Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of drivers sued their employer, Owl, Inc., for breach of contract and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They claimed they were not paid the correct hourly rate under their employment contract or overtime wages under the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment for Owl on the breach of contract claim and limited the damages available to the drivers for the FLSA claim. The parties then settled the FLSA claim for $350,000, and the drivers appealed the district court’s rulings.The district court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the drivers had agreed to a specific hourly rate, and enforcing a higher rate under the Service Contract Act (SCA) would create a private right of action under the SCA, which does not exist. The court also granted Owl’s motion in limine, limiting the FLSA damages to one-and-a-half times the rate the drivers were actually paid. The drivers settled the FLSA claim but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court entered a final judgment on all claims. The court also held that the drivers had standing to challenge the district court’s rulings despite the settlement. On the merits, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, holding that the SCA wage was not incorporated into the employment contracts. However, it reversed the district court’s ruling on the FLSA claim, holding that the “regular rate” under the FLSA should include the prevailing wage required by the SCA. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Perez v. Owl, Inc." on Justia Law

A high school football coach's contract was not renewed by the Valdosta Board of Education in 2020. The vote split along racial lines, with all white members voting to renew and all black members voting against renewal. The coach believed the decision was racially motivated.In 2020, the coach sued the five black board members individually under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, seeking monetary damages. The district court denied the board members' motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the coach failed to state a claim. The case was remanded for dismissal.In 2021, the coach filed a new lawsuit against the same board members and the Board itself, this time under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new complaint included more detailed allegations but was based on the same core facts. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, ruling that the new lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the Board was in privity with the individual board members and the two cases involved the same cause of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Board was in privity with the individual board members because they acted as the Board when they voted not to renew the coach's contract. The court also found that both lawsuits arose from the same nucleus of operative facts, thus meeting the criteria for res judicata. View "Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Board of Education" on Justia Law

David Efron and Madeleine Candelario were involved in a divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico, during which Efron was ordered to pay Candelario $50,000 per month. After the divorce was finalized, Candelario began a relationship with Judge Cordero, and Efron alleges that Candelario, her attorney, and Judges Cordero and Aponte conspired to reinstate the payments through a corrupt scheme. Efron claims this resulted in Candelario receiving approximately $7 million. Efron filed a federal lawsuit against Candelario and her attorney, asserting claims for deprivation of procedural due process, conspiracy to deny civil rights, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Efron’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court found that Efron’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the Puerto Rico court’s judgment and that granting relief would effectively nullify that judgment. The district court also rejected Efron’s argument that his claims fell under a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Efron’s claims because they essentially sought to challenge the state court’s judgment. The court concluded that Efron’s claims for damages were not independent of the state court’s decision but were directly related to it, as they required the federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Efron v. Candelario" on Justia Law

In 2017, Roy Moore, a Republican candidate for a U.S. Senate seat in Alabama, faced allegations of sexual misconduct with minors. Following his election loss, Moore filed a defamation lawsuit against Guy Cecil, Priorities USA, and Bully Pulpit Interactive LLC. The claims involved tweets by Cecil, a press release by Priorities USA, and a digital ad. Moore argued that the tweets were defamatory and that the press release and digital ad falsely labeled him a "child molester" and "child predator."The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the tweet-based claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, as Cecil had no significant contacts with Alabama. The court also dismissed the press release and digital ad claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that Moore did not sufficiently allege actual malice, a requirement for defamation claims involving public figures. The court allowed Moore to amend his complaint, but the amended complaint was also dismissed for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the tweet-based claims, agreeing that Cecil's tweets were not aimed at Alabama but rather at a national audience. The court also upheld the dismissal of the press release and digital ad claims, finding that Moore failed to allege facts showing that the defendants acted with actual malice. The court noted that ill-will or improper motive does not equate to actual malice, which requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, affirming the lower court's decision. View "Moore v. Cecil" on Justia Law

Roland McCarthy, a white man, was hired as Finance Director by the City Commission of Cordele, Georgia, in 2017 and promoted to City Manager in January 2021. During his tenure, Joshua Deriso campaigned for chairman of the City Commission, expressing intentions to replace white employees with African Americans and to have an all-black City Commission. After winning the election, Deriso and other black commissioners voted to fire McCarthy and replace him with a black City Manager, Angela Henderson Redding. McCarthy was warned by Deriso and another commissioner, Royce Reeves, that he would be replaced due to his race and could not return to his former position because he did not "look like" them.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed McCarthy's complaint, ruling that he failed to state plausible claims of racial discrimination against the City. The court found that McCarthy did not sufficiently allege that the Commission acted with a racially discriminatory motive, as only one voting commissioner was alleged to have racial animus. The court also dismissed claims against Deriso in his official capacity as duplicative of claims against the City and dismissed claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, citing qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's dismissal of McCarthy's claims against the City. The appellate court found that McCarthy plausibly alleged that the Commission discriminated against him because of his race, based on Deriso's and Reeves's statements and the racial composition of the vote. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, as he did not have the authority to make the official decision to fire McCarthy. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCarthy v. City of Cordele Georgia" on Justia Law

