Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was indicted for knowingly possessing machinegun conversion devices, which are considered machineguns under federal law. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the federal prohibition on possessing machineguns violates the Second Amendment when applied to adult citizens without felony convictions. After the district court denied his motion, he pleaded guilty, admitting that he knowingly sold three machinegun conversion devices to an undercover officer. He was sentenced to 24 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The court concluded that machineguns are not in common use, are dangerous and unusual, and thus not protected by the Second Amendment. Alternatively, it found that machinegun conversion devices not attached to a firearm are merely accessories and not “Arms” under the Second Amendment. Following the denial, the defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the Second Amendment protects possession of machineguns in light of Supreme Court precedent. The Eleventh Circuit applied a de novo standard of review and held that machineguns are not protected by the Second Amendment because they are not weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and are considered dangerous and unusual. The court also noted the historical and widespread regulation and prohibition of machineguns. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the federal machinegun ban is constitutional, including as applied to law-abiding, non-felon adults. The disposition by the Eleventh Circuit was to affirm the conviction. View "USA v. Alsenat" on Justia Law

Two individuals purchased Florida prepaid college tuition savings plans for their daughters in 2004 and 2006. The plans promised to cover tuition at Florida public colleges or transfer an equivalent amount to non-Florida colleges if the beneficiary chose to attend elsewhere. In 2007, the Florida Legislature authorized a new “tuition differential” fee, exempting holders of existing plans from paying that fee at Florida colleges. The Florida Prepaid College Board amended the plan contracts to specify that this new fee was not covered for out-of-state schools. Over a decade later, when both daughters chose to attend out-of-state colleges, the Board declined to transfer an amount equivalent to the tuition differential fee.The purchasers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against members of the Board, alleging that the Board’s refusal violated the Contracts and Takings Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Board from applying the statutory exemption and contract amendments to beneficiaries attending non-Florida schools. The Board moved to dismiss, arguing it was protected by sovereign immunity. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, reasoning the relief sought was prospective. However, the district court disagreed, ruling that the relief requested was essentially a demand for a refund, thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity because the relief sought would require specific performance of a contract with the state, which is not permitted under Ex parte Young and related Supreme Court precedent. However, the appellate court vacated the district court’s dismissal with prejudice and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice, as the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Lavina v. Florida Prepaid College Board" on Justia Law

A sign operator installed two advertising signs near Interstate 85 in Atlanta in 1993, after obtaining permits under the city’s 1982 sign code. These permits were renewed several times. In 2015, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the city amended its sign code, removing several content-based provisions but allowing lawful, nonconforming signs to remain. When the sign operator later sought to upgrade the signs, the city approved the changes, but private parties challenged the decision. The Superior Court of Fulton County found that the original permits were unlawful under the 1982 code, making the signs illegal. The city then ordered removal of the signs and issued citations when the order was not followed.The sign operator, joined by the property owner and its president, sued the City of Atlanta in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking a declaration that the 1982 sign code was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The district court initially dismissed some claims for lack of jurisdiction, then reconsidered and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the code was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, which the city had not attempted to satisfy.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs only had standing to challenge the provision of the 1982 code that applied to their signs—section 16-28.019(7)—rather than the entire code. The court further held that this provision, which distinguished between on-premises and off-premises signs, was content-neutral under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the provision meets the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard. View "Anderson v. City of Atlanta, Georgia" on Justia Law

A White police officer employed by the Atlanta Police Department alleged that he was denied a promotion to Captain in December 2014 and was later removed from a flexible work schedule after he reported alleged misconduct by superiors. The officer had previously reported in 2008 that Black supervisors were allegedly treating White officers less favorably, which resulted in tension but was not shown to have been communicated to the ultimate decisionmaker for promotions. In 2015, after reporting possible ticket-fixing by his superiors to internal and federal authorities, the officer was required to work a fixed schedule, which impacted his ability to work a second job and fulfill childcare obligations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed or granted summary judgment on most of the officer’s claims, including those under Title VII for racial discrimination and retaliation, and under the Georgia Whistleblower Act. The court found no evidence that the Police Chief, who was the sole decisionmaker for promotions, was aware of the officer’s 2008 discrimination complaint, and further held that the officer had not experienced an adverse employment action as required by the statutes. At trial, the jury found for the City on the Title VII discrimination claim, concluding the officer had not been denied a promotion.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s rulings, including summary judgment for the City on the Title VII and Whistleblower Act claims and the jury verdict on the discrimination claim. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Chief and another supervisor on the First Amendment retaliation claim, holding that revoking the officer’s flexible schedule constituted a material adverse action sufficient to support such a claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this First Amendment issue. View "Joyner v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

