Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, petitioned to have an error of law in the calculation of his sentence corrected based upon a Supreme Court decision interpreting the sentencing guidelines, even though that decision was issued eleven years after he was sentenced. At issue was whether the savings clause contained in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) permitted a federal prisoner to challenge his sentence in a habeas corpus petition when he could not raise that challenge in a section 2255 motion because of the section 2255(h) bar against second and successive motions. The court held that the savings clause did not authorize a federal prisoner to bring a habeas corpus petition, which would otherwise be barred by section 2255(h), and that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied in a way that resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory minimum. The court also held that the reasoning, standards, and tests announced by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Crosby, which involved a state prisoner case, also applied to federal prisoner cases. Therefore, petitioner must serve the sentence that was imposed on him fourteen years ago.

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding by attempting to dispose of and hide assets involved in a forfeiture proceeding. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court held that, because the government offered no evidence that defendant knew that his actions were likely to affect a forfeiture proceeding, the court concluded that a jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent to obstruct. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion where the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendant alleging that defendant had discriminated against him because of his bankruptcy, in violation of 11 U.S.C. 525(b), by refusing to hire him and alternatively, by terminating him from the job after it had hired him. The primary issue was whether section 525(b) prohibited a private employer from denying employment to an individual on the ground that he was or has been in bankruptcy. The court applied elementary principles of statutory construction and common sense, holding that section 525(b) did not prohibit private employers from denying employment to persons because of their status as a bankruptcy debtor. The court also held that the evidence was more than enough for the jury to discredit appellant's contrary testimony and found that no employment relationship was formed. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial where the jury's verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.

Petitioner was sentenced to death following his convictions on two counts of malice murder for the fatal shootings of his grandmother and fifteen-year-old cousin. At issue was whether habeas relief was properly denied where trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to conduct a reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence; where trial counsel's penalty-phase closing argument was ineffective; where petitioner's right to conflict-free counsel was wrongfully denied; and where petitioner was constructively absent from the penalty phase of trial. The court held that the state court's rejection of petitioner's ineffective-assistance claims was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington where neither the jury nor the sentencing judge was ever told that petitioner suffered from extensive mental health problems and a history of abuse. Accordingly, the court granted habeas corpus relief and had no occasion to address petitioner's remaining penalty-phase claims. The court further held that it was unpersuaded by petitioner's claim that he was otherwise unconstitutionally encumbered by conflict-ridden counsel.

Defendant appealed his 30 month sentence for removing a child from the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1204(a). At issue was whether the district court erred by applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3C1.2 for recklessly endangering another in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. The court held that the district court erred in applying section 3C1.2 where defendant did not endanger his son while knowingly fleeing a law enforcement officer when defendant was unaware of the pursuit by the Coast Guard agents until the pursuit was over and defendant immediately cooperated with the first law enforcement officers he encountered. The court also held that the error was not harmless because the district court expressly stated that it was sentencing defendant in the middle of the guideline range and defendant's 30 month sentence exceeded the guideline range applicable without the section 3C1.2 enhancement. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing.

Defendants, Don Eugene Siegelman, the former Governor of Alabama and Richard Scrushy, the founder and former Chief Executive Officer of Health South Corporation ("HealthSouth"), were convicted of federal funds bribery and five counts of honest services mail fraud and conspiracy. Siegelman was also convicted of obstruction of justice. The Supreme Court of the United States remanded to the court for reconsideration in light of Skilling v. United States. Defendants raised numerous issues of error related to their convictions and sentences. The court affirmed Count 3 and 4 for Federal Funds Bribery and held that there was no reversible error in the bribery instructions given by the district court and that the evidence of a corrupt agreement between defendants was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find quid pro quo. The court affirmed Count 5, 6, and 7 for Honest Services Mail Fraud and Conspiracy and held that any error in the honest services instructions was harmless. The court reversed Count 8 and 9 for Self Dealing where there was lack of evidence from which the jury could infer that Siegelman knowingly agreed to or participated in a broader scheme that included Scrushy's alleged subsequent dealing and where, in light of Skilling, the evidence was insufficient to show self-dealing. The court affirmed Count 17 for Obstruction of Justice and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that a certain statement at issue met the United States v. Caraza standard. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was no reasonable possibility of prejudice to defendants that arose out of the exposure of the jury to certain extrinsic evidence and denied the motion for new trial. The court held that exposure of the jurors to media reports about the trial was harmless in view of the limited and incidental nature of the exposure and the substantial evidence of defendants' guilt. The court also agreed with the district court that defendants were not entitled to a new trial where there was no possibility that defendants suffered prejudice from any premature deliberations, discussion of penalty, or deliberation with fewer than all the members of the jury present. The court further held that Scrushy's recusal motion was untimely and without merit; that defendants' claims regarding the Middle District of Alabama's jury selection procedures were without merit and did not entitle them to any relief; and that Siegelman's upward departure in sentencing was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant appealed a conviction for attempting to persuade, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction; whether the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his truck; and whether a detective failed to preserve computer evidence in bad faith and instant message transcripts should not have been admitted at trial. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions where defendant's actions strongly corroborated his culpability and supported the jury's verdict. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress where defendant's truck was mobile and the officers had probable cause to search the truck pursuant to the automobile exception. The court further held that defendant failed to provide evidence of bad faith on the part of the detective and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the transcripts or clearly erred in accepting as fact the detective's authenticating testimony, by rejecting defendant's best evidence objection because there was no showing of bad faith, and by failing to admit the alleged additional parts of the instant message transcripts where there was no evidence of its existence. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's proposed jury instructions where the spoliation doctrine had not been recognized in the criminal context.

Defendant appealed a sentence of 190 months imprisonment when he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after the district court applied the sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCT"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which imposed a mandatory minimum term of 15 years imprisonment for defendants convicted previously of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses. At issue was whether the district court erred by determining that defendant's three previous convictions arose out of separate and distinct criminal episodes and whether escaping from custody was a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The court held that the two burglary offenses committed by defendant on the same day at different locations, as well as defendant's attempt to escape when he was either at jail or being transported to jail, each constituted a separate offense. The court further held that the escape was considered a violent felony where a felon who risked escape from custody was likely to use an illegally possessed firearm in a violent way and that escape from custody was therefore a violent felony under the ACCA.

Appellant, the personal representative of the estate of her son, sued two police officers alleging violations of state wrongful death claims and excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 when her son died after being arrested and tasered by the officers. At issue was whether a section 1983 excessive force claim survived in Alabama if the injured party died before the lawsuit was filed, or abated pursuant to Ala. Code 6-5-462. The court held that there was no inconsistency between section 6-5-462 and federal law and that the statute was applicable to this case. Therefore, the excessive force claim against one of the officers abated under Alabama law when section 6-5-462 applied to the action, which was not filed prior to the death of the son.

Petitioner filed a motion for relief from the district court's judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) after his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, was denied on the merits by the district court. At issue was whether petitioner's motion for relief from the district court's judgment was a true Rule 60(b) motion or was, instead, a second or successive habeas petition where petitioner alleged that his attorney failed to raise a specific federal habeas claim which petitioner believed to be particularly strong. The court held that petitioner's motion raised a new habeas claim without first securing the court's permission to file a second or successive heabeas petition and therefore, the district court lacked lacked-subject matter jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim.