Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to his former employer, the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“Department”). Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that he failed to make out a prima facie case of Title VII race discrimination regarding (1) the Department’s investigation of an incident stemming from his alleged intoxication at work and (2) the Department’s failure to promote him to corporal while he was on administrative leave. Plaintiff also raised a separate evidentiary argument, alleging that the district court erred in refusing to admit a document he alleges is from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the investigation claim for different reasons than those relied upon by the district court. Further, the court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the document allegedly from the EEOC. The court wrote that Plaintiff has forfeited any arguments as to the district court’s findings that the purported EEOC document was inadmissible because it contained ultimate legal conclusions and an unsupported expert opinion because he did not challenge either of these grounds in his opening brief. Further, no extraordinary circumstances apply to warrant consideration because a refusal to consider the issue would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the issue is not one of substantial justice, the proper resolution is not beyond any doubt, and the issue does not present significant questions of general impact or of great public concern. View "Clyde Anthony v. Georgia Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician assistant, evaluated patients and prescribed their physical therapy. The clinics where Defendant worked then billed the patients' health insurance both for the evaluations and for the subsequent physical therapy. The problem—for Defendant and for the health-insurance company—was that the “patients” didn’t really need the physical therapy and didn’t actually receive any treatment. When the health insurance company grew suspicious of the abnormally high rate of physical-therapy prescriptions from the clinics, it cooperated with an FBI investigation into the clinics. That investigation led a grand jury to indict Defendant on eight healthcare fraud-related charges. After a trial, a jury convicted Defendant on three counts. On appeal, Defendant raised several challenges to his conviction—sufficiency, evidentiary, and instructional—and to his sentence.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that sufficient evidence allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew the bills were fraudulent. Moreover, the court wrote that the minimal leading questions Defendant points to here do not allow Defendant to overcome the overwhelming evidence of his guilt at trial. Moreover, the court reasoned that here, the district court sentenced Defendant to 48 months— below his Guidelines range of 51–63 months. Given that Defendant had previously participated in very similar schemes, been investigated by the Florida regulatory board for similar conduct, and had attempted to defraud the victim of millions of dollars, the court could not say that the 48-month sentence the district court imposed—slightly below the Guidelines range—was an abuse of discretion. View "USA v. Carlos Alfredo Verdeza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a deaf man who can understand only about 30% of verbal communication through lipreading. He communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL). Plaintiff worked for O’Reilly Auto Parts (O’Reilly) as an inbound materials handler. He claims that the company discriminated against him in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because it did not provide him with the reasonable accommodations that he requested for his disability. He alleged that he requested but did not receive an ASL interpreter for various meetings, training, and a company picnic. He also alleged that he asked for text messages summarizing nightly pre-shift meetings but did not receive them either. The district court, acting by consent through a magistrate judge, granted O’Reilly’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of O’Reilly. The court remanded for further proceedings involving Plaintiff’s claim that O’Reilly violated the ADA by failing to provide him with reasonable accommodations regarding the nightly pre-shift safety meetings and regarding his disciplinary proceedings involving attendance issues. The court concluded that genuine issues of material fact do exist about whether two of Plaintiff’s requested accommodations relate to his essential job functions and whether the failure to provide those two accommodations led to an “adverse employment decision.” If Plaintiff’s allegations turn out to be the actual facts, there was a violation of Title I of the ADA, and that means summary judgment against him was inappropriate. View "Teddy Beasley v. O'Reilly Auto Parts" on Justia Law

Over a four-day stretch during his incarceration at Walker State Prison in Georgia, Plaintiff failed to receive his prescribed seizure medication. On the fourth night, Plaintiff had two seizures that he claimed caused permanent brain damage. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, Plaintiff sued five prison employees, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to all five defendants on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff died from causes unrelated to the seizures that he suffered while in prison. His sister pursued his claims on appeal as the personal representative of his estate.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that none of them was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs and, accordingly, that none of them violated the Eighth Amendment—and, accordingly, that the district court was correct to grant all of them summary judgment. The court held that a deliberate-indifference plaintiff must prove (among other things) that the defendant acted with “more than gross negligence.” The court wrote that it echoes the district court’s lament that Defendants’ “careless actions and their systemic communication failures caused Plaintiff serious suffering” and “irreparably altered his life.” And the court reiterated that “while engaged in the business of prison medicine”—no less so than on the outside, so to speak—“the essential command of the Hippocratic Oath is ‘first, do no harm.’” Even so, the bar to proving an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim is appropriately high, and the court concluded that Plaintiff hasn’t met it. View "Betty Wade v. Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to a murder, but he offered two conflicting versions of the crime. At first, he said that he watched the victim’s murder. Then, he said that he participated but that he didn’t intend to kill the victim. A grand jury in Mobile County eventually indicted Defendant for capital murder. The case went to trial, and the jury found Defendant guilty. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant is intellectually disabled and therefore granted his habeas petition. At issue on appeal is whether the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendant is intellectually disabled and, as a result, that his sentence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.     