Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession. During Defenant's direct examination, he testified that he did not conspire with a co-defendant. In response, the district court held a sidebar conference, at which the prosecution requested the court instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy. The court provided the instruction to the jury, and the jury convicted Defendant.On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's clarifying instruction to the jury regarding conspiratorial liability as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it intervened to prevent a misunderstanding of the law of conspiracy that Defendant's counsel invited. Further the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the necessary men's rea to commit the offense. View "USA v. Francisco Morel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his First Step Act motion to reduce his sentence. The district court considering Defendant’s motion concluded that it was bound by the sentencing court’s drug-quantity finding when determining what his statutory penalties would have been under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because that drug quantity would still trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act, the district court also concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly used the 15-kilogram finding to determine what the statutory penalty would have been for Defendant under the Fair Sentencing Act. And because this finding would have compelled the sentencing court to impose the same mandatory life sentence even if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time, the district court correctly concluded that it could not reduce Defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.   The court explained Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce disparities between prison sentences for future offenses involving crack cocaine and powder cocaine. And in the First Step Act, Congress decided to extend the same reduction in sentencing disparities to past offenses. The language of that statute is straightforward—eligible crack offenders can now be resentenced “as if” the Fair Sentencing Act had already been in place during their original sentencing. What Congress did not do is offer a sentence reduction below the statutory minimum under the Fair Sentencing Act, or vacate drug-quantity findings that would have triggered that minimum at the time of the movant’s offense. View "USA v. Pinkney Clowers, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography. On appeal, he challenged his convictions on three grounds. First, he argued that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy Section 2251(a)’s interstate commerce element. Second, he contended that the district court reversibly erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet-sworn jury in his absence. Third, he asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish production under Section 2251(a) because of what he calls a “factual impossibility.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s convictions. The court held that from the evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that Defendant had the requisite intent to “produce” child pornography when he originally captured the photos of the victim. Further, here, Defendant’s initial jury was impaneled, but not sworn. In fact, the record shows that both parties agreed not to swear the jury given the impending storm—and, further, that once the storm had made landfall, Defendant’s lawyer admitted that he was “glad the jury wasn’t sworn” because it gave the court the necessary flexibility to make new trial arrangements. Because the jury wasn’t sworn, jeopardy never attached. And absent jeopardy, Defendant had no right to have his case decided by the particular jury that the judge had initially impaneled. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it discharged the entire panel. Moreover, the court found that Defendant’s s constitutional arguments are unavailing because he has failed to show any error—plain or otherwise—under either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. View "USA v. Clark Downs" on Justia Law

Acting as the decedent’s estate’s administrator and on behalf of his two sons, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant-Officer. Plaintiff principally sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Defendant had used constitutionally excessive force—and had thereby “unreasonably . . . seized” Plaintiff’s son in violation of the Fourth Amendment—when she fired the 58th and fatal bullet. She also appended two Georgia law claims: one for assault and battery and another for wrongful death. Defendant moved for summary judgment. She argued that qualified immunity shielded her from suit on the Section 1983 claim and that official immunity protected her from the state-law claims. The district court granted Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that in firing the shot that tragically killed Plaintiff’s son, Defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The court reasoned that Defendant was facing down a man who had been threatening to kill her for several minutes straight. He had held a gun to her head, separately pointed his gun at her and her partners, spurned repeated orders to drop his weapons and surrender, barricaded himself in his car, and, finally, opened fire. This man knew how to conceal guns; he was suicidal, dogged, and erratic, and he had shown no signs of backing down. The court wrote it has little trouble concluding that, in those circumstances, Defendant could reasonably have believed that he posed a lethal threat. Her decision to neutralize that threat was “reasonable” and therefore constitutional. View "Iwoinakee Gebray Harris-Billups v. Milele Anderson" on Justia Law

After a 19-year-old shot and killed seventeen people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which bans the sale of firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds. In doing so, the Legislature sought “to comprehensively address the crisis of gun violence, including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.” Shortly after the law passed, the NRA challenged it, alleging that the law violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in Florida’s favor. The NRA then filed an appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment in Florida’s favor. The court explained that Florida enacted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act—as its name indicates—for precisely the same reason as states in the Reconstruction Era adopted their firearm restrictions for 18-to-20-year-olds—to address the public-safety crisis some 18-to-20-year-olds with firearms represent. Because Florida’s Act is at least as modest as the firearm prohibitions on 18- to-20-year-olds in the Reconstruction Era and enacted for the same reason as those laws, it is “relevantly similar” to those Reconstruction Era laws. And as a result, it does not violate the Second Amendment. View "National Rifle Association, et al. v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement" on Justia Law

Defendant found in possession of a firearm, was charged with violating Section 922(g)(9) based on a previous misdemeanor conviction for battery under the Georgia Family Violence Act. The district court granted his pretrial motion to exclude evidence of that previous conviction after determining that his waiver of a jury trial in the earlier state proceeding resulting in the conviction had not been knowing and intelligent. Because that pretrial ruling left the government without any evidence to prove the prior qualifying conviction element of the charged Section 922(g)(9) offense, the government filed this appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court explained that it disagreed with the district court’s statement that there was “no evidence” that Defendant understood he had the right to a jury trial or that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. There is at least some evidence going both ways, and, if anything, the evidence showing a knowing and intelligent wavier is stronger than that indicating the absence of one. When the evidence is unclear or evenly balanced, or the inferences that can be drawn from it are ambiguous, the party with the burden of persuasion loses. View "USA v. Idris Shamsid-Deen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff served as the Chief of Police for the Sneads Police Department from March 2006 until October 2018. On October 9, 2018, the five-member Town Council terminated Plaintiff’s employment by a 4-to-1 vote. The Town Council did so under the charge that Plaintiff was disrespectful at best and insubordinate at worst. Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims his firing was in retaliation for things he said, disclosed, and reported, all regarding various matters related to the newer Councilmembers with whom he had a contentious relationship.   Plaintiff filed an eight-count action against the Town of Sneads, the Town Manager, Town Councilmembers, Town Council President, and Town Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). He brought unlawful-retaliation claims against the Town of Sneads under the Florida Whistle-blower’s Act (“FWA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the First Amendment. And he brought identical retaliation claims under the First Amendment against each of the five individual defendants. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts, and Plaintiff appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not established that he satisfied all three of these requirements for each instance of his speech that he claims were protected under the FWA. Further, the court wrote that because the record evidence shows that the Town of Sneads terminated Plaintiff for insubordination, not his invocation of the FMLA, the court concluded that the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim was also proper. View "John "Burt" McAlpin v. Town of Sneads Florida, et al" on Justia Law