Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, G4S, on his claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e-3(a), and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Count I of the complaint alleged that G4S discriminated against plaintiff based on his national origin and Count III alleged that G4S discriminated against him because of his race. Counts II and IV alleged that G4S terminated plaintiff's employment because he filed a complaint of discrimination with its Human Resources department. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on Counts II and IV but vacated its judgment on Counts I and III. The court remanded for the district court to consider whether Counts I and III presented claims sufficient to withstand summary judgment where the district court should bear in mind that those counts asserted the "status-based" category of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part. View "Barthelus v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that police officers' conduct in entering his house without a warrant and then arresting him for punching an officer infringed his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the district court properly denied the officers qualified immunity for entering plaintiff's residence without a warrant or anything remotely approaching reasonable suspicion. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in denying the officers' motions to dismiss the owner's claim for unlawful arrest where the officers' arrest of plaintiff after he punched the officer could not be considered a violation of his Fourth Amendment right not to be seized without probable cause. View "Morris v. Bower" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners in the City of Sanibel, filed suit against the city challenging a municipal ordinance that prohibits them from building a boat dock or accessory pier on their properties. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their substantive due process claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. created a new "substantial advancement" test for substantive due process claims based on state-created property rights. The district court correctly concluded that the riparian rights asserted by plaintiffs were state-created rights, not fundamental rights. Because plaintiffs challenged the ordinance on its face rather than contesting a specific zoning or permit decision made under the auspices of the ordinance, the court concluded that they were challenging a legislative act. Under the court's existing precedent, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not show that the ordinance lacked a rational basis and the court declined to adopt a new standard of review. Plaintiffs themselves plead at least two rational bases for the ordinance in their Amended Complaint: protection of seagrasses and aesthetic preservation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kentner, et al. v. City of Sanibel" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit contending that a Florida tax on motor and diesel fuel purchased off tribal lands violated the Indian Commerce Clause, the Indian sovereignty doctrine, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from this federal suit. Without a valid abrogation by Congress, Florida was immune from suit regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Further, the Tribe could not circumvent the sovereign immunity of Florida by suing the Director of the Department based on the decision in Ex parte Young where the Department, not the Director, is the real, substantial party in interest in this suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of FL Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

Godfrey Cook, a pretrial detainee, was murdered in the county jail by another pretrial detainee. Plaintiffs, the administrator of Cook's estate and Cook's two adult children, filed suit for money damages under federal and statutory law against defendants. The federal claims against all defendants except the Sheriff have been dismissed. This appeal concerned the district court's denial of the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. The court concluded that it was difficult to conclude that the Sheriff was on notice of a substantial risk of serious harm caused by deficient policies in the Jail and, even if he was on notice, a Jail policy permitting detention officers to move a mental health inmate to a different cell, when trained medical personnel have determined that the inmate does not pose a threat to others, did not violate clearly established law. Assuming that plaintiff adequately established that the Sheriff committed a constitutional violation by failing to train the detention officers at the Jail, plaintiff failed to establish that the Sheriff violated clearly established law. Because it was not clearly established that failing to segregate mental health inmates violated Cook's constitutional rights, the Sheriff's failure to train detention officers did not amount to a constitutional violation. Therefore, the Sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Keith, et al. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, an attorney and her client, filed suit against defendants in their individual capacities, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment based on the warrantless recording of their privileged conversations and the seizure of the written statement, and under 18 U.S.C. 2520(a) for violations of the Federal Wiretap Act based on the warrantless recording. The court concluded that plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy for their privileged attorney-client conversations in the interview room of the St. Johns County Sheriff's Office. The surreptitious recording and monitoring of those attorney-client conversations, without notice to plaintiffs, and without a warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment. Under the circumstances, it was clearly established that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrantless recording of attorney-client conversations between a non-incarcerated suspect and his attorney. The district court correctly held that defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the warrantless seizure of the client's written statement from the attorney violated their Fourth Amendment rights and that the exigent circumstances exception was inapplicable in this instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gennusa, et al. v. Canova, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the district court's order dismissing as moot his lawsuit alleging that two Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the protection he required after he assisted the BOP in the investigation of its own officer in another city. The court concluded that the district court applied the wrong standard for rebutting the government actor's presumption. Applying the correct legal standard to the facts of plaintiff's case, the court concluded that his request for injunctive relief was not moot. The BOP has not met its "formidable" or "heavy" burden of establishing "that it is absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur" or that the challenged conduct has been unambiguously terminated. The BOP has not met its burden to show that plaintiff would not be returned to a high-security BOP facility. Considering all the circumstances of plaintiff's case and applying the proper standard for evaluating voluntary cessation by a government actor, the court concluded that the BOP failed to carry its burden to demonstrate unambiguous termination of the challenged conduct. Accordingly, plaintiff's suit was not moot. The court reversed and remanded. View "Doe v. Stover, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against prison officials after he was assaulted and stabbed by his cellmate. Plaintiff alleged that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of harm that the cellmate posed to plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could infer from the facts that defendants actually knew that plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm from the cellmate where defendants knew that the cellmate had a violent past, was very disruptive, and needed greater management. The cellmate had started a dangerous fire that endangered his life and plaintiff's life, had expressed no regret for doing so, and used plaintiff's personal photographs and papers to start the fire. Defendants also knew that plaintiff feared for his life. Because the record contained sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the subjective element of plaintiff's Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, the district court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on that basis. The law clearly established that defendants' failure to investigate the substantial risk of harm constituted unconstitutional deliberate indifference to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Caldwell, et al. v. FCI Talladega Warden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate at the W.C. Holman Correctional Facility, was assaulted in the "back hallway" with a knife by another inmate who cut plaintiff's throat and nearly killed him. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prison officials, seeking damages for the injuries he received. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's requests for leave to conduct additional discovery where the only evidence plaintiff was unable to obtain related to the purchasing of craft materials and the policies for disposing of used hobby craft blades. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm plaintiff faced at the time of the assault. Although the evidence demonstrated that the warden was on notice that inmate-on-inmate assaults occurred in the back hallway, the evidence of inmate-on-inmate assault involving weapons did not indicate that inmates were exposed to something even approaching the constant threat of violence and Holman's policies for monitoring the back hallway did not create a substantial risk of serious harm. The record failed to demonstrate that any lapse in oversight of cutting instruments created a substantial risk of excessive inmate-on-inmate violence. Even if the conditions at Holman created an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence, defendants were not deliberately indifferent to the risk. View "Harrison v. Culliver, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law