Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

One of the mandatory conditions of Dennis’s probation for stealing social security funds was that she not commit any new state crimes. A police officer later investigated Dennis for theft of services after he suspected that she took food from a restaurant without paying. During a heated exchange with the officer, Dennis repeatedly disobeyed his commands. Based on this encounter, a probation officer provided written notice that Dennis had committed theft, battery, and felony obstruction.After a hearing, the district court found that Dennis committed misdemeanor obstruction and sentenced her to a term of supervised release. Dennis objected to that sentence on the ground that she had not been given written notice that her probation could be revoked for committing misdemeanor obstruction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because misdemeanor obstruction is a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the inclusion of felony obstruction in the petition “thereby g[ave] notice to the defendant that [s]he may be [found guilty] on either charge.” The notice given to Dennis satisfied the requirements of “due process of law.” View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police sergeant who was at the wrong house because of imprecise dispatch directions, shot and killed William David Powell, who was innocent of any crime and standing in his driveway. Powell was holding a pistol because he and his wife thought they had heard a prowler. Powell's wife filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendant in his individual capacity, alleging that he violated her husband's constitutional right to be free from excessive force.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiff has not identified case law with materially similar facts or with a broad statement of principle giving defendant fair notice that he had to warn Powell at the earliest possible moment and before using deadly force. Therefore, she has not met her burden of showing qualified immunity is not appropriate. The court stated that plaintiff has not shown that defendant's actions were unreasonable for qualified immunity purposes. View "Powell v. Snook" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no longer probable cause to support her detention when the perpetrator said, "[T]hat's not her." The court concluded that plaintiff cannot prove that defendant violated her constitutional rights for three reasons: first, plaintiff's continued detention was supported by probable cause; second, defendant was entitled to rely on a facially valid and lawfully obtained warrant; and third, defendant did not take an affirmative action to continue the prosecution. View "Washington v. Howard" on Justia Law

A teacher smelled marijuana burning in the classroom and alerted Principal Stamps and Assistant Principal Byars, who searched the belongings of every student in the class. They found marijuana stems and seeds, rolling paper, lighters, and assorted pills in T.R.’s backpack. T.R. denied smoking marijuana in the classroom that day. T.R. contends that during a first search, in a room with only Stamps and Counselor Dean, she removed her clothing, lifted her breasts, and bent over for an inspection while a window in the office, leading to a public hallway, remained uncovered. School officials did not find any drugs on T.R.’s person. T.R. alleges that school officials later again directed her to remove her clothing and she submitted. T.R. stated that she was on her menstrual cycle, which made her feel “humiliated.” T.R.’s teacher found the remains of the marijuana cigarette under T.R.’s desk the next day.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the Defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. To grant qualified immunity on these facts "would severely diminish the protections afforded students from strip searches" set out in Supreme Court precedent. Considering the degree of intrusiveness of the search and that school officials searched her twice, T.R.’s claim for outrage creates a sufficient question for the jury. View "T.R. v. Lamar County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Reeves is scheduled to be executed in January 2022. Alabama Act 2018-353 gave “death row inmates a single opportunity to elect that their execution be carried out by" nitrogen hypoxia, instead of Alabama’s default method, lethal injection. Reeves had until June 30, 2018, to elect nitrogen hypoxia in writing. An election form was distributed to every death row inmate. Reeves made no election. In 2020, Reeves filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that “with IQ scores in the upper 60s and low 70s, his general cognitive limitations and severely limited reading abilities rendered him unable to read and understand the election form without assistance” and that prison officials failed to provide a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the entry of a preliminary injunction, prohibiting Reeves’s execution other than by nitrogen hypoxia while his ADA claim remains pending. Reeves has standing, having demonstrated an injury in fact by alleging that lethal injection is significantly more painful than nitrogen hypoxia. Reeves showed that he was substantially likely to succeed on the merits by proving that he is a qualified individual with a disability; he lacked meaningful access to the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities by reason of his disability; and the public entity failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. Reeves could only comprehend at a first-grade level. The election form required an eleventh-grade reading level to be understood. View "Reeves v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Maldonado and Hill filed suit in Florida state court, asserting violations of their federal and state constitutional rights to the free exercise of their religion. After plaintiffs were granted in forma pauperis status by the state court, the case was removed to federal court where plaintiffs did not seek in forma pauperis status. The district court dismissed Maldonado's claims under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)—the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—and dismissed Hill's claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.In regard to Maldonado, the Eleventh Circuit held that a case commenced in state court by a prisoner and removed by a defendant to federal court—with the defendant paying the filing fee after removal—is not subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). In regard to Hill, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing his claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims. View "Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

