Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case arises out of a sober home’s battle to rezone its property. When its efforts came up short, the sober home sued the county in federal court, alleging disability discrimination. As discovery got underway, the sober home served a notice of deposition in which it sought to depose one of the county commissioners who voted down its rezoning request. The county opposed the deposition, arguing that the commissioner was shielded from discovery by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. But the commissioner never objected to the deposition request or otherwise appeared before the district court. The district court found that the immunity didn’t apply. At that point, the county and the commissioner appealed. Their sole argument on appeal is that the district court erred by denying the commissioner quasi-judicial immunity.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court first held that the county may not appeal because it lacks appellate standing under Article III. To appeal, a party must be aggrieved by the district court’s order. But it’s the commissioner—not the county—who has the (alleged) immunity. So the county has suffered no injury and cannot challenge the district court’s denial of the immunity on appeal. Second, the commissioner may not appeal because he was not a named party to this case and did not become a party through intervention, substitution, or third-party practice. While a nonparty may sometimes appeal when he has participated before the district court, the commissioner didn’t participate at all. View "Kimberly Regenesis, LLC, et al v. Lee County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, in his individual capacity and official capacity as sheriff, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and falsely arrested him. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with prejudice, finding the Complaint still fails to state a claim under the Twobly and Iqbal standard and does not cure the deficiencies that made the first amended complaint a shotgun pleading. Plaintiff appealed this order.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff carries the burden of pointing to what intentionally or recklessly false information went into the warrant affidavit. Otherwise, the presumption that the warrant was validly issued, and thus that probable cause existed, must stand. Here, the court explained that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege an absence of probable cause for his arrest, and Plaintiff failed to satisfy either of the two exceptions to carry that burden or a plausible connection between his election announcement and teleserve reassignment. View "Bryan Turner v. Mike Williams, et al." on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for two counts of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1) (“Counts One and Two”), and five counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a)1 and (e) (“Counts Three through Seven”). At issue on appeal is whether an adult who films himself exposing his genitals and masturbating in the presence of a child where the child is the object of sexual desire in the film “uses” that child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of the conduct prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). The court explained that here, Defendant used the presence of his eleven-year-old daughter as the object of his sexual desire as he engaged in sexually explicit conduct by masturbating in her presence. He recorded this conduct and distributed it over the internet. He does not challenge the district court’s finding that the child was under eighteen years old or that the visual depictions were transported or transmitted in interstate commerce. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal. Further, the court found that the rule of lenity does not apply. View "USA v. Edgar John Dawson, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order (1) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal and dismissing his appeal, and (2) denying his motion to reopen and remand his removal proceedings. Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, conceded removability. This petition is about only his application for cancellation of his removal. The main grounds for both his appeal to the BIA and his motion to reopen were Petitioner’s claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance and denied him constitutional due process as to his cancellation-of-removal application.   The Eleventh Circuit concluded as to the denial of Petitioner’s application that: (1) cancellation of removal is a purely discretionary form of relief from removal; (2) Petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in that purely discretionary relief; and (3) therefore, Petitioner’s constitutional due process claim is meritless, and we lack jurisdiction to entertain it under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).   As to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims in his motion to reopen and remand, the court concluded that: (1) Petitioner cannot establish a constitutional due process violation based on the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen because he does not have a protected liberty interest in either discretionary cancellation of removal or in the granting of a motion to reopen; (2) the BIA properly followed its legal precedent and (3) the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Petitioner’s challenge to the denial of his motion to reopen. View "Rosendo Ponce Flores v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant, a class C felon, violated the conditions of his supervised release. After revoking his supervised release, the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum of two years imprisonment and added one year of home confinement with location monitoring. This appeal presented a question of first impression about supervised release and home confinement.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence to the extent it imposed a term of home confinement and remanded for resentencing. The court held that because the district court sentenced Defendant to the statutory maximum term of two years imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose an additional year of home confinement with electronic monitoring “as an alternative to incarceration.” The court noted that as the Fifth Circuit has explained, a court cannot “impose the maximum term of incarceration under subsection (e)(3) and also impose a period of home confinement under (e)(4).” The reason is that incarceration beyond the statutory maximum term is not an option available to a district court. Because the district court did not have the option to impose imprisonment, it lacked authority to impose home confinement. The court explained that whether it views Defendant’s term of home confinement as a special condition of supervised release under Section 3563(b)(19) or as a stand-alone punishment under Section 3583(e)(4), a court may impose it “only as an alternative to incarceration.” The ordinary meaning of these provisions is that the district court erred by imposing a term of home confinement when it could not have imposed the same term of imprisonment. View "USA v. Rondell Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Florida prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights suit against several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He alleged that the police captain retaliated against him in various ways—including placing him in disciplinary/segregated confinement—because of complaints he made and grievances he filed. He also alleged that co-defendant officers beat him while he was handcuffed and held him down, and failed to intervene during the assault. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the captain and officers all of Plaintiff’s claims.
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment except for one of the alleged instances of retaliation. The court explained that Plaintiff’s testimony directly contradicts the captain’s assertion that the initial search was “random.” The evidence—when viewed in Plaintiff’s’ favor—shows a causal connection between the submission of complaints and grievances and the initial search and trashing of the cell. Summary judgment was therefore not warranted with respect to the alleged retaliatory search and trashing of Plaintiff’s cell. Further, the court explained that a reasonable jury could find that the amount of force used against Plaintiff violated the Eighth Amendment. If Plaintiff’s version of events is believed, the evidence supports “a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain”—the officer repeatedly struck a handcuffed, restrained, and unarmed prisoner several times because he “raised his voice.” View "Quincy A. Williams v. Correctional Officer Radford, et al." on Justia Law

