Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff received MemoryGel Silicone Gel Breast Implants made by Mentor Worldwide, LLC. After one of her implants ruptured, she sued Mentor pro se, alleging negligence and negligence per se, strict liability failure to warn, and strict liability manufacturing defect. The district court dismissed her complaint without prejudice and later dismissed her amended complaint with prejudice as preempted and foreclosed by Florida law.   Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of the manufacturing defect claims in Counts I and III of her initial complaint. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and held that Plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claims are sufficiently pleaded to survive a motion to dismiss.   The court explained that construing her pro se pleadings liberally, Plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claims are sufficiently pleaded to survive Mentor’s motion to dismiss. She plausibly alleged that Mentor violated a duty it owed to her, not the government. Specifically, she alleged that the implants’ manufacturing process differed from the specifications agreed to by the FDA and that Mentor used materials that differed from those approved by the FDA, violating both state law and the device-specific regulatory controls the FDA approved under 21 C.F.R. Section 820.30. These allegations are enough to state a plausible claim against Mentor under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court erred by holding otherwise. View "Lalitha E. Jacob, MD v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) and related parties under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 2333. They based their claims on the FARC’s commission of offenses like kidnapping and murder in Colombia.   Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Defendants and based on their submissions the district court awarded them significant damages. After obtaining that judgment, Plaintiffs sought to attach the assets of third parties blocked by the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The final judgment entered by the clerk described the monetary awards to each of the plaintiffs (including the trebled portions) as “compensatory damages.”   Plaintiffs instituted garnishment proceedings in district court to attach the assets of Defendant and several limited liability companies he owns or controls. Plaintiffs filed a motion, in this case, asking the district court to amend the final judgment by removing the references to “compensatory damages.” They argued that the clerk of court erred in characterizing the trebled amounts of the awards as “compensatory damages” when the court itself had not described them in that way.   The district court denied the Rule 60(a) motion in a written order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The court explained that Rule 60(a) provides that a court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other parts of the record. Here, the court saw no abuse of discretion (or clear error) when the district court found that the intent was for the entire $318 million to be deemed compensatory. View "Keith Stansell, et al v. Samark Jose Lopez Bello, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly used Roundup on his lawn for about 30 years. Plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, which he believes was linked to the main chemical ingredient in Roundup. Plaintiff filed against Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup®. In his four-count complaint, he alleged strict liability for a design defect under Georgia law (Count I); strict liability for failure to warn under Georgia law (Count II); negligence under Georgia law (Count III); and breach of implied warranties under Georgia law (Count IV). The district court granted Defendant’s motion, thereby eliminating Counts I and III from the Complaint. Plaintiff timely appealed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings as to Count II.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded. The court held that Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim is not preempted by the federal requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) or the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) actions pursuant to it. The court explained that sometimes IFRA or the EPA’s actions pursuant to FIFRA may preempt state law. But only federal action with the force of law has the capacity to preempt state law. Here, the problem for Monsanto is that the EPA’s registration process is not sufficiently formal to carry with it the force of law under Mead. Further, Monsanto cannot wave the “formality” wand on EPA actions to accomplish compliance with the Mead standard. None of them are the product of “notice-and-comment rulemaking” or “formal adjudication.” Nor do the EPA letters Monsanto points to “bespeak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind” Monsanto. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Several years ago, law firm Lueder, Larkin & Hunter represented the Pine Grove Homeowners Association in lawsuits seeking to collect delinquent fees from homeowners. One homeowner settled, and eventually Pine Grove voluntarily dismissed the other two suits. The homeowners then sued Lueder, Larkin & Hunter, arguing in state court that the law firm’s actions violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The firm removed the cases to federal court, where they were consolidated before a magistrate judge. After reviewing the complaints, the firm became convinced that the FDCPA claims filed against it were “unsubstantiated and frivolous”—meaning that the homeowners’ attorney had committed sanctionable conduct. The firm served the homeowners’ counsel with draft motions for Rule 11 sanctions.   