The case involves a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) brought by Relators against Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) and Native American Services Corporation (NASCO). The Relators allege that GAIC and NASCO fraudulently took control of DWG & Associates, Inc. (DWG), a company that had graduated from the Small Business Administration's (SBA) 8(a) program but was still performing on 8(a) contracts. The 8(a) program is designed to help small, disadvantaged businesses compete for federal contracts. DWG, initially owned and controlled by a disadvantaged individual, Gose, lost its eligibility when GAIC and NASCO allegedly took over its ownership and control without notifying the SBA or seeking a waiver, as required by the program's regulations.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the Relators' claims with prejudice. The court found that DWG, having graduated from the 8(a) program, was no longer a "participant" and thus not subject to the program's ownership and control requirements. Consequently, the court ruled that Relators failed to allege any false claims. Additionally, the court held that fraudulent inducement related to bidding on government contracts was not actionable under the FCA and that Relators failed to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) for pleading fraud.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that a business that has graduated from the 8(a) program but is still performing on 8(a) contracts remains a "participant" and is subject to the program's ownership and control requirements. The court further held that submitting bids and claims for payment under these circumstances without notifying the SBA or obtaining a waiver could constitute an actionable claim under the FCA. The court also found that Relators' complaint met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) by providing sufficient details about the alleged fraudulent conduct, including the specific contracts, task orders, and the date DWG became ineligible to bid. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Berry v. Native American Services Corporation" on Justia Law

In March 2020, seven crewmembers of the M/V Greg Mortimer cruise ship filed a lawsuit against several companies, including CMI Leisure Management, Inc., Cruise Management International, Inc., and Vikand Medical Solutions, LLC. The crewmembers alleged that the decision to sail during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed them to foreseeable harms, resulting in six of them contracting the virus. The crewmembers had signed employment agreements with other companies that contained forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses requiring disputes to be brought in the Bahamas under Bahamian law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the action based on the forum-selection clause. The court ruled that the defendants, who were not parties to the employment agreements, could invoke the forum-selection clause under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision. The appellate court held that the defendants could not invoke the forum-selection clause in the employment agreements under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court reasoned that the crewmembers' claims did not rely on the terms of their employment agreements, and thus, equitable estoppel did not apply. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Usme v. CMI Leisure Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around William Spears, a front desk clerk at hotels operated by Rick Patel Sr. and his son, Rick “Sunny” Patel Jr. Spears was compensated with monthly paychecks and onsite lodging. He sued the Patels and the hotel entities under the Fair Labor Standards Act for wages owed and unpaid overtime. The district court ruled that Sunny was an employer individually liable for the violations. In calculating Spears’s damages, the court considered the stipulated value of Spears’s lodging for unpaid overtime but declined to include it in the minimum-wage calculation.The case went to a bench trial before a magistrate judge. The judge found that Spears was not paid the legally required minimum wage or overtime. The judge ruled that Rick and Sunny were employers under the Act individually liable for those violations. The judge also found that Spears was entitled to damages for unpaid overtime and minimum wages. The judge included the stipulated $630 lodging value to determine Spears’s overtime pay rate but did not give the Patels credit for the value of Spears’s lodging when calculating Spears’s unpaid minimum wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the ruling that Sunny was an employer under the Act due to his involvement in the day-to-day operation of the hotels and some financial control. However, the court vacated and remanded for recalculation of damages. The court held that the magistrate judge erred in excluding the stipulated value of Spears’s lodging from the calculation of his unpaid minimum wages but including it for the calculation of Spears’s overtime damages. The court reasoned that the stipulation to the value of Spears’s lodging relieved the Patels of the burden to prove at trial the reasonable cost of lodging. View "Spears v. Patel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a products liability lawsuit filed by Virginia Redding against Coloplast Corporation. Redding alleged that vaginal mesh devices inserted inside her body were defectively designed. Coloplast argued that Redding's suit was time-barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations for products liability lawsuits, as her claim accrued more than four years before she filed suit. The district court sided with Redding, and Coloplast appealed.The case was previously reviewed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court denied Coloplast's motion for summary judgment, arguing that Redding's suit was time-barred. The court found that the facts in a similar case, Eghnayem v. Boston Scientific Corporation, were "strikingly similar" to Redding's case and compelled the conclusion that Redding's injuries were not sufficiently different from the symptoms that could have occurred as a result of the surgeries to put her on notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court concluded that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Redding, did not overwhelmingly establish that she knew or should have known about a compensable injury arising out of Coloplast's mesh before September 18, 2010, such that a reasonable jury could not conclude otherwise. As a result, Redding's claims were not time-barred under Florida's four-year statute of limitations. View "Redding v. Coloplast Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves Martha Isabel Rosales-Mendez, a Honduran native who illegally entered the United States. After being apprehended by border patrol agents, she was served with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The agents recorded an address provided by her boyfriend over the phone, which turned out to be incorrect. Consequently, Rosales-Mendez did not receive the second notice setting the date and time of her removal hearing, leading to her being ordered removed in absentia when she failed to appear.Rosales-Mendez's case was initially reviewed by an immigration judge who ordered her removal in absentia after she failed to attend the hearing. She later discovered the removal order and moved to reopen the removal proceeding, arguing lack of notice. However, the immigration judge denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that since Rosales-Mendez failed to provide a correct address, the officials were excused from providing her notice of her removal hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Rosales-Mendez's petition for review. The court held that immigration officials were not required to give notice of a removal hearing to an alien who provided them an inaccurate home address. The court reasoned that Rosales-Mendez, through her boyfriend, provided an incorrect address and failed to correct it, thereby forfeiting her right to actual notice of her removal hearing. The court concluded that Rosales-Mendez was properly ordered removed in absentia. View "Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law