Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a black female, worked at Crestwood Hospital as an emergency department nurse from 2007 to 2018. Plaintiff repeatedly complained about racial discrimination in the months before Crestwood Healthcare terminated her employment. But, also during that period, Crestwood uncovered evidence that Plaintiff engaged in bullying and other misconduct. After Plaintiff sued Crestwood for retaliating against her complaints of discrimination, she argued that circumstantial evidence created a reasonable inference of retaliation under either the McDonnell Douglas framework or a “convincing mosaic” of proof. The district court disagreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Crestwood.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that although an employee may prove retaliation with whatever circumstantial evidence creates a reasonable inference of retaliation, Plaintiff’s evidence falls short. The court wrote that Plaintiff turned to evidence of systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees. She asserts that two employees engaged in similar misconduct but were not terminated. The court explained that nothing in the record suggests that either of those employees engaged in misconduct comparable in degree or kind to Plaintiff’s misconduct. Neither employee was the subject of multiple reports that they were unprofessional, threatening, intimidating, and abusive. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot prove that other employees engaged in a similar degree of misconduct, she lacks evidence of better treatment of similarly situated employees. View "Daphne Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, a school resource officer, took issue with Plaintiff’s plan for managing her son’s afternoons and eventually sought and obtained arrest warrants for first- and second-degree child cruelty—felonies that are punishable by mandatory prison terms. Plaintiff was arrested, charged with both crimes and spent four days in jail before posting bond. All charges were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff sued Defendant for malicious prosecution under both federal and state law. The district court granted Defendant summary judgment on the ground that she had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in both first and second-degree child cruelty.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court, applying the summary-judgment standard, the court that, taken together (1) the facts that Defendant included in the affidavits that she filed in support of the arrest warrants and (2) the material facts that she knew but omitted from those affidavits do not support even arguable probable cause to believe that Plaintiff committed first- or second-degree child cruelty under Georgia law. Accordingly, the court held that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented a genuine dispute about whether Defendant acted with “malice.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendant had a close relationship with Plaintiff’s son, she felt disrespected by Plaintiff, she sought the arrest warrants very soon thereafter, seemingly without substantial additional investigation, and she inexplicably omitted material exculpatory information from her affidavits. Collectively, those facts give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant didn’t just make a mistake. View "Kameron Butler v. Charlene Smith" on Justia Law

The case at hand is about whether Plaintiff was retaliated against by her former employer, Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants, Inc. (“APC”), and the company that contracted with her employer, Centurion of Florida, LLC (“Centurion”) (together, “Defendants”), for engaging in protected activity. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged four counts. Centurion and APC both moved for summary judgment on all counts. The district court granted summary judgment on three of them. The district court directed the clerk to enter a final judgment on the three resolved counts, and it certified that the fourth count satisfied the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) for immediate interlocutory review, should either party file an appropriate application with the Eleventh Circuit. At issue is whether the district court’s certification was proper as to Plaintiff’s direct appeal and whether the requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) have been met as to Centurion’s cross-appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the answer to both questions is not and dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court explained that there are substantial reasons to delay resolving Plaintiff’s appeal of her whistleblower counts against APC. Plaintiff’s whistleblower counts against Centurion and APC are identical. It makes good sense that appeals of an order dismissing those counts should be heard together. But because there is no final judgment against Centurion, the court wrote that it lacks the power to adjudicate those counts against Centurion at this time. View "Ronda Scott v. Advanced Pharmaceutical Consultants Inc, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, in 1999. At the age of 47, Plaintiff took disability retirement on November 1, 2018. When Plaintiff retired, she continued to receive free health insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Plaintiff first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying disability reasons, such as Plaintiff’s Parkinson’s disease, received free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan, disability retirees such as Plaintiff are entitled to the health insurance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Her complaint alleged various claims, including violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court entered judgment for the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot establish that the City committed any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the essential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Further, the court held that the City’s s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and government-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental right. Thus under rational basis review, the City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving funds. View "Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and care of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC). Plaintiff was diagnosed with Hepatitis C (HCV) in 2009 but did not receive medication for it until nine years later. By then, Plaintiff’s HCV had progressed to stage F4 cirrhosis with indications of severe liver inflammation. Plaintiff sued numerous prison doctors, three of whom are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors and dismissed all claims against them. Plaintiff appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its denial of his motion to amend the complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment but affirmed its