Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Todd Mueller was shopping at a Walmart in Duluth, Georgia, when store employee Brandon Burston suspected him of shoplifting and surveilled him. After Mueller checked out, Burston and another associate approached him, resulting in a disputed encounter that led Mueller to exit through a rear entrance. Police pursued and arrested Mueller for obstruction of justice, and Burston later applied for a shoplifting warrant. Mueller also filed assault claims with police, but an additional warrant was issued against him for filing a false report. Ultimately, Mueller faced charges for obstruction, shoplifting, and filing a false police report. The district attorney declined to prosecute the false-report charge, negotiated a plea for obstruction resulting in probation, and dropped the shoplifting charge, with the parties disputing whether the latter was connected to the plea deal.Mueller initially sued Walmart and Burston in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, as well as various state-law claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. Mueller abandoned the federal claims, which the district court dismissed. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but declined jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims, dismissing them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that district courts have broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some, but not all, state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional decisions but reversed the summary judgment on Mueller’s malicious-prosecution claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find in Mueller’s favor regarding favorable termination of the shoplifting charge. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mueller v. Walmart Corporation" on Justia Law

A group of Colombian plaintiffs retained two attorneys under a contingency fee agreement to sue a multinational corporation for allegedly funding a paramilitary group that murdered their relatives. The agreement specified that the attorneys would receive one-third of any monetary award obtained before trial. A conflict soon arose between the attorneys after one joined a law firm, leading to disputes over representation and eventual court intervention. The case was consolidated into multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and over time, one attorney was discharged, with the court instructing the discharged attorney’s firm to file a charging lien to preserve its claim for fees and costs.After a settlement was reached that allocated $12.8 million to the plaintiffs and their counsel, the discharged firm moved to enforce its charging lien against the attorney’s share of the recovery. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommended nearly full payment to the firm. The district court adopted this recommendation, ordered the disputed funds to be held in the court registry pending appeal, and required that the funds not be disbursed until appellate review was exhausted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order enforcing the charging lien. The Eleventh Circuit held that such orders do not fall within the collateral-order doctrine because they do not resolve important issues separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The court explained that attorneys’ contractual or equitable rights to payment do not implicate substantial public interests or values of a high order and can be adequately reviewed after final judgment. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "All Does v. Conrad & Scherer, LLP" on Justia Law

A passenger aboard a cruise ship alleged that, after becoming inebriated, she was separated from her friends and ended up in a maintenance closet with a crewmember. She stated that she was held against her will and sexually assaulted. Both she and the crewmember gave differing accounts of the incident to FBI agents: she could not recall if she consented to sexual conduct, while the crewmember claimed it was consensual and that he did not know she was intoxicated. The FBI investigator ultimately concluded the encounter was consensual, and prosecutors declined to bring criminal charges.The passenger brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida asserting claims including false imprisonment and sexual assault. In pretrial proceedings, the district court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment liability, finding that the cruise line had not produced admissible evidence to create a dispute of material fact. The district court excluded the FBI reports as hearsay. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the cruise line was already liable for false imprisonment and limited the ability of the defendant to challenge the factual basis for that claim. The jury found the cruise line liable for sexual assault but rejected the negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, awarding over $10 million in damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on false imprisonment and in excluding the FBI investigator’s conclusions, which were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court reversed the partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacated the judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remanded for a new trial on those claims. The negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims remain resolved in favor of the cruise line. View "Doe v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual in Florida filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials failed to protect him from a cellmate with mental illness who subsequently assaulted him, causing serious injury. At the time he filed suit, the plaintiff requested to proceed in forma pauperis because he could not afford the filing fees. However, he had previously filed at least three federal actions that were dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim, triggering the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which generally bars further filings without prepayment unless the plaintiff demonstrates imminent danger of serious physical injury.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida screened the initial complaint, determined the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege imminent danger, and recommended dismissal under the PLRA’s three-strikes rule. The plaintiff objected, adding new factual allegations about ongoing threats and the continued presence and violence of his assailant, and formally requested leave to amend his complaint. The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissing the complaint without prejudice and refusing to consider the new allegations or grant leave to amend.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to either treat the plaintiff’s objections and supplemental allegations as an amendment to the complaint, which he was entitled to file as a matter of course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), or as a motion to amend. The appellate court vacated the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilson v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

After being involved in an eviction proceeding in Hillsborough County, Florida, an individual deposited funds into the court registry, as required by state law. Over time, he changed addresses and updated his contact information in the state’s e-filing system, but did not always update his address with the county court. The county clerk attempted to notify him of unclaimed funds by mailing letters to an outdated address (despite repeated returned mailings) and by publishing notice in a local Spanish-language newspaper with very limited circulation in the county. The funds were eventually declared abandoned and forfeited to the county under a Florida statute.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of the county clerk. The district court found that publication in the local newspaper constituted constitutionally sufficient notice and that the forfeiture did not amount to an unconstitutional taking because statutory schemes for escheatment of abandoned property are generally permissible.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the statute’s notice procedure is not facially unconstitutional because there are situations where publication alone may suffice—for instance, when the property owner is unknown. However, the court found the clerk’s application of the statute to this individual was unconstitutional. The clerk had access to alternative means of contact (including email and a valid mailing address in the state’s e-file system) but failed to use them, relying instead on methods not reasonably calculated to provide notice. The court also determined that the individual had not abandoned the funds, since he never received constitutionally adequate notice, and thus the county’s appropriation of the funds constituted an unconstitutional taking. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Warner v. Hillsborough County Clerk of Courts" on Justia Law

