Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possessing three firearms. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of ten years. Defendant appealed his conviction. He raised one issue. It involves the expert opinion testimony the Government presented in its case in chief over his objection to disprove his allegation that he was insane when he committed the Section 922(g)(1) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with Defendant that the district court abused its discretion in overruling his objection and admitting the testimony. However, the court determined that under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the error is harmless because it did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The court explained that to establish a legally sufficient Section 17 insanity defense, Defendant had to prove that on November 8, 2018, he had a severe mental disease or defect capable of causing him to possess the firearms even though he knew that he could not do so. His right to present the defense constituted his “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). He introduced nothing to prove his defense other than his girlfriend’s testimony and his behavior. And the treating psychologist did not diagnose him with a qualifying “severe mental disease or defect” under Section 17(a). So, the erroneous admission of the psychologist’s opinions about his mental state did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. View "USA v. Jessie James Turner, Jr." on Justia Law

The assignees of two Medicare Advantage Organizations seek reimbursements from insurance companies that they allege qualify as primary payers of beneficiaries’ medical expenses. The insurance companies argued, and the district courts agreed, that the assignees’ claims are barred because both assignees failed to satisfy a procedural requirement: a contractual claims-filing deadline in one case and a statutory requirement of a pre-suit demand in the other. The assignees contend that the procedural requirements are preempted by the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that Florida’s pre-suit demand requirement does not meet this relatively high bar. The statutory notice requirement and corresponding 30-day cure period are procedural requirements that may result in a brief delay. But the Florida law does not prevent or meaningfully impede the reimbursement of Medicare Advantage Organizations that Congress sought to facilitate. So, the provision does not create an unconstitutional obstacle to the purposes or operation of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act. View "MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. United Automobile Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for 27 counts of aiding and abetting the acquisition of controlled substances by deception and 102 counts of unlawfully dispensing controlled substances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instructions were improper and his statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a), was unconstitutionally vague. Defendant argued that the district court erred because its jury instruction used “or,” instead of “and,” in setting forth the elements of Section 841(a) offense.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and found that Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians. The court reasoned that in Ruan, the defendant physicians were convicted of violating Section 841(a)(1) by “dispensing controlled substances not ‘as authorized.’” Here similarly, the jury was instructed that “whether Defendant dispensed the controlled substances ‘outside the usual course of professional practice’ is to be judged objectively.” Because this instruction allowed the jury to convict Defendant without considering whether he knowingly or intentionally issued prescriptions outside the usual course of professional practice, it was erroneous under Ruan. However, the court concluded that it is satisfied that (1) this evidence extensively proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew his prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice, and (2) a jury would have found Defendant guilty absent the error. Further, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that Section 841 is unconstitutionally vague because the CSA does not define the phrases “legitimate medical purpose” and “usual course of professional practice.” These phrases do not require statutory or regulatory definitions. View "USA v. Dr. James Heaton" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), claiming that Defendant violated TILA because it did not provide him those disclosures. The question in this case was whether Plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue his claim, which turns on whether Plaintiff's injuries are traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose.The Eleventh Circuit found that Plaintiff's injuries were traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose and thus reversed the district court's finding to the contrary. The court, however, expressed no opinion about the merits of Plaitniff's claim. View "Gary Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC (“Sabal Trail”), is a natural-gas company that has a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). Sabal Trail sued Defendants to condemn easements on two tracts of their land so it could build a natural-gas pipeline through two adjacent properties. After Sabal Trail filed the condemnation actions, the district court granted it immediate possession of the land. Sabal Trail and Defendants could not agree on compensation for the taking. Besides the severance damages, the district court also ruled that Defendants would be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, though it hadn’t yet awarded them. On remand to the district court, the parties briefed the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. Sabal Trail opposed awarding them, arguing again that the U.S. Constitution’s “just compensation” standard should apply and that that standard did not include attorney’s fees and costs. The district court rejected Sabal Trail’s position, instead concluding that “state substantive law governs the measure of compensation in eminent domain cases brought by private parties against private property owners under the [NGA].   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that state law provides the measure of compensation in proceedings that arise under Section 717f(h) of the NGA. The parties agree that under Florida law, Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs as part of their compensation. Sabal Trail offered no other reason that the district court’s award here should not be upheld. View "Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Co, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff had three possible strikes: one dismissal for failure to state a claim, another dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and a summary judgment for failure to exhaust. The first dismissal is a strike because the dismissing court expressly said it was dismissing the action for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether: (1) “Is a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a ‘strike’ for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act?”; and (2) “If a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies can be a ‘strike’ for purposes of the [Act]’s ‘three strikes’ provision, does Wells have three strikes?”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint based on the three-strikes rule and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that the second dismissal—for failure to exhaust—counted as a strike because the dismissing court gave some signal in its order that the action was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. But the court agreed with Plaintiff that the summary judgment for failure to exhaust was not a strike because it was not a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Thus, without three strikes, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint under the three-strikes rule. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al" on Justia Law

The government served Appellant with three subpoenas directed at three business entities for which he is the document custodian. The subpoenas commanded the companies to appear and testify before the Grand Jury, produce documents, and certify that the records satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Appellant moved to quash the subpoenas and asserted a Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege, arguing the requested documents could incriminate him as the sole manager, registered agent, owner, and operator of the companies. The district court denied Appellant’s motion and, since Appellant refused to comply with the subpoenas, found Appellant in civil contempt. The district court stayed issuance of sanctions pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the district court has not yet imposed noncontingent sanctions. The court explained that the court’s precedents requiring a sanction to be imposed contemporaneously with a finding of contempt in order to be directly appealable are not inconsistent with the directives in United States v. Ryan. View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit heard a case arising from a Georgia prisoner’s objection based on his medical conditions to his prescribed method of execution. The district court dismissed the action as untimely and for failure to state a claim.   The Eleventh Circuit held that the action is timely because the prisoner raised an as-applied challenge, so the limitations period commenced only when the claim became or should have become apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. The court further held that the prisoner stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that the medication gabapentin had reduced his brain’s receptiveness to sedatives. But the court held that the prisoner failed to state a claim when he alleged that the lethal drugs cannot be injected into his veins according to standard protocols because he failed to plausibly allege that one alternative injection procedure could not constitutionally be performed. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Michael Wade Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs SkyHop Global, LLC, SkyHop Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “SkyHop”) and Defendant company owner and his company Indyzen, Inc. (collectively, “Indyzen”) have developed and deployed digital software aimed at transporting crew members to and from airports across the country. SkyHop has about eighty contracts with fifteen airlines, including major carriers like Delta, American, and United. SkyHop and Indyzen dispute who owns the digital software. And beyond that, they disagree on where their dispute should be decided. Indyzen has filed an arbitration action in California (where it is based), alleging various forms of breach of contract and other promises. Meanwhile, SkyHop has filed a federal lawsuit in Florida (where it is based), alleging that Indyzen violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the Florida Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act (“CADRA”). In response, Indyzen sought to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court entered an order dismissing SkyHop’s complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court reasoned that the allegations in SkyHop’s complaint suggest that SkyHop is the rightful owner of the digital software. And because Indyzen has refused to relinquish possession of the digital software without additional payment, SkyHop’s complaint states a cause of action under the CFAA. The complaint therefore satisfies the Florida long-arm statute. And it also meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause because the emails that Indyzen sent into Florida triggered SkyHop’s claims. View "SkyHop Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Praveen Narra, et al." on Justia Law