Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their constitutional and state law claims against Defendants and its owner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are legal practitioners who reside in Florida and represent clients in personal injury cases. Defendant is a company is operated by an owner who resides in Florida.   Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their right to due process of law by freezing their assets in Maryland, obtaining writs of garnishment based on Maryland law without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. They also alleged violations of state law, including a charge of usury, breach of contract, and tortious interference. The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ federal claim was so utterly frivolous that it robbed the court of federal question jurisdiction.   The sole issue before the Eleventh Circuit court was whether the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. The court reversed the district court’s ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ state and constitutional claims against Defendants. The court reasoned that Defendants have identified no case law suggesting that a plaintiff does not have a constitutionally protected interest in her property, even post-judgment.  Plaintiffs have plausibly raised an as-applied challenge to the use of Maryland’s garnishment statute, as opposed to a facial challenge, because they claim that the Maryland rules were applied in a way that unconstitutionally deprived them of their property. View "Diane N. Resnick, et al. v. KrunchCash, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition. The Eleventh Circuit issued a certificate of appealability and concluded that the district court properly denied Section 2254 habeas petition. The court reviewed Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.   The court held that counsel’s failure to assert the failure-to-inform theory as trial court error in briefing Petitioner’s appeal could not amount to ineffective assistance under Strickland. The fact that Petitioner was concerned about a joint trial, not joint representation, fully supports the Florida District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) rejection of this ineffective assistance claim. The court reasoned that the trial court appropriately responded to Petitioner’s concern by explaining why Petitioner would not be prejudiced by a joint trial: because the State had charged Petitioner as a principal in the armed robbery, all of the evidence that would be introduced in co-defendant’s trial would be introduced in his as well.   Further, the district court correctly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish that the DCA’s affirmance of this ineffective assistance claim constituted an adjudication that was “contrary to, or an incorrect application of,” the Supreme Court’s holdings in Strickland. View "Gregory Lamar Blackmon v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of his Final Administrative Removal Order and adverse reasonable fear determination, which were issued during his expedited removal proceedings as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act.   Petitioner contended that he was substantially prejudiced by his lack of counsel at the hearing before the immigration judge in his reasonable fear proceedings. He also argued that he was denied a “full and fair hearing” before the immigration judge because the judge failed to provide an adequate explanation of the procedures.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review and held that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated during his expedited removal proceedings. The court concluded that the immigration judge reasonably found that Petitioner’s assertions failed to establish his torture claim and the record does not compel a contrary finding. The court further concluded that substantial evidence supports the asylum officer’s and immigration judge’s negative reasonable fear determination on Petitioner’s claim for CAT relief.   The court reasoned that under the substantial prejudice standard, the petitioner “must demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  Petitioner failed to identify how he would have presented his case differently before the immigration judge.  Further, while Petitioner testified that some individuals threatening him were Haitian public officials, he did not offer any examples to show that those officials were threatening him in their official capacities or under the color of law. View "Emmanuel Priva v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

Defendant, a physician who operates a medical clinic, was under investigation for healthcare fraud and related charges. During the investigation, law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant permitting them to search the clinic. During the search, one officer found a bag of videotapes. The officer played the tapes, which led to Defendant being charged with several child pornography offenses. Defendant unsuccessfully sought suppression of the tapes at trial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The search warrant application specifically mentioned "videotapes" among the items to be searched. Thus, the officer's search of the tapes was covered by the search warrant.The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Defendant's claim that his right to a public trial was violated when the district judge closed the courtroom during several witnesses' testimony. Defendant agreed to most of the closures and failed to object to any of the other closures. View "USA v. Ronald Tai Young Moon, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Speech First, is a voluntary membership organization dedicated to protecting students’ free-speech rights. It represents students who attend universities across the country, including the University of Central Florida (“UCF”). Several of Speech First’s UCF-based members have attested that they desire to express their beliefs and opinions about a range of topics but are inhibited from doing so by two University policies referred to as the “discriminatory- harassment” and “bias-related-incidents” policies. Shortly after filing suit, Plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court denied.The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision denying Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction in its First Amendment violation claim against the University of Central Florida. The court held Plaintiff has standing to sue because the challenged policies chill its members’ speech and that the discriminatory-harassment policy likely violates the First Amendment.  Further, because the district court never considered the bias-related-incidents policy’s constitutionality on the merits—having erroneously concluded that Speech First lacked standing to challenge it, the court remanded for a determination of that issue.   The court reasoned that the discriminatory harassment and bias-related-incident policies objectively chill speech because its operation would cause a reasonable student to fear expressing potentially unpopular beliefs. Further, the court concluded that Plaintiff is substantially likely to establish that the discriminatory-harassment policy is both (1) impermissibly overbroad and (2) content and viewpoint-based restriction of speech. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Alexander Cartwright" on Justia Law

