use, aligning with the broader interpretation of theft under federal law. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

In March 2020, seven crewmembers of the M/V Greg Mortimer cruise ship filed a lawsuit against several companies, including CMI Leisure Management, Inc., Cruise Management International, Inc., and Vikand Medical Solutions, LLC. The crewmembers alleged that the decision to sail during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed them to foreseeable harms, resulting in six of them contracting the virus. The crewmembers had signed employment agreements with other companies that contained forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring disputes to be brought in the Bahamas under Bahamian law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the action based on the forum-selection clause. The court ruled that the defendants, who were not parties to the employment agreements, could invoke the forum-selection clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision. The appellate court held that the defendants could not invoke the forum-selection clause in the employment agreements under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court reasoned that the crewmembers' claims did not rely on the terms of their employment agreements, and thus, equitable estoppel did not apply. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Usme v. CMI Leisure Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States Coast Guard seized a vessel in the Dominican Republic's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that bore no nationality indicators. The crew claimed Colombian nationality for the vessel, but Colombia could not confirm or deny the vessel's registry, rendering it stateless under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The vessel was found to contain drugs, leading to the arrest and prosecution of the crew members, Jhonathan Alfonso, Jose Jorge Kohen, and Jose Miguel Rosario-Rojas, under the MDLEA.The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to them because they were arrested in the EEZ, which they asserted is not part of the "high seas" as defined by customary international law. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction under the MDLEA. The defendants subsequently pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the EEZ is part of the "high seas" and thus within Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause. The court also concluded that the defendants could not show any plain error with regard to the MDLEA’s definition of a vessel without nationality as including vessels where registry is asserted but cannot be confirmed or denied by the foreign country. View "United States v. Alfonso" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action brought by Earlene McBride against Carnival Corporation. McBride fell out of her wheelchair while being assisted by a Carnival crewmember, Fritz Charles, during disembarkation from a Carnival cruise ship. McBride claimed that she suffered severe injuries due to the fall and sued Carnival for negligence.The case was initially heard in the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court allowed the deposition testimony of Charles to be presented to the jury over McBride's objection. The jury awarded McBride economic damages for past medical expenses related to the fall but did not award her any damages for past pain and suffering. McBride appealed the district court's judgment, arguing that the court erred in allowing Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury and that the jury's verdict was inadequate because it did not award her past pain and suffering damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow Charles's deposition testimony to be presented to the jury. The court found that McBride had waived her objection to the use of the deposition by not raising it at the appropriate time during the trial. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of McBride's motion for a new trial on the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. The court found that the jury's verdict was inadequate as a matter of law because there was uncontradicted evidence that McBride suffered at least some pain in the immediate aftermath of the wheelchair incident. The case was remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of past pain and suffering damages related to the past medical expenses the jury awarded. View "McBride v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

In a personal injury lawsuit, Carelyn Fylling sued Royal Caribbean Cruises for negligence after she tripped, fell, and hit her head while entering a deck on one of their cruise ships. The case was tried before a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. During the trial, the court became aware that one of the jurors had a niece who worked for Royal Caribbean. Despite this potential conflict of interest, the court did not remove or question this juror about any potential bias, and allowed her to participate in deliberations. The jury found Royal Caribbean negligent, but also found Fylling comparative-negligent, reducing her recovery by ninety percent. Fylling appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion by not investigating the potential bias of the juror related to an employee of the defendant.The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Fylling. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by not investigating whether the juror could impartially discharge her responsibilities once it became aware of her potential bias. The court explained that when a district court becomes aware of potential juror bias, it is required to develop the factual circumstances sufficiently to make an informed judgment as to whether bias exists. A district court's obligation to protect the right to an impartial jury does not end when the jury is impaneled and sworn. The Eleventh Circuit therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Fylling v. Royal Carribean Cruises, Ltd." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case involved Asdrubal Quijada Marin and Juan Carlos Acosta Hurtado, two Venezuelan nationals who were apprehended by the United States Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea. They were convicted after a bench trial for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.On appeal, Marin and Acosta Hurtado challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the indictment should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the evidence should have been suppressed due to violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They also contended that their detention at sea for 48 days prior to indictment constituted unnecessary delay and outrageous government conduct.The Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over Marin and Acosta Hurtado under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act because Cameroon, the flag nation of the vessel, had consented to United States jurisdiction over the crew of the vessel. It also held that the Northland’s stop and search of the Zumaque Tracer did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so the District Court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence based on a Fourth Amendment violation. The Court also held that the District Court did not err in denying Acosta Hurtado’s motion to dismiss based on unnecessary delay arguments. Lastly, the Court held that Acosta Hurtado's claim of outrageous government conduct was meritless. View "USA v. Hurtado" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a three-count maritime negligence action against Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. (“Royal Caribbean”) after she fell aboard one of its cruise ships. She alleged that during the ship’s muster drill, a Royal Caribbean employee rushed her down a set of stairs—causing her to fall and severely injure her neck. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Royal Caribbean. First, on Count I (general negligence) and Count II (negligent failure to warn), the district court found that Plaintiff failed to show that Royal Caribbean had notice of the dangerous conditions that allegedly caused her fall. Second, on Count III (general negligence against Royal Caribbean for its employee’s conduct under a theory of vicarious liability), the district court determined that Plaintiff put forth insufficient evidence of medical causation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that looking to Florida negligence law: non-readily observable injuries require expert medical evidence to prove causation. The court concluded that Plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient medical evidence to satisfy proximate cause. And because proximate cause must be satisfied for each of Plaintiff’s three negligence-based claims to prevail, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Royal Caribbean. View "Judith Willis v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD." on Justia Law