A California-based company that produces lab-grown chicken sought to distribute and sell its product in Florida. After the company received federal approval from the USDA and FDA to market its lab-grown chicken, Florida enacted SB 1084, a law banning the manufacture, sale, and distribution of all lab-grown meat within the state. The company had previously held tasting events and developed business relationships in Florida but had no plans to manufacture its product there.Following the enactment of SB 1084, the company filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida against state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The company argued that the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) preempted Florida’s ban, claiming the state’s law imposed “additional or different” ingredient or facilities requirements in violation of the PPIA. The district court denied the company’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the company unlikely to succeed on its preemption claims because SB 1084 did not regulate the company’s ingredients, premises, facilities, or operations. The court also addressed standing and procedural questions, ultimately dismissing the preemption claims after the company amended its complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the filing of an amended complaint or the district court’s dismissal order rendered the appeal moot and whether the company could challenge the Florida law as preempted. The Eleventh Circuit held the appeal was not moot and that the company could bring a preemption action in equity. However, the court concluded the company was unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court held that Florida’s ban did not impose ingredient or facilities requirements preempted by the PPIA, as it simply banned the product’s sale and manufacture. Therefore, the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed. View "Upside Foods Inc v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Michael Nance, a Georgia prisoner sentenced to death, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state prison officials. He alleged that execution by lethal injection posed a substantial likelihood of severe pain due to his compromised veins, which he claimed would make it difficult or impossible for the execution team to establish intravenous access. Nance argued that extravasation of pentobarbital could cause intense, prolonged pain and asserted that execution by firing squad was a feasible, less painful alternative.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held a bench trial. Prior to trial, the court permitted the prison officials’ medical expert to examine Nance’s veins and allowed members of the execution team to testify anonymously and remotely, consistent with Georgia’s Secrecy Act. The parties submitted medical records and declarations, which showed that Nance had successfully undergone several recent medical procedures requiring intravenous access without noted complications. After trial, the district court found that Nance failed to prove a substantial likelihood of severe pain from lethal injection, based largely on his medical records, and entered judgment for the defendants. Nance later moved to alter or amend the judgment, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in its factual findings or evidentiary rulings, and concluded that Nance failed to prove the planned execution method posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the prison officials. View "Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a citizen of Sierra Leone and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in the District of Columbia in 2014 of attempted first-degree sexual abuse and kidnapping. The factual basis for his conviction included both forceful digital penetration and forceful penile penetration. After serving his prison sentence, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, specifically as “rape” or “an attempt to commit an aggravated felony,” and also as a crime of violence.In removal proceedings before the Immigration Judge, the petitioner admitted the factual allegations but disputed that his conviction was an aggravated felony, arguing that the D.C. statute criminalized digital penetration, which he claimed was not covered by the generic federal definition of rape. The Immigration Judge ordered removal, finding the conviction constituted attempted rape. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, relying on its precedent that the generic definition of rape included digital penetration, and dismissed other removability grounds as unnecessary. The Board also denied the petitioner’s requests for a waiver of inadmissibility, but remanded for further consideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture, directing the Immigration Judge to consider aggregate risks of torture. After additional hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the Board affirmed, declining to revisit removability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed only the Board’s removability determination. It held that the generic federal definition of “rape” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) does not include digital penetration, joining other circuits. Consequently, the Board erred in concluding the petitioner’s conviction categorically matched the federal definition of rape. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on other removability grounds. View "Barrie v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves a man who was convicted of first-degree murder in Broward County, Florida, after a fatal shooting during a domestic dispute with his girlfriend. The key evidence during trial was a confession obtained by police after the man initially invoked his right to counsel but later agreed to speak with detectives. This confession was not admitted as direct evidence at his second trial but was used extensively to impeach his testimony when he took the stand in his own defense. The prosecution also presented substantial physical and eyewitness evidence, including the testimony of two individuals present at the scene and expert forensic analysis.After his conviction, the defendant challenged the use of his statement in postconviction proceedings. The Florida trial court denied his motion for a new trial, and the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. The defendant later argued in a state postconviction proceeding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the statement on the grounds that it was coerced, in violation of the Due Process Clause. The state postconviction court, adopting the State’s response, found that the defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged error of his counsel, as the other evidence against him was overwhelming. The Fourth DCA affirmed without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief. The court held that the state court had adjudicated the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance claim on the merits, entitling its decision to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Eleventh Circuit found that the state court’s determination—that the outcome would not have been different even if the statement had been excluded—was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, the denial of habeas relief was affirmed. View "Calder v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Myelicia Rodgers, a clerk at a United States post office in Crestview, Florida, was accused of tampering with and stealing mail while working alone during early morning shifts. After suspicions arose due to complaints about opened mail, the Office of Inspector General conducted an investigation. Rodgers was observed via video and in person engaging in suspicious activities, including taking greeting cards into restricted areas, opening packages, and removing mail. Test letters with cash and gift cards were used in the investigation, some of which went missing, and Rodgers was caught taking and hiding one such letter. Upon being confronted, Rodgers admitted to opening some letters but denied stealing their contents.A grand jury indicted Rodgers on counts of mail tampering and theft by a postal employee. She waived her right to a jury and opted for a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. At trial, the government presented multiple witnesses and video evidence. Rodgers did not testify or call any witnesses in her defense. After the prosecution rested, Rodgers moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The district court explicitly informed Rodgers of her right not to testify and assured her that her silence would not be considered in determining guilt. Rodgers’s counsel argued that her silence should not be taken as evidence against her, and the court reiterated that it would base its decision solely on the evidence presented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court drew an adverse inference from Rodgers's decision not to testify. The court held that the district court did not consider Rodgers’s silence as evidence of guilt and properly respected her Fifth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Rodgers’s conviction. View "USA v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

Several individuals who reside in DeKalb County, Georgia, outside the city limits of Atlanta, opposed the construction of a new public safety training facility on city-owned land and wished to collect signatures for a referendum petition to repeal the city ordinance authorizing the lease for the facility. Atlanta’s municipal code required that signature gatherers for such petitions be residents of the City of Atlanta. Because they did not meet this residency requirement, the plaintiffs filed suit against the City, arguing that the restriction violated their First Amendment rights. They sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the residency requirement, as well as other relief connected to the signature collection process.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Atlanta from enforcing the residency requirement for signature gatherers. The court also ordered the City to issue new petitions without the residency restriction and restarted the 60-day signature collection period, while counting previously collected signatures. The City appealed the injunction and obtained a stay from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm sufficient for injunctive relief. The court specified that, under Kemp v. City of Claxton, 496 S.E.2d 712 (Ga. 1998), Georgia law does not allow the use of a referendum petition to challenge or repeal a city ordinance unless it amends the city charter. Because the plaintiffs could not lawfully utilize the referendum process for their intended purpose, they lacked a right to the process and consequently could not show irreparable injury. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Baker v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law