Petitioner a native and citizen of North Macedonia, appealed the dismissal or, alternatively, the denial of his 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 habeas petition seeking release from an alleged “unlawful and indefinite” detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner claimed that his detention by ICE officials violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it exceeded the “presumptively reasonable” 180-day period established in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The district court denied Petitioner relief, concluding, among other things, that the delay in his removal did not violate Zadvydas because Petitioner had sought and obtained an administrative stay of his removal proceedings.   The Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition seeking release and dismissed the case as moot. The court reasoned that it need not decide whether the voluntary cessation doctrine applies in the habeas immigration context because even if it did, it has not been satisfied. Further, the government has described Petitioner’s detention as having “ceased,” and, as of now, more than fifteen months have passed since Petitioner was released. Thus, the court found that there is no reasonable basis for it to believe that Peitioner will be re-detained unlawfully upon the termination of his suit. View "Goga Djadju v. Juan A. Lopez Vega, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Florida pretrial defendant awaiting trial on state criminal charges, filed a petition in federal court alleging that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated as a result of temporary measures suspending criminal jury trials in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He sought the dismissal of all of his criminal charges, traveling under the federal habeas provision found in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim, finding that Petitioner gave the court no basis for intervening in his state criminal prosecution. The court held that it cannot say that Petitioner’s speedy-trial filings, which expressly referenced only the Florida rule, fairly raised a federal constitutional speedy-trial claim. Further, there is not any indication that the state court somehow surmised that Petitioner had raised a federal constitutional claim-it never discussed the Sixth Amendment claim, even implicitly.   Further, the court held that Petitioner’s petition is barred under the application of the abstention doctrine under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The court reasoned that Younger established that, based on principles of comity and federalism, a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentence is not yet final. View "James Russell Johnson v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Speech First, Inc. (“Speech First”) filed a lawsuit against the University of Central Florida (“University”) arguing that Defendant’s discriminatory-harassment and bias-related-incidents policies violate the First Amendment. Specifically, Speech First contended that the policies are unconstitutionally overbroad and the discriminatory-harassment policy restricts speech based on viewpoint and content. The district court held that Speech First lacked Article III standing to challenge the policies.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding that Speech First has standing to sue and the discriminatory-harassment policy likely violates the First Amendment on the grounds that it is an overbroad and content- and viewpoint-based regulation of constitutionally protected expression. The court explained that Speech First has standing to challenge both policies at issue because the policies objectively chill its members’ speech. Further, the court found that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to preliminarily enjoin the discriminatory-harassment policy and that the district court should determine in the first instance whether Speech First is entitled to a preliminary injunction of the bias-related-incidents policy. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Alexander Cartwright" on Justia Law

Previously, a panel of 11th Circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 Sec. 1983 claims under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The panel based its decision on precedent holding that a "dismissal for failure to exhaust qualifies as a strike under the PLRA."The court voted, deciding to hear the appeal en banc. Thus, the panel's decision was vacated. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al." on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of three misdemeanor counts of willful failure to file a federal income tax return. Defendant was represented by counsel at trial, but he lacked representation during the pretrial process. At his arraignment, Defendant expressed his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. The magistrate judge found that Defendant’s waiver was knowing, even after misinforming him that the maximum sentence he could receive if convicted was 12 months of imprisonmentThe court found the magistrate judge’s statements were materially incorrect. Instead of “unambiguously” informing Defendant of the penalties he faced, the magistrate judge incorrectly asserted that “we’re not talking about a felony involving imprisonment beyond one year”—when the true maximum sentence was three times longer. Thus, the court held that there was no knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Next, the court found that the deprivation of Defendant’s right to counsel at all pretrial stages of the proceedings against him was a structural error. As such, the court vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "USA v. Saleem Hakim" on Justia Law