After he pleaded guilty to several counts, including two violations of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. In doing so, the court concluded that Defendant’s two prior convictions for selling cocaine in violation of Florida Statutes Section 893.13(1)(a) were “serious drug offense[s]” that Penn “committed on occasions different from one another.” Defendant appealed both determinations. Defendant contends that his sale-of-cocaine offenses were not serious drug offenses under ACCA.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it disagreed with Defendant’s contentions. Both of his arguments for why his sale-of-cocaine offenses are not serious drug offenses fail. The court reasoned that its precedent squarely forecloses his mens rea argument about the need to prove knowledge of the controlled substance’s illicit nature. And attempted transfers of a controlled substance are “distributing,” as ACCA uses the term. Likewise, his argument that his sale-of-cocaine offenses did not occur on separate occasions fails because he committed the crimes thirty days apart. View "USA v. Keith A. Penn" on Justia Law

Pardoned felon Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal conviction. Defendant argued that the district court erred in concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2) even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant’s motion.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s expungement motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the motion on the merits. The court reasoned that no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction over a constitutional expungement where the alleged constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid arrest or conviction. Thus, the court found it does not have ancillary jurisdiction over his expungement claim. View "USA v. James Batmasian" on Justia Law

In 2019, Defendant sought a further reduction under the First Step Act. By that time, he had completed four of the sentences—including all three marijuana-only sentences. The district court initially denied relief, holding that even Defendant’s crack-related convictions weren’t “covered offenses.” Defendant appealed, the government confessed error, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district court then reduced Defendant’s sentences to time served on the eleven crack-related convictions but held that, under Denson’s interpretation of Section 404(b), it lacked authority to modify his sentences on the three non-covered powder-related offenses.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held (1) that the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Denson that a district court “is permitted to reduce a defendant’s sentence” under the First Step Act “only on a ‘covered offense’” and “is not free . . . to change the defendant’s sentences on counts that are not ‘covered offenses,’” was a holding; (2) that Concepcion did not abrogate that holding; and (3) that the prior-panel-precedent rule obliges the court to follow it. View "USA v. Michael Jerome Files" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of cocaine possession. During Defenant's direct examination, he testified that he did not conspire with a co-defendant. In response, the district court held a sidebar conference, at which the prosecution requested the court instruct the jury on the elements of conspiracy. The court provided the instruction to the jury, and the jury convicted Defendant.On appeal, Defendant challenged the court's clarifying instruction to the jury regarding conspiratorial liability as well as the sufficiency of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it intervened to prevent a misunderstanding of the law of conspiracy that Defendant's counsel invited. Further the court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the necessary men's rea to commit the offense. View "USA v. Francisco Morel" on Justia Law