Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-appellants Donald Kipnis, Lawrence Kibler, Barry Mukamal and Kenneth Welt,appealedthe district court’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of their complaint against defendants-appellees Bayerische Hypo-Und Vereinsbank, AG and HVB U.S. Finance, Inc. (collectively, “HVB”) as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. This appeal arose out of the parties’ participation in an income tax shelter scheme known as a Custom Adjustable Rate Debt Structure (“CARDS”) transaction. In short, Plaintiffs alleged that HVB and its co-conspirators defrauded Plaintiffs by promoting and selling CARDS for their own financial gain. Plaintiffs “paid a heavy price in damages” as a result of HVB’s wrongdoing, including “substantial fees (and interest payments)” they paid HVB and other CARDS Dealers to participate in the CARDS strategy and “hundreds of thousands of dollars in ‘clean-up’ costs” they incurred after HVB failed to advise them to amend their tax returns. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought to recover the “damages that reasonably flow” from HVB’s misconduct. These damages included fees they paid to HVB and other CARDS Dealers, attorney’s fees and accountant’s fees incurred in litigating against the IRS, back taxes and interest paid by Plaintiffs, punitive damages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the instant action. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims did not accrue until November 1, 2012, because they did not sustain any damages until the tax court issued its final decision. By December 5, 2001 (plaintiffs’ mandatory repayment date) Plaintiffs had sustained part of the damages they sought to recover, including the fees they paid to HVB.The district court found Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in "Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane," (565 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1990)), to be misplaced, and dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint as time-barred. The parties agreed that Florida law controlled the sole issue in this appeal: when did Plaintiffs’ claims against HVB accrue for purposes of the statutes of limitations. It was not clear under Florida law when Plaintiffs first suffered injury, and thus when their claims against HVB accrued for purposes of the applicable statutes of limitations. Because the relevant facts were undisputed, and this appeal depended wholly on interpretations of Florida law regarding the statute of limitations, the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court. View "Kipnis v. Bayerische Hypo-UND Vereinsbank, AG" on Justia Law

In August 2012, the United States filed a civil suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., alleging that the failure of the Florida to provide a kosher diet program to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher was a substantial burden on those prisoners' religious exercise. The complaint requested both injunctive and declaratory relief under the statute. After the district court denied Florida's motion to dismiss the complaint, the State issued a new policy in March 2013, formally titled "Procedure 503.006" and informally referred to as "the Religious Diet Program." In addition to outlining the contents of the meals, Procedure 503.006 contains a number of provisions that determine a prisoner's eligibility for the program. When the United States learned about Procedure 503.006 in April 2013, it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction the court entered required Florida to provide the kosher diet, and prevented the State from enforcing the eligibility provisions of Procedure 503.006. The court's order did not, however, mention the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions established by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the district court held monthly status conferences between the parties. But the court did not make any need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings regarding the preliminary injunction, nor did it issue an order finalizing the preliminary injunction. As a result, the preliminary injunction expired by operation of law on Thursday, March 6, 2014. "The preliminary injunction in the present case passed on to injunction heaven [. . .] And with it died this appeal," unless there existed an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finding no exception, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the mooted issue, and vacated the portion of the district court's order that addressed it. View "United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from five putative class actions filed against Wells Fargo and its predecessor, Wachovia Bank. At issue was whether Wells Fargo's waiver of its right to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims should be extended to preclude Wells Fargo from compelling arbitration of the unnamed putative class members' claims. The court concluded that because a class including the unnamed putative class members had not been certified, Article III's jurisdictional limitations precluded the district court from entertaining Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss those members' claims as subject to arbitration; contrary to the position they take in this appeal, the named plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek the court's affirmance of the district court's provision holding that if a class is certified, Wells Fargo will be estopped to assert its contractual rights to arbitration; and, therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spears-Haymond v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants Joseph T. Cameron and Dow Chemical for injuries that Cameron allegedly inflicted on plaintiff while Cameron was acting within the course of his employment for Dow. Cameron was operating a car within the course and scope of his employment when the car hit plaintiff, who was riding her bicycle. The district court subsequently granted plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice so that plaintiff could, under Georgia law, refile in six months and thereby overcome defendants' claim that plaintiff had failed to timely perfect service. Defendants appealed. The court concluded that it is unlikely that defendants had a meritorious statute-of-limitations defense in the first place. Even if defendants did, in view of the equities, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). View "Arias v. Cameron" on Justia Law