The law firm appealed the denial of sanctions, and the homeowners appealed the summary judgment decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and vacated its denial of the Rule 11 motions. The court explained that it has long held that Rule 11 motions “are not barred if filed after a dismissal order, or after entry of judgment,” though it is apparently necessary to clarify that point in light of later cases. The homeowners claim that a later case, Walker, changed the Eleventh Circuit’s law. The court, looking at the relevant cases together, held that the reconciled rule follows: If a party fulfills the safe harbor requirement by serving a Rule 11 sanctions motion at least 21 days before final judgment, then she may file that motion after the judgment is entered and Lueder, Larkin & Hunter satisfied this rule. View "Wilbur Huggins v. Lueder, Larkin & Hunter, LLC" on Justia Law

Royal Palm Properties, LLC ("Royal Palm") sued Pink Palm Properties, LLC ("Pink Palm)" for trademark infringement and Pink Palm countersued. Both parties ultimately lost on their claims. Pink Palm asserted that it was the prevailing party, and thereby entitled to costs under Rule 54 and “exceptional case” fees under the Lanham Act because it successfully defended the initial infringement claim. The district court ruled that there was no prevailing party because there was a split judgment and both parties lost on their claims. Because it found that neither party could be characterized as the prevailing party, the district court declined to award costs or fees to Pink Palm.   Pink Palm’s appealed the district court’s fee order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The court wrote that when the parties achieve a “tie,” a district court may find no prevailing party for purposes of costs and fees. While there will be occasional instances, such as this one, where neither party prevails, the court noted that in the majority of cases whether there is a prevailing party and which party prevailed will be easily determined. Further when granting prevailing party status in those instances, however, a district court is limited to naming one, and only one, prevailing party. Here, neither party was the prevailing party, and, because it did not meet the threshold requirement of prevailing party status, Pink Palm was rightly denied costs under Rule 54 and attorney fees under the Lanham Act. View "Royal Palm Properties, LLC v. Pink Palm Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Charles and Tracy Lamirand took out a mortgage loan to buy a home in Florida but did not keep up with the payments. After they defaulted, the loan servicer sued to foreclose on the home. While the foreclosure suit was pending, Fay Servicing took over the loan. A disagreement arose, leading the Lamirands to sue Fay Servicing. The parties soon settled both lawsuits and agreed that the Lamirands owed $85,790.99 on the loan, to be paid in one year. But four months later, Fay Servicing sent the Lamirands a mortgage statement notifying them that their loan had “been accelerated” because they were “late on [their] monthly payments.” On Fay Servicing’s fast-tracked timetable, the Lamirands owed $92,789.55 to be paid in a month. If they did not pay, Fay Servicing’s statement warned, they risked more fees and even “the loss of [their] home to a foreclosure sale.” The statement then detailed many ways the Lamirands might pay. The statements distressed the Lamirands, who thought they needed to pay only $85,790.99 and make that payment by the date set in the settlement agreement. They eventually sued, alleging that by sending the statements Fay Servicing had violated the FDCPA and Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act. To the district court, the periodic statements were unrelated to debt collection, even though they urged the Lamirands to make their past-due loan payments, because Fay Servicing was required to send monthly updates under the Truth in Lending Act. The court thus held that the Lamirands had not stated an FDCPA claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Florida law claims, and dismissed the complaint. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a periodic statement mandated by the Truth in Lending Act could also be a debt-collection communication covered by the FDCPA. Because the complaint here plausibly alleged the periodic statements sent to the plaintiffs aimed to collect their debt, the district court’s dismissal of their complaint was reversed. View "Lamirand, et al v. Fay Servicing, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff agreed to help Defendants LLC obtain financing, and Defendants agreed to assign Plaintiff and his company their majority stake in the LLC.AN issue arose regarding what that assignment entailed. After years of litigation and a two-week trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff a four-million-dollar verdict on claims of fraud and conversion, which they reduced by a half-million dollars for his failure to mitigate damages. Defendants now seek to vacate that verdict, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court had subject matter over this action, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Second, none of the issues raised by Defendants on appeal warrant reversal. And three, on Plaintiff's cross-appeal, the district court erred in giving a failure-to-mitigate instruction to the jury. The court thus reinstated the $500,000 that the jury subtracted from the compensatory damages award.   