Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner pled guilty to a charge of lewd or lascivious conduct and was sentenced to five years of sexual offender probation. The terms of that probation provided that he “qualified and shall register with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a sexual offender pursuant to Section 943.0435.” Petitioner—proceeding pro se—sought federal habeas corpus relief from his conviction pursuant to Section 2254. The state moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because he was not “in custody” under Section 2254(a). The state argued that Petitioner was not in its physical custody at the time he filed his petition. Petitioner responded that his lifetime sex offender registration, “along with all the other restrictions that come with being a registered sex offender,” significantly restrained his individual liberty such that he was “in custody” for purposes of Section 2254(a). The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Section  2254 petition for lack of jurisdiction.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court found that Florida’s registration and reporting requirements for sex offenders do not render those offenders “in custody” within the meaning of Section 2254(a). The court reasoned that the proper inquiry here is under Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and its progeny. First, he is not at the beck and call of state officials. Second, Petitioner is not required to live in a certain community or home and does not need permission to hold a job or drive a car. Third, Petitioner has to provide in-person advance notice of trips outside the state and outside the country, but the trips themselves do not require permission or approval by state officials. View "Louis Matthew Clements v. State of Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), claiming that Defendant violated TILA because it did not provide him those disclosures. The question in this case was whether Plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue his claim, which turns on whether Plaintiff's injuries are traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose.The Eleventh Circuit found that Plaintiff's injuries were traceable to Defendant's failure to disclose and thus reversed the district court's finding to the contrary. The court, however, expressed no opinion about the merits of Plaitniff's claim. View "Gary Walters v. Fast AC, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC (“Sabal Trail”), is a natural-gas company that has a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). Sabal Trail sued Defendants to condemn easements on two tracts of their land so it could build a natural-gas pipeline through two adjacent properties. After Sabal Trail filed the condemnation actions, the district court granted it immediate possession of the land. Sabal Trail and Defendants could not agree on compensation for the taking. Besides the severance damages, the district court also ruled that Defendants would be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs, though it hadn’t yet awarded them. On remand to the district court, the parties briefed the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. Sabal Trail opposed awarding them, arguing again that the U.S. Constitution’s “just compensation” standard should apply and that that standard did not include attorney’s fees and costs. The district court rejected Sabal Trail’s position, instead concluding that “state substantive law governs the measure of compensation in eminent domain cases brought by private parties against private property owners under the [NGA].   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that state law provides the measure of compensation in proceedings that arise under Section 717f(h) of the NGA. The parties agree that under Florida law, Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and costs as part of their compensation. Sabal Trail offered no other reason that the district court’s award here should not be upheld. View "Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Co, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff had three possible strikes: one dismissal for failure to state a claim, another dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and a summary judgment for failure to exhaust. The first dismissal is a strike because the dismissing court expressly said it was dismissing the action for failure to state a claim. At issue was whether: (1) “Is a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a ‘strike’ for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act?”; and (2) “If a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies can be a ‘strike’ for purposes of the [Act]’s ‘three strikes’ provision, does Wells have three strikes?”   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint based on the three-strikes rule and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that the second dismissal—for failure to exhaust—counted as a strike because the dismissing court gave some signal in its order that the action was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. But the court agreed with Plaintiff that the summary judgment for failure to exhaust was not a strike because it was not a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Thus, without three strikes, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint under the three-strikes rule. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al" on Justia Law