The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court did not clearly err. The court explained that the district court did not err by turning to evidence of Defendant’s adaptive functioning after finding that his IQ score could be as low as 69. Further, the court reasoned that it cannot say that the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendan satisfied the adaptive-functioning prong. The record contains evidence “that would support a finding of fact that Defendant had significant limitations in at least two” domains. Further, the court wrote that the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Defendant’s deficits in intellectual and adaptive functioning “were present at an early age.” As a result, the court wrote that it cannot say that the district court clearly erred by finding that Defendant satisfied the final prong of his Atkins claim. View "Joseph Clifton Smith v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued three Defendant correctional officers under Section 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. While Plaintiff was in his prison cell, two correctional officers sprayed a chemical agent on him. The parties contest why the officers did this: Plaintiff says it was in retaliation for his protected speech; the correctional officers respond that it was to stop Plaintiff from tampering with a sprinkler in his cell. Shortly after that, Plaintiff alleged that a supervising officer instructed the prison staff not to feed him—again, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected speech. Plaintiff sued the two officers and the supervising officer for violating his First and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the two correctional officers under Heck v. Humphrey because it concluded that the success of Plaintiff’s claims required a showing that his prison disciplinary conviction was invalid. But although the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages against the supervising officer, it allowed Plaintiff’s demand for nominal damages to go to trial. The jury returned a verdict for the supervising officer.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the two correctional officers. The court explained that Heck does not bar Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, and even if Heck applies to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for compensatory and punitive damages. View "Wendall Jermaine Hall v. Lieutenant Peter Merola" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, brought a complaint under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging sexual abuse by Defendant, a pastor at a church Plaintiff attended more than thirty years ago. A magistrate judge granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and then recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In response, Plaintiff submitted a filing seeking to voluntarily dismiss the case and to receive a refund of his court fees. The district court, rather than treating Plaintiff’s filing as a self-executing notice of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 referred the matter to the magistrate judge, who issued a report recommending that Plaintiff’s requests be denied. The magistrate judge made that recommendation in an attempt to further the purposes of the “three-strikes provision” of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and this appeal followed.  Plaintiff, represented by counsel on appeal, contends that the district court erred by invoking the PLRA’s purposes to trump his clear right to voluntarily dismiss the action under Rule 41.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court explained that it found no language in the PLRA purporting to limit or condition a plaintiff’s right to voluntarily dismiss an action “without a court order” under Rule 41(a) in the prisoner-litigation context. Plaintiff acted within the bounds of Rule 41(a) by filing a notice of dismissal before Defendant responded. That notice was effective immediately upon filing and deprived the court of jurisdiction over the case. View "Jason Elliott Smith v. Delwyn Gerald Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged (1) Officer N. used excessive force when he tased Plaintiff at the scene of an automobile wreck, (2) Officer H. failed to intervene to prevent Officer N’s excessive force, and (3) the City of Madison, Alabama admitted the officers’ actions were the result of its municipal policy. Relying on body camera footage, Defendants Officer N., Officer H., and the City moved to dismiss. The district court granted their motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred by (1) considering the officers’ body camera footage when ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss without converting them into summary judgment motions, (2) granting qualified immunity to Officer N., (3) dismissing Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim against Officer H., and (4) dismissing his municipal liability claim against the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly considered the body camera footage, correctly ruled that Officer N. did not violate a constitutional right and thus Officer H. had no duty to intervene and accurately determined that Plaintiff’s claim against the City failed as a matter of law. The court explained Officer N.’s use of the taser was justified because of (1) Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with Officer N.’s commands, (2) Plaintiff’s unsafe driving that had just caused an automobile accident, (3) Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to get back in the vehicle, (4) Plaintiff’s physical resistance to Officer N.’s attempts to remove him from the vehicle, and (5) the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving series of events. Thus, the court concluded that Officer N.’s single use of a taser in dart mode was objectively reasonable. View "Curtis Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant, a pardoned felon, appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that his request is for a constitutional expungement.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion. However, because the district court assumed that it had jurisdiction and evaluated and denied Defendant’s motion on the merits, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court applied Kokkonen to Defendant’s request for a constitutional expungement. Since the proceedings from Defendant’s underlying tax offense—the offense for which Defendant brings his expungement claim—concluded more than a decade ago, the invocation of ancillary jurisdiction for an expungement of his record so that he can more easily donate to charity is not necessary “to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent,” nor is it necessary for the court to “manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Accordingly, the court held that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his total 40-year sentence and lifetime term of supervised release, imposed after he pleaded guilty to various counts of enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, sending extortionate interstate communications, and possessing and producing child pornography. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred in applying an enhancement. The government responds that even if the district court erred, the alleged error in calculating Defendant’s guideline range was harmless because his total offense level would have remained the same without the enhancement. Defendant also contends that the district court erred by failing to separately state its reasons for imposing a lifetime term of supervised release.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court’s statement of reasons complied with Section 3553(c)(1). It explained which of the Section 3553(a) factors it found most persuasive and stated that it had considered the parties’ arguments and the PSR in sentencing Defendant. The district court also indicated that, in determining its sentence, it considered Defendant’s age, as well as Defendant’s claim that he had been a victim of sexual assault himself. This explanation was sufficient as to Defendant’s overall sentence, which was comprised of a term of imprisonment of 40 years and a lifetime term of supervised release. View "USA v. Breshawn Hamilton" on Justia Law