Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had a two-day trial at which he testified, asserting a justification defense. The jury rejected that defense, finding him guilty. The district court denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. After calculating a guidelines range of 100 to 120 months, the court sentenced him to 80 months imprisonment. He challenged his conviction and his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Defendant had not established self-defense as a justification for shooting the victim. The court explained that the evidence showed that Defendant escalated the situation and interposed himself when his girlfriend was attempting to handle it. He claimed his actions were justified because he had to defend himself, but it was Defendant who had insisted that his girlfriend get her gun when she did not want to; she wanted to see who was outside and resolve the situation herself. The court reasoned that Defendant also could have called 911 and asked that law enforcement officers be sent to the house. It wasn’t clear error for the district court to find that Defendant, a convicted felon, had possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense. View "USA v. Hannibal Moore" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Polk County and two employees who worked at the jail, alleging that the Jail and its employees interfered with his right to communicate freely and confidentially with his attorneys by forcing him to scan his legal mail into a computer with a memory chip.  When Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at that Jail, the Jail required him to scan his legal mail into a computer that contained a memory chip. Though Plaintiff does not know whether anyone other than he read his mail, he worried that the Jail could and may have since it had access to the computer into which he had scanned his mail. Plaintiff sued Polk County and two employees who worked at the Jail. He alleged, among other things, that the Jail and its employees interfered with his right to communicate freely and confidentially with his attorneys by forcing him to scan his legal mail into a computer with a memory chip.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to allow for the reasonable inference that the Jail’s mail-scanning policy infringed on his free-speech rights. However, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim under the Due Process Clause. The court explained that because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee and because his claim involves the deprivation of a “basic necessity” like access to recreational activity, he must satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s objective and subjective standards to prevail on his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And that’s where his problem arises, as he argues only that the conditions of his confinement were objectively unreasonable. View "Rickey Christmas v. Lieutenant J. Nabors, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant filed an Application for Naturalization (Form N-400), on which she certified under penalty of perjury that she had never “committed a crime or offense for which she was NOT arrested.” Defendant was charged in 2012 with healthcare fraud and conspiracy crimes. In 2012, Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering. In 2021, the United States filed a complaint in the district court to revoke Defendant’s naturalization. The complaint alleged   had illegally procured her naturalization on the ground that she had failed to meet the requirement of “good moral character.” The government moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Defendant had illegally procured her naturalization because she had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the statutory period. The district court granted that motion. It concluded that the conspiracy crime to which Defendant pleaded guilty overlapped with the statutory “good moral character.”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting requirement, as defined by 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), is also not a crime categorically involving moral turpitude. The offense does not necessarily involve fraud. And, although the crime arguably involves deceit, it does not necessarily involve an activity that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Thus, the court held that a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude. View "USA v. Lisette Lopez" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals his sentence for possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin and 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. There are four issues on appeal: whether (1) the district court erred in imposing a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance, under Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) Defendant’s sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, (3) technical malfunctions during Defendant’s sentencing hearing conducted remotely via videoconference violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of criminal proceedings, and (4) the district court erred by imposing conditions of supervised release in the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence in part, vacated in part, and remanded for limited resentencing as to the conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court properly applied the enhancement for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance. Further, the court held that the district court did not impose a sentence that was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Moreover, the court held that Defendant is not entitled to resentencing because of the videoconference malfunctions. Finally, the district court erred by imposing conditions of supervised release not included in Defendant’s oral sentence. The court explained that the district court’s pronouncement here failed to reference the administrative order or otherwise indicate that the court was adopting conditions of supervised release beyond those mandated by statute. View "USA v. Jesus Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, says that he deserves a religious exemption from a Florida Department of Corrections rule that beards can only be a half-inch long. The district court agreed with him, and the Secretary of the Department does not push back on that substantive ruling. Instead, the Secretary argues that the decision was procedurally improper because an inmate must file a “Petition to Initiate Rulemaking” to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s pre-suit exhaustion requirements. Plaintiff responds that the Secretary did not preserve the issue. 
