Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Polypore International appeals the Federal Trade Commission's decision finding a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and ordering divestiture. The Commission held that Polypore's February 2008 acquisition of Microporous would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in relevant markets. Polypore and the acquired Microporous Products are producers of battery separators. Polypore internal memos reveal that it had developed an "MP Plan," which was a response to competition from Microporous. The MP Plan sought to secure long-term contracts with customers that Polypore thought were in danger of switching to Microporous. Polypore's 2008 budget projected that it would lose increasing amounts of business to Microporous and would be forced to reduce prices if it did not acquire Microporous. The Commission issued an administrative complaint charged that Polypore's acquisition of Microporous may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly for several types of battery separators, in violation of the Clayton Act. After a four-week hearing, the ALJ issued an extensive opinion holding that the acquisition was reasonably likely to substantially lessen competition in four relevant markets. Upon review, the Eleventh circuit concluded the Commission did not err when it treated the acquisition as a horizontal merger, found that there was a single market for deep-cycle separators, and included Microporous's Austrian plant in its divestiture order. View "Polypore International, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant James Early pled guilty to two counts of robbing a bank by violence with what turned out to be fake bombs. He was ultimately sentenced to a 210-month sentence. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Early" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T) appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of a putative class action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Lacy Baras, a customer of BB&T. Barras alleged in her complaint on behalf of herself and the class she sought to represent that BB&T charged her and others overdraft fees for payments from checking accounts even when the account contained sufficient funds to cover the payments. She also alleged that BB&T supplied inaccurate and misleading information about account balances, and failed to notify customers about changes to BB&T's policies for processing checking account transactions, thereby increasing overdraft charges assessed against customers. Barras asserted claims under the state Unfair Trade Practices Act for unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unconscionability, and sought to certify a class of BB&T account holders who were likewise charged allegedly inflated overdraft fees. BB&T moved to compel arbitration of all of Barras's claims pursuant to a provision in its "Bank Services Agreement" (BSA). The district court denied BB&T's motion, holding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under state law, and could not be enforced. Before the Eleventh Circuit decided BB&T's appeal to that order, the Supreme Court decided "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion" (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of that decision. On remand, BB&T renewed its motion to compel arbitration, and again the district court denied it. BB&T appealed that ruling, arguing that: (1) the question of whether the arbitration provision was enforceable must be resolved by an arbitrator; (2) the cost-and-fee shifting provision in the agreement that the district court held unconscionable did not apply to the arbitration provision; (3) "Concepcion" prohibited application of the state unconscionability doctrine to the arbitration provision; (4) the cost-and-fee shifting provision is not unconscionable; and (5) the cost-and-fee shifting privision was severable from the arbitration process. Taking each argument in turn, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Barras v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Curves, LLC d.b.a. Curves Bar & Grill and James Gann operated an alcohol-selling nightclub in Spalding County, Georgia. Defendant Spalding County’s ordinances prohibit nude dancing where alcohol is sold. Plaintiffs sued, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances and asserting claims for malicious arrest and malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ malicious arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s summary judgment ruling on the merits. In addition, Plaintiffs also question the impartiality of the District Judge and sought retroactive recusal and vacatur of summary judgment. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit declined to reach the constitutionality of the ordinance at question here, and finding no evidence of malice, the Court affirmed District Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants. View "Curves, LLC v. Spalding County, Georgia" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee Dorothy Collier came home from work early one day to find Plaintiff-Appellant Larry Butler alone and naked with her teenaged daughter. He hid in a closed when he heard someone entering the house. As it happened, Defendant worked as a corrections officer for a described "boot camp facility for minors" run by Defendant-Appellee Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office. She wore her uniform and gun belt with pistol. When she entered the room, saw her naked daughter and demanded an explanation, she discovered Plaintiff hiding in the closet. Defendant drew her gun. Plaintiff tried to explain that the daughter invited her to the house, but Defendant insisted he broke in. Defendant handcuffed the still-naked Plaintiff, and forced him to his knees. Defendant allowed Plaintiff to get dressed (at all times, under gunpoint), and eventually Plaintiff was allowed to leave the house. But before he had time to leave Defendant "warned him about the consequences of filing charges or even 'thinking about' reporting the incident." She told Butler that if he reported what had happened, she "would submit a report to discredit him and would engage in some 'creative writing' if necessary to justify the filing of charges against him for trespassing on the property." Despite those threats, Plaintiff eventually reported the incident to law enforcement. Plaintiff filed suit in Florida against Defendant individually and in her official capacity as a corrections officer, and the Palm Beach County Sheriff for violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case was removed from state to federal court. The district court concluded that the allegations in the amended complaint showed no more than Defendant acting as a private individual because nothing she allegedly did to Plaintiff relied on or invoked her authority as a law enforcement officer. For that reason, the court dismissed Plaintiff's 1983 claims. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed: "If the allegations are true, [Defendant's] treatment of [Plaintiff] was badder than old King Kong and meaner than a junkyard dog. She might even have acted like the meanest hunk of woman anybody had ever seen. Still, the fact that the mistreatment was mean does not mean that the mistreatment was under color of law." View "Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach County" on Justia Law

