Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerns whether several organizations may sue the governor and attorney general of Florida in federal court to challenge a state law that requires local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials. The state law provides that local officials shall support the enforcement of federal immigration law and cooperate with federal immigration initiatives and officials and that local officials may transport aliens subject to an immigration detainer to federal custody. Several plaintiff organizations sued the Florida governor and the Florida attorney general to enjoin enforcement of the law. The organizations alleged that the provisions about support and cooperation were adopted with the intent to discriminate based on race and national origin in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. And they maintained that the transport provision is preempted by federal law. After a bench trial, the district court permanently enjoined the governor and attorney general from enforcing compliance with these provisions.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that this controversy is not justiciable because the organizations lack standing. The organizations have not established a cognizable injury and cannot spend their way into standing without an impending threat that the provisions will cause actual harm. Moreover, the organizations’ alleged injury is neither traceable to the governor or attorney general nor redressable by a judgment against them because they do not enforce the challenged provisions. Instead, local officials, based on state law, must comply with federal immigration law. View "City of South Miami, et al v. Governor of the State of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

A Florida jury convicted Defendant of first-degree murder, burglary of a dwelling, and sexual battery. He was sentenced to death for the murder, 15 years imprisonment for the burglary, and 27 years for the sexual battery. After exhausting state remedies, Defendant sought habeas corpus relief in federal court, alleging (as relevant here) various evidentiary errors at his trial. The district court denied Defendant’s habeas petition, and he appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court correctly held that the state didn’t violate Brady, that Defendant’s trial counsel didn’t provide ineffective assistance at trial—for failing to move for hearings under either Frye or Richardson—and that Miranda doesn’t require suppressing Defendant’s statement to the officer. The court explained that it rejected Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim predicated on his trial counsel’s failure to move for a Frye hearing on the ground that any deficiency wasn’t prejudicial.   Further, the court reasoned that Defendant likely wouldn’t have won a Richardson motion because, as a matter of state law, the state’s discovery violation—if there was one—didn’t harm or prejudice him. As an initial matter, the alleged violation likely wasn’t willful. Moreover, the alleged violation wasn’t “substantial,” nor did it affect Defendant’s ability to prepare for trial. View "Steven Richard Taylor v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant, a real-estate developer, was convicted on multiple counts arising out of his alleged complicity in the bribery of Tallahassee City Commissioner Scott Maddox. On appeal, Defendant challenged his bribery-based convictions on several grounds, two of which required the Eleventh Circuit to carefully examine the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550 (2016), which explained—and by all accounts narrowed to some degree—the category of “official acts” that can support a federal bribery charge. Defendant separately contests his conviction for making false statements to federal agents during the course of their investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held it needn’t decide whether the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the meaning and application of the term “official act,” as used in 18 U.S.C. Section 201(a)(3) and interpreted in McDonnell, because (1) Defendant invited one of the errors that he now alleges and (2) he failed to object to the other and hasn’t shown that it affected his substantial rights. Further, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant assisted in bribing Maddox in connection with a Section 201(a)(3)-qualifying “official act”. Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence pertaining to an FBI agent’s conduct during the undercover investigation. And any error that the court might have committed in admitting the agent’s testimony that Defendant had made “false exculpatory statements” was harmless. Finally, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant made actionable false statements to FBI agents. View "USA v. John Thomas Burnette" on Justia Law

