Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Doe, a student at Emory University, was accused of sexual misconduct by Jane Roe following an encounter in April 2019. Roe alleged that Doe engaged in nonconsensual intercourse and choked her. Doe denied the allegations, asserting that the encounter was consensual. Emory conducted an investigation, during which Roe changed parts of her story. Despite inconsistencies in Roe's account, Emory found Doe responsible for sexual misconduct and suspended him for a semester. Doe appealed internally without success.Doe then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, claiming that Emory violated Title IX by discriminating against him based on sex and breached a contractual obligation to conduct the investigation fairly. The district court dismissed Doe's Title IX claim, reasoning that his allegations suggested pro-complainant bias rather than gender bias. The court also dismissed his contract claims, finding no mutual assent to the terms of the university's sexual misconduct policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Doe's Title IX claim, holding that his allegations did not plausibly indicate gender bias but rather suggested pro-complainant bias, which is not prohibited under Title IX. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Doe's breach-of-contract claims. It concluded that Doe plausibly alleged mutual assent to an implied contract based on Emory's sexual misconduct policy and found no basis to determine that Emory retained a unilateral right to amend the policy that would preclude mutual assent. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the contract claims. View "Doe v. Emory University" on Justia Law

Roland McCarthy, a white man, was hired as Finance Director by the City Commission of Cordele, Georgia, in 2017 and promoted to City Manager in January 2021. During his tenure, Joshua Deriso campaigned for chairman of the City Commission, expressing intentions to replace white employees with African Americans and to have an all-black City Commission. After winning the election, Deriso and other black commissioners voted to fire McCarthy and replace him with a black City Manager, Angela Henderson Redding. McCarthy was warned by Deriso and another commissioner, Royce Reeves, that he would be replaced due to his race and could not return to his former position because he did not "look like" them.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed McCarthy's complaint, ruling that he failed to state plausible claims of racial discrimination against the City. The court found that McCarthy did not sufficiently allege that the Commission acted with a racially discriminatory motive, as only one voting commissioner was alleged to have racial animus. The court also dismissed claims against Deriso in his official capacity as duplicative of claims against the City and dismissed claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, citing qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's dismissal of McCarthy's claims against the City. The appellate court found that McCarthy plausibly alleged that the Commission discriminated against him because of his race, based on Deriso's and Reeves's statements and the racial composition of the vote. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, as he did not have the authority to make the official decision to fire McCarthy. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCarthy v. City of Cordele Georgia" on Justia Law

A civilian, Clarissa Gilmore, was strip-searched while visiting her incarcerated husband at Smith State Prison in Georgia. During the search, officers manipulated her breasts, ordered her to bend over, and felt between her buttocks with a gloved hand. The officers did not inform her of the reasons for the search, and no contraband was found. Gilmore sued the officers and the Georgia Department of Corrections, claiming the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the search did not violate clearly established law and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court concluded that the officers acted within the scope of their discretionary authority and that there was no clearly established requirement for reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search of a prison visitor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the strip search violated Gilmore’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that correctional officers must have at least reasonable suspicion that a visitor is concealing contraband before conducting a strip search. However, the court also found that no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent expressly prohibited suspicionless strip searches of prison visitors at the time of the search. As a result, the law was not clearly established, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Gilmore v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of Montgomery residents who were jailed for failing to pay traffic fines. They sued the City of Montgomery, a private contractor (Judicial Correction Services, Inc.), and a lawyer (Branch D. Kloess), alleging that the process of converting fines into jail sentences violated the U.S. Constitution and Alabama law. The plaintiffs sought to certify their claims as class actions, arguing that the City and its contractors systematically failed to conduct proper inquiries into their ability to pay before jailing them.The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied class certification in both cases. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, particularly the predominance and superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the claims would require individualized inquiries into each probationer's circumstances, such as whether they were given proper hearings and whether the City or its contractors acted wrongfully or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of class certification. It agreed that the plaintiffs' claims necessitated individualized proof, making it difficult to resolve the issues on a class-wide basis. The court emphasized that the evidence required to prove the claims, such as records of what happened at individual probation hearings, was not available on a common, class-wide basis. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' claims involved a variety of individual incidents rather than a single, systemic issue that could be addressed collectively.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, as the plaintiffs' claims required individualized inquiries that did not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). The decision to deny class certification was affirmed. View "Carter v. The City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

