Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. During the proceeding, LVNV filed a proof of claim to collect the Heilig-Meyers debt, notwithstanding the limitations period had expired four years earlier. At issue on appeal was whether a proof of claim to collect a stale debt in Chapter 13 bankruptcy violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p. The court answered in the affirmative. The FDCPA's broad language, the court's precedent, and the record compelled the conclusion that defendants' conduct violated a number of the Act's protective provisions. Accordingly, the court reversed the orders of the bankruptcy court and the district court dismissing the adversary proceeding.View "Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

This bankruptcy appeal concerned whether Charles Kane and Harley Kane may discharge in Chapter 7 bankruptcy a $2 million judgment entered by a Florida state court in favor of creditors. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in concluding that the state court judgment arose from a "willful and malicious injury" by the Kanes, and therefore the bankruptcy court correctly allowed the Stewart Firms, under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), to prevent the Kanes from discharging the state court judgment. The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court properly determined that Harley Kane's misconduct in the Kane Firm's Chapter 11 case barred his own discharge in Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(7) and 727(a)(2) taken together. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Kane, et al. v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, et al." on Justia Law

Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, seeking to determine the secured status of the second and third mortgages held by Wells Fargo on debtor's principal residence. At issue was whether debtor can "strip off" a wholly unsecured junior mortgage in a Chapter 20 case. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) did not prohibit this result. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's determination that debtor could strip off Wells Fargo's second and third liens on the residence because they were wholly unsecured. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Scantling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against McCalla and Kondaur, claiming that they violated the automatic stay in plaintiff Kenneth Lodge's bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. 362, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. Because plaintiffs failed to show an emotional injury sufficient to support a recovery of actual damages under section 362(k), the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the automatic stay claim. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the FDCPA claim where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendants were "debt collectors" because the district court was not required to take judicial notice of defendants' websites and the district court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider a document that listed foreclosure advertisements for properties unrelated to plaintiffs' properties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lodge, et al. v. Kondaur Capital Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Santander appealed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order overruling Santander's objection to the confirmation of debtor's plan under Chapter 13. The bankruptcy court proposed that petitioner surrender his vehicle under 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5)(C) to satisfy Santander's claim. The bankruptcy court held that 11 U.S.C. 506(a)(1) and (a)(2) determined the vehicle's value and hence the amount of Santander's secured claim, which would be satisfied by debtor's surrender of the vehicle. The court held that section 506(a)(2)'s valuation standard applied when a Chapter 13 debtor surrendered his vehicle under section 1325(a)(5)(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's judgment. View "Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Heatherwood and FCB appealed the district court's affirmance of a final amended judgment entered by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that there was an implied restrictive covenant limiting the use of real property at issue to a golf course. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that, because FCB satisfied the person-aggrieved doctrine, FCB also met Article III standing requirements. On the merits, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it held that FCB and Heatherwood had actual, constructive and inquiry notice of the implied restrictive covenant; the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that most, if not all, of the homeowners within the Heatherwood subdivision bought their home with the expectation that the golf course property would remain a golf course; the bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the doctrine of estoppel by deed precluded the enforcement of the covenant; with respect to FCB and Heatherwood's argument that the doctrine of integration in the Agreement between HGC and Heatherwood served to destroy an implied covenant, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding integration did not apply under the facts of the case; in considering the doctrine of changed circumstances, the bankruptcy court relied on various factual findings in determining that the homeowners' benefit from the continued existence of the covenant outweighed the detriment borne by FCB and Heatherwood; and the court rejected FCB and Heatherwood's argument that HGC had no standing to enforce the implied restrictive covenant because HGC owned no property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Heatherwood Holdings, LLC v. HGC, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, trustee for the estate of debtor, attempted to avoid eight transfers made by debtor to the IRS as payment for the income tax liability of debtor's principal. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the United States as to the first seven transfers. The bankruptcy court concluded that plaintiff succeeded in proving constructive fraud and ruled that the IRS was an initial transferee from whom plaintiff could seek recovery. The district court affirmed with regard to the first seven transfers but reversed as to the eighth. The district court concluded that the IRS could not be held liable as an initial transferee because it qualified for the mere conduit exception. The court affirmed, viewing the transaction as sufficiently similar to the deposit of funds into a bank account to conclude that the IRS acted as a mere conduit. View "Menotte v. United States" on Justia Law

Debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition, instead of a Chapter 7 petition, only so that his attorney could be paid in installments through the proposed Chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court found that debtor had not filed his petition or his proposed plan in "good faith," as required by 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(3) and (a)(7). There was no evidence in this particular record revealing unique circumstances that would lead to the conclusion that it was in debtor's best interest to file under Chapter 13. After reviewing the record and the totality of the circumstances, the court could not say that the bankruptcy court's findings were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of confirmation of debtor's Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. View "Brown v. Gore" on Justia Law

The PAPER COMPANY's creditors successfully petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court then granted the PAPER COMPANY's motion to transform the Chapter 7 case into a Chapter 11 proceeding. While the Chapter 11 case was pending, the PBGC brought an action against the PAPER COMPANY. At issue on appeal was whether, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., the trustee of a corporation that is a contributing sponsor and is in bankruptcy can maintain an action for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate and the estate's unsecured creditors against the corporation's former owner (as a former member of the controlled group) for liabilities arising from the termination of a pension plan. The court held that the answer is no. The court concluded that ERISA's funding requirements were put in place for the benefit of plan beneficiaries, not for the protection of a bankrupt plan sponsor's unsecured creditors. The trustee's complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it was brought for the benefit of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors. View "Durango-Georgia Paper Co., et al. v. H.G. Estate, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

After debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court ruled that all of the income and expenses of debtor's husband should be considered in determining the ability of debtor to pay her debts. The district court affirmed. Given the nature of debtor's debt and the financial relationship between her and her husband, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in applying the totality of the circumstances test. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. View "In Re: Kulakowski" on Justia Law