Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Chase, alleging that Chase failed to comply with its obligations under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) by declining to issue him a permanent loan modification. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that HAMP did not provide a private cause of action and that, even if his claims were independent of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. The court applied the factors under Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Inves. to Hamp and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), 12 U.S.C. 5201-5261, holding that there was no implied right of action. Therefore, plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims. To the extent plaintiff's claims fell outside of HAMP, they failed as a matter of law. Rejecting plaintiff's remaining claim of promissory estoppel, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miller v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his civil action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The district court concluded that plaintiff's claim was covered by the FDCPA but that he did not allege acts that violated the FDCPA. Accepting plaintiff's allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the statement on the May 2009 notice that BAC was plaintiff's "creditor" was a false representation and was made by a "debt collector" as defined by section 1692a. Therefore, the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under the FDCPA and the judgment of the district court was vacated and remanded. View "Bourff v. Lublin, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against M&T Bank, alleging that it improperly charged its checking account customers overdraft fees. The district court denied M&T Bank's renewed motion to compel arbitration, finding that plaintiff's claims were not within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court held that, under the delegation provision, the decision of whether plaintiff's claims were within the scope of the arbitration agreement was a decision for an arbitrator, and the district court erred in making the decision itself. Further, the court believed that it was prudent for the district court to reconsider its unconscionability determination in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, so the court did not reach whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Given v. M&T Bank Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are personal investment holding corporations owned by two related Panamanian shareholders. Defendants, of who there are two distinct groups, are (1) a related group of banking corporations operating under the umbrella of Banco Santander, which provide banking, investment, and other financial management services; and (2) certain individual officers/employees of Santander. This dispute arose from plaintiff's investment of an undisclosed sum of money with defendants. At issue was whether a district court, having found a valid contract containing an arbitration clause existed, was also required to consider a further challenge to that contract's place within a broader, unexecuted agreement. Having considered those circumstances in light of Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and other relevant precedent, the court found that the district court properly construed the law regarding arbitrability in dismissing plaintiff's suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Solymar Investments, Ltd., et al. v. Banco Santander S.A., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's order denying its motion to compel plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The district court held that defendant had, by participating in the litigation for nine months prior to requesting that the case be submitted to arbitration, waived its contractual right to compel arbitration. The court found that defendant's right to compel arbitration, even if waived with respect to the claims in the Original Complaint, was revived by plaintiff's filing of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings, remanding for further proceedings.

This case arose when respondent obtained a month-long $200 loan from a storefront in Georgia in 2004. Respondent later sought relief from a Georgia state court, arguing that the loan was illegal and usurious under Georgia law because it carried a finance charge of $36, equivalent to an annual percentage rate of 253%. At issue on appeal was whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 4. The court held that, looking through the section 4 arbitration petition to the underlying controversy, respondent's dispute with Community State Bank (Bank) could have arisen under federal law and, thus, provided a basis for federal jurisdiction over the FAA petition. Therefore, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the Bank's section 4 petition. The court held that because Cash America's arbitration defenses were struck by the Georgia state court as a statutorily authorized sanction for their willful and deliberate discovery abuses, Cash America could not relitigate the issue of the arbitration clauses' enforceability in federal court. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the FAA petition, on the alternative ground of issue preclusion, as to Cash America. The court, however, vacated the order of dismissal as to the Bank and remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance the merits of the Bank's petition to compel arbitration.

This case concerned the termination of an employee, plaintiff, in the wake of an investigation into the disappearance of approximately $58,000 from a branch of Washington Mutual Bank (defendant). Plaintiff asserted that defendant unlawfully asked him to submit to a polygraph test and unlawfully failed to notify plaintiff of his right to continue his employer-provided health insurance for a period after his termination. The court held that because defendant requested plaintiff to submit to a polygraph test in connection with an "ongoing investigation" of a specific incident in which defendant had a "reasonable suspicion" that plaintiff was involved, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), 29 U.S.C. 2002(1), claim. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's improper notice claim under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) 29 U.S.C. 1163(2), 1166, where the court should have considered the claims on the merits because it was timely filed. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Count One of the multi-count indictment in this case charged Robert and Patrick Singletary, and others, with conspiring between 1997 and September 16, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three offenses: (1) to defraud a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344; (2) to make false representations with respect to material facts to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001; and (3) to defraud purchasers of residential property and mortgage lenders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Singletarys eventually pled guilty to Count One to the extent that it alleged a conspiracy to commit the section 1343 offense in addition to the section 1001 offense. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the sum of $1 million. The court held that the district court failed to determine by a preponderance of the evidence which of the 56 mortgages the loan officers handled was obtained through a false "gift" letter, a false "credit explanation" letter, or a false employment verification form; and where fraud was found, to determine the extent of the actual loss HUD could have incurred due to the mortgage's foreclosure. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution provisions and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs filed a purported class action as an adversary proceeding before the bankruptcy court alleging that their mortgage lender, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), violated various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules by failing to disclose certain fees on the proof of claim it filed in plaintiffs' Chapter 13 bankruptcy case. At issue was whether the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on plaintiffs' claims that Wells Fargo violated the automatic stay provisions in 11 U.S.C. 362; their claims that Wells Fargo violated 11 U.S.C 506(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 2016 by failing to disclose the fees; and their objection to the proof of claim. The court considered each of plaintiffs' automatic stay violations under section 362 and held that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on each claim. The court concluded that bankruptcy courts have not uniformly reached a conclusion supporting the proposition that pursuant to section 506(b), Rule 2016, or both of these provisions, a secured creditor must disclose and obtain court approval of post-petition legal expenses. Therefore, the court held that these provisions were not violated when a creditor merely recorded costs it had incurred in association with a mortgagee's bankruptcy for internal bookkeeping purposes and made no attempt to collect the fees or otherwise add them to the debtor's balance. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs' disclosure claims relied on events that have occurred during the course of their Chapter 13 case, the district court did not err in affirming the bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment. The court further held that Wells Fargo's failure to include the proof of claim fees on the proof of claim did not provide a valid basis for an objection; and as to this amount, plaintiffs have identified no reason why such amount was unenforceable. Therefore, Wells Fargo was entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

This case involved a residential construction scheme, which required the investor, the mortgage broker, the builder, and the bank providing the builder with the funds to construct the house to enter into certain independent contractual arrangements. Petitioners, investors whose builders went under and left them with unfinished houses or vacant lots, sought a writ of mandamus asking the court to order the district court to require respondent, the bank's executive vice-president for mortgage lending, to make a restitution in an amount equivalent to one point of their construction loans. The court held that the cause of petitioners' loss was not respondent, but the fact that the builders became insolvent and were unable or unwilling to complete their work. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was denied where petitioners assumed the risk that the builder might walk off the job; that if it did, the bank would declare the construction loan in default; and that, as the bank's borrower, they would be liable for the draws the builders had received plus interest.