This case arose from a 1999 class action suit against the maker of silicone breast implants. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama approved a mandatory, limited fund class settlement which resolved tens of thousands of claims arising from injuries allegedly caused by defective implants manufactured by Inamed Corporation. In 2006, Zuzanna Juris filed an individual suit in California state court naming Inamed and its successor Allergan, alleging injuries caused by her Inamed implants. Defendants contended that Juris' lawsuit was barred by the 1999 class settlement. Juris countered that she could avoid the settlement's res judicata effect on due process grounds. The district court held that the class settlement precluded Juris from prosecuting the California case. Juris appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the method the Alabama court approved for distributing class notice was constitutionally deficient because she did not receive actual, individual notice. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Juris' assertion that she should have received actual, individual notice rested on a "faulty premise." Even assuming a heightened notice standard applied in this case, the Court concluded that Juris was unable to demonstrate that the notice in the class proceeding was constitutionally deficient. Finding no other error in the district court's holding that the class settlement precluded Juris' California case, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that court's judgment. View "Juris v. Inamed Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Valinda Kornhauser filed suit to challenge the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security that denied her claim for disability benefits. The District Court referred the case to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation ("R&R"). After receiving and considering memoranda on the matter, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that the District Court vacate the Commissioner's decision and remand the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge, in addition to explaining why Plaintiff was entitled to a vacatur, observed that the memorandum her attorney had submitted failed to comply with Middle District of Florida Local Rule 1.05(a). The non-compliance, according to the Magistrate Judge, consisted of "smaller margins than authorized" by the rule and "footnotes . . . smaller than ten-point type." In a footnote to this observation, he stated: "These intentional violations would justify striking the memorandum. However, this sanction would unfairly punish the plaintiff. Consequently, I propose that, when plaintiff's counsel seeks attorney's fees, that the typical request for a cost-of-living increase be denied." Following the entry of judgment, Plaintiff petitioned the District Court for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). The parties stipulated to the amount of attorney fees, but after its consideration of the petition, the Magistrate Judge issue an R&R recommending that the district court award a lower amount in fees as have been stipulated because of Plaintiff's brief being submitted with small margins and unacceptable font sizing. Plaintiff's attorney filed an objection to the R&R, asking the district court not to adopt it because she did not intend to violate the local rule. Finding that the sanction was a reasonable exercise of the Magistrate Judge's disciplinary authority, the district court adopted the R&R with the sanction. Plaintiff appealed the imposition of the sanction. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sanction, finding "no procedural rule that sanctions the conduct involved" in this case. View "Kornhauser v. Comm'r of Social Security" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant Robert Daniels, a/k/a "Twin T" appealed his convictions and sentences for using a facility and means of interstate commerce to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any individual who had not attained the age of eighteen, to engage in prostitution and any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); knowingly transporting an individual in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution and any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2421-22. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent 78-month terms to be served consecutively to a prior sentence imposed by the Eastern District of Michigan. On appeal, Defendant raised six issues. The primary issue was one of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit: whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) requires the government to prove that the defendant knew that the victim was a minor. Upon review, the Court declined to find knowledge a requirement under 2422(b). The Court concluded that this statute was written for the protection of minors caught in the web of these illicit activities, rather than for offenders choosing to turn a blind eye to the age of the victims they transport. The Court found no merit in the other five issues Defendant raised and affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Daniel" on Justia Law

Defendant Geoffrey West appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was sentenced to death. He raised three issues on appeal, all pertaining to his claim he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the "lack of showing of prejudice" as grounds for its affirming the district court's decision to grant relief: "even if we suppose that [Defendant could] overcome the various technical and procedural hurdles to having the merits of his claims considered by federal courts and even if we suppose that his trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable way, Petitioner has entirely failed to show . . .how [he] prejudiced by his counsel's supposed inadequate performance." View "West v. Comm'r Alabama Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant John Furry, as personal representative of the estate of his daughter Tatiana Furry, appealed a district court’s order granting the Miccosukee Tribe’s motion to dismiss his complaint. He complained that the Miccosukee Tribe violated 18 U.S.C. 1161 and Florida’s dram shop law by knowingly serving excessive amounts of alcohol to his daughter, who then got in her car, drove off while intoxicated, and ended up in a fatal head-on collision with another vehicle on a highway just outside Miami. The Miccosukee Tribe moved to dismiss the complaint on the jurisdictional ground that it was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In its order granting the tribe's motion to dismiss, the district court determined that tribal sovereign immunity barred it from entertaining the suit. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit agreed: "The Supreme Court has made clear that a suit against an Indian tribe is barred unless the tribe has clearly waived its immunity or Congress has expressly and unequivocally abrogated that immunity. [Plaintiff argued] that both of these exceptions have been met here, but these arguments are ultimately without merit." View "Furry v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida" on Justia Law