This case arises out of a sober home’s battle to rezone its property. When its efforts came up short, the sober home sued the county in federal court, alleging disability discrimination. As discovery got underway, the sober home served a notice of deposition in which it sought to depose one of the county commissioners who voted down its rezoning request. The county opposed the deposition, arguing that the commissioner was shielded from discovery by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. But the commissioner never objected to the deposition request or otherwise appeared before the district court. The district court found that the immunity didn’t apply. At that point, the county and the commissioner appealed. Their sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court first held that the county may not appeal because it lacks appellate standing under Article III. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the district court’s order. But it’s the commissioner—not the county—who has the (alleged) immunity. So the county has suffered no injury and cannot challenge the district court’s denial of the immunity on appeal. Second, the commissioner may not appeal because he was not a named party to this case and did not become a party through intervention, substitution, or third-party practice. While a nonparty may sometimes appeal when he has participated before the district court, the commissioner didn’t participate at all. View "Kimberly Regenesis, LLC, et al v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in his individual capacity and official capacity as sheriff, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and falsely arrested him. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, finding the Complaint still fails to state a claim under the Twobly and Iqbal standard and does not cure the deficiencies that made the first amended complaint a shotgun pleading. Plaintiff appealed this order.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff carries the burden of pointing to what intentionally or recklessly false information went into the warrant affidavit. Otherwise, the presumption that the warrant was validly issued, and thus that probable cause existed, must stand. Here, the court explained that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest, and Plaintiff failed to satisfy either of the two exceptions to carry that burden or a plausible connection between his election announcement and teleserve reassignment. View "Bryan Turner v. Mike Williams, et al." on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for two counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1) (“Counts One and Two”), and five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a)1 and (e) (“Counts Three through Seven”). At issue on appeal is whether an adult who films himself exposing his genitals and masturbating in the presence of a child where the child is the object of sexual desire in the film “uses” that child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of the conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). The court explained that here, Defendant used the presence of his eleven-year-old daughter as the object of his sexual desire as he engaged in sexually explicit conduct by masturbating in her presence. He recorded this conduct and distributed it over the internet. He does not challenge the district court’s finding that the child was under eighteen years old or that the visual depictions were transported or transmitted in interstate commerce. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Further, the court found that the rule of lenity does not apply. View "USA v. Edgar John Dawson, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order (1) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal and dismissing his appeal, and (2) denying his motion to reopen and remand his removal proceedings. Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, conceded removability. This petition is about only his application for cancellation of his removal. The main grounds for both his appeal to the BIA and his motion to reopen were Petitioner’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance and denied him constitutional due process as to his cancellation-of-removal application.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded as to the denial of Petitioner’s application that: (1) cancellation of removal is a purely discretionary form of relief from removal; (2) Petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in that purely discretionary relief; and (3) therefore, Petitioner’s constitutional due process claim is meritless, and we lack jurisdiction to entertain it under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).   As to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims in his motion to reopen and remand, the court concluded that: (1) Petitioner cannot establish a constitutional due process violation based on the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen because he does not have a protected liberty interest in either discretionary cancellation of removal or in the granting of a motion to reopen; (2) the BIA properly followed its legal precedent and (3) the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Rosendo Ponce Flores v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum of two years imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with location monitoring. This appeal presented a question of first impression about supervised release and home confinement.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remanded for resentencing. The court held that because the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum term of two years imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an additional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an alternative to incarceration.” The court noted that as the Fifth Circuit has explained, a court cannot “impose the maximum term of incarceration under subsection (e)(3) and also impose a period of home confinement under (e)(4).” The reason is that incarceration beyond the statutory maximum term is not an option available to a district court. Because the district court did not have the option to impose imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose home confinement. The court explained that whether it views Defendant’s term of home confinement as a special condition of supervised release under Section 3563(b)(19) or as a stand-alone punishment under Section 3583(e)(4), a court may impose it “only as an alternative to incarceration.” The ordinary meaning of these provisions is that the district court erred by imposing a term of home confinement when it could not have imposed the same term of imprisonment. View "USA v. Rondell Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He alleged that the police captain retaliated against him in various ways—including placing him in disciplinary/segregated confinement—because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He also alleged that co-defendant officers beat him while he was handcuffed and held him down, and failed to intervene during the assault. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the captain and officers all of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment except for one of the alleged instances of retaliation. The court explained that Plaintiff’s testimony directly contradicts the captain’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The evidence—when viewed in Plaintiff’s’ favor—shows a causal connection between the submission of complaints and grievances and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory search and trashing of Plaintiff’s cell. Further, the court explained that a reasonable jury could find that the amount of force used against Plaintiff violated the Eighth Amendment. If Plaintiff’s version of events is believed, the evidence supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain”—the officer repeatedly struck a handcuffed, restrained, and unarmed prisoner several times because he “raised his voice.” View "Quincy A. Williams v. Correctional Officer Radford, et al." on Justia Law

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law