Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff was convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in a Georgia state court, he brought suit against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. In regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim against the civilian bystander that assisted the police in subduing plaintiff, the court held that a civilian's rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of another. In regard to Deputy Thacker, the court applied the Graham factors and concluded that the deputy did not use excessive force where plaintiff suffered only de minimus injuries that were entirely consistent with a routine takedown. In regard to Deputy Brantley, the court again applied the Graham factors and concluded that the taser was not clearly excessive under the circumstances where two crimes were at issue by the time the taser was deployed: plaintiff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and he had already begun his active and loud obstruction of the arrest. In regard to Sheriff Johnson, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. View "Charles v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law

In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and required payment of all fines, fees, and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4.In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction with respect to the “wealth discrimination” claims. In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination, on behalf of “low-income women of color who face unemployment, low wages, and difficulty paying off their financial debts at much higher rates than their male and white female counterparts.” The plaintiffs could prevail on their constitutional challenges only if they could “show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system,” and they presented no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "McCoy v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Cox, a transgender woman, was assaulted at three different Georgia prisons for male inmates: At each of these institutions, Cox received estrogen injections, causing her to present with female features. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. Cox sued six Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) officials, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that the GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that three GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender inmate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30301.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s suit. Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect Eighth Amendment claim; with respect to each defendant, she either failed to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference or failed to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The court rejected the PREA claims for the same reasons. View "Cox v. Deputy Warden" on Justia Law

Follies, an adult entertainment nightclub, filed suit against the City of Chamblee, challenging Ordinance 754, which amended section 6-152(a) of its Alcohol Code to require establishments selling liquor for consumption on the premises to stop alcohol sales by 2:00 a.m. Monday through Saturday and by 11:59 p.m. on Sunday.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that although Follies had a vested right in its 2018 liquor license, that vested right did not extend to the hours in which alcohol could be sold. The court explained that the 2018 liquor license issued to Follies did not specifically guarantee that alcohol could be sold during certain set hours. Consequently, Follies had no more than a unilateral expectation that it would be able to sell alcohol during specific hours. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee" on Justia Law

Giron, a Colombian national federal prisoner acting pro se, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The application notes for U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 identify four general categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction: medical, age, family, and a “catch-all ‘other reasons’ category.” Section 1B1.13 constrains district courts’ authority to identify when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements.” Under the governing policy statement, medical conditions rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling only if the medical condition is a terminal illness or “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within” prison. The court found that Giron’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease were manageable in prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court was not required to analyze 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the finding of no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” was sufficiently supported. View "United States v. Giron" on Justia Law

Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law

A member of Sons of Confederate Veterans applied to participate in the Old Soldiers Day Parade, a pro-American veterans parade funded and organized by the Alpharetta, Georgia, and was informed that the organization could participate if it agreed not to fly the Confederate battle flag.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court held that the Parade constituted government speech and entered summary judgment against the Sons. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Governments “are not obliged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they fund and organize.” In 2015, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, the Supreme Court clarified that, “[w]hen [the] government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” View "Leake v. Drinkard" on Justia Law

Tinker, a federal prisoner serving a 180-month sentence for possessing a firearm while a convicted felon, argued that his medical conditions—obesity, hypertension, a congenitally narrowed spinal canal, and mental illness—increased his risk of developing a severe illness should he contract Covid-19 and that such increased risk qualified him for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Assuming that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for early release, as required by section 3582, the district court, after considering the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), and the requirements of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13, denied Tinker’s motion.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not procedurally err when it assumed, without explicitly finding, that Tinker could present “extraordinary and compelling reasons” before denying his motion based on section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and section 1B1.13’s policy statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it weighed the section 3553(a) factors; the court emphasized Tinker’s extensive criminal history and the need to protect the public, which was within its discretion to do. The court acknowledged the parties’ filings, which discussed at length the factors that Tinker contends were ignored. View "United States v. Tinker" on Justia Law

Smith, a Muslim serving a life sentence, sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, claiming that GDOC’s grooming policy, which prohibits inmates from growing facial hair over a half-inch in length, placed a substantial burden on his religious exercise. The district court rejected Smith’s RLUIPA claim, finding that “GDOC ha[d] offered logical and persuasive reasons to show that allowing untrimmed beards would be unmanageable for GDOC” and that “it is plausible that allowing a close security inmate like Smith an untrimmed beard could be dangerous for prison security.” Rather than rule in favor of GDOC, the district court fashioned a remedy that neither party had requested: it held that RLUIPA entitled Smith to grow a three-inch beard.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The district court’s determination that it was reasonable for GDOC to conclude that allowing Smith to grow an untrimmed beard would be both unmanageable and dangerous was not clearly erroneous but its ruling requiring GDOC to allow Smith to grow a three-inch beard was improper and contrary to the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding, Holt v. Hobbs, that courts should consider only the plaintiff’s proposed alternatives in deciding whether there is an available less restrictive means for the government to further its compelling interests under RLUIPA. View "Smith v. Dozier" on Justia Law