Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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The case involved an appeal by two brothers, Jonathan and Daniel Markovich, who were convicted for operating fraudulent drug rehabilitation clinics in Florida. They were found guilty of various charges, including health-care fraud, wire fraud, kickbacks, money laundering, and bank fraud, resulting in fraudulent claims of over $100 million.The brothers appealed their convictions on several grounds. They argued that the district court violated their constitutional rights by denying their motion to compel the prosecution to obtain and disclose confidential medical records possessed by third parties. They also claimed that the court violated Federal Rules of Evidence by admitting unreliable and confusing expert testimony about the clinics' medical and billing practices. Additionally, they argued that the court abused its discretion by admitting lay summary testimony about medical and billing records.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court ruled that the prosecution had no duty to seek out potentially exculpatory evidence not in its possession. It also determined that the expert testimony was clear and reliable, and the summary testimony was proper. The court found that any challenge to bank-fraud counts was forfeited due to a lack of explanation or supporting legal authority. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the brothers' motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "United States v. Markovich" on Justia Law

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The case involves Andre Dubois, who was convicted on several federal firearm offenses. These offenses arose when Dubois attempted to ship a box containing firearms from Georgia to Dominica. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was asked to address five issues on appeal.Firstly, the court dismissed Dubois's argument that a recent Supreme Court case overturned the precedent upholding a ban on felons possessing firearms. The court held that the Supreme Court case did not abrogate the precedent, and therefore Dubois's argument failed.Secondly, the court affirmed that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dubois knew he was in possession of a firearm.Thirdly, the court found that Dubois's prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under Georgia law qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, triggering a higher base offense level.Fourthly, the court rejected Dubois's argument that the application of a sentencing enhancement for possession of a stolen gun violated his due process rights.Finally, the court held that the district court had not erred in imposing a $25,000 fine on Dubois, as there was sufficient evidence to suggest that he could afford to pay the fine.Therefore, Dubois's convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "USA v. Dubois" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiffs, Honeyfund.com Inc, Chevara Orrin, Whitespace Consulting LLC, and Primo Tampa LLC, challenged a Florida law known as the Individual Freedom Act. This law bans certain mandatory workplace trainings that espouse or promote a set of beliefs related to race, color, sex, or national origin deemed offensive by the state. The plaintiffs asserted that the Act violated their rights to free speech and was both vague and overbroad. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, with the understanding that the Act was both unconstitutionally vague and an unlawful content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction. Florida appealed this decision.The appellate court held that the Act was indeed a violation of the First Amendment. The court rejected Florida's argument that the Act regulated conduct, not speech, noting that the Act's restrictions were based on the content and viewpoint of the speech in the prohibited meetings. The court applied strict scrutiny, determining that the Act was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. It also rejected Florida’s attempt to tie the Act to Title VII, a federal law prohibiting employment discrimination, stating that having similar asserted purposes did not make the two laws equivalent. The plaintiffs' claim of irreparable injury due to an ongoing violation of the First Amendment was also acknowledged. The court thus affirmed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining the operation of the provision. View "Honeyfund.Com Inc v. Governor, State of Florida" on Justia Law

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This case relates to the admission of an investigator's testimony from a preliminary hearing in a subsequent trial. The appellant, Maurice Kent, was a member of a violent gang and was charged with RICO conspiracy and five other substantive crimes, including the attempted murder of Shadeed Muhammad. The government alleged that the gang murdered a former member, Qualeef Rhode, for cooperating with the police’s investigation into the attempted murder. The government introduced an investigator’s testimony from a preliminary hearing in a related case, which identified Rhode as cooperating with law enforcement to implicate Kent in the attempted murder. Kent argued that this testimony was hearsay and its admission violated his Confrontation Clause rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected Kent's arguments and affirmed the decision of the district court. The court held that the investigator's testimony was not hearsay because it was offered for the effect it had on the listeners (other gang members) and not for the truth of the matter asserted. It was relevant because it influenced Kent and the other gang members who heard the testimony at the preliminary hearing, providing them with a motive to murder Rhode. The court also determined that the district court had sufficiently reduced the risk that the jury would improperly consider the out-of-court statement for the truth of the matter asserted by redacting the most prejudicial portions of the testimony and instructing the jury to consider the testimony only for its effect on the listeners. Therefore, the admission of the testimony did not violate Kent's rights under the Confrontation Clause. View "United States v. Kent" on Justia Law

