Justia U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, against a hospital-based radiology provider and its debt collection agent for making autodialed or prerecorded calls. The collection bureau, Gulf Coast, contended that the calls fell within a statutory exception for "prior express consent," as interpreted in a 2008 declaratory ruling from the FCC. The district court concluded that the FCC's interpretation was inconsistent with the language of the TCPA and, regardless of the 2008 FCC Ruling, did not apply on the facts of this case. The court concluded, however, that the district court lacked the power to consider the validity of the 2008 FCC Ruling and erred in concluding that the FCC's interpretation did not control the disposition of the case. In these circumstances, plaintiff's claim falls squarely within the FCC order. Consequently, the TCPA exception for prior express consent entitled Gulf Coast to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded with instructions. View "Mais v. Gulf Coast Collection Bureau" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her minor child, filed suit alleging that Wells Fargo violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991's (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), prohibition on autodialing cell phones without the express consent of the called party. Wells Fargo had called the cell phone number used by the child to collect a debt from a former customer who had listed the phone number on a Wells Fargo account application. Wells Fargo was unaware that the cell phone number was no longer assigned to the former customer and the former customer never revoked his consent or requested that Wells Fargo cease calling the number. The court concluded that "called party," for purposes of section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) means the subscriber to the cell phone service or user of the cell phone called. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in plaintiff's favor. View "Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against McCalla and Kondaur, claiming that they violated the automatic stay in plaintiff Kenneth Lodge's bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. 362, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. Because plaintiffs failed to show an emotional injury sufficient to support a recovery of actual damages under section 362(k), the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment as to the automatic stay claim. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the FDCPA claim where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that defendants were "debt collectors" because the district court was not required to take judicial notice of defendants' websites and the district court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider a document that listed foreclosure advertisements for properties unrelated to plaintiffs' properties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lodge, et al. v. Kondaur Capital Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227, which provides a damages remedy for cellular-phone subscribers who received autodialed phone calls without having given prior express consent to receive such calls. State Farm, in turn, sued Clara Betancourt, plaintiff's housemate who had listed plaintiff's number as an emergency contact number, for the balance due on Betancourt's delinquient credit-card account and for its legal expenses in defending itself against plaintiff's TCPA lawsuit. Determining that it had jurisdiction, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm on plaintiff's TCPA claim and reversed the grant of summary judgment to State Farm on its negligent misrepresentation claim against Betancourt because there were various genuine disputes of material fact regarding both complaints. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B." on Justia Law

The FTC filed suit against defendants, alleging that they violated the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a), and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (the Telemarketing Act), 15 U.S.C. 6102, by deceiving consumers in the sale of trade-association memberships. According to the FTC, consumers were led to believe that they were purchasing major medical insurance, but what they actually received were memberships in a trade association that offered only limited discounts for certain medical care. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against IAB, the individual Wood defendants, and IAB-affiliated entities. The court affirmed, concluding that the FTC met its burden of proof for injunctive relief by demonstrating that it was likely to succeed on the merits and that an injunction would serve the public interest; the district court did not abuse its discretion in freezing defendants' assets; and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012, does not preempt the FTC's claims. View "Federal Trade Commission v. IAB Marketing Assoc., LP, et al." on Justia Law

After appellants failed to pay their medical debts, Urology and UAB West referred the accounts to Franklin Collection Service and added to appellants' accounts a charge for collection fees. The court held that Franklin violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692-1692p, when it collected from appellants a debt that included a 33-and-1/3% "collection fee" when appellants only agreed to pay the actual costs of collection. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin on appellants claims under section 1692f of the FDCPA. The court affirmed the remaining federal and state law claims. View "Bradley, et al. v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against debt management businesses and individual employees of those businesses on behalf of herself and a statewide class of about 10,000 consumers. The parties agreed to allow a magistrate judge to enter a final judgment in the class action. The parties then reached a settlement agreement. Five class members and the Attorneys General of Connecticut, Florida, Maine, New York, and West Virginia objected to the settlement agreement. The court concluded that the magistrate judge had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a final judgment because absent class members were not parties whose consent was required for a magistrate judge to enter a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 636(c). However, the court vacated the judgment because the magistrate judge abused his discretion when he found, without adequate evidentiary support, that defendants could not satisfy a significant judgment. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Day v. Persels & Assoc., LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Chase under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1641(g), alleging that Chase did not comply with disclosure requirements when it did not inform them that it had been assigned an interest in their mortgage. The court concluded that the assignment was an "administrative convenience" within the meaning of section 1641(f) because the assignment allowed Chase to perform foreclosure, a requirement of servicing the loan. Accordingly, Chase was not subject to the disclosure requirements and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Chase. View "Reed, Jr., et al. v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved arbitration proceedings stemming from plaintiff's class action suit alleging, among other things, that SouthernLINC's termination fees were unlawful penalties under Georgia law. SouthernLINC, a wireless provider, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to vacate two arbitration awards. Under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers under section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., either in construing the arbitration clause as he did or in certifying a class. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Southern Communications Serv. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The FTC sued Randall Leshin and his co-appellants based on deceptive marketing practices and other violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq., committed by Leshin's debt-consolidation business. At issue on appeal was whether a district court could convert the unpaid remainder of an equitable disgorgement remedy, stemming from a compensatory civil contempt sanction, into the legal remedy of a money judgment after the contemnor has disgorged as much money as he currently has the ability to pay. The court concluded that the district court acted within the bounds of its broad discretion in this case and affirmed the judgment. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Leshin, et al." on Justia Law