Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. Petitioner argues that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of the online state court dockets without providing him an opportunity to be heard. However, the court concluded that petitioner himself provided all the information needed to show that his filing was late, and he was given a chance to argue that the district court erred. In this case, when petitioner admitted untimeliness and provided the dates to prove it, he eliminated any need for the district court to look elsewhere before dismissing his petition. Furthermore, petitioner had an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice here and simply did not take advantage of it. View "Turner v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court's entry of summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims. Likewise, the court reached the same conclusion about the one employee's sex-based hostile work environment claim. However, after summary judgment was entered in this case, Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S. Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020), clarified that retaliatory hostile work environment claims are not governed by the "severe or pervasive" standard applied by the district court here. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order as to that claim and directed the district court to analyze the claim in light of Monaghan. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

On its own motion, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its previously issued opinion and substituted the following opinion in its place.Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two police officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force when apprehending him. After a jury returned a verdict for the officers, the district court entered judgment in favor of them. Although represented by counsel, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on January 26, 2018. The district court struck plaintiff's motion as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party on February 27, 2018, and subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff's counsel.The court held that a pro se motion for a new trial that is stricken because the movant is represented by counsel tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal of the judgment under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A). In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff's Rule 59 motion for a new trial tolled the time for him to file a notice of appeal, his notice of appeal was therefore timely, and the court has jurisdiction over his appeal. However, because plaintiff's claims are meritless, the court affirmed the judgment.The court joined its fellow circuits in finding that Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755 (2000), applies to civil cases and concluded that plaintiff waived his objection to the admissibility of the Hotel Video by preemptively agreeing to play the video at the outset of the trial as a joint exhibit and referring to the video throughout trial. The court also concluded that the admission of comments made by the officers' counsel during trial do not warrant a new trial; concluded that plaintiff failed to show plain error in the district court's questioning and commentary; concluded that the district court's summary denial did not warrant a new trial; and concluded that the district court did not err in striking plaintiff's pro se motion for new trial. View "Ruiz v. Wing" on Justia Law

After debtor voluntarily filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court determined that he was transferring assets and defrauding creditors. The bankruptcy court removed him as the debtor-in-possession and appointed a trustee to administer the estate. Debtor appealed, arguing that the trustee's appointment violated his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from "involuntary servitude"—because, he said, under the trustee's direction, all of his post-petition earnings would be put into the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of his creditors. The bankruptcy court dismissed debtor's Thirteenth Amendment claim as unripe, and the district court similarly held that debtor could not show an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that debtor's loss of authority and control over his estate, which he suffered as a result of his removal as the debtor-in-possession, constitutes an Article III-qualifying injury-in-fact that is both traceable to the bankruptcy court's appointment of the trustee and redressable by an order vacating that appointment. Therefore, debtor has standing to pursue his Thirteenth Amendment claim. The court left it to the district court on remand to consider the merits of debtor's arguments. View "Breland v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in her individual capacity and as guardian and next friend of T.D.H., a minor, alleging that Chief Carroll, the four named officers, and the City of Rainbow City violated her and T.D.H.'s constitutional rights to be free from the use of excessive force, failing to intervene in the use of that force, and falsely imprisoning and falsely arresting her and T.D.H. Plaintiff also alleged that Rainbow City and Chief Carroll failed to appropriately train and supervise the other named officers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' actions while T.D.H. was suffering from a grand mal seizure at a concert.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to T.D.H., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Officer Morris's repeated tasings amounted to excessive force prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, and that the constitutional violation was clearly established based on both materially similar case law and the obvious clarity exception. Therefore, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Officer Morris, and the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Count Five. Because the facts taken in the light most favorable to T.D.H. establish that Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland violated a clearly established right by failing to intervene, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Counts Eight, Eleven, and Twelve (in part). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on T.D.H.'s false imprisonment claim (Count Twenty-Two) against Officer Morris, and the denial of summary judgment on Counts One and Two. View "Helm v. Carroll" on Justia Law

After Junior Prosper was shot and killed by a police officer, Prosper's widow filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officer. The district court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and granted his motion for summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court was within its discretion to exclude the opinions of two expert witnesses. The court also concluded that the officer acted as an objectively reasonable officer both in tasing and in using deadly force on Prosper. The court explained that plaintiff's interpretation of the blurry surveillance video amounts to mere speculation and thus the video fails to create the issues of fact that plaintiff says it does. Rather, the officer's version of events remains unrebutted and controls the court's analysis. The court concluded that the officer did not violate Prosper's Fourth Amendment rights by using deadly force after Prosper struck him in the face, resisted arrest through three taser discharges, and bit down on his finger while "twisting and turning" with unabating intensity. Furthermore, the district court did not err by finding that the officer acted as an objectively reasonable officer by using the taser. View "Prosper v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner claims that since he was restrained without adequate and on-the-record justification by the district court, his trial counsel should have objected and that the failure to object constituted inadequate assistance.The court concluded that, even if Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), could excuse petitioner's procedural default, he has failed to show actual prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and therefore has not presented a "substantial claim" that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In this case, given the strong evidence of his guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the jury seeing petitioner in shackles affected his conviction. Nor is there any reasonable probability that seeing petitioner in shackles affected the jury's decision to recommend the death penalty. View "Clark v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

PBT, on behalf of itself and the owners of the other condominiums, sought an injunction in state court barring the Town from levying a special assessment against their properties. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Town's motion for summary judgment on the owners' substantive due process and equal protection claims. In regard to the substantive due process claim, the court concluded that PBT failed to provide evidence showing that the Town lacked a rational basis in enacting the Resolution as a whole. In regard to the equal protection claim, given the relevant differences between the Comparators and the PB Towers, the court concluded that all that PBT has shown is that the Town Council treated dissimilar properties differently. The court concluded that such treatment does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore, even if they were similar, PBT fails to identify any evidence that an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would consider the similarity it proffers.The court also affirmed the Town's motion to dismiss the owners' state law claims. The court explained that the district court was correct to dismiss the state law takings claims asserted in Count III, but erred in dismissing the state law claim alleging an unconstitutional tax. However, the unconstitutional tax claim was properly before the district court only based on supplemental jurisdiction. Because the federal claims were properly dismissed, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim on remand. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider. View "PBT Real Estate, LLC v. Town of Palm Beach" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that his attorneys violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial. The court concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court's determination that petitioner failed to show that the allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him, as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was not an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, it was not unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court to conclude that there is no reasonable probability of a different result if petitioner's trial attorneys had collected and presented the mitigating evidence proffered to the state habeas court. View "Lee v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two prolife sidewalk counselors, filed a civil rights action against the City and Police Chief, alleging that defendants violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion through their application of the City's permit ordinance and the inclusion of a noise provision in their special-event permit.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege critical facts necessary to establish a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to plead necessary facts to support an inference that the noise provision violates their right to freedom of speech; the noise provision is not unconstitutionally vague; and the district court did not err by refusing to apply strict scrutiny to plaintiffs' free exercise claim. View "Henderson v. McMurray" on Justia Law