Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In August 2019, Plaintiff filed a class action against GoDaddy. The putative class alleged that the web-hosting company embarked on an unlawful telemarketing campaign. Objector-Appellant then filed an objection and moved to reconsider the fee award. He made two arguments. First, he objected that the district court awarded fees to class counsel twenty days before the court’s purported objection deadline. Second, he claimed that the parties’ settlement was a “coupon settlement” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1712(e) of the Class Action Fairness Act because GoDaddy class members could select GoDaddy vouchers as their recompense. The question at the core of this appeal is whether the plaintiffs who received a single unwanted, illegal telemarketing text message suffered a concrete injury.   The Eleventh Circuit remanded this appeal to the panel to consider the CAFA issues raised in Appellant’s appeal. The court held that the receipt of an unwanted text message causes a concrete injury. The court explained that while an unwanted text message is insufficiently offensive to satisfy the common law’s elements, Congress has used its lawmaking powers to recognize a lower quantum of injury necessary to bring a claim under the TCPA. As a result, the plaintiffs’ harm “is smaller in degree rather than entirely absent.” View "Susan Drazen, et al v. Mr. Juan Pinto" on Justia Law

Brinker International, Inc. (“Brinker”), the owner of Chili’s restaurants, faced a cyber-attack in which customers’ credit and debit cards were compromised. Chili’s customers have brought a class action because their information was accessed (and in some cases used) and disseminated by cyber criminals. The district court certified the class, and Brinker appealed that decision. On appeal, Brinker mounted three arguments: 1) the District Court’s class certification order violates our precedent on Article III standing for class actions; 2) the district court improvidently granted certification because the class will eventually require individualized mini-trials on class members’ injuries; and 3) the district court erred by finding that a common damages methodology existed for the class.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated in part and remanded. The court explained that although all three plaintiffs adequately allege a concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing, two of the plaintiffs' allegations face a fatal causation issue. The court explained that while the district court’s interpretation of the class definitions surely meets the standing analysis, the court has outlined for one of the named plaintiffs, the court noted that the phrase in the class definitions “accessed by cybercriminals” is broader than the two delineated categories the district court gave, which were limited to cases of fraudulent charges or posting of credit card information on the dark web. Therefore, the court remanded this case to give the district court the opportunity to clarify its predominance finding. View "Eric Steinmetz, et al v. Brinker International, Inc." on Justia Law

MiMedx is a Florida corporation headquartered in Marietta, Georgia. Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois is the lead plaintiff in this consolidated securities class action. Carpenters purchased 41,080 shares of MiMedx common stock in three separate transactions between August 2017 and October 2017 and later sold those shares in December 2017. The district court dismissed Carpenters’s action, finding that none of the complaint’s allegations occurring before the date Carpenters sold its MiMedx stock constituted a partial corrective disclosure sufficient to demonstrate loss causation. Carpenters contend that the district court erred in its loss causation analysis. Carpenters further argued that the district court erred in denying its post-judgment motion for relief from judgment, as well as its post-judgment request for leave to amend its complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in finding that Carpenters lacked standing to bring its Exchange Act claims against Defendants and vacated that portion of the district court’s order. The court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Carpenters’ second amended complaint for failure to plead loss causation. The court explained that as to Rule 59(e), the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Carpenters sought to relitigate arguments it had already raised before the entry of judgment. As to Rule 60(b)(1) the court found no mistake in the district court’s application of the law in this case that would change the outcome of this case. And, as to Rule 60(b)(6), the district court found that Carpenters’ motion primarily focused on the court’s purported “mistakes in the application of the law,” which fall squarely under Rule 60(b)(1). View "Carpenters Pension Fund of Illinois v. MiMedx Group, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, through his estate, sued Ford Motor Company, inter alia, for wrongful death and product liability pursuant to the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). He alleged that a faulty seatbelt design in his 2003 Ford Mustang caused his fatal injury. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ford. Plaintiff now appealed, arguing that the district court erroneously ruled on several evidentiary issues, a motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), and a motion for a new trial. Ford filed a cross-appeal in anticipation of a possible reversal, challenging the district court’s denial of its motion to exclude expert testimony at trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rulings challenged by Plaintiff. As for Ford’s cross-appeal,  the court dismissed for lack of standing. Here, the working seatbelt from the crash was admitted into evidence alongside expert testimony opining that the driver likely caused the excess webbing. A reasonable jury could have weighed this evidence against the evidence introduced by Plaintiff and “might reach different conclusions” about whether Plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Id. Therefore, JMOL is not proper, and the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion. Further, the court explained that although Ford has identified cases where the court has addressed a victorious Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, the court is not bound by a prior decision’s sub silentio treatment of a jurisdictional question. View "Mark Henderson v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of an insurance dispute between Plaintiff and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. After an accident in which her vehicle suffered substantial damage, Plaintiff made a claim under her Safeco-issued insurance policy for the damage. Safeco declared her vehicle a total loss and paid her what it deemed to be the actual cash value of her vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment to Safeco.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as proof that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to incur dealer fees, Plaintiff pointed to the facts that (1) she incurred dealer fees in purchasing both the Lexus that was totaled and her Subaru replacement vehicle, (2) approximately 50-70% of Safeco policyholders are likely to purchase a vehicle from a dealer, and (3) approximately 85-95% of dealerships charge dealer fees. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff’s three data points show a reasonable likelihood that a policyholder will incur dealer fees if she chooses to purchase her replacement vehicle from a dealer. And they show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. But they do not show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. Plaintiff has failed as a matter of law to satisfy the Mills standard; therefore, the district court correctly awarded Safeco summary judgment on this issue. View "Gina Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

