Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition challenging airport screening procedures two years after the TSA deployed the screening procedures in airports nationwide. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Henderson v. Shinseki and another en banc decision by the Court make clear that the 60-day deadline for filing a petition in the court of appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a) is not "jurisdictional," but is instead a claim-processing rule. In this case, even though petitioner's delay in filing his petition does not defeat the court's jurisdiction, his petition is nevertheless untimely because no reasonable ground excused his delay in filing. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition as untimely and, in the alternative, denied the petition on the merits where the screening procedures require only a reasonable administrative search that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court granted a motion to seal filed by the Administration. View "Corbett v. Transportation Security Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of firefighters whose pension contribution rate was raised from 6% to 8.5%, filed suit alleging that the City's actions impaired the terms of their employment contracts in violation of the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to demonstrate that any contractual right had been impaired. The court concluded that plaintiffs have no basis upon which to challenge a violation of the Contract Clause where, without passing any law, the City, at bottom, was doing nothing different from what a private party does. The City was free to amend the employee contribution rate without constitutional consequence. Even assuming the existence of a contractual provision not to raise the employee contribution rate, plaintiffs still cannot succeed on their Contract Clause challenge because, at most, the City has breached a contract, not impaired one. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Taylor, et al. v. City of Gadsden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that officers used excessive force when his head was slammed against the pavement with extreme force after he had been handcuffed and was lying prone on the ground. The court held that plaintiff stated a valid Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force and that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim. View "Saunders v. Duke, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to three years probation for threatening to shoot President Obama on defendant's Facebook page. Afterwards, defendant spoke to a reporter for his college newspaper, saying that his ordeal was "pretty funny," that he could not be imprisoned in his "own house," and that a lot of good had come out of his case, including his rock band because a "lot of people showed up [to one of his shows] to see the kid who threatened to kill the [P]resident." The district court, upon learning of these comments, modified the conditions of probation to include 45 days in a halfway house and one year of home confinement with electronic monitoring. Defendant appealed. The court concluded that defendant's appeal was moot to the extent that it challenged the district court's modification of the conditions of probation to include a 45-day term in a halfway house; the appeal was not moot with respect to the district court's modification of the conditions of probation to include an additional eight months in home confinement with electronic monitoring; where 18 U.S.C. 3563(c) permits modification when a defendant's post-sentencing conduct shows that the original conditions were not sufficient to accomplish the purposes of probation, the home confinement modification did not violate defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause; the home confinement modification did not violate the Due Process Clause where, assuming there was any error, it did not seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings; and the home confinement modification did not violate the First Amendment where defendant's post-sentencing comments were relevant to the conditions of probation because they indicated that defendant did not grasp the seriousness of his conduct and did not think much of the probationary sentence he had received, and defendant was not punished for any abstract beliefs. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "United States v. Serrapio, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging that the employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, by terminating him based on his diagnoses of alcoholism. The court agreed with the employer that plaintiff was not qualified under DOT regulations to drive a commercial truck because he had a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. Because the court determined that plaintiff was not entitled to drive a commercial truck under the DOT regulations, the court need not address whether the employer's company policy also supported that determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on the ADA claim. In regards to the FMLA claims, the court agreed with the district court's determination that plaintiff's interference claim failed because the employer would have discharged plaintiff regardless of his FMLA leave, and plaintiff's retaliation claim failed because he could not show that the employer's decision to terminate him was causally related to his FMLA leave. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the FMLA claims. View "Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant reduced and ultimately terminated plaintiff's consulting work as a forensic psychologist for the Broward County Public Defender's office in retaliation for plaintiff's constitutionally protected testimony about a Florida state court judge. The court vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to defendant where a reasonable fact-finder could find that defendant was subjectively motivated to reduce and did reduce plaintiff's work because of his testimony and plaintiff's testimony was also a motivating factor behind defendant removing him from the wheel rotation system; affirmed the judgment of the district court granting qualified immunity to defendant in his individual capacity where there was evidence of both lawful and unlawful motivations for defendant's actions and preexisting law did not dictate that the merits of the case must be decided in plaintiff's favor; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brannon, et al. v. Finklestein" on Justia Law

Hillcrest filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging a Right-of-Way Preservation Ordinance. The court concluded that Hillcrest's facial substantive due process claim accrued when the Ordinance was enacted on November 22, 2005, and was time-barred when Hillcrest filed this action more than five years later. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order to the extent that it granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of Hillcrest on its facial substantive due process claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco County" on Justia Law

This appeal involved complaints of a racially hostile work environment at a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, owned by Austal. At issue on appeal was whether an employee may rely on evidence of racial harassment of which he is not personally aware to prove that his work environment was objectively hostile. The court held that an employee alleging a hostile work environment cannot complain about conduct of which he was oblivious for the purpose of proving that his work environment was objectively hostile. In this instance, the court concluded that seven of the employees presented sufficient evidence that their work environments were objectively hostile, and vacated the summary judgment against them. The court affirmed the summary judgment against the remaining six employees and affirmed the two jury verdicts. View "Adams, et al. v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of Southern Nuclear's motion for summary judgment as to his claim of discrimination based on the misuse of information obtained during a required medical evaluation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112(d)(3)(C). The court joined the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in holding that an individual seeking relief under section 12112(d)(3)(C) must demonstrate that he is a qualified individual with a disability. Here, plaintiff admitted at oral argument that he could not demonstrate that he is an individual with a disability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Wetherbee v. Southern Nuclear Operating Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Regions alleging that Regions settled a check presented by them at less than par in violation of Florida Statute 655.85 (Counts I and II). Plaintiffs also claimed that Regions was unjustly enriched when it settled their check at less than par (Counts III and IV). Under section 655.85, a financial institution may not settle any check drawn on it otherwise than at par. The court concluded that, because federal law preempted section 655.85 with respect to national banks, by operation of 12 U.S.C. 1831(a)(j)(1), so too does it preempt section 655.85 with respect to Regions, an out-of-state bank. And because plaintiffs have premised their unjust enrichment claims on the same facts as they lay out in Counts I and II, Counts III and IV are similarly preempted. View "Pereira, et al. v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law