Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the district court's judgment denying it sovereign immunity protection as an arm of the state of Alabama. Appellee contended that appellant was sufficiently independent from the state of Alabama, that it was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that her claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., should be allowed to continue. At issue was whether appellant was an arm of the state. The court held that at this time, appellant was not entitled to sovereign immunity protection as an arm of the state of Alabama where the state court found that an entity was not an arm of the state. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The city filed a complaint in admiralty against defendant, a vessel, claiming that defendant committed the maritime tort of trespass because it remained at the city marina after the city explicitly revoked its consent, and seeking to foreclose its maritime lien for necessaries (unpaid dockage provided to defendant by the city). Claimant, owner of the vessel, appealed from the district court's entry of an order of summary judgment and an order of final judgment for the city in an in rem proceeding against defendant. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that it had federal admiralty jurisdiction over defendant where defendant was a "vessel" for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction; the district court's factual findings regarding the amount claimant owed under the city's maritime lien for necessaries were not clearly erroneous; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the city on claimant's affirmative defense of retaliation; the district court correctly concluded that the city was not estopped from bringing its action in admiralty against defendant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply collateral estoppel because the issues at stake were significantly different from those in dispute in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the district court's orders were affirmed.

Defendant was indicted in October 2006 of conspiring to "possess with the intent to distribute, and to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base (crack) and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride (powder)." In September 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to distribute an unspecified quantity of both identified drugs. Defendant subsequently appealed substantive and procedural aspects of his 151 months imprisonment. The court held that because there was no basis to disturb the ruling, or any of the other decisions defendant challenged, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal stemmed from a violent drug conspiracy in South Florida that involved a number of criminals. The four whose joint trial led to this appeal were Daniel "D.V." Varela, Liana "The Negra" Lopez, Ricardo "Rick" Sanchez, and Daniel "Homer" Troya. During their crime wave, Troya and Sanchez carjacked a fellow drug dealer and shot him to death, as well as his wife and their two young children. Lopez and Varela, on appeal, raised several issues, the primary one being that they should not have been jointly tried with Troya and Sanchez. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for severance and proceeding with a joint trial of all four conspirators who resided in the "Thug Mansion." The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Varela's motion to sever the felon-in-possession charges against him from the other charges; by requiring that all four of the defendants agree on the exercise of any peremptory challenges; in denying Varela's motion to suppress the results of the October 25 search of the "Thug Mansion;" and by allowing Varela's former cocaine customers to testify about their dealings with him. The court further held that the mandatory life sentence of life imprisonment that 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) provided did not violate the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in light of United States v. Willis. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Count One of the multi-count indictment in this case charged Robert and Patrick Singletary, and others, with conspiring between 1997 and September 16, 2004, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371, to commit three offenses: (1) to defraud a federally insured bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1344; (2) to make false representations with respect to material facts to the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001; and (3) to defraud purchasers of residential property and mortgage lenders, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1343. The Singletarys eventually pled guilty to Count One to the extent that it alleged a conspiracy to commit the section 1343 offense in addition to the section 1001 offense. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution in the sum of $1 million. The court held that the district court failed to determine by a preponderance of the evidence which of the 56 mortgages the loan officers handled was obtained through a false "gift" letter, a false "credit explanation" letter, or a false employment verification form; and where fraud was found, to determine the extent of the actual loss HUD could have incurred due to the mortgage's foreclosure. Accordingly, the court vacated the restitution provisions and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (Act). The government subsequently appealed the district court's ruling that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and the district court's severability holding. The state plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court's ruling on their Medicaid expansion claim. The court held that the Act's Medicaid expansion was constitutional. The court also held that the individual mandate was enacted as a regulatory penalty, not a revenue-raising tax, and could not be sustained as an exercise of Congress's power under the Taxing and Spending Clause; the individual mandate exceeded Congress's enumerated commerce power and was unconstitutional; and the individual mandate, however, could be severed from the remainder of the Act's myriad of reforms. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud using a computer, accessing a protected computer without authorization with intent to defraud, and three counts of aggravated identify theft where defendant's convictions arose from a scheme he and his co-conspirators concocted to access Florida A&M University's internet-based grading system. Defendant also appealed his sentence, contending that his 84 month prison sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence; by preventing cross-examination on his pending state burglary charges; and by giving instructions to the jury regarding two distinct statutory conspiracies. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions on Counts Three, Four, and Five for aggravated identity theft and any error in the jury instructions did not adversely affect the outcome of the trial or the substantial rights of defendant. The court further held that, upon consideration of the parties' briefs and review of the record, based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant's low-end Guidelines range sentence was consistent with the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and was therefore reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In this political corruption case, Larry P. Langford, formerly a Commissioner for Jefferson County, Alabama and mayor of Birmingham, Alabama, appealed his convictions for multiple counts of bribery, conspiracy, money laundering, mail fraud, tax fraud, and criminal forfeiture. Langford broadly argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for mail and wire fraud; the district court fatally erred in some of its evidentiary rulings; the district court wrongfully charged the jury about the bribery statute; and the district court mistakenly denied his post-voir-dire motion for a change of venue. After thorough review, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, Cindy Fils and Nemours Maurice, raised claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that certain named police officers used excessive force to subdue plaintiffs at a club. The court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the officers appealed. The court affirmed the district court with respect to Maurice's excessive force claims against Officer Bergert and Williams; reversed the district court with respect to Fils' excessive force claims against Officer Bergert and Burns; affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the remaining claims; and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, visually or manually impaired Florida citizens who were registered to vote in Duval County, Florida and were represented by the American Association of People with Disabilities, filed a putative class action against defendants, alleging that defendants violated federal statutory and state constitutional provisions by failing to provide handicapped-accessible voting machines to visually or manually impaired Florida voters after the 2000 general election. The court vacated its prior opinion and in its revised opinion, held that the district court erroneously granted plaintiffs' requested declaratory judgment and injunction against purported violations of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The opinion, however, based that outcome exclusively on the ground that voting machines were not "facilities" under 28 C.F.R. 35.151(b).