Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was enrolled in the Counselor Education Program at Augusta State University (ASU), seeking to obtain her master's degree in school counseling. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that requiring her to complete a remediation plan addressing what the faculty perceived as deficiencies in her ability to be a multiculturally competent counselor violated her First Amendment free speech and free exercise rights. Plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent ASU's officials from dismissing her from the program if she did not complete the remediation plan. The district court denied her motion for a preliminary injunction and plaintiff appealed. The court held that because plaintiff failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits with respect to her free speech and free exercise claims, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for a preliminary injunction.

In 1987, defendant was convicted of first degree rape. In 2009, defendant was convicted for conspiracy to violate federal drug laws. Because of defendant's earlier youthful offender adjudication on the rape charge, in sentencing him on the federal drug charge the court imposed as a condition of supervised release that he register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16901, et seq. At issue was whether it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause to require a defendant who was convicted of a post-SORNA crime that was not a sex offense to register as a condition of supervised release because of a pre-SORNA, Alabama Youthful Offender Act conviction that was a sex offense. The court held that when Congress enacted SORNA, Congress did not intend to impose additional punishment for past sex offenses but instead wanted to put into place a civil and non-punitive regulatory scheme. The court also held that SORNA was not so punitive in effect, as applied to those convicted of sex offenses under the Alabama statute, as to negate the intention that it be a civil regulatory scheme. Therefore, the court rejected defendant's ex post facto claim.

Petitioner was convicted in Florida state court of armed burglary and first-degree murder and a death sentence was imposed. On appeal, petitioner argued that he was entitled to habeas relief because the state withheld material exculpatory evidence and knowingly presented false or misleading evidence to the jury at his trial. Petitioner also contended that the sentencing state court, in its sentencing order, erred in relying on deposition testimony that was not presented in open court either at the guilt or the penalty phase. The court held that petitioner had not carried his burden of establishing that the state court's factual determinations were unreasonable, and therefore petitioner had also not established that Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States were contravened or unreasonably applied by the Florida Supreme Court. The court also held that petitioner had not carried his burden of demonstrating that the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the sentencer's reference to non-trial testimony was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the district court's order denying petitioner's habeas petition was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his sentence for illegal reentry after deportation by an alien previously convicted of a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(1). On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was excessive. The court held that the violation of state law proscribing the possession of a forged document with the intent to defraud was a crime related to forgery under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R). Therefore, defendant's conviction was related to forgery such that the increased offense level under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b) applied. The court also held that the district court amply supported its sentencing decision in the record and that the sentence imposed was reasonable and well within the judge's discretion. Therefore, there was no basis upon which to vacate defendant's sentence.

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that defendant fired her from her job as an editor because of sex discrimination. Plaintiff also claimed that her constitutional rights were violated because defendant terminated her employment due to her medical condition, known as Gender Identity Disorder. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff on her sex discrimination claim and granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's medical discrimination claim. Both parties timely appealed. The court held that a government agent violated the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of sex-based discrimination when he or she fired a transgender or transsexual employee because of his or her gender non-conformity. The court also held that defendant had advanced no reason that could qualify as a governmental purpose, much less an "important" governmental purpose, and even less than that, a "sufficiently important government purpose" that was achieved by firing plaintiff because of her gender non-conformity. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her sex-discrimination claim. In light of this decision, which provided plaintiff with all the relief she sought, there was no need to address plaintiff's cross-appeal.

Defendant, former commissioner in charge of the Environmental Services Department of Jefferson County, was convicted of charges related to federal-funds bribery for accepting cash from an engineering firm that contracted with the county for a sewer reconstruction project. Defendant subsequently appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the reasonableness of his prison term. The court held that the same evidence that supported defendant's federal-funds bribery convictions supported his conspiracy conviction. The court also held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the sole legal issue before the en banc court was whether the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Head v. Hill - that Georgia's statutory reasonable standard for capital defendants' mental retardation claims did not violate the Eighth Amendment - was contrary to clearly established federal law, as announced in Atkins v. Virginia. Because there was no specific, much less "clearly established" by Supreme Court precedent, federal rule regarding the burden of proof for mental retardation claims, section 2254 mandated that the court leave the Georgia Supreme Court decision alone. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its tax refund suit for mootness. Shortly after the litigation began, the IRS refunded the disputed taxes in full. Plaintiff claimed, however, that a live controversy still existed because it also sought declaratory and injunctive relief in order to obtain a favorable determination of its tax-exempt status. Plaintiff claimed that the failure of the IRS to recognize plaintiff as a tax-exempt organization had collateral consequences that prevented the tax refund from rendering the case moot. The court held that filing a claim for a tax refund suit was not simply a procedural hurdle that, once leapt over, allowed a party to seek other forward-looking relief against the IRS after the refund had been granted. Without a live refund claim, there was no way to distinguish the case from the kind of pre-enforcement suits that Congress had expressly forbidden taxpayers from bringing. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted of distribution of child pornography to an unidentified person, not connected with law enforcement, who convinced him that she (or he) was a minor. The district court applied the distribution to a minor enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(C) after concluding that the actual age of the recipient, which had never been determined in the case, did not matter so long as defendant thought that the recipient was a minor. The court held that defendant's belief that the recipient was a minor at the time he sent her the child pornography was not enough to justify the enhancement and that the government must prove that the recipient was under the age of 18 years at the time. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded to the district court to make a finding regarding whether the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time defendant sent the child pornography, the recipient was 18 years of age. If the district court found that the government had not carried its burden of proving that fact, about which the court expressed no view, it should resentence defendant without the section 2G2.2(b)(3)(C) enhancement.

Defendant was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death. At issue on appeal was whether defendant's second state petition for a writ of habeas corpus was "properly filed," under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2), so as to toll the one-year limitation period for filing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held that defendant's second state habeas petition was untimely, and the district court did not err by dismissing his petition.