Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The dispute underlying this appeal concerned the constitutionality of a large religious statue located directly outside the courthouse in Dixie County, Florida. The American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. (“ACLU”) brought suit against the County, arguing that such a monument violates the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The County moved for summary judgment on the ground that John Doe, the ACLU member through whom the ACLU claimed standing, could not demonstrate an actual injury that he had suffered as a result of the display. The district court denied the motion. The ACLU later moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found that due to a material conflict in the evidence, an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing was merited. The Court therefore remanded the case so that such a hearing could be conducted. View "American Civil Liberties Union v. Dixie County Florida" on Justia Law

Petitioner Elias Jimenez-Galicia, a native and citizen of El Salvador, sought judicial review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA's order affirmed an immigration judge's ("IJ") order of removal and denial of Petitioner's request for cancellation of removal. The denial was based on a determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Because the Fourth Circuit was not presented with a genuine question of law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary determination that Petitioner lacked good moral character. Therefore the Court dismissed the petition. View "Jimenez-Galicia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit consolidated two criminal cases involving sophisticated financial structuring arrangements between related corporate subsidiaries. Appellants, William Allen Broughton and Richard William Peterson were convicted of conducting a "modern-day financial shell game" in which they falsified financial statements, exchanged paper ownership over non-extant fraudulent assets, and collected insurance premiums and monthly payments from unwitting innocents. Collectively, they stated two bases for reversal: (1) Broughton contended that the Government's purported failure to file charges within the relevant statutes of limitations "demand[ed]" reversal; and (2) both Appellants claimed that the district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of acquittal due to an insufficiency of evidence. Finding no error, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Appellants' convictions. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

When Edith Entrekin was admitted to a nursing home in Alabama, she signed a contract requiring the arbitration of "all claims or disputes" that she or the executor of her future estate might have against the nursing home. After Entrekin died, the executor of her estate brought an action against the nursing home for damages under Alabama's wrongful death statute. The district court denied the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration. The issue on appeal to the Eleventh circuit centered on whether a decedent's agreement with a nursing home to arbitrate any claims that she or her executor may have in the future against the nursing home bind her executor to arbitrate a wrongful death claim against the nursing home under Alabama law? The Court found it was "compelled" to follow the Alabama Supreme Court's holdings and compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim in this case. The Court reversed the district court's order denying the nursing home's motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Entrekin v. Westside Terrace, LLC" on Justia Law

Supreme Fuels Trading FZE filed suit against four defendants including International Oil Trading Company, LLC (IOTC) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and made several common-law and statutory claims under Florida law. IOTC appealed the district court's order that it pay $5 million to Supreme Fuels pursuant to a settlement agreement. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Supreme Fuels argued that the district court's order was not appealable. Upon further review, the Court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. International Oil Trading Co." on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad appealed the District Court's denial of its asserted right to victim status under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and sought restitution. In December 2010, the United States filed a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, charging it with violating provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The government simultaneously filed criminal informations against three subsidiaries of Alcatel-Lucent (Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel Lucent Trade International, and Alcatel Centroamerica) charging them with conspiracy to violate the FCPA's accounting and anti-bribery provisions. In 2011, Alcatel-Lucent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and factual proffer with the United States. The agreement deferred prosecution for three years, subject to Alcatel-Lucent's compliance with specific reforms in its accounting and oversight controls, and required Alcatel-Lucent to pay a penalty of $92 million. The facts proffered in Alcatel-Lucent's deferred prosecution agreement identified Appellant Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE). Alcatel-Lucent admitted that it hired and paid unusually large fees to "consultants," who in turn curried favor with ICE officials and board members to secure telecommunications contracts by offering direct bribes or kickbacks from any contracts awarded by ICE to Alcatel-Lucent or its subsidiaries. After thorough review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. View "United States v. Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad" on Justia Law

In late 2008, Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from her aunt. At that time, both Cassell and her wholly owned company, J&L Arborists, LLC, were insolvent. After consulting with attorneys and accountants, she used her $220,000 inheritance to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity. She began receiving monthly payments, and under the annuity contract she is scheduled to receive those payments for the rest of her life. The contract also guarantees the payments for ten years regardless of when Cassell dies. She designated her children as the beneficiaries of the payments if she dies within the ten-year guarantee period. A year after she had purchased the annuity, Cassell and her company filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. She included the annuity as an asset in her Schedule B disclosures, and listed it as exempt under Georgia law on Schedule C. The trustee objected, contending that Cassell's annuity is nonexempt because it does not meet the requirements of the statute. The bankruptcy court held that Cassell's annuity was an "annuity" within the meaning of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute. The district court affirmed as to the issues that the bankruptcy court had addressed but remanded the case, leaving it for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance whether the annuity payments were reasonably necessary for Cassell's support. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question pertaining to the Georgia exemption to the Georgia Supreme Court. View "Silliman v. Cassell" on Justia Law

In 1982, a jury convicted Defendant Omar Blanco of the first-degree capital murder of John Ryan and armed burglary of the residence where Ryan lived. The court accepted the jury's sentencing recommendation on the murder conviction and sentenced Defendant to death. The court also sentenced him to seventy-five years' imprisonment for the armed burglary conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Blanco's convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. In 1987, Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his convictions and sentences. The District Court denied the writ as to his convictions but granted the writ as to his death sentence on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his case. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The result of the new penalty-phase proceeding was the same: the jury recommended the death penalty and the court imposed it. In this appeal, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a writ of habeas corpus should have been granted to vacate Defendant's death sentence. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida decided that it should not. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and therefore affirmed its judgment. View "Blanco v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant Johnny Shane Kormondy, a Florida death row inmate convicted of murder, appealed a district court decision that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Two state court trial proceedings were before the District Court when it ruled. The first proceeding was the guilt phase of Defendant's bifurcated trial in July 1994. The second proceeding was the penalty phase of his 1999 trial. The District Court denied the writ with respect to both phases of the trial. After briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. View "Kormondy v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

This case represented the third decision the Eleventh Circuit issued within a month concerning the application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the scope of a district court’s authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, the Court held that those amendments did not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) if the defendant’s guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. This appeal raised a different issue because the pro se appellant’s original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result, Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons, section 3582(c)(2) gave the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its discretion. But because the district court in this case believed it lacked that authority, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that order denying the motion for resentencing and remanded for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence. View "United States v. Liberse" on Justia Law