In October 2018, Butts County Sheriff’s Office deputies placed signs in the front yards of the residences of all 57 registered sex offenders within the County, warning “STOP” and “NO TRICK-OR-TREAT AT THIS ADDRESS.” The Sheriff also posted an explanation of the signs on Facebook, in order to associate the signs with the registrants who lived on the properties. Before Halloween 2019, three registered sex offenders living in Butts County sued, seeking to enjoin the Sheriff from placing the signs again. Contrary to the Sheriff’s initial assertions, Georgia law does not forbid registered sex offenders from participating in Halloween. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The Sheriff’s warning signs are compelled government speech, and their placement violates a homeowner’s First Amendment rights. The forced display of a government message on private property violates the “right to refrain from speaking at all,” and the signs are not a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling government interest. The Sheriff’s interest in protecting children from sexual abuse is compelling but the Sheriff has not provided any evidence that the registrants actually pose a danger to trick-or-treating children or that these signs would serve to prevent such danger. View "McClendon v. Long" on Justia Law

In 2007, Moore was convicted of possession of several unregistered destructive devices and was sentenced to the statutory maximum for his offense—120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months’ supervised release. He completed his term of imprisonment in 2016. His supervised release has been revoked three times. Upon the third revocation, Moore was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and an additional 18 months’ supervised release. During the revocation proceedings, he was also sentenced to a consecutive term of six months’ imprisonment for criminal contempt. Moore argued that 18 U.S.C. 3583(e), the statute under which he was sentenced upon revocation, was unconstitutional because it allowed the district court to extend Moore’s sentence beyond the authorized statutory maximum for his offense of conviction based solely on “judge-found facts” in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Although the district court plainly erred in imposing an additional term of supervised release because it failed to account for the terms of imprisonment that were imposed upon the prior revocations of his supervised release, section 3583(e) is not unconstitutional as applied to Moore; the district court did not impose a substantively unreasonable sentence. The district court did not plainly err in convicting Moore of criminal contempt without giving him an opportunity to allocute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Georgia law places restrictions on which prospective candidates for elective office can appear on the general election ballot. The Libertarian Party of Georgia, prospective Libertarian candidates, and affiliated voters ask the court to hold that Georgia's ballot-access laws unconstitutionally burden their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and deny them equal protection.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly held that the laws violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court explained that, under the Anderson framework, the laws need only be justified by the State's important regulatory interests. In this case, the interests the Secretary asserts—in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot, in maintaining the orderly administration of elections, and in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election—are compelling. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Georgia's laws do not cause an equal protection violation. The court concluded that the Secretary's stated interest sufficiently justifies the distinction between candidates. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the district court's injunction, and remanded. View "Cowen v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Booker is on Florida’s death row for first-degree murder. In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. In 2020, the Capital Habeas Unit of the Office of the Federal Public Defender (CHU) sought permission to represent Booker in state court to exhaust a “Brady” claim so that Booker could pursue the claim in a successive federal habeas petition. The Brady claim focused on the prosecution’s failure to disclose notes that allegedly could have been used to impeach an FBI hair expert. Booker said that he had learned through a FOIA request and a review by a qualified microscopist that there were inconsistencies between the expert’s trial testimony and his notes. The state objected to the appointment of CHU, noting that Booker had a state-law right to counsel through Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel North (CCRC-N); CCRC-N counsel was appointed to represent Booker in state court. Nonetheless, the district court appointed CHU under 18 U.S.C. 3599 to represent Booker in state courtThe Eleventh Circuit dismissed an appeal. Florida cannot establish standing based on a hypothetical conflict of interest that is not actual or imminent. State courts are empowered to reject appearances by CHU counsel, so the appointment cannot have inflicted an injury on Florida’s sovereignty. View "Booker v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law