Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Honduran citizen who suffered a back injury while employed as a mason aboard one of Carnival's ships, filed suit against Carnival in state court asserting claims of Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, negligence, unseaworthiness, and failure to provide adequate maintenance and cure. Plaintiff alleged that the physician chosen and paid by Carnival negligently performed his back surgery. Carnival removed to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of his claims under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (CREFAA), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. Plaintiff argued that his Jones Act claim did not fall within his employment contract ("Seafarer's Agreement") with Carnival and, therefore, was not within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause. The court concluded that the order compelling plaintiff to arbitrate his claims was "a final decision with respect to arbitration," and the court had appellate jurisdiction. The court also concluded that plaintiff's dispute with Carnival clearly arose out of or in connection with the Seafarer's Agreement and was subject to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "Martinez v. Carnival Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess and for possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. At issue was whether the admission of a certification of the Secretary of State to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction for prosecution of drug trafficking on the high seas violated defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him at trial. The court concluded that the pretrial admission of the certification did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the certification proved jurisdiction, as a diplomatic courtesy to a foreign nation, and did not prove an element of a defendant's culpability. The court also concluded that the pretrial determination of jurisdiction did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment; the district court did not err when it determined it had jurisdiction based on the certification of the Secretary of State; the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. 70501 et seq., is a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Felonies Clause; and defendant's conviction did not violate his right to due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seafarers who worked aboard cruise ships operated by NCL, filed suit under the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that NCL did not pay them their full wages because their compensation did not take into account the amounts they were required to pay their helpers to complete their work on embarkation days. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in not awarding penalty wages under the Act. The court concluded that the district court made findings of fact which were supported by the record and the district court did not err by failing to award penalty wages based upon these findings. There was simply no evidence of willful, arbitrary, or willful misconduct on the part of NCL. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wallace, et al. v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned segments of two Georgia waterways, the Flint River and Spring Creek. Aqua Log, a company that finds, removes, and sells submerged logs, brought three in rem actions seeking a salvage award for the logs submerged at the bottom of the waterways or, in the alternative, an award of title to the logs based on the American Law of Finds. Because the segments of the Flint River and Spring Creek at issue in these cases were capable of supporting commercial activity, they were navigable waters for admiralty-jurisdiction purposes. The court therefore held that the district court erred in concluding that the waterways were not navigable and dismissing the cases for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aqua Log Inc. v. Lost and Abandoned Pre-Cut Logs and Rafts of Logs" on Justia Law

This case involved claims brought by cabin stewards against their employer, Celebrity Cruises, and against the Union (FIT) that represented them. Because the stewards were foreign employees involved in an internal wage dispute with a foreign ship, neither the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 159, applied to the stewards' challenges. Since their claims were dependent upon the protections of those acts, the district court properly dismissed their claims against Celebrity and FIT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-13623. Because the stewards could have raised their Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313, claim in Lobo II but did not, the court affirmed the district court's order in Gomez as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Appeal No. 10-10406 View "Lobo, et al v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former seaman employee of defendant, was injured on the job and sued defendant in Florida state court claiming that defendant was negligent under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, and failed to provide maintenance and care as required by U.S. maritime law. Defendant, noting that plaintiff's employment contract required the parties to submit disputes to arbitration, removed the case to federal district court under 9 U.S.C. 205. After the removal, the district court in a single order denied defendant's motion to enforce the arbitration clause on the basis that the arbitration clause was void under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention) for violating public policy and remanded the matter back to state court. Defendant appealed this order. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal and argued that by concluding that the arbitration clause was null and void, there was no longer a basis for jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the court subsequently granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Harrisson v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Oceania Cruises after he became ill on the cruise and received allegedly substandard care. Plaintiff claimed that Oceania negligently hired, retained, and supervised the ship's doctor. Oceania attempted to bring this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(3), contending that the district court erred when it held that a limitation-of-liability provision in Oceania's ticket contract was unenforceable. The district court concluded that the provision, which incorporated by reference portions of international treaties and the United States Code, was so confusing that it did not reasonably communicate to the passengers the cruise line's liability limits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Ford Motor Co. v. S.S. Santa Irene, which held that the application of the limitation-of-liability provision was not an immediately appealable order under section 1292(a)(3). View "Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises, Inc." on Justia Law

MARPOL is the common name for the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1340 U.N.T.S. 62. At issue was whether the United States had jurisdiction to prosecute a nominated surveyor for knowingly violating the MARPOL treaty while aboard a foreign vessel docked in the United States. After thorough review of the relevant treaty and U.S. law, the court held that the United States had jurisdiction to prosecute surveyors for MARPOL violations committed in U.S. ports. Further, under the court's lenient standards of review for issues raised for the first time on appeal, the court found no reversible error in the indictment or jury instructions. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's denial of judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Pena" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.

This case stemmed from Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc.'s (Odyssey) discovery of a 19th Century Spanish vessel in international waters where Odyssey filed a verified admiralty complaint in rem against the shipwrecked vessel and sought a warrant of arrest. The Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Peru, and twenty-five individuals filed claims against the res and Spain subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the res was a Spanish warship and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Odyssey's claims because the vessel was immune from judicial arrest under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Spain's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(1) standard for factual challenges to jurisdiction to Spain's motion to dismiss; the district court did not abuse its discretion by evaluating Spain's Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the extensive record before it; the evidence in the record fully supported the finding of the district court that the res was the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes (Mercedes), a Spanish vessel that sank in 1804, for the purposes of sovereign immunity and the district court correctly decided that FSIA immunity applied to the arrest of the Mercedes; the cargo aboard the Mercedes was treated as part of the shipwreck of the Mercedes for sovereign immunity purposes; and the district court did not err when it ordered the Odyssey to release the recovered res to the custody of Spain.