Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Defendant Ralph Merrill sold millions of rounds of ammunition to the United States Army, he concealed that the ammunition was manufactured by a Communist Chinese military company because his contract with the Army prohibited the delivery of that kind of ammunition. Defendant had the ammunition repackaged which made it unsafe for later use. Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to commit false statements, major fraud, and wire fraud against the United States and for major fraud and wire fraud. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court misinterpreted the regulation that prohibited the Department of Defense from acquiring munitions manufactured by a Communist Chinese military company, that the regulation did not apply to the ammunition he sold, and that he did not defraud the government because he did not misrepresent a material fact when he lied about the origin of the ammunition. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded Defendant's arguments failed because his interpretation of the applicable statutes was flawed and, "more fundamentally, is irrelevant to his misconduct." Because all of Defendant's arguments failed, the Court affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Merrill" on Justia Law

This case arose from a foreign shipping contract billing dispute between Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (CONECEL) and Jet Air Service Equador S.A. (JASE). CONECEL filed an application in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. 1782 to obtain discovery for use in foreign proceedings in Ecuador. According to CONECEL, the foreign proceedings included both a pending arbitration brought by JASE against CONECEL for nonpayment under the contract, and contemplated civil and private criminal suits CONECEL might bring against two of its former employees who, CONECEL claims, may have violated Ecuador's collusion laws in connection with processing and approving JASE's allegedly inflated invoices. CONECEL's application sought discovery from JASE's United States counterpart, JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc. (JAS USA), which does business in Miami and was involved in the invoicing operations at issue in the dispute. The district court granted the application and authorized CONECEL to issue a subpoena. Thereafter, JASE intervened and moved to quash the subpoena and vacate the order granting the application. The district court denied the motion, as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration. JASE appealed the denial of both. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the orders of the district court. the Court concluded that the panel before which which JASE and CONECEL's dispute was pending acts as a first-instance decisionmaker; it permits the gathering and submission of evidence; it resolves the dispute; it issues a binding order; and its order is subject to judicial review. The discovery statute requires nothing more. The Court also held that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in granting the section 1782 discovery application over JASE's objections that it would be forced to produce proprietary and confidential information. The application was narrowly tailored and primarily requested information concerning JASE's billing of CONECEL, which was undeniably at issue in the current dispute between the parties." Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying JASE's motion for reconsideration. View "In re: Application of Consorcio Ecuatoriano" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty, Defendant-Appellant Silvano Jimenez-Cardenas appealed his 57-month sentence for illegal reentry, and possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Defendant challenged the district court's refusal to group his illegal reentry and firearm convictions when calculating his sentence per the sentencing guidelines. After review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court properly refused to group the convictions, and affirmed Defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Jimenez-Cardena" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a federal officer with limited authority who repeatedly usurped the power to patrol traffic, violated the civil rights of motorists, abused the public trust, and lied about it in official reports. Defendant, a former officer of the Federal Protective Service, appealed his convictions and sentences for eight counts of willfully depriving a person of the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by a law enforcement officer and four counts of making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Defendant raised seven issues on appeal. The court affirmed four of defendant's eight convictions for willful unreasonable seizures and affirmed his four convictions for making false statements. The court vacated the remaining convictions for willful unreasonable seizures. View "United States v. House" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. At issue was whether the Supreme Court of Florida unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, when it determined that defendant's attorney at his second penalty phase hearing made a reasonable strategic decision to present the expert testimony of a mental health expert who provided some damaging testimony during the first penalty phase. The court concluded that capital defense lawyers did not render deficient performance as a matter of law when they presented evidence of a defendant's antisocial personality disorder; the Supreme Court of Florida reasonably concluded that counsel satisfied the deferential standard of Strickland when they called the expert to testify again; and in light of defendant's statements that he did not want further testing, there were reasonable arguments that counsel satisfied the deferential standard of Strickland when they did not pursue different mental health theories at the resentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Morton v. Secretary, FL. Dept. of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a prisoner on Florida's death row, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging his capital murder conviction. At issue was whether the Florida Supreme Court's decision denying petitioner's claim that the trial court erred when refusing to instruct the jury about other consecutive sentences was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina. Petitioner based his claim on the trial court's refusal to inform the advisory jury of his multiple terms of incarceration that he would have to serve before becoming eligible for parole. The court held that petitioner could not prevail on his claim for relief because none of the Supreme Court precedent upon which he relied illustrated that the Florida Supreme Court rendered a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application, of clearly established law under section 2254(d). View "Booker v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted of murdering his neighbor and attempting to murder six of her family members by adding the toxic element thallium to bottles of Coca-Cola in the victims' homes. On appeal, petitioner alleged that certain parts of a special agent's testimony were false and petitioner was thus entitled to a new trial under Giglio v. United States. The court held that, assuming that the false testimony violated Giglio, the error was harmless under the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson. Accordingly, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief. View "Trepal v. Secretary, FL Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Alabama prison inmate awaiting execution for a capital murder, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant's principal claims were that in requiring him to stand trial jointly with a co-defendant, the Alabama courts denied him due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and an individualized sentencing proceeding, as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. Defendant also argued that the prosecutor commented on his post-Miranda silence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found no error in the district court's denial of the writ and affirmed the judgment. View "Hardy v. Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions on one count of receipt of child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography. The court rejected defendant's argument that his statements during two interviews should have been suppressed because the waiver form was "confusing, misleading and constitutionally deficient" where the language of the waiver forms reasonably, clearly, and accurately conveyed defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and the waiver forms' qualifications of defendant's entitlement to a civilian lawyer did not invalidate the otherwise adequate statements of defendant's rights. The court also rejected defendant's claim that the district court abused its discretion by admitting defendant's statements at trial without first requiring the government to introduce evidence that defendant provided the statements voluntarily. Further, the child pornography statutes at issue were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; the indictment was not multiplicitous; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain testimony at issue over defendant's counsel's objections; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence under rules 414 and 403 and by denying defendant's motion for mistrial; and defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's dismissal of their amended complaint against Florida government defendants, SBHD, AHCA, and DCF. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' billing practice violated both 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(25)(C), the "balance billing" provision of the federal Medicaid Act, and a similar Florida statute. The court concluded that section 1396a(a)(25)(C) did not confer upon plaintiffs a federal right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and therefore, affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the amended complaint. View "Martes, et al. v. CEO of South Broward Hospital Dist., et al." on Justia Law