 The Eleventh Circuit rejected both parties’ arguments and affirmed the district court. The court explained that though it was an open question when the parties argued this case, the Supreme Court has since unanimously clarified that a “purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment” is reviewable on appeal even if the losing party failed to renew its arguments at or after trial.   Further, when a state sets up a grievance procedure for its prisoners, as Florida has done, a prisoner must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available under that procedure before he can initiate a lawsuit. But a prisoner need not do anything else. Florida’s three-step grievance procedure for settling prisoner complaints does not include filing a rulemaking petition, so a Florida prisoner need not seek rulemaking before he can sue. View "Durell Sims v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence on violators of Section 922(g)(1) if they have three previous qualifying felonies. Because Defendant has two other qualifying felonies, Defendant’s eligibility for ACCA’s mandatory minimum turns on whether his Florida conviction for unlawful possession of a listed chemical is a “serious drug offense” because it “involves manufacturing . . . a controlled substance.” The district court counted the Florida conviction and sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded this case for resentencing. The court held that a conviction under Florida Statutes Section 893.149(1) for possessing a listed chemical with reasonable cause to believe it will be used to manufacture a controlled substance is not a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. The court explained that possessing one ingredient to make a controlled substance with “reasonable cause to believe” that some person will use it to manufacture a controlled substance is too far removed from the conduct of manufacturing itself to satisfy the “necessarily entails” standard. View "USA v. Christopher E. Miles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were arrested by Sheriff’s deputies for stashing their client’s cell phone in a bag only minutes before the police executed a search warrant for child pornography on that phone.  Plaintiffs alleged that District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney ordered the arrest. Following the arrest, the DA, in a statement to the press, and ADA, on the courthouse steps, publicly accused Plaintiffs of concealing evidence of a crime and knowingly possessing child pornography. After Plaintiffs were acquitted they filed this federal lawsuit for unlawful arrest. The district court entered judgment against the Deputies and denied the DA’s and ADA’s motion for summary judgment on the false arrest claim. The district court also denied the district attorneys’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation claims.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims. The court wrote that on remand, the district court should determine whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the defamation claims. The court held that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. The court explained it believes “a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests here.” However, even if Defendants made their allegedly defamatory statements as part of their official duties, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that state-agent immunity does not protect against intentional defamation. View "Megan Garcia, et al v. Pamela Casey, et al" on Justia Law

During removal proceedings, Petitioner wrote to the Board of Immigration Appeals asking to withdraw his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision and to be deported. The Board granted his withdrawal request. He now asserts that the federal laws governing derivative citizenship are unconstitutional and seeks a declaration that he is a U.S. citizen as a judicial remedy.   The Eleventh Circuit denied his appeal. The court concluded that although it has jurisdiction to determine whether the Board erroneously withdrew Petitioner’s appeal, he does not argue the Board did. Further, the court explained that Petitioner also forfeited judicial review of his claims by withdrawing his appeal and asking to be deported. The court explained that Petitioner also moved to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on the ground that there are “genuine issue[s] of material fact” about his claim that former 8 U.S.C. Section 1432(a) unconstitutionally discriminates based on gender and race. However, the court reasoned that because it concluded that Petitioner forfeited any right to judicial review of that claim, there is no genuine issue of material fact that requires the court to transfer this case to the district court. View "Franco P. Clement v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Petitioner an Alabama prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. The district judge granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to convey to Petitioner a favorable plea offer of thirty years’ imprisonment during his capital murder trial.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state habeas court’s determinations that Petitioner would not have accepted the plea offer and that the state trial court would not have accepted an agreement between Petitioner and the District Attorney were unreasonable. The court also found that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeal’s (ACCA’s) determination that Petitioner received the plea offer was unreasonable. Because the court found that the state habeas court’s factual determinations were unreasonable, it held that Petitioner has cleared the hurdle created by AEDPA. Accordingly, because Petitioner cleared the AEDPA hurdle, the court found it best for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s claim. View "Brandon Washington v. Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors and the administrator of a man shot and killed by Defendant police officers filed a lawsuit alleging claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and battery and negligence under Georgia law. And it demanded monetary damages. Both officers moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are entitled to qualified immunity from the claim of excessive force. They also argued that they are entitled to official immunity under Georgia law from the claims of battery and negligence. The district court denied the officers’ motions.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Defendants’ appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that it lacks appellate jurisdiction over the denial of qualified or official immunity that turns on issues of evidentiary sufficiency. The court explained that in this case, the only issues in this appeal are issues of evidentiary sufficiency. In their motions for summary judgment, the officers argued that their use of force was reasonable under the circumstances because they encountered a suspect who had brandished a gun, discharged it at least once, and ignored their commands to show his hands. The officers argued that in the light of these facts when they saw the man move, they had actual and probable cause to use deadly force on him. View "Joshua Paul English, et al v. Officer Jonathan Fowler, et al" on Justia Law