A restaurant in Florida that hosts drag performances challenged the constitutionality of a state law known as the Protection of Children Act. The Act makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly admit a child to an “adult live performance,” defined as shows depicting nudity, sexual conduct, or lewd conduct, and meeting additional criteria based on prurient appeal, offensiveness to community standards for the age of the child present, and lack of serious value for that age. The restaurant argued that the Act’s use of the word “lewd” and its age-variable standards rendered the law unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, alleging harm to its business and chilling of its performances.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted a preliminary injunction, finding the Act unlikely to survive strict scrutiny and to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The injunction barred the Secretary of the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation from enforcing the Act against anyone in the state. This decision was affirmed by a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, but the full court granted rehearing en banc, stayed the injunction as to nonparties, and requested briefing on the scope and merits of the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on en banc review, vacated the preliminary injunction in its entirety. The court held that the district court lacked authority to issue a universal injunction barring enforcement of the Act statewide, as such relief exceeds a federal court’s equitable power. Furthermore, the court found the Act’s language, as construed by Florida precedent, did not render it unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and Hamburger Mary’s was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business" on Justia Law

A municipality in Alabama brought a lawsuit against a chemical manufacturer, alleging that the company’s products containing per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contaminated the Alabama River. The contamination allegedly originated from PFAS-containing wastewater discharged by paper mills, which used the manufacturer’s products. The municipality relies on water from the river for its drinking supply, and PFAS are difficult to remove with its current filtration system, necessitating expensive upgrades.After being sued in Alabama state court for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the manufacturer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. The municipality expressly disclaimed any claims related to PFAS contamination from aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting product produced by the manufacturer for the military. The district court found that the heart of the claims was the supply of PFAS products to paper mills, not federal conduct, and remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court held that the manufacturer sufficiently alleged facts supporting federal officer removal jurisdiction. It concluded that the manufacturer plausibly acted under a federal officer when producing AFFF and that the complaint’s gravamen encompassed PFAS contamination generally, not just from paper mills. The court found the municipality’s disclaimers to be mere artful pleading that did not sever the causal connection required for removal. The manufacturer also plausibly asserted a colorable federal government contractor defense. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Several U.S. nationals, descendants of Ramón Rodriguez Gutiérrez, alleged that their family’s property in Cuba was confiscated by the Cuban government in 1961. They claimed ownership of a significant interest in a Havana cigarette factory and an adjacent mixed-use building, both seized as part of the nationalization of the tobacco industry. The plaintiffs sued multiple corporations, including two British companies, asserting that these entities had trafficked in the confiscated property in violation of the Helms-Burton Act by marketing and publicizing Cuban tobacco products made at the seized factory, including activities on U.S.-based social media platforms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Following jurisdictional discovery, a magistrate judge recommended dismissal for improper venue for some defendants, and for lack of personal jurisdiction for others, specifically Imperial Brands and WPP. The district court adopted the recommendation to dismiss the claims against these British corporations, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), as their alleged U.S.-related activities were insufficient to confer jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit examined whether federal courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over Imperial Brands and WPP in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment imposes a “reasonableness” standard for personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Applying this standard, the court found that neither Imperial Brands nor WPP had sufficient notice, meaningful U.S. connections, or presence to justify jurisdiction. The court concluded that subjecting these companies to U.S. jurisdiction would be unreasonable and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Rodriguez v. Imperial Brands, PLC." on Justia Law

Four individuals who regularly engage in panhandling in Daytona Beach, Florida, challenged the city’s 2019 ordinance that imposed wide-ranging restrictions on panhandling. They argued that the law, which defined panhandling as in-person requests for immediate donations, and which banned or restricted this conduct in various locations and circumstances, violated their First Amendment rights. Each plaintiff relied on panhandling for basic needs and had faced threats, arrests, or other enforcement actions as a result of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida reviewed the case and granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court found that the ordinance’s challenged provisions were content-based, failed strict scrutiny, and thus violated the First Amendment. It issued a declaratory judgment, a universal injunction against enforcement of the challenged provisions, and awarded damages as agreed by the parties. The City of Daytona Beach appealed these decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on speech by targeting only in-person requests for immediate donations, distinguishing them from other types of solicitation. The court found that several provisions could not withstand strict scrutiny, as the city had less speech-restrictive means to achieve its public health and safety goals. However, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge only some, not all, of the ordinance’s provisions and that the district court’s remedy was overbroad. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the provisions where at least one plaintiff had standing, vacated it in other respects, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The damages award was affirmed because at least one provision was found unconstitutional. View "Scott v. City of Daytona Beach" on Justia Law

A group of inmates incarcerated within Alabama’s state prison system filed a class action challenging the adequacy of mental health care provided by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC). The plaintiffs, who suffer from serious mental illnesses, alleged that overcrowding, understaffing, and a series of systemic failures resulted in constitutionally deficient mental health services, contributing to a suicide rate far above the national average. Key alleged deficiencies included improper identification and classification of mental health needs, inadequate treatment plans, insufficient psychotherapy, lack of proper suicide risk management, improper use of segregation for mentally ill inmates, and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for manifestations of mental illness.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama managed the litigation in multiple phases. After a seven-week bench trial, the court found the ADOC liable under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious mental health needs. The court then held extensive remedial proceedings, including further hearings and negotiations, and entered a comprehensive, system-wide remedial injunction. The court made detailed factual findings and, to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), issued particularized findings that the relief ordered was necessary, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means to remedy the constitutional violations. The court also adopted a monitoring plan to ensure compliance, involving external experts and a transition to internal oversight.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s liability findings and most aspects of the remedial and monitoring orders, holding that system-wide relief was appropriate given the systemic nature of the violations. However, the appellate court reversed certain remedial provisions where it found the relief exceeded what was necessary to correct the constitutional violations, particularly with respect to suicide-proofing cells and some staffing requirements, and as applied to a women’s facility where violations were not established. The case was remanded for modification in those limited respects. View "Braggs v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law