Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Property Appraiser and the Tax Collector appealed from an order of the district court affirming the final order of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court held that debtor's request for the bankruptcy court to redetermine her ad valorem tax liability for the year 2009 was timely filed under 11 U.S.C. 108(a) and 505. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that debtor's request was timely under section 108(a). The bankruptcy court's interpretation of the language in section 505(a)(2)(C) failed to give full effect to Congress's intent. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's holding. View "Dubov, et al. v. Read" on Justia Law

This case involved unanswered questions of Georgia law that are central to this appeal. Because these questions are determinative of the case and there are no controlling precedents from the Supreme Court of Georgia, the court respectfully certified the following questions for resolution: (1) Whether a security deed that lacks the signature of an unofficial witness should be considered "duly filed, recorded, and indexed" as required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33, such that a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser would have constructive notice when the deed incorporates the covenants, terms, and provisions of a rider that contains the attestations required by O.C.G.A. 44-13-33 and said rider was filed, recorded, and indexed with the security deed; and (2) If the answer to question one was in the negative, whether such a situation would nonetheless put a subsequent hypothetical bona fide purchaser on inquiry notice. View "Gordon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In late 2008, Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from her aunt. At that time, both Cassell and her wholly owned company, J&L Arborists, LLC, were insolvent. After consulting with attorneys and accountants, she used her $220,000 inheritance to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity. She began receiving monthly payments, and under the annuity contract she is scheduled to receive those payments for the rest of her life. The contract also guarantees the payments for ten years regardless of when Cassell dies. She designated her children as the beneficiaries of the payments if she dies within the ten-year guarantee period. A year after she had purchased the annuity, Cassell and her company filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. She included the annuity as an asset in her Schedule B disclosures, and listed it as exempt under Georgia law on Schedule C. The trustee objected, contending that Cassell's annuity is nonexempt because it does not meet the requirements of the statute. The bankruptcy court held that Cassell's annuity was an "annuity" within the meaning of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute. The district court affirmed as to the issues that the bankruptcy court had addressed but remanded the case, leaving it for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance whether the annuity payments were reasonably necessary for Cassell's support. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question pertaining to the Georgia exemption to the Georgia Supreme Court. View "Silliman v. Cassell" on Justia Law

The Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Stacey Williams appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' claim of pregnancy discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and state law negligence. The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on Williams' Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., claim for pregnancy discrimination because Williams had presented enough circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that her supervisor's action in terminating her because of her pregnancy and his inaction in not attempting to find her a light-duty job were a violation of Title VII. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 race discrimination claims because she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gate Gourmet intentionally discriminated against her based on her race. Summary judgment was improperly granted against Williams' Title VII and section 1981 retaliation claims because there was a reasonable inference that the statutorily protected filing of and refusal to settle the EEOC charge caused Gate Gourmet to deny Williams a light-duty position, which was a materially adverse action. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Williams v. Gate Gourmet, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a debt which consisted of claims of tort liability possessed by relatives of people buried in a cemetery called Graceland. Creditors alleged that debtors were liable to them and the members of their class for damages because, due to inadequate record keeping, debtors were unable to locate upon request the grave sites of family members or close relatives buried in Graceland. At issue was whether a bankruptcy court in one federal district had jurisdiction to determine whether a debt was discharged in a bankruptcy case litigated in another federal district. The court held that the court lacked jurisdiction and therefore did not reach the other issues on appeal. View "Alderwoods Group, Inc., et al. v. Garcia, et al." on Justia Law

This bankruptcy appeal involved a transfer of liens by subsidiaries of TOUSA, Inc., to secure the payment of a debt owed only by their parent, TOUSA. This appeal by the Committee of Unsecured Creditors presented two issues: (1) whether the bankruptcy court clearly erred when it found that the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the liens to secure loans used to pay a debt owed only by TOUSA; and (2) whether the Transeastern Lenders were entities "for whose benefit" the Conveying Subsidiaries transferred the liens. The court held that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err when it found that the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the liens and that the bankruptcy court correctly ruled that the Transeastern Lenders were entities "for whose benefit" the liens were transferred. The court reversed the judgment of the district court, affirmed the liability findings of the bankruptcy court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Senior Transeastern Lenders, et al. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed from a district court order ruling that her debt from a fraudulent transfer judgment was nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). At issue was whether a fraudulent transfer of property by a co-conspirator constituted a willful and malicious injury under section 523(a)(6). The court held that the district court properly concluded that the fraudulent transfer was not dischargeable as part of the bankruptcy proceeding because plaintiff satisfied the elements of section 523(a)(6) by showing that debtor willfully and maliciously injured plaintiff's property. View "Maxfield v. Jenning" on Justia Law

Debtor appealed the district court's decision affirming the bankruptcy court's determination that an Illinois judgment debt owed to the Bank was not dischargeable, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(4). The court held that the bankruptcy court's order must be affirmed under section 523(a)(4) as a debt arising from a defalcation while debtor was acting in a fiduciary capacity. The court also held that the district court correctly determined that the propriety of the Bank's actions was not a basis for finding that the Illinois judgment debt should be discharged. Instead, the court agreed with the district court that the issue was not properly before the court, but rather should be brought by debtor in an action in Illinois to consider the malfeasance of the trustee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the bankruptcy court. View "Bullock v. BankChampaign NA" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's affirmation of the bankruptcy court's order that partially overruled appellant's objection to confirmation of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan. Appellant contended that under Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, debtor must pay interest on its claim at the contract rate of 10.5% because appellant was an oversecured creditor. The bankruptcy and district courts found that appellant could only recover post-petition interest at the contract rate from the date of filing until confirmation of the bankruptcy plan. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's order.

International Management Associates, LLC, and several related entities (Debtors) were operated as the instruments of a Ponzi scheme. A receiver ultimately filed voluntary petitions in the bankruptcy court seeking relief for each of the Debtors under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. A consolidated plan of liquidation was approved and a plan trustee appointed. The trustee then instituted a number of adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court seeking to avoid and to recover distributions that had been made to the investors in the Debtors. The trustee claimed that transfers to the investors prior to the collapse of the Ponzi scheme were fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(A) and applicable state law. The investors asserted an affirmative defense under section 548(c), claiming that the transfers were for value. The trustee moved for partial summary judgment. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, effectively upholding the availability of the investors' affirmative defense. The trustee appealed. The court held that, under In re AFI Holdings, Inc. and the general rule, later transfers from the Debtors up to the amount of the investment satisfied the investor defendants' restitution or fraud claims and provided value to the Debtors. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's judgment was affirmed.