Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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MaChelle Joseph, a former head women’s basketball coach at Georgia Tech, and Thomas Crowther, a former art professor at Augusta University, filed separate complaints alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX and other laws. Joseph claimed that Georgia Tech provided fewer resources to the women’s basketball team compared to the men’s team and retaliated against her for raising these issues. Crowther alleged that he was retaliated against after being accused of sexual harassment and participating in the investigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed Joseph’s Title IX claims, ruling that Title VII precluded them, and granted summary judgment against her remaining claims. For Crowther, the district court denied the motion to dismiss his Title IX claims, allowing them to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed these consolidated appeals. The court held that Title IX does not provide an implied right of action for sex discrimination in employment, reversing the district court’s decision to allow Crowther’s Title IX claims and affirming the dismissal of Joseph’s Title IX claims. The court also ruled that Crowther’s retaliation claim under Title IX, based on his participation in the investigation, did not state a valid claim. Additionally, the court found that Joseph’s claims of sex discrimination under Title VII, based on her association with the women’s team, were not viable. Finally, the court affirmed the summary judgment against Joseph’s retaliation claims under Title VII, Title IX, and the Georgia Whistleblower Act, concluding that she failed to show that the reasons for her termination were pretextual. View "Joseph v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia" on Justia Law

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Alfreida Hogan, an African-American woman, was employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as a nurse practitioner from July 2012 until March 2019, when she was demoted to staff nurse and subsequently resigned. She alleged that her immediate supervisor harassed her and gave her false, negative performance reviews due to her race, leading to her demotion. In April 2019, Hogan contacted her agency counselor, claiming racial discrimination. On July 3, 2019, the counselor informed her that informal resolution efforts had ended and that she could file a formal administrative complaint. Hogan's counsel claimed to have emailed the complaint on July 19, 2019, but the VA never received it. Hogan's counsel did not follow up until April 2020, when he learned the VA had not received the complaint. The VA dismissed the complaint due to the missed 15-day filing deadline.The district court dismissed Hogan's Title VII claims for race discrimination and retaliation, citing the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Crawford v. Babbitt, which held that failure to exhaust administrative remedies was a jurisdictional bar. The district court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to Hogan's untimely filing of her administrative complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the 15-day deadline to file a formal administrative complaint, set by EEOC regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b), is a claims-processing rule subject to equitable tolling, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court noted that Crawford did not control this case because it involved a different issue. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Fort Bend County v. Davis, which held that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional. Despite this, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that Hogan did not demonstrate due diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the 15-day deadline. View "Hogan v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs, co-personal representatives of the estate of Sara Schleider, filed a lawsuit in Florida state court against GVDB Operations, LLC, and JSMGV Management Company, LLC. They alleged that the defendants failed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at their assisted living facility, resulting in Sara Schleider contracting the virus and subsequently dying. The plaintiffs asserted state-law claims for survival and wrongful death under Florida Statute § 429.28, alleging negligence and, alternatively, willful misconduct or gross negligence.The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction on three grounds: acting under a federal officer, complete preemption by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act, and an embedded federal question concerning the PREP Act. The district court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants' arguments did not establish federal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the remand, holding that the defendants did not act under a federal officer, as their compliance with federal guidelines did not equate to acting under federal authority. The court also determined that the PREP Act did not completely preempt the plaintiffs' state-law claims, as the Act's willful misconduct provision did not wholly displace state-law causes of action for negligence. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiffs' claims did not raise a substantial federal question under the Grable doctrine, as the federal issues were not necessarily raised by the plaintiffs' well-pleaded complaint. Thus, the district court's remand to state court was affirmed. View "Howard Schleider v. GVDB Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2010, four individuals sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) under the Anti-Terrorism Act, resulting in a default judgment of $318 million against FARC. Unable to collect from FARC, the plaintiffs sought to garnish assets of Samark José López Bello and his companies, alleging they were agents or instrumentalities of FARC. The district court initially ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, mandating a jury trial to determine the agency status of López and his companies.On remand, the district court scheduled a jury trial and allowed discovery. The plaintiffs sought to depose López and requested documents. López and his companies filed motions for protective orders to avoid discovery, which the district court denied, warning of sanctions for non-compliance. López failed to appear for his deposition and did not comply with document requests. Consequently, the district court entered default judgments against López and his companies, citing willful disobedience and the inability to compel compliance due to López's fugitive status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's entry of default judgments, finding no abuse of discretion. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court correctly interpreted its scheduling order to allow discovery and found that López's failure to comply with discovery orders was willful. The court also determined that less severe sanctions would not ensure compliance, given López's fugitive status. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction due to an appeal of the protective order denials, as those orders were not final or immediately appealable. View "Stansell v. Lopez Bello" on Justia Law

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Two plaintiffs, Lester Jenkins and Dwight Siples Jr., participated in the cleanup of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and later developed chronic sinusitis, which they attributed to exposure to crude oil and dispersants during the cleanup. They filed suits against BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company, claiming that their medical conditions were caused by this exposure. The plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to establish general causation, which is necessary in toxic-tort cases where the medical community does not recognize the alleged toxins as harmful.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida reviewed the expert testimonies of Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Gina Solomon, who opined that a causal relationship existed between the cleanup work and chronic sinusitis. However, the district court excluded their testimonies, finding that neither expert identified a minimal level of exposure at which crude oil, its dispersants, or associated chemicals are hazardous to humans. The court also noted that the experts failed to identify a statistically significant association between the chronic conditions and exposure to crude oil, assess the limitations of various studies, or meaningfully consider causal factors. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of BP.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimonies. It emphasized that in toxic-tort cases, plaintiffs must demonstrate the levels of exposure that are hazardous to humans generally. The court found that the experts failed to establish a harmful level of exposure for crude oil or its dispersants and did not adequately support their causation opinions with reliable scientific evidence. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of BP was affirmed. View "In Re Deepwater Horizon Belo Cases" on Justia Law