A transgender woman from Mexico, identified as A.P.A., who unlawfully immigrated to the United States as a child, faced deportation proceedings after being convicted of driving under the influence. In response, A.P.A. petitioned for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), citing past abuse by a custodial uncle in Mexico and fear of future persecution and torture due to her transgender status. The immigration judge denied these requests, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the decision.The BIA determined that A.P.A.'s asylum claim was untimely and did not meet the exception to the one-year deadline based on "changed" or "extraordinary circumstances." The BIA also concluded that A.P.A. had not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in Mexico as a transgender woman. The BIA denied A.P.A.'s request for CAT relief for the same reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of the asylum application based on its timeliness, as per the statute and previous court decisions. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s decision that A.P.A. was not likely to suffer future persecution or torture as a transgender woman in Mexico. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review in part and dismissed it in part. View "A.P.A. v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Sylvan Plowright filed a lawsuit against Miami-Dade County, its police chief, and two of its police officers after one of the officers, Sergio Cordova, fatally shot Plowright’s dog, Niles, during an investigation. The district court dismissed Plowright’s complaint, concluding that Cordova was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate any clearly established right when he shot Niles.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the use of deadly force against a domestic animal constitutes a seizure of its owner’s property subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. The court found that under the facts alleged in the complaint, no reasonable officer in Cordova’s position could have believed that Niles posed an imminent danger, and therefore, his decision to shoot Niles falls short of that requirement. The court reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s § 1983 claim against Cordova and remanded for further proceedings. The court also reversed the dismissal of Plowright’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cordova. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Plowright’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against a second officer, as well as his claims against the county and its police chief. View "Plowright v. Miami Dade County" on Justia Law

The case involves the American Alliance for Equal Rights (the Alliance), a membership organization dedicated to ending racial classifications and preferences in America, and Fearless Fund Management, LLC (Fearless), a venture capital fund that invests in businesses led by women of color. Fearless organized the "Fearless Strivers Grant Contest," a funding competition open only to businesses owned by black women. The Alliance, representing several members who wished to participate in the contest but were not black women, sued Fearless, alleging that the contest violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits private parties from discriminating on the basis of race when making or enforcing contracts.The district court denied the Alliance's request for a preliminary injunction to prevent Fearless from closing the application process. The court concluded that the Alliance had standing to sue and that § 1981 applied to Fearless's contest. However, it also concluded that the First Amendment "may bar" the Alliance's § 1981 claim on the ground that the contest constitutes expressive conduct, and that the Alliance hadn't demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Alliance has standing and that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate because Fearless's contest is substantially likely to violate § 1981, is substantially unlikely to enjoy First Amendment protection, and inflicts irreparable injury. The court affirmed the district court's determination that the Alliance has standing to sue but reversed its decision and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. View "American Alliance for Equal Rights v. Fearless Fund Management, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

In 2021, Carmelo Etienne threatened violence against a federal magistrate judge, a courtroom deputy, and other courthouse employees via a phone call to a federal courthouse. He later pleaded nolo contendere to threatening to assault and murder a federal magistrate judge and a courtroom deputy. The district court imposed a time-served sentence and three years of supervised release. As special conditions of that release, the district court ordered Etienne to make financial disclosures to the probation office and prohibited him from visiting certain federal courthouses and from calling the judges’ chambers or court facilities. Etienne challenged both conditions on appeal.Previously, the district court had overruled Etienne's objection to the stay-away order, which he argued unduly burdened his right to access the federal courts. He did not object to the financial disclosure condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that it was not plain error to impose the financial disclosure condition. The court also found that the stay-away order was not vague or overbroad and did not unduly burden Etienne’s right to access the federal courts. The court noted that the stay-away order was narrowly tailored to address Etienne’s serious criminal conduct and did not create an absolute bar on Etienne’s rights. View "USA v. Etienne" on Justia Law

This case involves a mistaken identification by two sheriff's office investigators, Joseph Bultman and Jon Hixon, who identified George Angel Harris as the individual captured on security camera footage using a stolen debit card. Based on this identification, Hixon obtained two arrest warrants for Harris for financial transaction card fraud. Harris was arrested and held in jail for a few hours before being released. The criminal case against him was eventually dismissed.Previously, Harris filed a lawsuit against the investigators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by causing him to be falsely arrested and unlawfully detained without probable cause. The district court construed Harris' claims as ones for malicious prosecution and granted summary judgment in favor of the investigators on qualified immunity grounds.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Harris argued that the investigation leading to his arrest was inadequate, that the district court erred in excluding his expert's testimony about the unreasonableness of the investigation, and that Hixon's arrest affidavit was based on conclusory statements without supporting facts, making the warrants for his arrest constitutionally inadequate.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the investigators' mistaken identification of Harris was a reasonable mistake and did not violate Harris' Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Harris' expert's testimony, as it would not have been helpful to a jury. Finally, the court held that even if the arrest warrant application was insufficient, the investigators had probable cause to arrest Harris based on their own knowledge and the brief period of Harris' detention. View "Harris v. Hixon" on Justia Law