Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Phillip Morris after her husband's death, alleging claims of fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, negligence, and strict liability under Florida law. The jury found Phillip Morris comparatively liable for the husband's injuries and death but awarded plaintiff no damages. Plaintiff argued to the district court that the verdict was inconsistent with liability and that the jury did not follow the district court's instructions. The district court denied plaintiff's request and then plaintiff moved for a mistrial based on the same reasons. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a party’s post-trial claim that a jury verdict is inconsistent does not preserve for appeal the separate and legally distinct claim that the verdict was the result of an unlawful jury compromise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, as well as the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict. View "Reider v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Tamborlee for negligence in the Southern District of Florida after she was injured during a shore excursion in Belize. At issue was whether the district court had general personal jurisdiction over Tamborlee, a Panama corporation that provides shore excursions for tourists in Belize. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Tamborlee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because Tamborlee's activities in Florida are not so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home there. Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that any office Tamborlee might have had in Florida played a significant role in its operations and Tamborlee’s remaining activities in Florida are not meaningfully different from the activities of the defendants in general personal jurisdiction caselaw. View "Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt." on Justia Law

Defendants Hi-Tech, Jared Wheat, Stephen Smith, and Dr. Terrill Mark Wright appealed the district court's order holding them in contempt for violating injunctions that prohibit them from making any representations about weight-loss products unless they possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it held defendants in contempt because the district court misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel when it refused to consider defendants' evidence of substantiation. In this case, the level of substantiation the injunctions require for the representations at issue in the contempt proceedings is not "identical" to any issue the district court decided in the earlier litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "FTC v. Hi-Tech Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Donald Kipnis, Lawrence Kibler, Barry Mukamal and Kenneth Welt,appealedthe district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint against defendants-appellees Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG and HVB U.S. Finance, Inc. (collectively, “HVB”) as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. This appeal arose out of the parties’ participation in an income tax shelter scheme known as a Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) transaction. In short, Plaintiffs alleged that HVB and its co-conspirators defrauded Plaintiffs by promoting and selling CARDS for their own financial gain. Plaintiffs “paid a heavy price in damages” as a result of HVB’s wrongdoing, including “substantial fees (and interest payments)” they paid HVB and other CARDS Dealers to participate in the CARDS strategy and “hundreds of thousands of dollars in ‘clean-up’ costs” they incurred after HVB failed to advise them to amend their tax returns. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought to recover the “damages that reasonably flow” from HVB’s misconduct. These damages included fees they paid to HVB and other CARDS Dealers, attorney’s fees and accountant’s fees incurred in litigating against the IRS, back taxes and interest paid by Plaintiffs, punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the instant action. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims did not accrue until November 1, 2012, because they did not sustain any damages until the tax court issued its final decision. By December 5, 2001 (plaintiffs’ mandatory repayment date) Plaintiffs had sustained part of the damages they sought to recover, including the fees they paid to HVB.The district court found Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane," (565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)), to be misplaced, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as time-barred. The parties agreed that Florida law controlled the sole issue in this appeal: when did Plaintiffs’ claims against HVB accrue for purposes of the statutes of limitations. It was not clear under Florida law when Plaintiffs first suffered injury, and thus when their claims against HVB accrued for purposes of the applicable statutes of limitations. Because the relevant facts were undisputed, and this appeal depended wholly on interpretations of Florida law regarding the statute of limitations, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. View "Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-UND Vereinsbank, AG" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from five putative class actions filed against Wells Fargo and its predecessor, Wachovia Bank. At issue was whether Wells Fargo's waiver of its right to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims should be extended to preclude Wells Fargo from compelling arbitration of the unnamed putative class members' claims. The court concluded that because a class including the unnamed putative class members had not been certified, Article III's jurisdictional limitations precluded the district court from entertaining Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss those members' claims as subject to arbitration; contrary to the position they take in this appeal, the named plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek the court's affirmance of the district court's provision holding that if a class is certified, Wells Fargo will be estopped to assert its contractual rights to arbitration; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spears-Haymond v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants Joseph T. Cameron and Dow Chemical for injuries that Cameron allegedly inflicted on plaintiff while Cameron was acting within the course of his employment for Dow. Cameron was operating a car within the course and scope of his employment when the car hit plaintiff, who was riding her bicycle. The district court subsequently granted plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice so that plaintiff could, under Georgia law, refile in six months and thereby overcome defendants' claim that plaintiff had failed to timely perfect service. Defendants appealed. The court concluded that it is unlikely that defendants had a meritorious statute-of-limitations defense in the first place. Even if defendants did, in view of the equities, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). View "Arias v. Cameron" on Justia Law

National Maritime filed suit against Burrell for amounts owed for management and custodial services provided for a vessel, National Maritime obtained a judgment in its favor, and then National Maritime discovered that Burrell transferred all of its assets to its owner, Glenn F. Straub. National Maritime initiated a supplemental proceeding to void the transfer and the district court entered a judgment against Straub. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over the supplementary proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) and the record supports the finding of a fraudulent transfer to an insider, Fla. Stat. 726.106(2). View "Nat'l Maritime Servs. v. Straub" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo closed her bank accounts and refused to return the money in her accounts. The court concluded that plaintiff defaulted on Wells Fargo’s counterclaim when she failed to file a timely answer. So her request for leave to file an out-of-time answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an entry of default under the more forgiving Rule 55(c) standard as opposed to the more exacting Rule 6(b)(1)(B) standard. Because plaintiff’s failure to respond to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim meant that the pleadings had not yet closed, the district court’s evaluation of Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's motion under Rule 55(c). Even if Wells Fargo's motion could have been properly considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it should have been denied. Because the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court, the contents of the Agreement must be evaluated in determining whether Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court also reversed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings because the district court was required to review the actual contract at issue in evaluating whether amendment of the complaint would necessarily be futile. Because the court reversed the order granting judgment on the pleadings for Wells Fargo, on which the award of attorney's fees was based, the court remanded the attorney's fee issue. View "Perez v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law