Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of an insurance dispute between Plaintiff and Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. After an accident in which her vehicle suffered substantial damage, Plaintiff made a claim under her Safeco-issued insurance policy for the damage. Safeco declared her vehicle a total loss and paid her what it deemed to be the actual cash value of her vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment to Safeco.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that as proof that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to incur dealer fees, Plaintiff pointed to the facts that (1) she incurred dealer fees in purchasing both the Lexus that was totaled and her Subaru replacement vehicle, (2) approximately 50-70% of Safeco policyholders are likely to purchase a vehicle from a dealer, and (3) approximately 85-95% of dealerships charge dealer fees. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, do not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact. Plaintiff’s three data points show a reasonable likelihood that a policyholder will incur dealer fees if she chooses to purchase her replacement vehicle from a dealer. And they show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. But they do not show that a policyholder is reasonably likely to need to purchase a replacement vehicle from a dealer. Plaintiff has failed as a matter of law to satisfy the Mills standard; therefore, the district court correctly awarded Safeco summary judgment on this issue. View "Gina Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

A jury determined that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office discriminated and retaliated against helicopter pilot (Plaintiff) in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and awarded Plaintiff $240,000 in lost wages. The verdict form also asked whether the sheriff’s office “willfully violated the law,” and the jury answered, “Yes.” Based on a statutory provision that awards double damages for willful violations, Plaintiff moved to alter the judgment. But the district judge decided that the jury finding on willfulness was “advisory” and denied Plaintiff’s motion. The district judge also denied the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for an altered judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the verdict against the sheriff’s office. But the court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to alter the judgment because the parties consented to have the jury decide the issue of willfulness. View "Scott Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

E.G. fell from a roof and became paralyzed from the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs projected into the millions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage for the man. This appeal is a battle between the two of them. The primary insurer for E.G.’s company was Southern-Owners Insurance Company. E.G. was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. Southern-Owners refused to pay any amount to settle the claim, and American Builders and Evanston ponied up a million dollars apiece instead. American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subrogation. Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury heard the case and found in favor of American Builders.  Southern-Owners sought judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied those motions, too. On appeal, Southern-Owners challenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the evidence is not “so overwhelmingly in favor of [Southern-Owners] that a reasonable jury could not” have ruled for American Builders on bad faith and against Southern-Owners on breach of contract. Further, the court held that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Southern-Owners’ Rule 59 motion. View "American Builders Insurance Company v. Southern-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Over the course of twenty-two months, Plaintiff-—a childhood victim of lead poisoning—assigned his rights to nearly one million dollars in structured settlement payments to factoring companies for pennies on the dollar. Through six transfer agreements that he lacked the capacity to understand, Plaintiff relinquished his rights to monthly payments with a total aggregate value of $959,834.42 spread over the course of about twenty-six years for a series of immediate lump-sum cash payments that amounted to $268,130. Plaintiff sued Transamerica Annuity Service Corporation and Transamerica Life Insurance Company (collectively, “Transamerica”), the entities that issued and funded his periodic payments before he assigned them. Plaintiff asserted two claims against Transamerica: one for breach of contract under New York law and the other for exploitation of a vulnerable adult under Florida’s Adult Protective Services Act (“FAPSA”), Florida Statute Section 415.1111.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s FAPSA claim fails under the plain language of the statute. In his operative complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Transamerica intended to deprive him of the use of his funds. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Transamerica “allowed” (or “facilitated”) his exploitation by the factoring companies, which resulted in an unauthorized taking of his assets. Based on the facts that Plaintiff pleaded, Transamerica’s actions simply do not amount to “exploitation,” as that term is defined in FAPSA. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a violation of FAPSA, the court affirmed the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal of his FAPSA claim. View "Lujerio Cordero v. Transamerica Annuity Service, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly underpaying him for overtime hours. Plaintiff worked in Florida, but he sued Waste Pro USA, Inc., and its subsidiary, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., as one of several named plaintiffs in a purported collective action in the District of South Carolina. That court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied as moot his motion to sever his claims and transfer them to a district court in Florida. Instead of appealing or seeking other relief in the South Carolina court, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the same claims. The Florida district court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff had “alternate ways of preserving his cause of action short of invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling.” He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of