National Maritime filed suit against Burrell for amounts owed for management and custodial services provided for a vessel, National Maritime obtained a judgment in its favor, and then National Maritime discovered that Burrell transferred all of its assets to its owner, Glenn F. Straub. National Maritime initiated a supplemental proceeding to void the transfer and the district court entered a judgment against Straub. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over the supplementary proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) and the record supports the finding of a fraudulent transfer to an insider, Fla. Stat. 726.106(2). View "Nat'l Maritime Servs. v. Straub" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Wells Fargo after Wells Fargo closed her bank accounts and refused to return the money in her accounts. The court concluded that plaintiff defaulted on Wells Fargo’s counterclaim when she failed to file a timely answer. So her request for leave to file an out-of-time answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an entry of default under the more forgiving Rule 55(c) standard as opposed to the more exacting Rule 6(b)(1)(B) standard. Because plaintiff’s failure to respond to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim meant that the pleadings had not yet closed, the district court’s evaluation of Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order granting Wells Fargo's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's motion under Rule 55(c). Even if Wells Fargo's motion could have been properly considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it should have been denied. Because the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court, the contents of the Agreement must be evaluated in determining whether Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court also reversed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint and remanded for further proceedings because the district court was required to review the actual contract at issue in evaluating whether amendment of the complaint would necessarily be futile. Because the court reversed the order granting judgment on the pleadings for Wells Fargo, on which the award of attorney's fees was based, the court remanded the attorney's fee issue. View "Perez v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a proposed class action in Florida state court against BLP, alleging that BLP sent unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(C), and its implementing regulations. BLP removed to federal court and BLP served each named plaintiff an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. BLP then moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the unaccepted Rule 68 offers rendered the case moot. The court concluded that a plaintiff's individual claim is not mooted by an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment, and a proffer that moots a named plaintiff's individual claim does not moot a class action in circumstances like those presented in this case, even if the proffer comes before the plaintiff has moved to certify the class. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. View "Jeffrey M. Stein D.D.S., et al. v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, worker who helped build the new Marlins ballpark, filed suit alleging that the contractor who employed them failed to pay them the wages and overtime that they were entitled to receive under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 206. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs' failure to reiterate their unpaid-overtime-hours claim in the statement of claim document is not controlling where that document does not have the status of a pleading and is not an amendment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The existence of federal jurisdiction at the pleading stage is to be determined based on the contents of the complaint, applying the well-pleaded complaint rule. In this case, the unpaid-overtime-hours claim in Count I alleges that plaintiffs were not always paid time-and-a-half for hours beyond forty worked in a workweek but were instead paid their regular rate for some overtime hours and nothing at all for others. The court concluded that plaintiffs alleged a claim on the face of the complaint and reversed the judgment of the district court, remanding for further proceedings. View "Calderon, et al. v. Form Works/Baker JV, LLC" on Justia Law

After his termination, plaintiff, a tenured university professor at Georgia Tech, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Georgia Tech's President and others. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff was afforded adequate procedural due process prior to revocation of his tenure and termination of his employment with Georgia Tech where the pre-termination procedures afforded plaintiff satisfied the established guidelines for minimum procedural due process. Plaintiff received prior, written notice of the charges against him, he presented argument and evidence on his own behalf, he had a right to appeal his termination to the Board of Regents, and he submitted a written appeal to the Board of Regents. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Laskar, Ph.D. v. Peterson, et al." on Justia Law

Hundreds of property owners filed toxic tort suits against P&W, an aircraft and rocket engine manufacturer, for damages resulting from purported groundwater contamination. The district court granted P&W's motions for Lone Pine case management orders. The district court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs' second amended complaints with prejudice and plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded, as a general matter, that it is not legally appropriate for a district court to issue a Lone Pine order requiring factual support for the plaintiffs' claims before it has determined that those claims survive a motion to dismiss under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Whatever the general propriety and/or utility of Lone Pine orders, they should not be used as (or become) the platforms for pseudo-summary judgment motions at a time when the case is not at issue and the parties have not engaged in reciprocal discovery. On the merits, the court held that the grounds for dismissal urged by P&W and relied upon the district court did not warrant dismissal of the second amended complaints. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Adinolfe, et al. v. United Technologies Corp." on Justia Law