Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the district court erred by conducting de novo review. The state court's denial of petitioner's Brady claim was entitled to deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the state court's denial was neither an unreasonable determination of the facts nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Rimmer v. Secretary, FL Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, employed as a police officer with the city, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights when the city and the mayor arranged for plaintiff's termination based on plaintiff's support of a purported political enemy. The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for defendants and held that plaintiff did not voluntarily leave his employment with the city but rather was effectively terminated. Because a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff's resignation was not a product of his free will, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered an adverse employment action when his employment with the city ended abruptly. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. City of Doral" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff filed with the EEOC a charge of race and disability discrimination against her employer, the school board. In 2009, the Commission dismissed the charge and provided her notice of her right to sue within 90 days, but plaintiff failed to file within that period. Instead, in 2011, plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration with the Commission, which then vacated the dismissal of her first charge. The DOJ then granted plaintiff's request for a new notice of her right to sue about the same allegations of discrimination, and she filed suit within 90 days of the second notice. The district court then dismissed the complaint as untimely. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commission lacked the authority to issue the second notice of the right to sue and thus plaintiff failed to establish she was entitled to equitable tolling. View "Stamper v. Duval County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Miami-Dade County State Attorney under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after she informed plaintiff that his recording of a meeting between him and the Chief of Police violated the Florida Security of Communications Act, Fla. Stat. 934.03, and that the violation was a felony. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment and held that plaintiff did not violate section 934.03 and, consequently, the government's threatened prosecution had no basis in the law. In this case, at no point did the chief, or any participant in the meeting, exhibit any expectation of privacy. Nor was there advance notice or published or displayed rules that established confidentiality and certainly none that prohibited note taking or recordings. Furthermore, the meeting fell within the "uttered at a public meeting" exception of section 934.02, and the circumstances did not justify an expectation of privacy. Because the court resolved the case under state law, it need not reach the constitutional issue of whether the recording was protected by the First Amendment. View "McDonough v. Fernandez-Rundle" on Justia Law

After city officers shot plaintiff, he filed suit alleging claims, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's denial of their second motion to dismiss and instructing them to develop and file their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) report. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order to the extent that it denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and directed plaintiff to amend his complaint again. The court explained that, after plaintiff has filed his second amended complaint, defendants may file another motion to dismiss that includes assertions of immunity from suit. View "Howe v. City of Enterprise" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate her conviction and sentence for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, car jacking in this case. The court held that Johnson v. United States does not apply to or invalidate 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B) and that petitioner's attempted-carjacking conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(B). Alternatively, the court held that petitioner's attempted carjacking categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the force clause of section 924(c)(3)(A). View "Ovalles v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Georgia district attorney and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants conspired to violate his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff, employed as the director of the police department's crime lab, was terminated from his position after the district attorney contacted the police chief to express his concerns that plaintiff had written an expert report for and planned to testify on behalf of the defense in a criminal case. The Eleventh Circuit held that prosecutors were not entitled to absolute immunity for their alleged actions in this case because those actions were not taken in their role as advocates. However, the prosecutors were entitled to qualified immunity because they were acting within the outer perimeter of their discretionary skills in expressing concerns about plaintiff's outside work, and the law was not clearly established at the time. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the prosecutors' motion for judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity and remanded. View "Mikko v. Howard" on Justia Law

Georgia law by its terms does not provide for negligence actions directly against dogs. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against a police canine, Draco, and others after Draco inflicted serious damage to plaintiff when Draco refused to release his bite. The Eleventh Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because no binding precedent clearly established that their actions in allowing Draco to apprehend plaintiff violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights; the County and Chief Ayers in his official capacity have sovereign immunity; and Defendants Fransen, Towler, Ross, and Ayers were entitled to official immunity for the claims against them in their individual capacities View "Jones v. Officer S. Fransen" on Justia Law

Federal tobacco laws do not preempt state tort claims based on the dangerousness of all the cigarettes manufactured by the tobacco companies. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the jury verdicts of negligence and strict liability in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Engle III), and decertified the class to allow individual actions about the remaining issues. In this case, R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris challenged the jury verdict against them in one of the individual actions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed its holding in Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013), and concluded that giving full faith and credit to the Engle jury findings of negligence and strict liability does not deprive R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris of property without due process of law, and that federal law does not preempt the Engle jury findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments against R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris. View "Graham v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied J.W. Ledford, Jr.'s motion for an emergency stay of execution, holding that Ledford's 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint challenging Georgia's method of execution was time-barred. The court further held that, even if the claims were not time-barred, Ledford's allegations and supporting documents did not establish a substantial risk of serious harm, much less a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claims; Ledford has not alleged sufficient facts to render it plausible that a firing squad was a feasible and readily implemented method of execution in Georgia that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain; and, under all the particular facts and circumstances of this case, Ledford failed to show that he has met the equitable requirements for a stay of execution. View "Ledford, Jr. v. Commissioner, GA Department of Corrections" on Justia Law