The court explained that Plaintiff's federal civil RICO claim was not so obviously frivolous that it failed to invoke federal jurisdiction. And although the district court could have declined to continue exercising jurisdiction once the federal RICO claim was dismissed, the parties consented to litigate the remaining state law claims in federal court. As a result, Defendants cannot argue on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by declining to dismiss the case. View "Arturo Rubinstein, et al v. Yoram Yehuba, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a court-appointed receiver, appealed the district court’s dismissal of his aiding and abetting claims on behalf of the companies in receivership (the Receivership Entities) against PNC Bank. The district court granted PNC’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it found that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring those claims. The district court relied on our decision in Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 960 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020).   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that he has standing because he was appointed pursuant to Section 501.207(3) of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders granting PNC’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration and leave to amend. The court held that even assuming that Section 501.207(3) applies, it does not rectify the standing issue in Isaiah because it does not expressly address the imputation of wrongful acts between the Receivership Entities themselves and their insiders. View "Jonathan E. Perlman v. PNC Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff an attorney employed by the Atlanta Housing Authority (“AHA”), which is a recipient of federal grant funds—was fired after challenging the negotiation tactics of AHA’s new CEO (“CEO”). Plaintiff’s complaints filed with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) inspector general and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia were both dismissed for failure to state a claim under the NDAA.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously concluded that Section 4712 did not apply to her as an employee of a federal “grantee,” and erroneously found that she merely alleged a difference of opinion, not a specific violation of a contract or grant.   The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Plaintiff that she falls within the class of disclosing persons protected by Section 4712, however, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that when Congress and the President enacted Section 4712 of the NDAA, they extended its protections to employees of federal grantees, not just federal contractors. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s holding that employees like Plaintiff could not qualify for whistleblower protections. However, Plaintiff failed to show that her belief that the CEO’s actions evinced gross mismanagement was reasonable. Nor did she show that she had a reasonable belief that the CEO’s actions constituted an abuse of authority or a violation of a law, rule, or regulation. Thus, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Karen Fuerst v. The Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s doctors prescribed him Optune, a medical technology that had recently received FDA approval for treating recurrent GBM. The device delivers tumor treating field therapy (TTFT) to inhibit cancer-cell replication. A company called Novocure is the sole supplier of the Optune device, which is rented by patients on a monthly basis.   Because Plaintiff is a Medicare Part B beneficiary, he and Novocure asked Medicare to cover his TTFT. Novocure was held liable for the claims. Plaintiff and Novocure submitted 13 claims to Medicare, corresponding to 13 months of TTFT. The district court held that Plaintiff lacked standing because he hadn’t suffered an injury in fact.   The Eleventh Circuit was tasked with deciding whether Plaintiff has standing to challenge a denial of Medicare coverage where the costs of his treatment were imposed not on him, but rather on a third-party supplier. The court affirmed the district court’s determination that Plaintiff hadn’t suffered an injury in fact.   Here, Plaintiff’s alleged harm will only come to pass due to the challenged action if, at some indefinite point in the future: (1) his condition worsens, (2) he has paid his premiums and stayed on Medicare Part B, (3) he elects to resume TTFT, (4) his doctor prescribes the therapy (5) Plaintiff receives the treatment, (6) he files a claim, (7) which is denied at every level of the Medicare appeals process, (8) the adjudicators determine that Plaintiff’s hypothetical future case presents a “comparable situation,” and (9) they further find that the instant coverage denial and no other source put Plaintiff on notice that he could be held liable. View "Edwin R. Banks v. Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law