Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ariel Torres, a former Starbucks employee, and Raphyr Lubin, the husband of another former Starbucks employee, filed a putative class action against Starbucks. They alleged that Starbucks sent them deficient health-insurance notices under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Starbucks moved to compel arbitration based on employment agreements signed by Torres and Lubin’s wife. Torres agreed to arbitration, but Lubin opposed it, arguing he was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration for Lubin. The court found that Lubin was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement and was not suing to enforce it. Instead, Lubin sought to enforce his own statutory right to an adequate COBRA notice. The court held that no equitable doctrine of Florida contract law required Lubin to arbitrate and that Starbucks waived its argument that Lubin’s rights were derivative of his wife’s rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Lubin, not being a party to the arbitration agreement, could not be compelled to arbitrate. The court also found that the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause did not apply to Lubin, as he was not a party to the agreement. Additionally, the court rejected Starbucks’s arguments based on equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary doctrine, and the derivative claim theory, concluding that none of these principles required Lubin to arbitrate his claim. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Lubin v. Starbucks Corporation" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan company, HSR, engaged another Guatemalan company, AICSA, to design and construct a hydroelectric power plant. The project faced opposition from the local indigenous community, leading to work suspension and eventual contract termination by HSR. HSR initiated arbitration seeking payments and damages from AICSA, which counterclaimed for its own damages and sought to include its subcontractor, Novacom, in the arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially denied AICSA's motion to vacate the arbitration award, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, later reversed this, holding that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides grounds for vacatur in cases governed by the New York Convention. The case was remanded to the District Court, which ultimately confirmed the arbitration award, leading to AICSA's appeal.The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the arbitration tribunal did not exceed its authority in three key areas: requiring AICSA to maintain or renew advance payment bonds, denying AICSA's claim that HSR breached anti-corruption provisions, and refusing to join Novacom to the arbitration. The court emphasized that the tribunal's decisions were based on interpretations of the contract, even if those interpretations were arguably erroneous. The court's review was limited to whether the tribunal interpreted the contract, not whether it did so correctly. View "Hidroelectrica Santa Rita S.A. v. Corporacion AIC, SA" on Justia Law

Adam and Miranda Steines, along with Andrew Ormesher, filed a class action lawsuit against Westgate, a resort company, alleging violations of the Military Lending Act (MLA). The Steines, who purchased a timeshare in Orlando and financed it through a loan from Westgate, claimed that Westgate's loan documents did not comply with the MLA's requirements, including the prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses. The Steines sought rescission of their timeshare, injunctive relief, damages, and restitution.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held an evidentiary hearing and denied Westgate's motions to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint. The court found that the MLA applied to the timeshare loan and that the MLA's prohibition on mandatory arbitration clauses overrode the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Westgate appealed the decision, arguing that the district court should not have addressed the arbitrability issue and that the MLA did not override the FAA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the question of whether the MLA overrides the FAA is a matter for the court to decide, not the arbitrator. The court found that the MLA explicitly prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer credit contracts involving servicemembers, thereby overriding the FAA. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court's finding that the timeshare loan did not qualify as a "residential mortgage" under the MLA, as the timeshare units were more akin to hotel rooms than residential dwellings.As a result, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, affirming that the MLA's provisions rendered the FAA inapplicable in this case. View "Steines v. Westgate Palace, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

A property-insurance dispute arose between a condominium association and its insurer after storms damaged the property. The association demanded an appraisal of the loss, and both parties selected appraisers who then chose an umpire. The association's appraiser disclosed, on the day of final negotiations, that he believed he had a financial stake in the award due to a contingency-fee retainer. The insurer did not object at that time, and the appraisal panel issued an award over a month later. Subsequently, the insurer moved to vacate the award, claiming the appraiser's partiality.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the insurer's motion to vacate the award, ruling that the insurer had waived its objection by not raising it sooner. The court also confirmed the appraisal award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the insurer waived its objection to the appraiser's partiality by failing to object at the time of the disclosure. The court emphasized that a party must timely object to an arbitrator's or appraiser's partiality when it becomes aware of a potential conflict of interest. By waiting over two months and until after the award was issued, the insurer forfeited its right to challenge the appraiser's impartiality. The court did not address other arguments related to the choice of law or the appraiser's partiality, as the waiver issue was dispositive. View "Biscayne Beach Club Condominium Association, Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, several clients of Wyndham Vacation Resorts (Resorts) sought to arbitrate disputes with Resorts, but their petitions were rejected by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) because Resorts had failed to comply with AAA’s policies. The clients then sued Resorts in federal court. Resorts moved to stay the litigation and direct arbitration, but the district court denied the motion, reasoning that Resorts cannot rely on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to compel arbitration because it had defaulted in its obligation to arbitrate by failing to comply with AAA's policies.The appellate court held as follows: First, the three clients who originally sought to arbitrate their claims against Resorts, only to see their petitions rejected due to Resorts’ noncompliance with AAA policies, may proceed to litigation. Second, three other clients who never formally submitted their claims against Resorts to the AAA, but whose agreements with Resorts contained identical arbitration provisions, may also proceed to litigation. However, two clients who had an agreement with different Wyndham-related entities must return to the district court for further consideration of the FAA’s applicability to their dispute.The court found that the district court correctly concluded that Resorts could not compel arbitration under the FAA. However, the court found that the district court's decision was too broad regarding the other Wyndham-related entities, Development and WorldMark, because there was no evidence that they had violated the AAA’s policies. As a result, the court vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings concerning these entities. View "Bedgood v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

