Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is not exempt from the rules of discovery. Nonetheless, the CFPB tried to bring a wide-ranging civil lawsuit against 18 defendants without ever being deposed. When the district court ordered the CFPB to sit for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, the CFPB doubled down by engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process. The district court imposed sanctions for this misconduct. On appeal, the CFPB maintains that it behaved properly.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that violating the district court’s clear orders and derailing multiple depositions is nowhere near proper conduct. The court explained that the CFPB was determined to avoid 30(b)(6) depositions. To realize its goal, the CFPB employed tactics that the district court repeatedly forbade. As such, the CFPB clearly violated Rule 37(b), and severe sanctions were warranted. The court, therefore, held that the district court’s sanctions order dismissing the CFPB’s claims against the five appellees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Check & Credit Recovery, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employee opened, in Plaintiff’s name, a credit card with Chase and ran up tens of thousands of dollars in debt. The employee also illegally accessed Plaintiff’s bank accounts and used them to partially pay off the monthly statements. When she discovered the scheme, Plaintiff reported the fraud to Chase, but Chase refused to characterize the charges as illegitimate. Plaintiff sued Chase under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for not conducting a reasonable investigation into her dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase because it concluded that Chase’s investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute was “reasonable,” as the Act requires.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff hasn’t shown a genuine dispute of fact whether Chase’s conclusion was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court explained that Chase didn’t need to keep investigating. Nor has Plaintiff explained what Chase should have done differently: whom it should have talked to or what documents it should have considered that might have affected its apparent-authority analysis. That omission dooms Plaintiff’s claim because “a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a reasonable investigation would have resulted in the furnisher concluding that the information was inaccurate or incomplete without identifying some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.” View "Shelly Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GDNR”) sued DeKalb County for violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). To resolve this suit, the parties agreed to a consent decree in 2011. Eight years later, South River Watershed Alliance, Inc. (“South River”) and J.E. sued DeKalb County for failing to follow the decree and violating the CWA. The CWA authorizes citizen suits for enforcement purposes, but such suits are not allowed when an “administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action . . . to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.” Thus, this case turned on whether the 2011 consent decree—along with the ongoing efforts of the EPA and GDNR to require compliance—constitutes diligent prosecution. The district court determined that South River’s suit was barred by the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, South River argued for the opposite result and requests injunctive relief to ensure DeKalb County’s compliance.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South River wants the current consent decree discarded in favor of a more muscular alternative. The fact that South River disagrees with the prosecution strategy undertaken by the EPA and GDNR, however, is not enough to prove that the EPA and GDNR have failed to diligently prosecute DeKalb County’s CWA violations. To the contrary, the record shows that the EPA and GDNR have been diligent, which means that South River’s suit is barred under 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(b)(1)(B). View "South River Watershed Alliance, et al. v. DeKalb County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Empire Indemnity Insurance Company issued an insurance policy (the “Policy”) to Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc., for coverage of five buildings that Positano owns in Naples, Florida. Following Hurricane Irma, Positano filed a first-party claim for property insurance benefits under the Policy, claiming that Hurricane Irma damaged its property and that the damage was covered by the Policy. Empire determined that there was coverage to only three of the five buildings covered by the Policy but disagreed as to the amount of the loss. Positano sought to invoke appraisal based on the Policy’s appraisal provision. Positano then sued Empire in Florida state court, and Empire removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Positano moved to compel appraisal and to stay the case pending the resolution of the appraisal proceedings, which Empire opposed. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court grant Positano’s motion, and, over Empire’s objection, the district court ordered the parties to appraisal and stayed the proceedings pending appraisal. Empire timely appealed the district court’s order.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court’s order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings pending appraisal is an interlocutory order that is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(a)(1). The court also concluded that the order compelling appraisal and staying the action pending appraisal is not immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). View "Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc. v. Empire Indemnity Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor cited and fined Chewy, Inc., for inadequately protecting its warehouse employees from “under-rides,” a kind of forklift accident. The Secretary found that no specific standard covered the under-ride hazard and that Chewy had a general duty to protect its workers from that hazard. An administrative law judge upheld the citation and ruled that the standard Chewy cited, 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.178, did not cover the under-ride hazard.   