A jury determined that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office discriminated and retaliated against helicopter pilot (Plaintiff) in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and awarded Plaintiff $240,000 in lost wages. The verdict form also asked whether the sheriff’s office “willfully violated the law,” and the jury answered, “Yes.” Based on a statutory provision that awards double damages for willful violations, Plaintiff moved to alter the judgment. But the district judge decided that the jury finding on willfulness was “advisory” and denied Plaintiff’s motion. The district judge also denied the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for an altered judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the verdict against the sheriff’s office. But the court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to alter the judgment because the parties consented to have the jury decide the issue of willfulness. View "Scott Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

E.G. fell from a roof and became paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs projected into the millions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage for the man. This appeal is a battle between the two of them. The primary insurer for E.G.’s company was Southern-Owners Insurance Company. E.G. was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. Southern-Owners refused to pay any amount to settle the claim, and American Builders and Evanston ponied up a million dollars apiece instead. American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subrogation. Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury heard the case and found in favor of American Builders.  Southern-Owners sought judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied those motions, too. On appeal, Southern-Owners challenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence is not “so overwhelmingly in favor of [Southern-Owners] that a reasonable jury could not” have ruled for American Builders on bad faith and against Southern-Owners on breach of contract. Further, the court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Southern-Owners’ Rule 59 motion. View "American Builders Insurance Company v. Southern-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Over the course of twenty-two months, Plaintiff-—a childhood victim of lead poisoning—assigned his rights to nearly one million dollars in structured settlement payments to factoring companies for pennies on the dollar. Through six transfer agreements that he lacked the capacity to understand, Plaintiff relinquished his rights to monthly payments with a total aggregate value of $959,834.42 spread over the course of about twenty-six years for a series of immediate lump-sum cash payments that amounted to $268,130. Plaintiff sued Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Transamerica”), the entities that issued and funded his periodic payments before he assigned them. Plaintiff asserted two claims against Transamerica: one for breach of contract under New York law and the other for exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Florida’s Adult Protective Services Act (“FAPSA”), Florida Statute Section 415.1111.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s FAPSA claim fails under the plain language of the statute. In his operative complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Transamerica intended to deprive him of the use of his funds. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Transamerica “allowed” (or “facilitated”) his exploitation by the factoring companies, which resulted in an unauthorized taking of his assets. Based on the facts that Plaintiff pleaded, Transamerica’s actions simply do not amount to “exploitation,” as that term is defined in FAPSA. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of FAPSA, the court affirmed the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal of his FAPSA claim. View "Lujerio Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly underpaying him for overtime hours. Plaintiff worked in Florida, but he sued Waste Pro USA, Inc., and its subsidiary, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., as one of several named plaintiffs in a purported collective action in the District of South Carolina. That court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied as moot his motion to sever his claims and transfer them to a district court in Florida. Instead of appealing or seeking other relief in the South Carolina court, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the same claims. The Florida district court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff had “alternate ways of preserving his cause of action short of invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling.” He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of or for relief from the dismissal order and argued that transfer was in the interest of justice. He also could have appealed the dismissal. “The right to appeal generally is regarded as an adequate legal remedy [that] forecloses equitable relief.” The court wrote that a diligent plaintiff would have filed a protective action or pursued a legal remedy in the South Carolina proceeding. Further, to the extent Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if equitable tolling does not apply in this case, that is the consequence of his own failure to pursue his remedies at law. Equity will not intervene in such circumstances. View "Anthony Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc, et al." on Justia Law