Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conditions of petitioner's supervision program render her "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2241, such that the district court had jurisdiction to consider her habeas petition. The court also concluded that petitioner did not validly self-execute the 1995 deportation order when, shortly before it was entered, she voluntarily left the United States. Whether the court resolved 8 U.S.C. 1101(g)'s ambiguity through the principle of lenity or through Chevron deference, the court reached the same conclusion: Section 1101(g)'s two conditions operate successively. In this case, petitioner left the Untied States before she was ordered removed and thus she was not "deported or removed" within the meaning of Section 1101(g). Accordingly, the government may lawfully deport her under the still-operative 1995 order. View "Argueta Romero v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Telcy, convicted of drug and firearms offenses, was sentenced to life imprisonment due to his armed career criminal enhancement. His 2010 section 2255 habeas petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, was rejected. In 2013 and 2016, Telcy unsuccessfully sought permission to file second or successive section 2255 habeas petitions. In 2019, under the First Step Act, the district court. reduced Telcy’s sentence to a term of 235 months without holding a hearing or revisiting its previous factual findings.Telcy again sought permission to file a second or successive 2255 habeas petition, arguing that, because his guideline range was based on the ACCA enhancement and the district court considered this guideline range when it imposed a reduced sentence, he would suffer adverse collateral consequences if he were not allowed to challenge the enhancement in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. For purposes of the bar on second or successive 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, a First Step Act sentence reduction is not a “new judgment” that resets the clock, allowing a defendant to file a new, “first” habeas petition. When a district judge reduces a sentence under the First Step Act, the court is not authorized to conduct a plenary, de novo resentencing; the sentence reduction does not affect the validity or lawfulness of the underlying sentence. View "Telcy v. United States" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued an interim rule that requires facilities that provide health care to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to ensure that their staff, unless exempt for medical or religious reasons, are fully vaccinated against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,555. Under the rule, covered staff must request an exemption or receive their first dose of a two-dose vaccine or a single-dose vaccine by December 6, 2021. Florida unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to bar the interim rule’s enforcement.The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of the motion, first deciding not to apply the mootness doctrine and to exercise jurisdiction despite another district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction. Florida failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, or that the balance of the equities favors an injunction. The Secretary has express statutory authority to require facilities voluntarily participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs to meet health and safety standards to protect patients. The Secretary provided a detailed explanation for why there was good cause for dispensing with the notice-and-comment requirement. Ample evidence supports the Secretary’s determination that facility staff vaccination will provide important protection for patients. View "State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Davis, a former Congressman, mayoral candidate, candidate for governor of Alabama, and federal prosecutor, is Black. In 2016, he became Executive Director of LSA, a non-profit law firm serving low-income Alabamians. Davis experienced problems with some of his subordinates and colleagues; some complained to LSA’s Executive Committee. On August 18, 2017, as Davis left work, he was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to suspend him with pay pending an investigation of those complaints. A “Suspension Letter” cited spending decisions outside the approved budget, failure to follow LSA's hiring policies and procedures, creating new initiatives without Board approval, and creating a hostile work environment for some LSA employees. LSA posted a security guard in front of its building and hired Mowery, an Alabama political consultant, to handle public relations related to Davis’s suspension. Mowery had handled one of Davis’s failed political campaigns until their relationship soured; Mowery had worked for the campaign of Davis’s opponent in another race.Days later, Davis notified the Board of his resignation. He filed suit, alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and under Title VII, and defamation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Being placed on paid leave was not an adverse employment action and Davis did not raise a fact issue on his constructive discharge claim. LSA’s disclosures to Mowery did not constitute “publication”—an essential element of defamation. View "Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a police officer individually and the City of Miami Beach on plaintiff's claims of excessive force and state law battery. Plaintiff alleged that his arrest was effected and he was fully secured, not resisting, and not posing a threat when the officer gratuitously and forcibly struck him in his face.The court reviewed the evidence and videos in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with the benefit of oral argument, concluding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. In this case, a reasonable jury could find that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he entered the holding cell and forcibly struck plaintiff, who was then secure, not resisting, and not a safety threat to any officers. Furthermore, an objectively reasonable officer would have known at the time that it was clearly unlawful to gratuitously and forcibly strike an arrestee who was fully secured, not resisting, not posing a safety threat, and not attempting to flee. Likewise, summary judgment is not warranted on plaintiff's state law battery claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in a Georgia state court, he brought suit against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. In regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim against the civilian bystander that assisted the police in subduing plaintiff, the court held that a civilian's rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of another. In regard to Deputy Thacker, the court applied the Graham factors and concluded that the deputy did not use excessive force where plaintiff suffered only de minimus injuries that were entirely consistent with a routine takedown. In regard to Deputy Brantley, the court again applied the Graham factors and concluded that the taser was not clearly excessive under the circumstances where two crimes were at issue by the time the taser was deployed: plaintiff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and he had already begun his active and loud obstruction of the arrest. In regard to Sheriff Johnson, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. View "Charles v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Jackson was traveling in his wheelchair along a street near the Louisville Embassy Suites Hotel when he was hit by a hotel valet driver. He suffered severe injuries. Jackson sued, in Kentucky state court, several entities connected to the hotel, including Le Centre, the owner of the hotel property. Le Centre had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection before the suit was filed; its reorganization disclosure statement explained that Le Centre’s Chapter 11 plan included the release not only of Le Centre but also of related non-debtor parties. Jackson's attorney received an amended version of the disclosure statement and a copy of the plan. Le Centre did not serve Jackson with a specific form of notice required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, however.After the approved Chapter 11 plan went into effect, Le Centre and two other released entities moved to dismiss in the state court action as barred by the confirmation order. Jackson sought to proceed nominally against these entities to reach their insurers. The bankruptcy court denied this request. The district court and Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Jackson received sufficient notice to satisfy due process and the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that Jackson could not pursue the nominal claims. View "Jackson v. Le Centre on Fourth, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law

In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and required payment of all fines, fees, and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4.In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction with respect to the “wealth discrimination” claims. In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination, on behalf of “low-income women of color who face unemployment, low wages, and difficulty paying off their financial debts at much higher rates than their male and white female counterparts.” The plaintiffs could prevail on their constitutional challenges only if they could “show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system,” and they presented no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "McCoy v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Cox, a transgender woman, was assaulted at three different Georgia prisons for male inmates: At each of these institutions, Cox received estrogen injections, causing her to present with female features. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. Cox sued six Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) officials, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that the GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that three GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender inmate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30301.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s suit. Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect Eighth Amendment claim; with respect to each defendant, she either failed to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference or failed to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The court rejected the PREA claims for the same reasons. View "Cox v. Deputy Warden" on Justia Law