The Eleventh Circuit granted Chewy’s petition for review, set aside the Commission’s order, and vacated the citation. The court held that Chewy complied with the safety standard that specifically addresses under-rides. Accordingly, the Secretary cannot cite Chewy for failing to protect its workers from that hazard. The court explained that the Secretary’s distinction between a standard that prevents the under-ride hazard and a standard that addresses the hazards that arise in the event of an under-ride, if accepted and extended to other cases, would upend the regulatory scheme. Further, the court wrote that the administrative law judge’s interpretation of section 1910.5(f ) is also unreasonable because it requires that compliance with the specific standard eliminate the hazard for preemption to occur. View "Chewy, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioners chartered their yacht, Lady Leila, in 2014 and 2015. They did not conduct the chartering activity for profit—it was a hobby. Though the hobby generated income, it also incurred sizeable expenses each year. Petitioners deducted some of those expenses under Section 183(b)(2) and placed them “above the line” to reduce their gross income. After an audit, the Commissioner determined that the Section 183(b)(2) deductions were miscellaneous itemized deductions under Section 67, meaning that they belonged “below the line” and reduced adjusted gross income, not gross income. Moreover, because Petitioners had earned tens of millions of dollars in 2014 and 2015 and, at that time, the Code allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of adjusted gross income, the Commissioner disallowed the Section 183(b)(2) deductions altogether. Facing deficiencies and penalties, Petitioners petitioned the Tax Court, which granted summary judgment for the Commissioner. They sought appellate review.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court and denied the petition for review. The court explained that because Sections 63 and 67 also omit Section 183, hobby expenses deducted under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous itemized deductions. During the relevant time period, these deductions were subject to a two-percent floor on adjusted gross income. The result is that Section 183(b)(2) gave Petitioners a deduction for their expenses from operating Lady Leila, but Section 67 did not allow them to take that deduction because they could not meet the two-percent threshold for miscellaneous itemized deductions. View "Carl L. Gregory, et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2021, Respondent-Appellant left Brazil with her daughter, Y.F.G., and eventually entered the United States. The child’s father, Petitioner-Appellee, shared custody of Y.F.G., and he petitioned for the child’s return to Brazil under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.Following a bench trial at which both parents testified, the district court ordered that Y.F.G. be returned to Brazil. The district court expressly found Father not to be credible, but because the district court concluded that Mother did not provide independent corroboration to support her own testimony, the district court found she had not established by clear and convincing evidence a “grave risk” of harm to Y.F.G. in Brazil.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that when a factfinder does not believe an interested witness’s testimony, it may—but is not required to—consider that witness’s discredited testimony as corroborating substantive evidence that the opposite of the testimony is true. And when a single witness provides the only evidence on some point, that testimony, without corroboration, can still meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence if the factfinder concludes that it is credible. The district court failed to take these principles into account, requiring reversal. View "Wellekson Goncalves Silva v. Andriene Ferreira dos Santos" on Justia Law

Eight South Florida hospitals dutifully provided out-of-network emergency treatment to numerous Cigna customers. When Cigna reimbursed the hospitals just 15% of what they had charged, the hospitals sued, accusing Cigna of paying less than the “community” rate. As proof, the hospitals showed that they normally receive five times as much for the care they provided here. In response, Cigna asserted that the hospitals’ data proved nothing because, it insisted, the relevant “community” necessarily includes more than just the eight plaintiff hospitals. The district court agreed and granted Cigna summary judgment.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that even if the relevant “community” here extends beyond the eight plaintiff hospitals, their receipts alone are enough to create a genuine factual dispute about what the “community” rates are. The court reasoned that to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff needn’t present evidence that compels a single, airtight inference—just evidence that allows a reasonable one. The court explained that the way to rebut an inference allegedly skewed by limited data is to add data. And Cigna can do just that—at trial. If it can show there that most other providers in the “community” charge less than the plaintiff hospitals do, then it may well debunk the hospitals’ estimate. But unless and until that happens, it remains the case that a reasonable jury could conclude that the eight plaintiff hospitals’ rates reflect the prevailing community rate—and thus that Cigna shortchanged them. View "North Shore Medical Center, Inc., et al v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law