Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found Defendant guilty of various drug crimes. Now on appeal, Defendant attacked his indictment, claiming that the grand jury’s probable cause determination was rendered defective by the district court’s special procedures related to the Covid-19 pandemic. Under these procedures, grand jurors met in three separate federal courthouses but were joined together by videoconferencing. Defendant also argued that the wiretaps used to gather evidence against him did not meet the statutory necessity requirement.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the COVID-19 accommodations that Defendant criticized introduced no fundamental error into his prosecution. The court wrote that Defendant does not claim that they affected the grand jury’s decision in any way. As for the statutory necessity claim, the district court did not clearly err in deciding that the wiretaps were necessary. The court further explained that a review of the wiretap affidavits themselves shows that they provided more than enough explanation to comply with the law. After describing the investigation’s history and goals, the affidavits comprehensively outlined the “Need for Interception” and discussed “Alternative Investigative Techniques.” They exhaustively detailed why previous sources of information and reasonable alternative methods—including physical surveillance, cameras, interviews, undercover agents, subpoenas, search warrants, trash searches, and more—would not suffice. The court found that such thorough and specific affidavits easily satisfy the legal requirements. View "USA v. James Lamount Graham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the Chief Meteorologist at CBS46, an Atlanta news station. But during his tenure, female colleagues raised repeated complaints that he engaged in inappropriate conduct and sexual harassment—including “compliments” about appearance, sexually charged language, requests for nude photos, and more. Plaintiff, who is white, alleges that he was terminated because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The sexual harassment justification, he says, was just a pretext. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the ultimate question in any discrimination case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on race. Here, Plaintiff failed to show that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant terminated his employment because he was white.   The court explained that Plaintiff notes that the station’s new meteorologist is a Hispanic woman. However, Plaintiff mostly argued that the existence of race data on the corporate form meant that he was fired because he was white. The court explained Plaintiff lacked direct evidence of discrimination, he lacked evidence that Defendant treated his race as a factor favoring his termination, and he lacked evidence that Defendant treated similarly situated non-white employees more favorably. On the other hand, Defendant has produced extensive evidence of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment, which is a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. The court explained that on this record, no reasonable jury could infer that Defendant’s justification was pretext for race discrimination. View "Paul Ossmann v. Meredith Corporation" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in district court to one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2016 to 100 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant completed his custodial sentence and began serving his three-year term of supervised release on May 10, 2018. Less than four months before his supervision was set to expire, his probation office filed a petition alleging that Defendant violated two conditions of his supervised release and asked the district court to issue a warrant for his arrest. The court revoked Defendant’s supervised release and sentenced him to serve an additional 18 months’ imprisonment “to be concurrent with any sentence already served or to be served” that a state court imposed. Defendant appealed.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated. The court explained that it rejected the government’s position that a term of supervised release is tolled while an offender absconds from supervision. Accordingly, Defendant’s supervised release term expired as scheduled in May 2021. Because his 2022 battery and resulting conviction did not occur until after that date, the district court lacked the authority to revoke Defendant’s supervised release on that basis. But because the district court nonetheless maintained jurisdiction to revoke his supervision based on his earlier violation, the court remanded for the court to decide whether to revoke Defendant’s supervision based on that violation alone and to decide what sentence to impose for that violation. View "USA v. James Reginald Talley" on Justia Law

After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal, Petitioner sought state post-conviction relief. As relevant here, he asserted that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the risks of not following through with his plea agreement and by not doing enough to persuade him to testify against his co-defendant. The Alabama courts rejected this ineffectiveness claim, ruling in part that Petitioner could not show prejudice resulting from his attorneys’ conduct. The district court denied Petitioner’s federal habeas corpus petition, concluding that the decision of the Alabama courts was not an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would have refused to testify against a co-Defendant, no matter what more his attorneys did, stands. Based on that finding, their ultimate conclusion that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly deficient performance—which constitutes a ruling on a mixed question of law and fact—is not unreasonable under Section 2254(d)(2). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Alabama courts’ factual finding that Petitioner would not have changed his mind no matter what more his attorneys might have done is entitled to a presumption of correctness. And that presumption has not been overcome by clear and convincing evidence. View "Robert Shawn Ingram v. Warden, Holman Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

