Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss his complaint, seeking judicial review of the USCIS's denial of a national interest waiver pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i), based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that section 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) specifies that a national interest waiver is within the discretion of the Attorney General, and therefore section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Brasil v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus vacating petitioner's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. Of the twelve claims presented to the Circuit Court, only the first five challenged petitioner's conviction and thus are relevant here. Claims I and III incorporated numerous subclaims: Claim I had three subclaims, while Claim III had eight subclaims denoted A through H, with Claim III-H having an additional five subclaims of its own. Claim III-H-4, which provided the principal basis for the writ of habeas corpus the district court issued, alleged that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland the handwritten notes he made of a pretrial conversation he had with two named individuals.The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust Claim III-H-4 in the state courts because he failed to present the claim to the Florida Supreme Court such that the reasonable reader would understand the claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Furthermore, the district court's issuance of the writ based on a witness's statement constituted reversible error. The court considered the remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of relief as to petitioner's cross-appeal. View "Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging race discrimination after defendant terminated plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff failed to show that defendant engaged in race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, in the alternative, plaintiff provided a convincing mosaic of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment at this stage. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of showing factual disputes that should be decided by a jury—a jury whose role it is to weigh conflicting evidence and make any necessary credibility determinations. Therefore, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Jenkins v. Nell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order dismissing, based on lack of standing, plaintiffs' action alleging that Sea Island did not comply with the Clean Water Act’s permitting process. The court concluded that Plaintiff Fraser adequately alleged a concrete injury to her aesthetic interest in the wetland and therefore the court need not address plaintiffs' remaining arguments. In this case, Fraser adequately alleged that she suffered an injury to her aesthetic interests in the wetland because she has viewed the wetland, derived aesthetic pleasure from its natural habitat and vegetation, and now derives less pleasure from the unnatural grasses and lawn placed on the wetland. Therefore, Fraser's allegations are sufficient to establish an injury in fact at this stage, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "The Glynn Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Sea Island Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

Heather operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require a license. After moving to Florida in 2015, she continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Heather tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice. After a complaint was filed against her and she paid $500.00 in fines and $254.09 in investigatory fees, Heather sued, claiming that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violated her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. The district court granted the Florida Department of Health summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018). The Act “is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech,” and is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Del Castillo v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health" on Justia Law

One of the mandatory conditions of Dennis’s probation for stealing social security funds was that she not commit any new state crimes. A police officer later investigated Dennis for theft of services after he suspected that she took food from a restaurant without paying. During a heated exchange with the officer, Dennis repeatedly disobeyed his commands. Based on this encounter, a probation officer provided written notice that Dennis had committed theft, battery, and felony obstruction.After a hearing, the district court found that Dennis committed misdemeanor obstruction and sentenced her to a term of supervised release. Dennis objected to that sentence on the ground that she had not been given written notice that her probation could be revoked for committing misdemeanor obstruction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because misdemeanor obstruction is a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the inclusion of felony obstruction in the petition “thereby g[ave] notice to the defendant that [s]he may be [found guilty] on either charge.” The notice given to Dennis satisfied the requirements of “due process of law.” View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Defendant, a police sergeant who was at the wrong house because of imprecise dispatch directions, shot and killed William David Powell, who was innocent of any crime and standing in his driveway. Powell was holding a pistol because he and his wife thought they had heard a prowler. Powell's wife filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against defendant in his individual capacity, alleging that he violated her husband's constitutional right to be free from excessive force.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that plaintiff has not identified case law with materially similar facts or with a broad statement of principle giving defendant fair notice that he had to warn Powell at the earliest possible moment and before using deadly force. Therefore, she has not met her burden of showing qualified immunity is not appropriate. The court stated that plaintiff has not shown that defendant's actions were unreasonable for qualified immunity purposes. View "Powell v. Snook" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged that defendant violated her right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was no longer probable cause to support her detention when the perpetrator said, "[T]hat's not her." The court concluded that plaintiff cannot prove that defendant violated her constitutional rights for three reasons: first, plaintiff's continued detention was supported by probable cause; second, defendant was entitled to rely on a facially valid and lawfully obtained warrant; and third, defendant did not take an affirmative action to continue the prosecution. View "Washington v. Howard" on Justia Law

A teacher smelled marijuana burning in the classroom and alerted Principal Stamps and Assistant Principal Byars, who searched the belongings of every student in the class. They found marijuana stems and seeds, rolling paper, lighters, and assorted pills in T.R.’s backpack. T.R. denied smoking marijuana in the classroom that day. T.R. contends that during a first search, in a room with only Stamps and Counselor Dean, she removed her clothing, lifted her breasts, and bent over for an inspection while a window in the office, leading to a public hallway, remained uncovered. School officials did not find any drugs on T.R.’s person. T.R. alleges that school officials later again directed her to remove her clothing and she submitted. T.R. stated that she was on her menstrual cycle, which made her feel “humiliated.” T.R.’s teacher found the remains of the marijuana cigarette under T.R.’s desk the next day.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the Defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. To grant qualified immunity on these facts "would severely diminish the protections afforded students from strip searches" set out in Supreme Court precedent. Considering the degree of intrusiveness of the search and that school officials searched her twice, T.R.’s claim for outrage creates a sufficient question for the jury. View "T.R. v. Lamar County Board of Education" on Justia Law