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In this case, three individuals and the Firearms Policy Coalition (FPC), an advocacy group, challenged a Georgia law that prohibits individuals under the age of 21 from obtaining licenses to carry firearms. They sued three county probate judges, who issue carry licenses, and Georgia’s Commissioner of Public Safety, who designs the carry license application form. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue any of the defendants and that the case was both moot and unripe. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs have standing to sue the probate judges, but not the Commissioner of Public Safety. The court found that the plaintiffs' alleged injury - the inability to carry firearms due to their age - is traceable to the actions of the probate judges who issue the licenses, and could be redressed by a court order directed at them. However, the court held that the plaintiffs' injuries are not fairly traceable to, nor redressable by a court order against, the Commissioner of Public Safety, who merely designs the application form and lacks enforcement authority. The court also held that the case was neither moot nor unripe with respect to the probate judges, reversing the district court's dismissal of the case in part and remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Baughcum v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Robert Franklyn Lodge, a native and citizen of Jamaica, challenged the constitutionality of a federal law regarding derivative citizenship. Lodge, born out of wedlock and abandoned by his mother, was brought to the United States by his naturalized father. After being convicted of aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove Lodge, who argued that he had derived citizenship from his father under a since-repealed statute. The immigration judge ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Lodge’s appeal.Lodge argued that the former statute discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against black children based on race. He asked the court to declare him a citizen, arguing that the statute, if cured of its constitutional defects, would have permitted his father to transmit citizenship to him. However, the court found that Lodge would not have derived citizenship from his father even under a version of the statute cured of its alleged constitutional defects. Consequently, the court denied Lodge's petition for review and deemed his motion to transfer as moot. View "Lodge v. United States Attorney General" on Justia Law

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Robert Franklyn Lodge, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was brought to the United States by his father, who became a naturalized U.S. citizen. After Lodge was convicted of aggravated felonies, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him. Lodge argued that he had derived citizenship from his father under a statute that has been repealed. The immigration judge ordered Lodge removed to Jamaica, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Lodge argued that the former statute discriminated against unmarried fathers based on sex and against black children based on race, and that he should have been granted citizenship if the statute were free of these constitutional defects. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Lodge's petition for review, concluding that he lacked standing to raise these constitutional challenges. The court found that Lodge's injury (removal from the U.S. due to non-citizenship) was not traceable to the sex classification in the statute, because even under a sex-neutral version of the statute, Lodge would not have derived citizenship from his father, because his mother's maternity was established. The court did not address the merits of Lodge's arguments about race and sex discrimination or whether he had third-party standing to assert his father's right to equal protection. Lodge's motion to transfer was denied as moot. View "Lodge v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

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The case concerns Tia Deyon Pugh, who was charged with impeding law enforcement during a civil disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) during a protest in Mobile, Alabama. She smashed a police car window with a baseball bat, thus obstructing law enforcement officers in their official duties during the civil disorder. Pugh challenged the constitutionality of Section 231(a)(3) on four grounds, arguing that it: (1) exceeds Congress’s power to legislate under the Commerce Clause, (2) is a substantially overbroad regulation of activities protected by the First Amendment, (3) is a content-based restriction of expressive activities in violation of the First Amendment, and (4) is vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Pugh was found guilty by a jury.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Pugh’s conviction. The court held that Section 231(a)(3) does not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as the statute's jurisdictional element is sufficient to limit its scope to constitutional applications. The court also found that the statute does not violate the First Amendment as it does not broadly prohibit protected speech and expressive conduct. Furthermore, the court ruled that the statute is not a content-based restriction and does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause due to vagueness. The court concluded that the statute constitutionally applies to Pugh's conduct, and she may not challenge the statute on vagueness grounds based on its application to others. View "USA v. Pugh" on Justia Law

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A decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether the Governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis, violated the First Amendment rights of Andrew Warren, a state attorney for Florida’s Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, when he suspended Warren from office. Warren, a vocal advocate for criminal justice reform, had been elected to his position twice. During his time in office, he implemented several policies and signed onto advocacy statements related to issues such as transgender health care and abortion rights. Governor DeSantis suspended Warren from his position, justifying the decision on the basis of these activities. Warren sued, claiming that the suspension was retaliation for his First Amendment-protected activities. The district court found that six factors motivated DeSantis to suspend Warren, two of which were protected by the First Amendment. However, the court concluded that DeSantis would have suspended Warren regardless of these protected activities, basing this conclusion on the other four factors. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred in not considering all of Warren's activities as protected by the First Amendment. The court emphasized that, as an elected official, Warren had a right to express his views on policy matters of public concern and that his suspension based on these expressions violated his First Amendment rights. The court vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Warren v. DeSantis" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit partially affirmed and partially reversed a lower court's ruling in a case involving James McDonough, a citizen activist, who was banned from future meetings and arrested for disorderly conduct and cyberstalking by the City of Homestead, Florida. McDonough claimed these actions violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights.The court determined that the city council meetings were designated public forums, and the ban was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest as required, thus violating McDonough's First Amendment rights.The court also found that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest McDonough for disorderly conduct, which involved swearing at officers and making obscene gestures. The court stated that such actions do not constitute disorderly conduct and are protected under the First Amendment. However, the court ruled that the City had probable cause to arrest McDonough for cyberstalking, as it was not unreasonable for the City to interpret Florida’s cyberstalking statute as barring McDonough from targeting one of its officers with his series of posts.The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "McDonough v. Garcia" on Justia Law