The government served Appellant with three subpoenas directed at three business entities for which he is the document custodian. The subpoenas commanded the companies to appear and testify before the Grand Jury, produce documents, and certify that the records satisfied the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Appellant moved to quash the subpoenas and asserted a Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege, arguing the requested documents could incriminate him as the sole manager, registered agent, owner, and operator of the companies. The district court denied Appellant’s motion and, since Appellant refused to comply with the subpoenas, found Appellant in civil contempt. The district court stayed issuance of sanctions pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the district court has not yet imposed noncontingent sanctions. The court explained that the court’s precedents requiring a sanction to be imposed contemporaneously with a finding of contempt in order to be directly appealable are not inconsistent with the directives in United States v. Ryan. View "In re: Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit heard a case arising from a Georgia prisoner’s objection based on his medical conditions to his prescribed method of execution. The district court dismissed the action as untimely and for failure to state a claim.   The Eleventh Circuit held that the action is timely because the prisoner raised an as-applied challenge, so the limitations period commenced only when the claim became or should have become apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. The court further held that the prisoner stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that the medication gabapentin had reduced his brain’s receptiveness to sedatives. But the court held that the prisoner failed to state a claim when he alleged that the lethal drugs cannot be injected into his veins according to standard protocols because he failed to plausibly allege that one alternative injection procedure could not constitutionally be performed. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Michael Wade Nance v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs SkyHop Global, LLC, SkyHop Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “SkyHop”) and Defendant company owner and his company Indyzen, Inc. (collectively, “Indyzen”) have developed and deployed digital software aimed at transporting crew members to and from airports across the country. SkyHop has about eighty contracts with fifteen airlines, including major carriers like Delta, American, and United. SkyHop and Indyzen dispute who owns the digital software. And beyond that, they disagree on where their dispute should be decided. Indyzen has filed an arbitration action in California (where it is based), alleging various forms of breach of contract and other promises. Meanwhile, SkyHop has filed a federal lawsuit in Florida (where it is based), alleging that Indyzen violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the Florida Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act (“CADRA”). In response, Indyzen sought to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court entered an order dismissing SkyHop’s complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court reasoned that the allegations in SkyHop’s complaint suggest that SkyHop is the rightful owner of the digital software. And because Indyzen has refused to relinquish possession of the digital software without additional payment, SkyHop’s complaint states a cause of action under the CFAA. The complaint therefore satisfies the Florida long-arm statute. And it also meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause because the emails that Indyzen sent into Florida triggered SkyHop’s claims. View "SkyHop Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Praveen Narra, et al." on Justia Law

Thirteen states sued the Treasury Secretary and related officials to challenge a tax offset provision in the American Rescue Plan Act, a coronavirus stimulus package passed by Congress in 2021. That offset provision prohibits states from using Rescue Plan funds “to either directly or indirectly offset a reduction in [their] net tax revenue” that results from a change in law that “reduces any tax.” The States argued that this “tax mandate” exceeds Congress’s authority under the Constitution. The district court agreed and permanently enjoined enforcement of the offset provision. The Secretary appealed.   At issue was whether the States’ challenge presents a justiciable controversy and if so, whether the offset provision is unconstitutional. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court answered both questions correctly. The court explained that all four elements weigh in favor of granting a permanent injunction. The district court did not misapply the law nor base its determination on clearly erroneous facts. It did not abuse its discretion. We also agree with the district court that the permanent injunction fully redresses the States’ harm in this case—declaratory relief is unnecessary. The court reiterated, however, that the permanent injunction applies only to Section 802(c)(2)(A), which is severable from the remaining provisions of the Act. View "State of West Virginia, et al v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, et al" on Justia Law

Deputy sheriffs arrested Plaintiff based on a warrant for another man of the same name, detained him, and released him when his identity was verified three days later. Plaintiff sued the deputies for violating his alleged due process right to be free from over-detention under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   At issue was whether an individual detained for three days based on mistaken identity for a valid arrest warrant has stated a claim for relief under the Fourteenth Amendment for his over-detention. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that under Baker v. McCollan, no violation of due process occurs if a detainee’s arrest warrant is valid and his detention lasts an amount of time no more than three days. And both conditions are met here. The court explained that Plaintiff was arrested on a valid warrant and held for only three days. Thus, under Baker, Plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for a violation of his due process rights. View "David Sosa v. Martin County, Florida, et al." on Justia Law

The jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder and robbery. The verdict form included interrogatories about the firearm enhancement. After he was resentenced, Petitioner filed a third motion that asserted two grounds for relief. Petitioner filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus that asserted the same two claims for relief that he alleged in his third Florida Rule 3.850 motion. The district court denied the petition and denied Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It determined that both of Petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred.   On appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus the Eleventh Circuit was required to decide whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by requesting that the jury be instructed on lesser included offenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render ineffective counsel. Further, the court wrote that because Petitioner’s claim that insufficient evidence supported his conviction was denied by the state courts based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground, he is also not entitled to relief on that claim. View "Demetrius Carey v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law