Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, says that he deserves a religious exemption from a Florida Department of Corrections rule that beards can only be a half-inch long. The district court agreed with him, and the Secretary of the Department does not push back on that substantive ruling. Instead, the Secretary argues that the decision was procedurally improper because an inmate must file a “Petition to Initiate Rulemaking” to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s pre-suit exhaustion requirements. Plaintiff responds that the Secretary did not preserve the issue. 
 The Eleventh Circuit rejected both parties’ arguments and affirmed the district court. The court explained that though it was an open question when the parties argued this case, the Supreme Court has since unanimously clarified that a “purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment” is reviewable on appeal even if the losing party failed to renew its arguments at or after trial.   Further, when a state sets up a grievance procedure for its prisoners, as Florida has done, a prisoner must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before he can initiate a lawsuit. But a prisoner need not do anything else. Florida’s three-step grievance procedure for settling prisoner complaints does not include filing a rulemaking petition, so a Florida prisoner need not seek rulemaking before he can sue. View "Durell Sims v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors and the administrator of a man shot and killed by Defendant police officers filed a lawsuit alleging claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and battery and negligence under Georgia law. And it demanded monetary damages. Both officers moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of excessive force. They also argued that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from the claims of battery and negligence. The district court denied the officers’ motions.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified or official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency. The court explained that in this case, the only issues in this appeal are issues of evidentiary sufficiency. In their motions for summary judgment, the officers argued that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances because they encountered a suspect who had brandished a gun, discharged it at least once, and ignored their commands to show his hands. The officers argued that in the light of these facts when they saw the man move, they had actual and probable cause to use deadly force on him. View "Joshua Paul English, et al v. Officer Jonathan Fowler, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an Alabama death row inmate scheduled to be executed by lethal injection on July 20, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Section 1983 complaint asserting that the manner in which Alabama executes its lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, he takes issue with the manner in which the execution team attempted to secure IV access in the inmates during the preceding three executions that occurred in 2022. Relatedly, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Alabama from executing him by any method other than nitrogen hypoxia. Plaintiff appealed the denial of that motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  The court focused its analysis on whether the district court clearly erred in determining that Plaintiff did not show that he faces a “substantial risk of serious harm” if executed by lethal injection. Plaintiff argued that Nance does not control and that the court should instead follow its unpublished decision in Smith. The court explained that the evidence established that since the allegedly “botched” executions, ADOC conducted a full review of its execution processes and procedures, and determined that no deficiencies existed with the protocol itself. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the intervening changes made by the ADOC “have disrupted the pattern discussed in Smith,” rendering Plaintiff’s claim that the same pattern would continue to occur purely speculative. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Plaintiff did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim. View "James Edward Barber v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in violation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Plaintiff after she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkelstein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work, did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organizations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated Plaintiff's employment after the primary election, which Plaintiff had lost to another employee of the office. The district court granted summary judgment to Finkelstein. It concluded that many of Plaintiff’s statements about Finkelstein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Plaintiff’s interests against her employer’s interests, the district court concluded that her interest in making these statements did not outweigh the government’s interest in the effective management of the public defender’s office.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s termination cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court wrote that it is yet to consider whether and how a public employee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although the court recognized that an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing the elected official currently holding that position, the court believes the employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the employee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frustrate the employer’s mission. View "Ruby Green v. Howard Finkelstein, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff wanted to enjoy that terrific feeling of carefreely careening down a waterslide with his son to celebrate his son’s seventh birthday. So he took his son to Universal’s Volcano Bay waterpark and got in line to ride its Krakatau Aqua Coaster— a waterslide version of a roller coaster. But as Plaintiff approached the front of the line, Universal pulled him aside and told him he was “unfit” to ride the Aqua Coaster. Plaintiff was born with only one hand. And Universal doesn’t allow people without two natural hands to ride. So Plaintiff sued Universal for imposing an allegedly discriminatory eligibility criterion in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). During the litigation, Universal stipulated that the Aqua Coaster’s manufacturer had identified “no specific risks” of riding to anyone like Plaintiff. Universal argued that complying with this morass of mandates was “necessary.” The district court agreed and also concluded that the ADA did not preempt Florida law. It therefore entered summary judgment for Universal.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that the ADA prohibits imposing a discriminatory eligibility criterion unless the criterion is “necessary.” Universal argues that “compliance with state law” necessitates Universal’s discriminatory eligibility requirement. But to the extent that state law conflicts with the ADA and requires disability discrimination, the court held that “compliance with state law,” in and of itself, cannot qualify as “necessary” under the ADA, or it would impermissibly preempt and effectively eviscerate the ADA. So “compliance with state law” does not relieve Universal of its obligation to follow the ADA View "Dylan Campbell v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is serving a life sentence in Georgia and is in the custody of the GDC. As an inmate, his communications with those on the outside are governed by GDC policies and regulations. In 2018, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. His complaint named the GDC Commissioner, and Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar—the GDC analysts who had intercepted his emails in September and October of 2017—as defendants. It did not name Ms. Keen—the GDC analyst who intercepted the email to the Aleph Institute in February of 2018—as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit, on Plaintiff’s due process claims, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that Plaintiff had a First Amendment liberty interest in his outgoing emails. As a result, he was entitled to procedural safeguards when his emails in September and October of 2017 were intercepted. Although Ms. Patterson and Ms. Edgar are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s requests for damages on the due process claims, those claims must be tried by a jury. The requests for declaratory relief on the due process claims are not barred by qualified or sovereign immunity, and a reasonable jury could find that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. With respect to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims relating to the forwarding and inmate information policies, the court affirmed. View "Ralph Harrison Benning v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

A jury determined that the Broward County Sheriff’s Office discriminated and retaliated against helicopter pilot (Plaintiff) in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and awarded Plaintiff $240,000 in lost wages. The verdict form also asked whether the sheriff’s office “willfully violated the law,” and the jury answered, “Yes.” Based on a statutory provision that awards double damages for willful violations, Plaintiff moved to alter the judgment. But the district judge decided that the jury finding on willfulness was “advisory” and denied Plaintiff’s motion. The district judge also denied the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the sheriff’s office’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for an altered judgment. The court held that there was sufficient evidence supporting the verdict against the sheriff’s office. But the court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s motion to alter the judgment because the parties consented to have the jury decide the issue of willfulness. View "Scott Thomas v. Broward County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer for allegedly underpaying him for overtime hours. Plaintiff worked in Florida, but he sued Waste Pro USA, Inc., and its subsidiary, Waste Pro of Florida, Inc., as one of several named plaintiffs in a purported collective action in the District of South Carolina. That court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it denied as moot his motion to sever his claims and transfer them to a district court in Florida. Instead of appealing or seeking other relief in the South Carolina court, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the same claims. The Florida district court granted summary judgment in favor of Waste Pro USA and Waste Pro of Florida because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff had “alternate ways of preserving his cause of action short of invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling.” He could have filed a motion for reconsideration of or for relief from the dismissal order and argued that transfer was in the interest of justice. He also could have appealed the dismissal. “The right to appeal generally is regarded as an adequate legal remedy [that] forecloses equitable relief.” The court wrote that a diligent plaintiff would have filed a protective action or pursued a legal remedy in the South Carolina proceeding. Further, to the extent Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if equitable tolling does not apply in this case, that is the consequence of his own failure to pursue his remedies at law. Equity will not intervene in such circumstances. View "Anthony Wright v. Waste Pro USA Inc, et al." on Justia Law