Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AEA, a public-sector union, and related parties filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Alabama Act No. 2010-761, Ala. Code 17-17-5. Act 761 “prohibit[s] a state or local government employee from arranging by payroll deduction or otherwise the payment of any contribution to an organization that uses any portion of those contributions for political activity.” AEA claims that Act 761 violates the First Amendment rights of AEA and its members because the subjective motivations of the lawmakers in passing the Act was to retaliate against AEA for its political speech on education policy. AEA pursued its claim through subpoenas seeking files of four certain lawmakers. At issue on appeal are the lawmakers' petitions for writs of mandamus and their appeals, all challenging the district court’s refusal to quash AEA’s subpoenas. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeals under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to quash AEA’s subpoenas. The court’s precedent applying United States v. O’Brien recognizes that, when a statute is facially constitutional, a plaintiff cannot bring a free-speech challenge by claiming that the lawmakers who passed it acted with a constitutionally impermissible purpose. The court concluded that the O’Brien rule applies here, which means that AEA has no valid federal claim to justify intruding upon the lawmakers’ legislative privileges. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re: Mike Hubbard" on Justia Law

Appellant Tony Denson, a pro se federal prisoner, appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether Denson’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object to treating Denson’s Florida conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun, in violation of Florida Statute § 790.221(1), as a “crime of violence” for career offender guidelines calculations under U.S.S.G. sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. After review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Denson’s section 2255 motion. On August 3, 2015, the United States Supreme Court entered an order granting Appellant's petition for a writ of certiorari and vacated the Eleventh Circuit's prior decision, issued in 2014, and remanded this case for further decision in light of "Johnson v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)). The Eleventh Circuit Court requested supplemental briefs by the parties addressing the impact, if any, of "Johnson" on this appeal. Having concluded that Johnson has no impact on the issues in this appeal, the Court reinstated its prior decision. View "Denson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, Nivis Martin and her ex-husband participated in a scheme in which the pair lied on a series of mortgage applications relating to property they held in Florida. After a trial by jury, Martin was convicted of multiple counts of bank and wire fraud, sentenced to a prison term of 46 months, and ordered to pay close to $1 million in restitution. On appeal, Martin challenged her convictions, contending that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts because the evidence was insufficient. She also challenged her sentence, arguing that her offense level should have been reduced pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.2 to reflect her minimal or minor role in the offense. Finally, she contended that the trial court erred when it imposed an order of restitution. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed her convictions and sentence, but vacated the restitution award and remand for a new determination of the victims’ losses. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant Jacques Maddox appealed his 78-month sentence, which was imposed after a jury convicted him of aiding and abetting an attempted armed robbery of a Walgreens drug store in 2013. That jury, however, also acquitted Defendant of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in imposing: (1) a five-level enhancement based on his accomplice’s brandishing of a firearm during the attempted robbery; and (2) a two-level enhancement based on injuries inflicted on a victim by this accomplice. After careful review, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant’s sentence. View "United States v. Maddox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, filed suit against CCG and its sheriff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that, upon taking office after winning his election, the sheriff transferred her to a less prestigious position with much less responsibility and authority based on her support of his opponent in the election. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that (1) her First Amendment claim was foreclosed as a matter of law by this court’s precedent, despite the fact that CCG’s civil service system prohibits employment decisions based on political patronage, and (2) her Fourteenth Amendment claim could not proceed to trial because no genuine dispute existed over whether the sheriff’s proffered reasons for her transfer were a pretext for discrimination. View "Ezell v. Darr" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, alleging claims related to a beating by prison staff, for which he was denied medical treatment. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court reversed the district court's judgment because the district court failed to follow the two-step process the court has created for deciding exhaustion challenges, and because in concluding that one of plaintiff's grievances did not exhaust, the district court enforced a procedural bar that the prison may have waived. View "Whatley v. Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting claims for, among other things, unlawful arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law, claiming that he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause based only on his refusal of an officer’s request to provide biographical information for a report. The court held that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the government may not conduct the equivalent of a Terry stop inside a person’s home. However, in this case, because the law on this point was not clearly established in this Circuit, the court affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to the officer, who reached into plaintiff’s home to arrest and handcuff him when, in the course of what the officer described as a Terry stop, plaintiff declined to identify himself in response to the officer's questioning. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's state-law claim for failure to establish a claim. View "Moore v. Pederson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the Special Management Unit (SMU) at Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (GDCP), filed suit alleging claims stemming from injuries he sustained during a prison riot and from the conditions of his confinement at the hospital after the riot. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's failure to protect claim arising out of the prison riot because plaintiff did not adequately allege a substantial risk of serious harm in the period leading up the prison riot. However, the court concluded that plaintiff did adequately plead an Eighth Amendment violation arising out of his three-day hospital stay. Moreover, as to the claim that plaintiff had been confined in conditions lacking in basic sanitation, Deputy Warden Powell is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Deputy was put on fair notice both by the court's caselaw and the knowledge that forcing a prisoner to soil himself over a two-day period while chained in a hospital bed creates an obvious health risk and is an affront to human dignity. The court further concluded that plaintiff cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages because he has not alleged any physical injury resulting from his hospital stay, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e). However, plaintiff can proceed with his claim for nominal damages for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Brooks v. Warden" on Justia Law

The City filed three separate fair housing lawsuits against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Citigroup, alleging that each bank had engaged in a decade-long pattern of discriminatory lending by targeting minorities for predatory loans. Each complaint contained the same two causes of action: one claim arising under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., as well as an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. The district court dismissed the City's FHA claim. The court found that the City has constitutional standing to pursue its FHA claims; under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the “zone of interests” for the FHA extends as broadly as permitted under Article III of the Constitution, and therefore encompasses the City’s claim; while the court agreed with the district court that the FHA contains a proximate cause requirement, the court found that this analysis is based on principles drawn from the law of tort, and that the City has adequately alleged proximate cause; and the court concluded that the “continuing violation doctrine” can apply to the City’s claims, if they are adequately pled. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the City’s federal claims with prejudice and in denying the City’s motion for leave to amend on the grounds of futility because the district court imposed too stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly applied the proximate cause analysis. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state law claim because the benefits the City allegedly conferred on the defendants were not sufficiently direct to plead an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Miami v. CitiGroup Inc." on Justia Law

The City filed three separate fair housing lawsuits against Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Citigroup, alleging that each bank had engaged in a decade-long pattern of discriminatory lending by targeting minorities for predatory loans. Each complaint contained the same two causes of action: one claim arising under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., as well as an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. The district court dismissed the City's FHA claim. The court found that the City has constitutional standing to pursue its FHA claims; under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the “zone of interests” for the FHA extends as broadly as permitted under Article III of the Constitution, and therefore encompasses the City’s claim; while the court agreed with the district court that the FHA contains a proximate cause requirement, the court found that this analysis is based on principles drawn from the law of tort, and that the City has adequately alleged proximate cause; and the court concluded that the “continuing violation doctrine” can apply to the City’s claims, if they are adequately pled. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the City’s federal claims with prejudice and in denying the City’s motion for leave to amend on the grounds of futility because the district court imposed too stringent a zone of interests test and wrongly applied the proximate cause analysis. The court affirmed the dismissal of the state law claim because the benefits the City allegedly conferred on the defendants were not sufficiently direct to plead an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co." on Justia Law