In 2006, Petitioner pleaded guilty to murdering his grandmother and stepgrandfather. He was sentenced to death. After exhausting his direct appeals, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court agreed with Alabama and summarily dismissed Petitioner's petition. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.Petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C 2254, which was dismissed on abandonment grounds. As an alternate holding, the district court found that Petitioner's claims were too conclusory to get around AEDPA.The Eleventh Circuit granted a COA on three issues, ultimately rejecting each on the basis that his claim were insufficient to overcome AEPDA deference to state court decisions. View "Ellis Louis Mashburn, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted and convicted of tampering with a witness. Defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense in three respects: (1) the alleged threat of physical force only related to a criminal investigation, not an “official proceeding”; (2) the evidence failed to establish that he intended to prevent his girlfriend from testifying in an official proceeding; and (3) the evidence failed to establish that he was the person who threatened his girlfriend.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it was not persuaded by any of Defendant’s arguments. The court wrote that Defendant’s girlfriend was preparing to testify as a witness in an upcoming grand jury proceedings and possible trial against her crack supplier. The evidence in the record can reasonably support the conclusion that Defendant threatened his girlfriend in relation to those upcoming proceedings and that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to obstruct an official proceeding. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant was the caller who threatened his girlfriend. View "USA v. William Raymond Beach" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. He made three arguments on appeal: (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking a juror for cause because of her religious beliefs, (2) the district court plainly erred by allowing law enforcement officers to identify Defendant in surveillance footage, and (3) his convictions for using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence should be vacated because aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c).   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the attempted Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). The court explained that the Supreme Court distinguished between the completed offense and an attempt to complete that offense. To obtain a conviction for completed Hobbs Act robbery, the government must prove “that the defendant engaged in the ‘unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force.’” By contrast, to obtain a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government need only show that the defendant intended to complete the offense and performed a “substantial step” toward that end. The court wrote Taylor did not disturb the court’s holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, and aiding and abetting a completed Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(3)(A). View "USA v. Tyvonne Wiley" on Justia Law

During a domestic dispute, Plaintiff shot his unarmed twenty-two-year-old son, killing him. He was arrested and prosecuted for murder but was acquitted after a jury trial. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the City of Apopka, Florida and some of its police officers. He asserted a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim that he was arrested without probable cause, a Florida state law claim for false arrest based on the same contention, and a Section 1983 claim that the officers’ search of his home violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff challenged the denial of his motion for a new trial that based on the failure to give a municipal liability jury instruction that he requested. On remand, the district court followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. It determined that there was actual probable cause to support Plaintiff’s arrest and that even in light of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contended, among other things, that he was arrested without probable cause.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Plaintiff’s requested instruction because the issue of custom or practice liability was not, as the court pointed out, properly before the jury. The court explained that the district court, as it was required to do, followed the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate when it determined that the issue of custom or practice municipal liability was not properly before the jury. View "Timothy Davis, Sr. v. City of Apopka" on Justia Law

Defendant, who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues—has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Defendant was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 876(c) and (2) threatening a federal official. For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Defendant now challenged his convictions and sentence on five grounds.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the judge expressly considered two other factors when making his sentencing decision, both of which he cited as bases for an upward departure: (1) Defendant’s history of making threats; and (2) the evidence of racial animus. Further, even if the district judge’s reference to his own religious experience was improper, it didn’t “substantially affect his selection of Defendant’s sentence”—and, therefore, was harmless. View "USA v. Lawrence F. Curtin" on Justia Law

This appeal centers around section 4(a)(1)–(3) of Alabama’s Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection Act (the “Act”). Section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act states that “no person shall engage in or cause” the prescription or administration of puberty-blocking medication or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor “for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor’s perception of his or her gender or sex if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor’s sex.” Shortly after the Act was signed into law, a group of transgender minors, their parents, and other concerned individuals challenged the Act’s constitutionality, claiming that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As part of that lawsuit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Alabama from enforcing section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in issuing this preliminary injunction because it applied the wrong standard of scrutiny. The plaintiffs have not presented any authority that supports the existence of a constitutional right to “treat [one’s] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards.” Nor have they shown that section 4(a)(1)–(3) classifies on the basis of sex or any other protected characteristic. Accordingly, section 4(a)(1)–(3) is subject only to rational basis review. The court explained that the district court erred by reviewing the statute under a heightened standard of scrutiny, its determination that Paintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits cannot stand. View "Paul Eknes-Tucker, et al. v. Governor of the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law