Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in ruling that his sentencing claim was not cognizable under section 2255. Defendant also argued that the actual innocence exception to the procedural default rule applied to excuse the procedural default of his sentencing claim. The court held that defendant procedurally defaulted his claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal and that the actual innocence exception did not apply to defendant's claim of legal innocence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the section 2255 motion.

This case stemmed from Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc.'s (Odyssey) discovery of a 19th Century Spanish vessel in international waters where Odyssey filed a verified admiralty complaint in rem against the shipwrecked vessel and sought a warrant of arrest. The Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Peru, and twenty-five individuals filed claims against the res and Spain subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the res was a Spanish warship and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Odyssey's claims because the vessel was immune from judicial arrest under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611. The court affirmed the district court's grant of Spain's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly applied the Rule 12(b)(1) standard for factual challenges to jurisdiction to Spain's motion to dismiss; the district court did not abuse its discretion by evaluating Spain's Rule 12(b)(1) motion based on the extensive record before it; the evidence in the record fully supported the finding of the district court that the res was the Nuestra Senora de las Mercedes (Mercedes), a Spanish vessel that sank in 1804, for the purposes of sovereign immunity and the district court correctly decided that FSIA immunity applied to the arrest of the Mercedes; the cargo aboard the Mercedes was treated as part of the shipwreck of the Mercedes for sovereign immunity purposes; and the district court did not err when it ordered the Odyssey to release the recovered res to the custody of Spain.

Defendants were convicted of offenses relating to their support for Islamist violence overseas. The issues raised on appeal related to the admission of testimony from an FBI agent; sufficiency of the evidence; admission of an expert's testimony; admission of portions of a television interview with Osama bin Laden; denial of a motion to suppress statements made to FBI agents; denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on alleged outrageous government conduct; admission of evidence of innocent intent; denial of a motion for severance; application of the terrorism enhancement to defendants' sentences; and, on cross-appeal, substantive and procedural error in sentencing. After review of the entire record, the court held that defendants were not entitled to relief on any of their claims. The court held, however, that the district court erred in imposing Jose Padilla's sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendants' convictions in all respects but vacated Padilla's sentence and remanded his case to the district court for re-sentencing.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus and his complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Plaintiff's complaint requested the district court to mandamus the defendants (1) to determine as a matter of law that plaintiff had been "admitted" to the United States for purposes of his application for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(a) and (2) to re-open and re-adjudicate plaintiff's application for adjustment of status, which was previously denied. The court held that plaintiff could not satisfy the requirements for mandamus relief and that he had not demonstrated that he lacked an adequate remedy for obtaining relief. In fact, plaintiff had sued under the APA, which provided an adequate remedy. Therefore, the court held that because plaintiff had an adequate remedy available to him, the district court properly dismissed his request for mandamus relief. The court also held that the plain language of section 1255(a) limited eligibility for status adjustment to an alien who had been inspected and admitted or paroled. That an alien with Temporary Protected Status had lawful status as a nonimmigrant for purposes of adjusting his status did not change section 1255(a)'s threshold requirement that he was eligible for adjustment of status only if he was initially inspected and admitted or paroled. Accordingly, the court held that the district court's ruling was consistent with the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, even if the statutory language was ambiguous, the court deferred to the Department of Homeland Security's consistent and well-reasoned interpretation of the interplay between section 1255(a) and section 1254a(f)(4). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the petition and complaint.

Defendant was convicted of 130 counts arising, inter alia, from his wire fraud, health care fraud, and unlawful dispensing of controlled substances. Defendant was also convicted of three counts charging a patient's death resulted from the use of controlled substances dispensed by defendant from his health care fraud violation. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the district court gave erroneous instructions to the jury, he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the government's evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The court held that the district court's jury instructions were not erroneous where the district court properly instructed that the 18 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C) standard was satisfied upon a finding that, but for the victims ingesting the controlled substances charged in the indictment, the victims would not have died. The court also held that 18 U.S.C. 1347(a) required nothing more than a cause-in-fact connection between defendant's conduct and the death, and that any claimed error in the section 1347(a) charge was harmless. The court rejected defendant's claim that his trial counsel's performance was deficient in that trial counsel failed to make appropriate motions for acquittal at the close of evidence. The court held that, given the overwhelming evidence, the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain all of defendant's convictions and that motions for acquittal, even if made, would have failed. Accordingly, defendant's convictions and sentences were affirmed.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, complaining that he was denied clemency proceedings or alternatively, was denied clemency itself without the benefit of a clemency investigation and clemency counsel. The court held that the district court correctly dismissed petitioner's section 2254 petition where he had no right to clemency that he could enforce through his habeas petition. The court also denied petitioner's request to stay the execution and remand to the district court so that counsel could be appointed and the complaint could be raised under 42 U.S.C. 1983 where petitioner had not shown a significant or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his clemency claim or claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs brought an action against the City of Marietta, Georgia, challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and against plaintiffs on all claims except for one plaintiff's claim (Covenant) that the city's ordinance, as amended in November 2004, facially violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, by treating religious assemblies less favorably than non-religious assemblies. The court held that claims seeking injunctive relief were moot in light of the passage of the 2008 Ordinance and dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, to the extent that RLUIPA claims sought damages, they failed on the merits because all damages stemmed from Covenant's inability to build a church in the R-2 residential zone and Covenant was not entitled to build a church in that zone. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that the 2004 Ordinance facially violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA and did not err in awarding nominal damages for this claim. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Covenant's motion to leave to amend the complaint.

Defendant was convicted and sentenced to death in 1995 for murder. Because defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the murder, the state court eventually set aside his death sentence and resentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that his life without parole sentence was an unconstitutional penalty for him because he was not yet eighteen years old at the time he committed the murder. The court held that it owed 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) deference to the state trial and appellate court decisions that defendant's life without parole sentence, and the procedures under which it was imposed, were not unconstitutional in light of the Roper v. Simmons decision.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and was sentenced to 127 months in prison. Defendant appealed his sentence and contended that an intervening decision showed that the district court erred by failing to apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) in determining his sentences. The court held that FSA claims, like any other type of sentence claim, could be waived by a knowing and voluntary appeal waiver. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where defendant waived his right to appeal his sentence.

Plaintiff, a death row prisoner who was scheduled to be executed by the State of Florida, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction and to stay his execution, alleging that Florida's use of an altered lethal injection protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion and plaintiff sought a stay of execution from this court so that he could obtain a merits ruling on his complaint. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that he had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim and therefore, denied plaintiff's motion for stay of execution.