or for relief from the dismissal order and argued that transfer was in the interest of justice. He also could have appealed the dismissal. “The right to appeal generally is regarded as an adequate legal remedy [that] forecloses equitable relief.” The court wrote that a diligent plaintiff would have filed a protective action or pursued a legal remedy in the South Carolina proceeding. Further, to the extent Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if equitable tolling does not apply in this case, that is the consequence of his own failure to pursue his remedies at law. Equity will not intervene in such circumstances. View "Anthony Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc, et al." on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is not exempt from the rules of discovery. Nonetheless, the CFPB tried to bring a wide-ranging civil lawsuit against 18 defendants without ever being deposed. When the district court ordered the CFPB to sit for Rule 30(b)(6) depositions, the CFPB doubled down by engaging in dramatic abuse of the discovery process. The district court imposed sanctions for this misconduct. On appeal, the CFPB maintains that it behaved properly.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that violating the district court’s clear orders and derailing multiple depositions is nowhere near proper conduct. The court explained that the CFPB was determined to avoid 30(b)(6) depositions. To realize its goal, the CFPB employed tactics that the district court repeatedly forbade. As such, the CFPB clearly violated Rule 37(b), and severe sanctions were warranted. The court, therefore, held that the district court’s sanctions order dismissing the CFPB’s claims against the five appellees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Check & Credit Recovery, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s employee opened, in Plaintiff’s name, a credit card with Chase and ran up tens of thousands of dollars in debt. The employee also illegally accessed Plaintiff’s bank accounts and used them to partially pay off the monthly statements. When she discovered the scheme, Plaintiff reported the fraud to Chase, but Chase refused to characterize the charges as illegitimate. Plaintiff sued Chase under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for not conducting a reasonable investigation into her dispute. The district court granted summary judgment for Chase because it concluded that Chase’s investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute was “reasonable,” as the Act requires.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff hasn’t shown a genuine dispute of fact whether Chase’s conclusion was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court explained that Chase didn’t need to keep investigating. Nor has Plaintiff explained what Chase should have done differently: whom it should have talked to or what documents it should have considered that might have affected its apparent-authority analysis. That omission dooms Plaintiff’s claim because “a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a reasonable investigation would have resulted in the furnisher concluding that the information was inaccurate or incomplete without identifying some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was, in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.” View "Shelly Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from the tragic death of a man who died while in custody. Appellants appealed the district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the Sheriff and granting summary judgment to the Fulton County Sheriff’s Department Officers, NaphCare, and a NaphCare employee.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Sheriff and its grant of summary judgment to both the Officers and the employee. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment in favor of NaphCare. The court explained that in Appellants’ response to NaphCare’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants relied mainly on the medical report and deposition of Dr. Timothy Hughes but also referred to the report and deposition of two other witnesses, as required by O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-9.1. Dr. Hughes’s report concluded the failure of NaphCare medical staff to properly screen, examine, and treat the decedent was the proximate cause of his death. This testimony is supported by the other witnesses. The court agreed with Appellants that, based on Dr. Hughes’s testimony, there is enough of a genuine issue of material fact for NaphCare’s liability to reach a jury. Dr. Hughes did not solely rest his argument on NaphCare’s failure to sedate the decedent. It was the failure of the staff to follow through with the decedent at all that was the problem. While this included the need for sedation, it also included immediate classification to suicide watch and observation. View "April Myrick, et al v. Fulton County, Georgia, et al" on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“GDNR”) sued DeKalb County for violating the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). To resolve this suit, the parties agreed to a consent decree in 2011. Eight years later, South River Watershed Alliance, Inc. (“South River”) and J.E. sued DeKalb County for failing to follow the decree and violating the CWA. The CWA authorizes citizen suits for enforcement purposes, but such suits are not allowed when an “administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action . . . to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order.” Thus, this case turned on whether the 2011 consent decree—along with the ongoing efforts of the EPA and GDNR to require compliance—constitutes diligent prosecution. The district court determined that South River’s suit was barred by the diligent prosecution bar. On appeal, South River argued for the opposite result and requests injunctive relief to ensure DeKalb County’s compliance.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South River wants the current consent decree discarded in favor of a more muscular alternative. The fact that South River disagrees with the prosecution strategy undertaken by the EPA and GDNR, however, is not enough to prove that the EPA and GDNR have failed to diligently prosecute DeKalb County’s CWA violations. To the contrary, the record shows that the EPA and GDNR have been diligent, which means that South River’s suit is barred under 33 U.S.C. Section 1365(b)(1)(B). View "South River Watershed Alliance, et al. v. DeKalb County, Georgia" on Justia Law