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Fane Lozman owns a parcel of submerged and upland land in the City of Riviera Beach, Florida. After the city enacted a comprehensive plan and ordinance restricting development, Lozman sued, claiming the city deprived his property of all beneficial economic use without just compensation. Lozman has not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning to understand the extent of permitted development on his land. He also faced federal and state enforcement actions for unauthorized modifications to his property.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment for Riviera Beach. The court found that Lozman did not have any right to fill his submerged land under federal and state law, was not denied all economically productive or beneficial uses of his land, and did not plead a ripe Penn Central regulatory taking claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Lozman's claim was not ripe for judicial review because he had not received a final decision from Riviera Beach regarding the application of the comprehensive plan and ordinance to his property. Lozman had not applied for any permits, variances, or rezoning, which are necessary to determine the nature and extent of permitted development. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Lozman’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach" on Justia Law

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In this labor dispute, several employees sued their employer, a steel manufacturer, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Alabama common law. They claimed the company failed to pay wages for all hours worked, improperly calculated overtime, and delayed overtime payments. The plaintiffs sought relief for themselves and similarly situated employees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ordered the defendant to produce key time and pay records multiple times over two years. The defendant repeatedly failed to comply, offering various excuses and blaming its third-party payroll processor, ADP. The court eventually issued a default judgment against the defendant due to its continuous noncompliance and misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision to issue a default judgment, finding that the defendant's conduct warranted such a severe sanction. The appellate court also upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to reconsider the sanctions, noting that the district court had the discretion to revisit its interlocutory orders but did not abuse that discretion in this case.The appellate court also affirmed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs' claims regarding workweek calculations and bonus payments were well-pleaded. However, the appellate court vacated and remanded the district court's calculation of damages, instructing the lower court to provide a more thorough explanation of its reasoning regarding the statute of limitations defense. View "Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC" on Justia Law

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Joseph and Jo-Lynn Jenkins Parrott filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2018, committing to a payment plan. After several amendments to their plan, the bankruptcy trustee moved to dismiss the case due to missed payments. The bankruptcy court ordered the Parrotts to catch up on payments or face dismissal. Despite extensions, the Parrotts failed to comply, leading to a dismissal order on January 29, 2020, effective February 13, 2020. The Parrotts filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 5, 2020, which was struck for lacking their attorney’s signature. They filed a second notice on February 18, 2020, after their attorney withdrew.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the Parrotts' appeal, ruling it untimely and citing their failure to comply with procedural rules. The court noted the Parrotts' noncompliance with local rules and their inadequate response to an order to show cause regarding jurisdiction. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and, alternatively, dismissed the case as a sanction for procedural noncompliance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Parrotts' initial notice of appeal, though defective, was timely and that the second notice cured the defect, thus conferring jurisdiction on the district court. The appellate court also found that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case as a sanction, noting that dismissal is a last resort and should only be used in extreme circumstances, which were not present here. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for consideration on the merits. View "Parrott v. Neway" on Justia Law

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The case involves Bradley Rodriguez, who applied for disability benefits and supplemental security income, claiming a disability due to a traumatic brain injury, bipolar disorder, and depression. His application was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security Administration (SSA). The Appeals Council also denied his request for review. Rodriguez then filed a federal lawsuit challenging the denial of benefits, raising several constitutional issues regarding the appointment of SSA ALJs, Appeals Council members, and the Commissioner of the SSA. He also argued that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the SSA. The court found that the ALJ was properly appointed, the Appeals Council members were not principal officers requiring presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, and the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable. The court also held that Rodriguez was not entitled to a new hearing because he did not show that the unconstitutional removal provision caused him any harm. Additionally, the court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Commissioner had the statutory authority to appoint SSA ALJs and properly exercised that authority through ratification in July 2018. The Appeals Council members were deemed inferior officers, not principal officers, and thus did not require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. The court also agreed that the for-cause removal provision for the Commissioner was unconstitutional but severable, and Rodriguez did not demonstrate entitlement to retrospective relief. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, including medical records and vocational expert testimony. View "Rodriguez v. Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

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Two plaintiffs, Julia McCreight and Rebecca Wester, were long-term employees of AuburnBank, each with over twenty years of service. McCreight, a mortgage loan originator, and Wester, a loan closer, were both terminated by Michael King, the mortgage department manager. McCreight was fired for sending an unauthorized loan approval letter to a borrower who did not qualify, while Wester was terminated for failing to verify a borrower’s employment status before closing a loan. Both women, over sixty years old at the time of their termination, claimed they were fired due to age and sex discrimination and in retaliation for their complaints about King’s behavior.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of AuburnBank and King on all counts. The court found that neither McCreight nor Wester provided sufficient evidence to support their claims of age and sex discrimination or retaliation. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that McCreight and Wester failed to present enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that their terminations were due to illegal discrimination. The court clarified that mixed-motive theories of liability do not need to be explicitly pleaded in the complaint but must be raised by summary judgment. The court found that McCreight did not raise a mixed-motive theory at the district court level and failed to provide sufficient evidence for her single-motive theory. Similarly, Wester’s evidence was insufficient to support her claims. The court also held that both plaintiffs failed to show causation for their retaliation claims, as there was no evidence that the decision-makers knew about their discrimination complaints. View "McCreight v. AuburnBank" on Justia Law