denial of the motion to amend. The court explained that the bar to proving an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is high, but it is not insurmountable. The court explained that Plaintiff has raised a number of factual disputes regarding the denial of his HCV treatment for over eight years. These disputes are sufficiently material to be decided by a jury. View "Ricky J. Johnson v. Dr. Sharon Lewis, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a hospital nurse for St. Vincent’s Health System. After St. Vincent’s fired her, Plaintiff sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent’s, and Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed she presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to all her claims. She also claimed that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a “mixed-motive” retaliation claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because there was no evidence of severe or pervasive harassment; Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) did nothing to undermine the application of McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims because but for causation still applies; Plainitff's retaliation claim cannot survive; and disparate-treatment claim fails because there is no evidence that race played a role in her termination. View "Cynthia Diane Yelling v. St. Vincent's Health System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as the Superintendent of Dothan City Schools in Dothan, Alabama. The employment contract stated Plaintiff could only be terminated for cause. Furthermore, the contract stated that the termination would not be effective until the Board provided Plaintiff with a statement of the cause for termination and allowed her an opportunity for a hearing. Lastly, the employment contract provided that Plainitff could resign with or without cause as long as she gave at least 120 days notice in writing of her resignation to the Board. Six days after Plaintiff’s intent to resign was sent, Plaintiff alleges that the Board voted to terminate Plaintiff’s contract. She brought claims for deprivation of due process and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985, and breach of contract. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s due process claims and affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s conspiracy and breach of contract claims. The court explained that instead of construing all ambiguities in Plaintiff’s favor, the district court used the minutes to recharacterize the allegations within Plaintiff’s complaint. When taking the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, there is a plausible claim for relief. In paragraph 18 of the complaint, Plaintiff’s classifies her communication as an “intent” to resign, not an actual resignation. The court wrote that the district court erred by ignoring that Plaintiff had a plausible claim to relief and not drawing reasonable inferences in her favor. View "Phyllis Edwards v. Dothan City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a black nurse who was disciplined and ultimately fired by her employer, Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County—appealed the district court’s entry of summary judgment on her Title VII and state-law claims alleging (1) employment discrimination, (2) hostile work environment, and (3) retaliation. Harris contends that the district court erred in rejecting all three claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Public Health Trust says that several incidents that occurred at Jackson Reeves shouldn’t be considered because they weren’t caused by Plaintiff’s race. The court wrote that it agreed with Public Health Trust that three of the incidents weren’t caused by Harris’s race and, accordingly, shouldn’t be considered as part of the hostile-work-environment calculus. Further, the court reasoned that even considering Plaintiff’s limited evidence in the light most favorable to her, these are not, given the totality of the circumstances, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment. View "Mary E. Harris v. The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Defendant is a Pasco County, Florida, Sherriff’s Office deputy. Chris Nocco, the Pasco County Sheriff, is a codefendant. Plaintiff’s initial complaint in this case consisted of twelve counts. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, the complaint at hand, contains ten counts. Count I of the amended complaint, which replicates verbatim Count I of the initial complaint, was brought against Defendant in his individual capacity and is the only count before the Eleventh Circuit in this appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.   At issue on appeal is whether the Fourth Amendment precluded a law enforcement officer—who had stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation—from asking a passenger in the vehicle to identify himself unless the officer had reason to suspect that the passenger had committed, was in the process of committing, or was likely to commit a criminal offense. The second question is whether binding precedent clearly established, at the time relevant here, that an officer could not ask a passenger to identify himself absent this reasonable suspicion.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The court explained that it doubts that the Florida Supreme Court would hold that a passenger is free to resist an officer’s request for identification in the setting this case presents. At the very least, it is arguable that the court would uphold the request and find the officer had at least arguable cause to arrest the passenger for resisting an officer without violence in violation of Section 843.02. View "Marques A. Johnson v. James Dunn" on Justia Law

TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its officers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”). The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying cartridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud controlled Phazzer Electronics, and Phazzer Electronics employed, among others, Defendant. In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt for violating the 2017 injunction, Abboud and Defendant went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names. Based on that activity, the district court found Defendant (and others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. At issue on appeal is whether the 2017 injunction extended broadly enough to bind Defendant and prohibit her conduct under the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the district court decided   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction. The court concluded that the record cannot sustain Defendant’s conviction.  The court explained that the district court did not make factual findings about whether Defendant was a key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 injunction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that injunction. View "USA v. Diana Robinson" on Justia Law