Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bersin filed suit, alleging that it had been induced into investing more than $350,000 in a BWB franchise through fraud and misrepresentations, some of which concerned OBWB’s advertising of patented technology. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its case against OBWB in state court; nor did the district court err in declining to hold Bersin in contempt. The court concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 2283, deprived the district court of the power to enjoin Bersin from prosecuting its state court suit. Even if the district court had the power to issue such an injunction, it would have been improper on the merits to bind Bersin to a settlement release it had no part in negotiating and from which it obtained no benefit. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "The Original Brooklyn Water Bagel Co., Inc. v. Bersin Bagel Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Bar, alleging a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the State Bar’s rules applied the same standards and procedures for reinstatement for disbarred attorneys to attorneys suspended for more than 90 days, amounted to “defacto disbarment,” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and then denied plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the judgment. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's appeal, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Alabama State Bar is an arm of the state of Alabama and thus enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's section 1983 claim. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's FRCP 59(e) motion where, to the extent plaintiff contends his due process claim was a “direct action” under the Fourteenth Amendment, his amended complaint did not allege such a claim, and he could not use his Rule 59(e) motion to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Nichols v. Alabama State Bar" on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Twenty-one months after plaintiff filed an employment discrimination case against US Steel, she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. When U.S. Steel learned of the bankruptcy case - that plaintiff's Chapter 7 petition had not disclosed the employment-discrimination claims she was pursuing and that the Chapter 7 Trustee was treating the bankruptcy as a “no asset” case and had filed a Report of No Distribution with the bankruptcy court - it moved the district court alternatively to dismiss the case or for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel as formulated in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., and Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., controlled its decision. The court concluded that New Hampshire v. Maine did not govern the district court's application of judicial estoppel in this case. Therefore, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the district court erred in failing to give the New Hampshire factors appropriate weight and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring her claims on the basis of judicial estoppel. Further, the court concluded that the district court did not err in applying Eleventh Circuit precedent, namely Burnes and Robinson, where the bankruptcy court in those cases accepted the debtor's failure to disclose as property of the bankruptcy estate claims the debtor was litigating in federal district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Slater v. US Steel Corp." on Justia Law

The Tribe appealed from two orders and a final judgment in a fraud-and-embezzlement-related RICO suit against former tribal officials, several attorneys, a law firm, and Morgan Stanley. In this case, the undisputed current leaders of the Tribe seek entry into federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction based on federal statutory claims against Tribal and non-Tribal members alike. On the pleadings as presented at this stage of the proceedings, general justiciability concerns regarding intra-Tribal conflicts do not defeat jurisdiction. The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim, however, because the Tribe did not challenge the dismissal on these grounds in its opening brief and because the complaint lacks the requisite specificity and fails to state a plausible claim. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. Cypress" on Justia Law

The company appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of a dispute between the Company and the Union in June 2012 and the district court's enforcement of the resulting arbitration award in favor of the Union in December 2014. Although the June 2012 order was a final decision when it was issued, the Company did not appeal it until after the district court entered the December 2014 order. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the first order. In regards to the December 14 order, the court affirmed because no basis exists to vacate the arbitration award in this instance. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Union's motion for attorney's fees. The court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "United Steel v. Wise Alloys, LLC" on Justia Law

Key TV, a local over-the-air broadcaster, filed suit against Comcast, owner and operator of a cable television system serving the same area, alleging that it was unlawfully overcharged for the right to broadcast its content over Comcast's cable system and that Comcast illegally discriminated against it by not carrying the station in high definition or including it on Comcast's "hospitality tier." Key TV also filed two state law claims. The district court stayed the entire case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine pending resolution of Key TV's federal law claims by the FCC. The court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to entertain this interlocutory appeal where this stay does not end the litigation on the merits and it does not leave the district court without anything to do but execute the judgment. The court further concluded that the collateral order doctrine does not apply to save appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal. View "Beach TV Cable Co. v. Comcast of Florida/Georgia, LLC" on Justia Law

The court certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently declined to answer the certified question. After reconsideration of the facts and law in this case, the court found that it is unnecessary at this juncture to answer the certified question because there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding a preliminary (and dispositive) issue: the nature of the parties’ relationship. The court concluded that the record is presently insufficient to determine whether the parties entered into an attorney-client relationship or a principal-agent relationship when Mississippi Valley hired defendant as an attorney agent. The court will not pass on the certified question regarding whether defendant’s conduct does or does not constitute the provision of legal services, because if the parties never entered into an attorney-client relationship, then defendant’s conduct is irrelevant. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Valley Title Ins. Co. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Ameritox and Millennium are competitors in the drug-testing industry. Ameritox filed suit against Millennium, alleging in its original complaint that Millennium had “formed a business plan to increase its market share, revenue, and profits” by providing financial inducements and other kickbacks, in violation of both federal and state law. The jury subsequently awarded judgment in favor of Ameritox and the district court denied Millennium’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and granted in part and denied in part its motion for a new trial or reduction in the award of punitive damages; upon reconsideration, the district court reduced the award of punitive damages. In this appeal, the court concluded that the district court's decision to retain supplemental jurisdiction over novel and complex state-law claims hailing from nine different states - claims that the parties either did know or should have known were novel and complex - constituted an abuse of discretion.. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice so the parties can litigate their claims in a proper forum. View "Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Labs." on Justia Law

Gaston Glock, creator of the Glock 17 handgun, began divorce proceedings with his wife, Helga, in Austria in 2011. The litigation moved to the United States in 2013, where Helga filed a miscellaneous proceeding under 28 U.S.C. 1782, seeking to discover evidence from the Glock Entities, in the United States for use in Gaston and Helga’s Austrian divorce proceedings. After Helga filed the section 1782 application, she filed a separate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, lawsuit, in the United States, against Gaston and the Glock Entities. Helga then returned to the section 1782 court in 2014, to seek authorization to allow her to disclose the documents she obtained in that litigation to her RICO attorney, for potential use in the RICO Action. The magistrate judge subsequently vacated her earlier paperless order but then entered a written order granting Helga permission to use the documents in the RICO Action. The district judge sustained the objections of the Glock Entities and concluded that the magistrate judge’s determination that Helga could use evidence obtained in a section 1782 proceeding for a separate civil lawsuit in the United States was “contrary to law.” In regard to the Protective Order, the district court concluded that although it did not expressly exclude use of the documents in civil lawsuits in the United States, it must be construed to prohibit such use since it was entered into in the context of a section 1782 action. Nevertheless, the district court stated, “This order does not preclude Helga Glock from seeking the documents in the [RICO] Action.” The court concluded that the restrictions on subsequent use of evidence obtained under section 1782 urged here by the Glock Entities are simply not supported by statutory text, legislative history, conventional discovery practice, or policy considerations. The court found that section 1782 does not preclude, as a matter of law, the use of evidence procured pursuant to it in subsequent United States civil litigation. Because the district court’s rulings were erroneous as a matter of law, the court reversed the judgment. View "Glock v. Glock, Inc." on Justia Law