These appeals are about a pending insurance contract dispute between Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc., and Empire Indemnity Insurance Company, which issued an insurance policy (the “Policy”) to Positano for coverage of five buildings that Positano owns in Naples, Florida. Following Hurricane Irma, Positano filed a first-party claim for property insurance benefits under the Policy, claiming that Hurricane Irma damaged its property and that the damage was covered by the Policy. Empire determined that there was coverage to only three of the five buildings covered by the Policy but disagreed as to the amount of the loss. Positano sought to invoke appraisal based on the Policy’s appraisal provision. Positano sued Empire in Florida state court, and Empire removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Positano moved to compel appraisal and to stay the case pending the resolution of the appraisal proceedings, which Empire opposed. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court grant Positano’s motion, and, over Empire’s objection, the district court ordered the parties to appraisal and stayed the proceedings pending appraisal. Empire timely appealed the district court’s order.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court concluded that the district court’s order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings pending appraisal is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1). The court concluded that the order compelling appraisal and staying the action pending appraisal is not immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). View "Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc. v. Empire Indemnity Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Noble Prestige Limited lent Paul Thomas Horn $500,000 to pursue litigation against a telecommunications company. While the litigation was pending, a conservatorship over Horn’s assets was commenced in a probate court in Denver, Colorado (the “Denver Probate Court”). The case was settled, and the proceeds were placed in the conservatorship estate, subject to Galle’s management and the ultimate custody and control of the Denver Probate Court. Noble ultimately obtained arbitral awards that required Horn to pay Noble the debt owed under the loan agreement and Galle to pay Noble costs associated with the arbitration. Noble moved to confirm the awards and sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting Galle, Horn, and Galle’s law firm. Galle and GLG (together, “Respondents”) opposed Noble’s request and moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted Noble’s request, entering what it termed a “temporary restraining order” that prohibited Galle from dissipating or transferring $10,000,000 “notwithstanding any order(s) entered by the [Denver] Probate Court.” The district court also entered an order granting Respondents’ motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part. Respondents appealed both orders.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Respondents’ appeal to the extent it challenged the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss, vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunctive relief, and remanded the case. The court explained that Noble’s petition fails to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the district court and, therefore, the issuance of a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 was improper. Further, the court explained that district court lacked the power to issue an order freezing the AT&T settlement funds pending judgment. View "Noble Prestige Limited v. Craig Thomas Galle, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner was employed at Office Depot as a senior financial analyst. He was responsible for, among other things, ensuring data integrity. One of Ronnie’s principal duties was to calculate and report a metric called “Sales Lift.” Sales Lift is a metric designed to quantify the cost-reduction benefit of closing redundant retail stores. Petitioner identified two potential accounting errors that he believed signaled securities fraud related to the Sales Lift. Petitioner alleged that after he reported the issue, his relationship with his boss became strained. Eventually, Petitioner was terminated at that meeting for failing to perform the task of identifying the cause of the data discrepancy. Petitioner filed complaint with the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and OSHA dismissed his complaint. Petitioner petitioned for review of the ARB’s decision.
The Eleventh Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that a reasonable person with his training and experience would believe this conduct constituted a SOX violation, the ARB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The court wrote that Petitioner’s assertions that Office Depot intentionally manipulated sales data and that his assigned task of investigating the discrepancy was a stalling tactic are mere speculation, which alone is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact as to the objective reasonableness of Petitioner’s belief. View "Chris Ronnie v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued The Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc. (“SCAD”) for race discrimination and retaliation after he was fired from his job as Head Fishing Coach. As part of his employment onboarding, however, Plaintiff signed a document agreeing to arbitrate—not litigate—all legal disputes that arose between him and SCAD. Accordingly, SCAD moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The district court, approving and adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), granted SCAD’s motion. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by ignoring that his agreement with SCAD was unconscionable and that SCAD waived its right to arbitrate. He also argued that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his early discovery request.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting SCAD’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The court concluded that the Plaintiff’s arbitration agreement is neither substantively nor procedurally unconscionable. Further, the court found that SCAD did not waive its right to enforce arbitration and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Plaintiff’s request for early discovery. In short, the court concluded that Plaintiff is bound by his agreement to arbitrate his legal claims against SCAD. View "Isaac Payne v. Savannah College of Art and Design, Inc." on Justia Law