Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed a sentence of 190 months imprisonment when he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the district court applied the sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCT"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which imposed a mandatory minimum term of 15 years imprisonment for defendants convicted previously of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses. At issue was whether the district court erred by determining that defendant's three previous convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes and whether escaping from custody was a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The court held that the two burglary offenses committed by defendant on the same day at different locations, as well as defendant's attempt to escape when he was either at jail or being transported to jail, each constituted a separate offense. The court further held that the escape was considered a violent felony where a felon who risked escape from custody was likely to use an illegally possessed firearm in a violent way and that escape from custody was therefore a violent felony under the ACCA.

Appellant, the personal representative of the estate of her son, sued two police officers alleging violations of state wrongful death claims and excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when her son died after being arrested and tasered by the officers. At issue was whether a section 1983 excessive force claim survived in Alabama if the injured party died before the lawsuit was filed, or abated pursuant to Ala. Code 6-5-462. The court held that there was no inconsistency between section 6-5-462 and federal law and that the statute was applicable to this case. Therefore, the excessive force claim against one of the officers abated under Alabama law when section 6-5-462 applied to the action, which was not filed prior to the death of the son.

Petitioner filed a motion for relief from the district court's judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) after his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied on the merits by the district court. At issue was whether petitioner's motion for relief from the district court's judgment was a true Rule 60(b) motion or was, instead, a second or successive habeas petition where petitioner alleged that his attorney failed to raise a specific federal habeas claim which petitioner believed to be particularly strong. The court held that petitioner's motion raised a new habeas claim without first securing the court's permission to file a second or successive heabeas petition and therefore, the district court lacked lacked-subject matter jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim.

Petitioner appealed a denial of habeas corpus relief when he was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a young college student. At issue was whether petitioner was entitled to habeas relief based on the prosecutor's references to petitioner's failure to disclose his version of the facts prior to his testimony at the trial in light of Doyle v. Ohio. The court held that the district court properly denied habeas corpus relief where the record was silent about whether any officer or agent ever read petitioner his Miranda rights and therefore, petitioner failed to demonstrate that an essential element was violated under Doyle.

Petitioner, a Florida state prisoner, appealed from the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his capital conviction and sentence. At issue was whether the prosecutor's comments during voir dire and closing argument violated petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to due process and whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilty and penalty phases of trial. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that petitioner was barred from raising the due process claims where he failed to raise these federal claims in state court. The court also held that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel during voire dire, during the guilty phase, or during the penalty phase of trial.

Plaintiffs, Orlando Food Not Bombs and First Vagabonds Church of God, filed a complaint against the City of Orlando ("City") seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages where the City's ordinance restricted the frequency of plaintiffs' feedings of homeless persons in public parks. At issue was whether the City's ordinance, which limited the number of feedings of large groups that any person or political organization could sponsor in centrally located parks, violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that the ordinance did not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment where the ordinance was a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction of speech and was a reasonable regulation of expressive conduct.

Plaintiff, a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections, appealed the district court's judgments, which related to his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in favor of the seven defendant prison officials. At issue was whether two defendants retaliated against plaintiff for filing grievances when plaintiff made statements which "reeked of disrespect of, and profanity to" the defendants. The court affirmed and held that, even if some impermissible reason had entered into defendants' decision-making process to charge plaintiff with prison disciplinary infractions, plaintiff would have been disciplined anyway where the hearing panels concluded that plaintiff had committed the charged conduct which violated prison rules.

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the City of Miami ("City") and several of its police officers, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the City's municipal policies directly caused violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights where defendants prevented plaintiffs from using a certain operational plan for a protest. At issue was whether defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted and whether the district court erred in granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that summary judgment was proper where plaintiffs failed to adduce any evidence that would create genuine issues of material fact necessary to support essential elements of their claims. The court also held that the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss where plaintiffs failed to assert specific allegations related to actual, ongoing controversies.

Plaintiff sued defendants alleging that defendants' actions in connection with the opening of his mail violated both prison protocol and the Constitution. At issue was whether, in the absence of physical injury, a prisoner was precluded from seeking punitive damages by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The court held that Harris v. Garner, standing alone, sufficiently foreclosed the punitive damages relief sought by plaintiff given that his constitutional claim did not appear to meet 42 U.S.C. 1997(e)(e)'s physical injury requirement.

Plaintiffs sued the City of Jacksonville, Fl ("City") alleging that the City's adult zoning scheme was an invalid time, manner, and place restriction because it did not leave the plaintiffs with adequate alternative avenues for their protected activities. At issue was whether the district court's order granting in part and denying in part both parties' motions for summary judgment was proper. The court court held that it cannot entertain the merits of the parties' arguments where the City has, during the pendency of the appeal, legislatively removed the two provisions underlying the plaintiff's claims.