Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

IPS appealed the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration and stay plaintiffs' claims against it. Plaintiffs cross-appeal, disputing the preemption of their claims under the Employment Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and alleging a lack of federal jurisdiction. The court found that jurisdiction was proper and affirmed the district court's denial of IPS's motion to compel arbitration.

This case stemmed from a property dispute between the parties. White Springs appealed the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Glawson, challenging the grant of attorneys' fees, expert fees, and prejudgment interest and sought to vacate or modify the arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10, 11. The court held that the arbitration panel had the power to decide Glawson's claims for attorneys' fees and that Glawson properly submitted the issue to the panel. The court was unable to grant White Springs' request that the court review the legality of the award of expert fees and prejudgment interest on the ad valorem taxes, as the FAA did not permit it to do so. Therefore, the court found no basis to overturn any portion of the panel's final arbitration award.

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V.

Defendant appealed the district court's order denying its motion to compel plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The district court held that defendant had, by participating in the litigation for nine months prior to requesting that the case be submitted to arbitration, waived its contractual right to compel arbitration. The court found that defendant's right to compel arbitration, even if waived with respect to the claims in the Original Complaint, was revived by plaintiff's filing of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings, remanding for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in his employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant on a single count of Jones Act negligence, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30104, claiming that defendant breached its duty to supply him with a safe place to work. The court held that, given the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and governing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, the court must enforce the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract, at least at this initial arbitration-enforcement stage. Therefore, after review and oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim.

This case arose when respondent obtained a month-long $200 loan from a storefront in Georgia in 2004. Respondent later sought relief from a Georgia state court, arguing that the loan was illegal and usurious under Georgia law because it carried a finance charge of $36, equivalent to an annual percentage rate of 253%. At issue on appeal was whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 4. The court held that, looking through the section 4 arbitration petition to the underlying controversy, respondent's dispute with Community State Bank (Bank) could have arisen under federal law and, thus, provided a basis for federal jurisdiction over the FAA petition. Therefore, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the Bank's section 4 petition. The court held that because Cash America's arbitration defenses were struck by the Georgia state court as a statutorily authorized sanction for their willful and deliberate discovery abuses, Cash America could not relitigate the issue of the arbitration clauses' enforceability in federal court. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FAA petition, on the alternative ground of issue preclusion, as to Cash America. The court, however, vacated the order of dismissal as to the Bank and remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance the merits of the Bank's petition to compel arbitration.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration.

This case arose out of a dispute over the construction of a yacht where the parties subsequently entered into binding arbitration pursuant to their own written agreement. At issue was whether the arbitrators "exceeded their powers" - thereby justifying vacatur of their award under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(4) - when they purportedly failed to provide a "reasoned award" as agreed to by the parties. The court concluded that three validly-appointed arbitrators oversaw a five day hearing and rendered a thoughtful, reasoned award. The court declined to narrowly interpret what constituted a reasonable award to overturn an otherwise apparently seamless procedure. The parties received precisely what they bargained for and to vacate the award and remand for an entirely new proceeding would insufficiently respect the value of the arbitration and inject the courts further into the arbitration process than Congress had mandated. Accordingly, the court held that the award should be confirmed and the judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded for reinstatement the award.

The union contracts state that a cost-of-living allowance will be applied to offset health insurance costs for hourly-rated employees and not be applied to hourly wage rates. The contracts state that the COLA will be equal to 1¢ per hour for each full 0.3 of a point change in the Consumer Price Index calculation. An employer was calculating the COLA on a weekly basis and maintained that the adjustment was only $0.08 per week; the union argued that the adjustment should be calculated at $3.20 per week ($0.08 x 40 hours per week). In November 2008, an arbitrator rejected management's argument that the contracts included a scrivener's error and that the COLA should be calculated on a weekly, rather than hourly basis.The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the unions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, preempts employers' state law fraud counterclaims. An attempt to assert a federal common law "fraudulent procurement" defense was barred by the three-month limitations period for challenging the arbitrator's award.