Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Daniel Anthony Smith entered a conditional guilty plea to receiving and attempting to distribute child pornography. Exercising his preserved right to appeal, Defendant sought review of the district court's denial of his motion to suppress inculpatory physical and testimonial evidence. He contended on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, as he did in the district court, that the officers' warrantless and uninvited entry into his house violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence that the officers gathered after that entry should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. "Even assuming that the officers' initial entry into Mr. Smith's home violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression is unwarranted because Mr. Smith's later consent was not tainted by the entry." The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court and Defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute barring the unrestricted carrying of weapons or long guns in eight specific locations (the "Carry Law"). The statutory bar did not apply to a license holder if, on arriving at one of the eight locations, a person notifies security or management of the weapon and explicitly follows the security or management personnel's direction for removing, securing, storing or temporarily surrendering the weapon. Refusal to approach security or management personnel or to comply with management's direction is a misdemeanor. One of the eight locations is a "place of worship." In this case, Plaintiffs Edward Stone and Jonathan Wilkins alleged that they wanted to carry handguns to their respective places of worship. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Carry Law was unconstitutional. The U.S. District court found no merit to Plaintiffs' claims and dismissed their complaints. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the allegations in their amended complaints were sufficient to make the case that the Carry Law's place-of-worship provision was unconstitutional on its face, or as applied to Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations that the Carry Law interfered with their constitutional rights were not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims. View "GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury charged Appellant Hector Almedina with conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States, from January 2011 through February 2011; importation of 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin; and possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. A jury found Appellant guilty on each count and found that each charged offense involved at least 100 grams of heroin. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Appellant to serve concurrent 97-month terms of imprisonment, which Appellant appealed. After reviewing the record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant to 97 months' imprisonment. The Court therefore affirmed his sentence. View "USA v. Hector Almedina" on Justia Law

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Darby Bank & Trust Co., appealed an order of the district court that remanded the underlying case the action to state court. The district court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the FDIC had not been formally substituted as a party in the state court action prior to removal. After review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. The Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the FDIC is "substituted as a party" in a state court proceeding under 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution, and may at that point remove the action to federal court." View "North Savannah Properties, LLC, et al v. FDIC" on Justia Law

In this case, death row inmate Petitioner Carlton Gary was appointed two attorneys to prosecute his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. After the writ was denied, and before his execution was to take place, the same attorneys represented Petitioner at a clemency hearing before the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Clemency was denied, but the Georgia Supreme Court stayed Petitioner's execution to enable him to pursue a motion for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing in the court in which he was convicted and sentenced, the Superior Court for Muscogee County (the "DNA motion"), and depending on the outcome of the DNA motion, an extraordinary motion for a new trial. The Superior Court granted Petitioner's DNA motion. Based upon "newly discovered DNA evidence," Petitioner began preparation for an extraordinary motion for new trial. The attorneys appointed to represent Petitioner in the District Court and at the clemency hearing prosecuted the DNA motion and are preparing, and intend to prosecute, his extraordinary motion for a new trial. In three appeals before the Eleventh Circuit, Petitioner challenged three orders: Appeal No. 09-16198 arose from the District Court's denial of a motion for funds to pay two experts to appear in person at Petitioner's clemency hearing; Appeal No. 11-10705 involved the District Court's partial denial of a voucher submitted by Petitioner's counsel for payment of services rendered in pursuing the extraordinary motion for a new trial; and Appeal No. 11-15396 addressed the District Court’s denial of a motion for funds to pay an expert to assist Petitioner's attorneys in connection with the DNA motion. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 11-10705, and affirmed the district court's decisions in his other two appeals. View "Gary v. Georgia Diagnostic Prison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding. View "Ramirez v. U.S. Dept. of Trans." on Justia Law

The narrow question presented to the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether a Tax Court petition that challenged a notice of deficiency as invalid, "was a proceeding in respect of the deficiency" so as to suspend the limitations period. The IRS selected Petitioner-Appellant Shockley Communications Corporation's (SCC) return for audit. SCC was closely held, and Petitioners-Appellants Terry Shockley, Sandra Shockley and Shockley Holdings, LP were shareholders in SCC. The IRS began the statutory procedures required prior to formal "assessment" of SCC's tax. If a proceeding regarding the taxpayer's deficiency is placed on the Tax Court docket, the IRS must wait to assess until the Tax Court decision becomes final, plus 60 days thereafter. Receipt of the notices was the issue before the Tax Court. After review and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit held that the petition at issue here suspended the running of the statute of limitations, and reversed. View "Shockley v. Commissioner of IRS" on Justia Law

Appellants Charity Benton, Patricia A. Smith, and Gail Zucker appealed the district court's order remanding Appellee Orvel W. Lloyd's civil rights lawsuit to Florida state court. Appellants properly removed the case to the Middle District of Florida. Although the district court recognized Appellants' right to remove the action to federal court, the district court determined that allowing Lloyd to proceed in federal court would contravene the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") which bars "three strikes" prisoner litigants like Lloyd from bringing civil suits in federal court as indigents. After reviewing the district court's order and the parties' briefs, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remand this case for further proceedings. View "Lloyd v. Benton" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Deshawn Glover appealed a district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence based on a retroactive amendment to the sentencing guidelines that lowered base offense levels for certain crack cocaine crimes. He contended that Amendment 759 to the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 2011), abrogates the Eleventh Circuit's holding in "United States v. Mills," (613 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2010)), and gave the district court authority to reduce his sentence as a result of Amendment 750, which revised the crack cocaine quantity tables in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 to conform to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. "[T]he the statutory provision, the Sentencing Commission's corresponding policy statement, and the commentary to that policy statement all make it clear that a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case. It is that simple." Neither of the Amendments changed Defendant's guidelines range. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded Defendant was not entitled to resentencing. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Florida death row inmate Duane Eugene Owen appealed a district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Owen was sentenced to death for two murders in 1984 for which he was separately tried, convicted and sentenced. On appeal, Owen raised multiple issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error or violation of Owen's constitutional rights. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. View "Owen v. Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law