Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, mother of Darius Johnell James, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the county sheriff and ten corrections officers after Darius committed suicide while in the custody of the county jail. The district court ruled that qualified immunity barred suit against three officers, but not against the remaining seven. The seven officers appealed. The court held that, under its precedent, an officer is liable under section 1983 for the suicide of an inmate only if he had subjective knowledge of a serious risk that the inmate would commit suicide and he disregarded that known risk. In this case, the court found no genuine factual dispute that these seven officers did not have subjective knowledge of a serious risk of suicide. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jackson v. West" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging a Florida law that widens the permissible gap between parole interviews as violating, inter alia, the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that he is at a significant risk of increased time in prison as a result of the Florida statute allowing longer intervals between parole interviews. Therefore, the district court properly screened plaintiff’s complaint as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Jones v. FL Parole Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a law enforcement officer, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for injuries she suffered from his alleged use of excessive force during a traffic stop and search of her car. The court concluded that no clearly established law put defendant on notice that his conduct in stopping plaintiff and searching her car violated her constitutional rights. In this case, defendant had probable cause to stop and to search plaintiff’s vehicle; not only did she refuse to let him search it, she struggled with him to keep him from searching it by stopping him from taking her keys to turn off her car; the only force that defendant applied that she complained about was two yanks to get her out of the driver’s seat; he never applied any other force; and he did not even handcuff her. Therefore, defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, and the court reversed the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment. View "Merricks v. Adkisson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful termination action under the Florida Whistleblower Act (FWA), Fla. Stat. 448.102(3). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the action. The court agreed with the district court that the action was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 24. The court joined the Fourth Circuit and other federal circuits, holding that the at-pleasure provision of the NBA preempts plaintiff's claim under the FWA for wrongful discharge under Florida law because the FWA is in direct conflict with the NBA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wiersum v. U.S. Bank" on Justia Law

A cell phone was found during a random search in the Federal Correctional Complex at Coleman Medium Prison in Florida. An examination of the phone’s call history showed that the son of inmate Israel Santiago-Lugo had called that phone the day before it was found. Santiago-Lugo was charged in a prison incident report with having violated the rule against possession of a cell phone. After a hearing he was instead found to have violated the rule against conduct that disrupts or interferes with the orderly running of the institution. As a result, he lost good time credits and suffered other sanctions. Santiago-Lugo filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition claiming that his procedural due process rights had been violated in the disciplinary proceeding. The district court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court alternatively ruled that his due process claim failed on the merits. Santiago-Lugo appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. The Warden conceded that Santiago-Lugo exhausted his administrative remedies, so the district court did have jurisdiction to hear his appeal; however the Court found no violation of due process rights when good time credits and other sanctions were imposed. View "Santiago-Lugo v. Warden" on Justia Law

Robert Preston appealed the district court’s denial of his federal habeas petition. A jury convicted Preston of premeditated murder for the 1978 killing of Earline Walker and recommended that he be sentenced to death. Nearly thirty years later, Preston filed a habeas petition in federal district court, raising twenty-eight claims. The district court denied habeas relief on all of them. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on one claim, which alleged that the state failed to present sufficient evidence of premeditation at trial, and that Preston’s conviction, therefore, violated his due process rights. After thorough review, the Eleventh Circuit found no violation, and affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Preston v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant Cora Cadia Ford owned and managed a tax preparation business. Through that business, she operated a complex fraud scheme over a period of many years, acquiring personal information under false pretenses, often from victims who were homeless or mentally or physically disabled, and then using that information to file false tax returns and pocket the resulting refunds. She appealed her conviction and sentence on ten counts each of mail fraud, making a false claim, and aggravated identity theft. After careful consideration of all of defendant's alleged errors at the trial court level, the Tenth Circuit affirmed her conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Ford" on Justia Law

Dale Peters appealed a final order denying his request for transfer of Writ of Execution proceedings to California and a hearing by granting the government's Application for an Amended Writ of Execution, resulting from a restitution judgment entered against him. Peters was convicted of one count of conspiring to defraud the United States and thirty-one counts of filing false and fictitious claims on the United States in an extensive tax-fraud conspiracy. In early 2013, the district judge entered final judgment against Peters, which included 144 months of imprisonment and restitution of $5,362,039.69. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. Later that year, the government filed an Application for Writ of Execution to levy on real property Peters owned in Sonora, California. His last known address was stated to be an apartment located in San Mateo. A deputy clerk entered a Writ of Execution on Peters' real property. Peters filed a Response to the Amended Application and Amended Writ of Execution, demanding a hearing and transfer of proceedings to the district, where he resided. Peters contended: (1) the property was exempt from levy, and (2) the restitution order was not final, because his criminal appeal was pending. The district judge concluded Peters' real property was not exempt from levy, because his restitution order had not been stayed. He found transfer of the Writ of Execution proceedings was not appropriate and granted the government's Amended Application for Writ of Execution. Peters appealed that final order. The Elevent Circuit reversed, finding the district judge erred in denying Peters' request to transfer his Amended Writ of Execution proceeding to California for a hearing. The final order granting the government's application for an Amended Writ of Execution after Peters' request for transfer was vacated, and the case remanded to the district judge to enter an order transferring Peters' Amended Writ of Execution proceeding to the California district court with jurisdiction for a hearing and decision. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

Donald Creel pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography, and received an enhanced sentence when the district court ruled that he "[d]istribut[ed]" child pornography through a file sharing program on his computer. The issue this case posed for the Eleventh Circuit's review centered on whether the definition of "[d]istribution" of child pornography under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) (Nov. 2013), included an element of mens rea. Because distribution of child pornography did not require an offender to know that he made child pornography accessible to others, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Creel’s sentence. View "United States v. Creel" on Justia Law

The issues presented to the Eleventh Circuit in these consolidated appeals of Donald LaFond, Jr. and Jason Widdison, both convicted for second degree murder, was whether the district court abused its discretion in four rulings: (1) the admission of evidence of the defendants’ memberships in gangs; (2) an order that the jurors be identified anonymously; (3) a refusal to give two requested jury instructions about self-defense; and (4) an order that Widdison’s hands remain shackled during his sentencing hearing. Widdison and LaFond, both of whom were inmates in a federal prison, attacked Kenneth Mills, another inmate, who died a month later from his injuries. The government presented evidence that Widdison and LaFond were members of white supremacist gangs who attacked Mills, a white inmate, because he refused to take any action to have his black cellmate replaced. Widdison and LaFond responded that they acted in self-defense after Mills drew a knife to attack LaFond. A jury convicted Widdison and LaFond of second degree murder. Both Widdison and LaFond raised the issue about the admission of evidence of their gang memberships, and Widdison raised the other three issues. The Eleventh Circuit concluded, after review, that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of the defendants’ memberships in gangs to prove motive or intent, when it ordered that the jurors be identified anonymously to protect their safety, and when it refused to give jury instructions about self-defense that were unsupported by the evidence. The Court also held that the constitutional rule against shackling does not apply to a sentencing hearing before a judge. View "United States v. LaFond" on Justia Law