Articles Posted in Constitutional Law

The City challenged the district court's order granting Retailers' renewed motion for a preliminary injunction, and denying the City's motions for clarification and for reconsideration. The preliminary injunction enjoined the enforcement of two City ordinances that restrict commercial solicitation and handbilling in sections of five streets in the Historic Art Deco District. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding that Retailers were likely to succeed on the merits with respect to Section 74-1, the anti-solicitation ordinance, because the record suggested that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored–specifically that the City failed to consider numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives. The court also held that the district court correctly concluded that Retailers showed a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that Section 46-92, the anti-handbilling ordinance, was overbroad. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction. View "FF Cosmetics FL, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under state law and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201-219, as well as the grant of summary judgment for the City as to claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court held that plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient on their face to state a plausible claim for a violation of the FLSA; the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's state law claims based on his failure to comply with Ala. Code 11–47–23; and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City as to plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that the City unlawfully failed to accommodate him or that he suffered an adverse employment action, plaintiff did not meet his burden of identifying a reasonable accommodation, and he did not show that he was constructively discharged. View "Boyle v. City of Pell City" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the district court erred by conducting de novo review. The state court's denial of petitioner's Brady claim was entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the state court's denial was neither an unreasonable determination of the facts nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Rimmer v. Secretary, FL Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as a police officer with the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights when the city and the mayor arranged for plaintiff's termination based on plaintiff's support of a purported political enemy. The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for defendants and held that plaintiff did not voluntarily leave his employment with the city but rather was effectively terminated. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff's resignation was not a product of his free will, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action when his employment with the city ended abruptly. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. City of Doral" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff filed with the EEOC a charge of race and disability discrimination against her employer, the school board. In 2009, the Commission dismissed the charge and provided her notice of her right to sue within 90 days, but plaintiff failed to file within that period. Instead, in 2011, plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration with the Commission, which then vacated the dismissal of her first charge. The DOJ then granted plaintiff's request for a new notice of her right to sue about the same allegations of discrimination, and she filed suit within 90 days of the second notice. The district court then dismissed the complaint as untimely. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commission lacked the authority to issue the second notice of the right to sue and thus plaintiff failed to establish she was entitled to equitable tolling. View "Stamper v. Duval County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Miami-Dade County State Attorney under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after she informed plaintiff that his recording of a meeting between him and the Chief of Police violated the Florida Security of Communications Act, Fla. Stat. 934.03, and that the violation was a felony. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment and held that plaintiff did not violate section 934.03 and, consequently, the government's threatened prosecution had no basis in the law. In this case, at no point did the chief, or any participant in the meeting, exhibit any expectation of privacy. Nor was there advance notice or published or displayed rules that established confidentiality and certainly none that prohibited note taking or recordings. Furthermore, the meeting fell within the "uttered at a public meeting" exception of section 934.02, and the circumstances did not justify an expectation of privacy. Because the court resolved the case under state law, it need not reach the constitutional issue of whether the recording was protected by the First Amendment. View "McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle" on Justia Law

After city officers shot plaintiff, he filed suit alleging claims, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their second motion to dismiss and instructing them to develop and file their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) report. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order to the extent that it denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and directed plaintiff to amend his complaint again. The court explained that, after plaintiff has filed his second amended complaint, defendants may file another motion to dismiss that includes assertions of immunity from suit. View "Howe v. City of Enterprise" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate her conviction and sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, car jacking in this case. The court held that Johnson v. United States does not apply to or invalidate 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that petitioner's attempted-carjacking conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(B). Alternatively, the court held that petitioner's attempted carjacking categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of section 924(c)(3)(A). View "Ovalles v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Georgia district attorney and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants conspired to violate his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff, employed as the director of the police department's crime lab, was terminated from his position after the district attorney contacted the police chief to express his concerns that plaintiff had written an expert report for and planned to testify on behalf of the defense in a criminal case. The Eleventh Circuit held that prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions in this case because those actions were not taken in their role as advocates. However, the prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity because they were acting within the outer perimeter of their discretionary skills in expressing concerns about plaintiff's outside work, and the law was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the prosecutors' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity and remanded. View "Mikko v. Howard" on Justia Law

Georgia law by its terms does not provide for negligence actions directly against dogs. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against a police canine, Draco, and others after Draco inflicted serious damage to plaintiff when Draco refused to release his bite. The Eleventh Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because no binding precedent clearly established that their actions in allowing Draco to apprehend plaintiff violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; the County and Chief Ayers in his official capacity have sovereign immunity; and Defendants Fransen, Towler, Ross, and Ayers were entitled to official immunity for the claims against them in their individual capacities View "Jones v. Officer S. Fransen" on Justia Law